Search Results

Possible Causes of Rising Income Inequality

Matthew P. Drennan

in Income Inequality: Why It Matters and Why Most Economists Didn't Notice

Why has income inequality risen so much? Economic causes and demographic causes are less important than institutional and political causes. Key economic causes are globalization, skill-biased ... More

Why has income inequality risen so much? Economic causes and demographic causes are less important than institutional and political causes. Key economic causes are globalization, skill-biased technological change, and job polarization. All the rich countries are subject to those economic trends, but the United States has experienced the sharpest rise of inequality. Demograhic factors, such as highly educated men marrying highly educated women, contribute to rising income inequality, but such forces only account for 15 percent of the observed rise. Institutional factors—the drastic decline in the power of labor unions—and political factors are the most important forces raising income inequality.Less

The Lobbyists *: Need For Legislation

A.G. Noorani

in CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND CITIZENS' RIGHTS: An Omnibus Comprising Constitutional Questions in India and Citizens' Rights, Judges and State Accountability

This chapter discusses the need to regulate lobbying in India. It discusses the case of the United States, where senators and Congressmen hold themselves out as guns for hire to both domestic ... More

This chapter discusses the need to regulate lobbying in India. It discusses the case of the United States, where senators and Congressmen hold themselves out as guns for hire to both domestic interests and foreign governments, in order to cope with the increasing expense of election campaigns. The chapter suggests that before the situation in India deteriorates and acquires American proportions, why not borrow a leaf from that country and trim it to suit India's needs? It describes laws such as the Regulation of Lobbying Act, 1946, which has provided for registration of lobbyists but was confined to lobbying in respect of legislation; and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, 1995 which covers the making and administration of policy, contract or loan, as well as legislation.Less

Between Democracy and Plutocracy

Mugambi Jouet

in Exceptional America: What Divides Americans from the World and from Each Other

Wealth inequality is much sharper in America than all other industrialized countries. The income of the richest 1% Americans has soared while the income of ordinary people either decreased or ... More

Wealth inequality is much sharper in America than all other industrialized countries. The income of the richest 1% Americans has soared while the income of ordinary people either decreased or stagnated in recent decades. However, America used to be a rather middle-class society. It was not before the 1980s that the G.O.P.’s far-right branch grew more influential in challenging the oppression of “big government.” New Deal era policies were gradually abandoned and wealth inequality soared. Ronald Reagan claimed that “fascism was really the basis for the New Deal,” and his heirs followed suit in denouncing the federal government’s “tyranny.” Overall, the center of the U.S. political debate on economic issues is drastically more to the right than in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The Democratic Party is far less devoted to the interests of the poor, the working-class, and the middle-class than other left-wing parties in the West. The G.O.P. tends to cater only to the richest of the rich, unlike virtually no other major conservative party in the modern Western world.Less

The Influence of Permit-Price Uncertainty and Lobbying on Energy Investments

Philipp Hieronymi and David Schüller

in Emissions Trading as a Policy Instrument: Evaluation and Prospects

In this model an investor can choose between replacing a pre-determined generation capacity by investing into wind or gas power. He also has the option to lobby in order to increase the profitability ... More

In this model an investor can choose between replacing a pre-determined generation capacity by investing into wind or gas power. He also has the option to lobby in order to increase the profitability of either energy type. If he chooses gas power, he has to obtain emission permits. The price of emissions develops according to a geometric Brownian Motion. We find that current permit prices are insufficient to induce renewable investment and wind power lobbying must be very effective in order to induce investment in this power type. The benefit of lobbying for gas power seems to low due to the low permit price. In a United States like situation with no permit market, no effective renewable support scheme, and very strong gas lobbying efforts, we find that close to no renewable capacity will be installed. Depending on the scenario, the social cost of subsidizing wind energy can be large.Less

Pressures for Government Action

Price Fishback, Jonathan Rose, and Kenneth Snowden

in Well Worth Saving: How the New Deal Safeguarded Home Ownership

The HOLC was passed during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration, and like other New Deal programs was directed at a pressing problem with a clear constituency in mind. Given the ... More

The HOLC was passed during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration, and like other New Deal programs was directed at a pressing problem with a clear constituency in mind. Given the foreclosure crisis described in the previous chapter, by early 1933 a variety of interest groups were putting great pressure on the federal government to pass a program to prevent foreclosures and stabilize the residential real estate market. Homeowners, lenders, and real estate builders all lobbied for action. The HOLC paralleled similar legislation for the farm mortgage sector, and followed less successful efforts to address the crisis, including state-level moratoria legislation, and the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank system.Less

Is the Political Class Corrupt?

Ron Formisano

in American Oligarchy: The Permanent Political Class

Is the political class corrupt or decent and just “well dressed”? Among the public, the perception of corruption persists.

Institutions, Finance, Trade

Wim Klooster and Gert Oostindie

in Realm between Empires: The Second Dutch Atlantic, 1680-1815

For governance, investment, and the shipment and sale of Atlantic goods the overseas Dutch depended on the United Provinces. The West India Company, which maintained its slave trade monopoly until ... More

For governance, investment, and the shipment and sale of Atlantic goods the overseas Dutch depended on the United Provinces. The West India Company, which maintained its slave trade monopoly until the 1730s, provided the umbrella for most activities in the Dutch Atlantic world, although Suriname and Berbice were ruled by separate entities in which the WIC was only a partner. In mid-century, the Dutch Guiana colonies offered Dutch investors attractive opportunities, which led to the transfer of tremendous amounts of credit. An artificial boom followed, which failed to produce high profits and ended in a credit crisis which would thwart the further plantation growth of Suriname. Cash crops from Suriname and the other New World colonies were carried in massive quantities to the Dutch Republic, while the Dutch slave trade not only provisioned the Dutch colonies, but also those of other empires.Less

Getting to grips with lobbying: regulated office-holders, unregulated lobbies

David Hine and Gillian Peele

in The regulation of standards in British public life: Doing the right thing?

This chapter deals with lobbying. In the United Kingdom, most regulation of lobbying activities has focussed on regulating those being lobbied, rather than the lobbyists themselves. However, the ... More

This chapter deals with lobbying. In the United Kingdom, most regulation of lobbying activities has focussed on regulating those being lobbied, rather than the lobbyists themselves. However, the increase in lobbying has created together created powerful pressure to regulate lobbyists directly and the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 has started the process of requiring some lobbyists to register. The chapter also examines the role of All-Party parliamentary groups(APGs) and their vulnerability to lobbying activity.Less

Integrity issues and devolution

David Hine and Gillian Peele

in The regulation of standards in British public life: Doing the right thing?

This chapter explores the different arrangements for ethical regulation in the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Initially, these arrangements were provided for in the ... More

This chapter explores the different arrangements for ethical regulation in the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Initially, these arrangements were provided for in the devolution legislation but over time the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies have developed and refined their own machinery in the light of experience. Although the three different jurisdictions differ in their approach to the regulation of standards, all have been giving increasing attention to the problem of ethical issues. In Scotland an early lobbying scandal (“lobbygate”) swiftly led to the establishment of a Code of Conduct and stronger regulatory machinery. Recent initiatives have produced a new approach to regulating lobbyists. Wales has also refined its standards machinery since devolution was introduced. Northern Ireland continues to lag behind the other two areas, although has learned from experience in Scotland and is catching up with improvements to its integrity arrangeemnts. The chapter analyses the distinctive features of the three systems and identifies continuing differences both from each other and the rest of the UK.Less

Working with local government

Nick Gallent and Steve Robinson

in Neighbourhood planning: Communities, networks and governance

This chapter examines the lobbying relationship that parish councils enter into with local government officers and considers how much local authorities might learn about the longer-term aspirations ... More

This chapter examines the lobbying relationship that parish councils enter into with local government officers and considers how much local authorities might learn about the longer-term aspirations of communities though this relationship. It is argued that this relationship is often characterised as ‘report-react’, with authorities using communities as a sounding board for consultation. The degree of genuine partnership generated is limitedLess

Lobbying and policy capture

David Miller, Claire Harkins, Matthias Schlögl, and Brendan Montague

in Impact of Market Forces on Addictive Substances and Behaviours: The web of influence of addictive industries

This chapter examines how policy is captured and aims to show how the capture of the other domains examined in this book relate to the ultimate prize of policy capture. Notable, however, policy can ... More

This chapter examines how policy is captured and aims to show how the capture of the other domains examined in this book relate to the ultimate prize of policy capture. Notable, however, policy can be captured variety of ways. The chapter considers two dimensions of policy capture—upstream and downstream. ‘Downstream’ refers to attempts to influence particular policy measures that might directly affect the industry concerned. ‘Upstream’ refers to influencing the agreed procedures by which decisions on particular matters will be taken in years to come. After that we turn to a relatively recent innovation in policy making that challenges the very categories adopted in policy studies. Partnership governance breaches the seemingly clear conceptual split between interest groups and government. We examine some key UK and EU examples in the addictions field, asking about the implications for public health and corporate power.Less

Lobbying Insiders and Lobbying Outsiders

Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

in Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

Chapter 2 puts forward the theoretical framework that guides the book's analysis of lobbying in multilevel Europe. The key argument is that business and non-business groups differ in the severity of ... More

Chapter 2 puts forward the theoretical framework that guides the book's analysis of lobbying in multilevel Europe. The key argument is that business and non-business groups differ in the severity of collective action problems and the resources they possess relatively abundantly. The expectation that follows from this argument is that different types of interest groups follow distinct logics of lobbying. Business groups, especially those that possess ample material resources, are more likely to follow an insider logic of lobbying, whereas non-business groups are more likely to pursue an outsider logic. The chapter briefly sets out a few expectations that derive from this argument for interest group strategies, access to decision-makers, and influence on policy outcomes.Less

Studying Lobbying in Multilevel Europe

Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

in Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

This chapter explains the methodological approach taken to study interest group lobbying in multilevel Europe. It presents two surveys. The first relied on samples of all interest groups that exist ... More

This chapter explains the methodological approach taken to study interest group lobbying in multilevel Europe. It presents two surveys. The first relied on samples of all interest groups that exist in a series of European countries. The second surveyed groups that were active on at least one of three campaigns that attracted much lobbying in Europe in the period between 2009 and 2013. The chapter stresses the advantages of combining these two approaches in a study of lobbying. It also contains information, such as on response rates, that is essential to assess the plausibility of the findings presented in later chapters.Less

A Map of Interest Group Activity in Europe

Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

in Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

The fourth chapter provides a map of interest group activity in multilevel Europe. It draws on data from two surveys to discuss key characteristics of the interest groups that lobby in the European ... More

The fourth chapter provides a map of interest group activity in multilevel Europe. It draws on data from two surveys to discuss key characteristics of the interest groups that lobby in the European multilevel system and to give a descriptive overview of lobbying behaviour. Among the findings that emerge is that on average, interest groups in Europe are small and resource-poor organizations. They also tend to be quite specialized in terms of policy areas that they are interested in, but not particularly picky in their choice of lobbying tactics. This descriptive analysis of the data offers initial empirical support for some assumptions underlying the argument about lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders and for some steps in the causal reasoning presented in this book.Less

Strategies I: Gaining Access or Going Public

Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

in Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

Interest groups use a large variety of tactics to influence public policy, but some focus more on inside lobbying and others more on outside lobbying. This chapter explains this variation in lobbying ... More

Interest groups use a large variety of tactics to influence public policy, but some focus more on inside lobbying and others more on outside lobbying. This chapter explains this variation in lobbying strategies across interest groups. It shows that business associations are more likely to engage in inside lobbying and citizen groups and labour unions are more likely to go public, with professional associations taking an intermediary position. The effect of group type, however, is conditional on groups' endowment with material resources and the issue context: the differences are largest for resource-rich groups and groups lobbying on distributive issues. Most of these findings hold for lobbying on both national and European Union legislation.Less

Europeanization: Business Associations as Multilevel Players

Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo

in Insiders versus Outsiders: Interest Group Politics in Multilevel Europe

In multilevel Europe, interest groups not only face a choice between more or less inside and outside lobbying. They also need to decide how much of their lobbying they should focus on national ... More

In multilevel Europe, interest groups not only face a choice between more or less inside and outside lobbying. They also need to decide how much of their lobbying they should focus on national politics and how much on European Union (EU) politics. The more an interest group focuses on EU legislation relative to national legislation, and the more lobbying it carries out at the EU level relative to the national level, the more Europeanized it is. Chapter~8 shows that lobbying insiders, namely resource-rich business associations, are more Europeanized than other groups. Moreover, groups active in policy areas in which the EU has strong competences are more Europeanized than other groups.Less