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The Violence of Inequality: Race and Lobbying in the Politics of Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States

Sappho Xenakis and Leonidas K. Cheliotis

in Tracing the Relationship between Inequality, Crime and Punishment: Space, Time and Politics

There is no shortage of scholarly and other research on the reciprocal relationship that inequality bears to crime, victimisation and contact with the criminal justice system, both in the specific ... More

There is no shortage of scholarly and other research on the reciprocal relationship that inequality bears to crime, victimisation and contact with the criminal justice system, both in the specific United States context and beyond. Often, however, inequality has been studied in conjunction with only one of the three phenomena at issue, despite the intersections that arguably obtain between them–and, indeed, between their respective connections with inequality itself. There are, moreover, forms of inequality that have received far less attention in pertinent research than their prevalence and broader significance would appear to merit. The purpose of this chapter is dual: first, to identify ways in which inequality’s linkages to crime, victimisation and criminal justice may relate to one another; and second, to highlight the need for a greater focus than has been placed heretofore on the role of institutionalised inequality of access to the political process, particularly as this works to bias criminal justice policy-making towards the preferences of financially motivated state lobbying groups at the expense of disadvantaged racial minorities. In so doing, the chapter singles out for analysis the US case and, more specifically, engages with key extant explanations of the staggering rise in the use of imprisonment in the country since the 1970s.Less

Possible Causes of Rising Income Inequality

Matthew P. Drennan

in Income Inequality: Why It Matters and Why Most Economists Didn't Notice

Why has income inequality risen so much? Economic causes and demographic causes are less important than institutional and political causes. Key economic causes are globalization, skill-biased ... More

Why has income inequality risen so much? Economic causes and demographic causes are less important than institutional and political causes. Key economic causes are globalization, skill-biased technological change, and job polarization. All the rich countries are subject to those economic trends, but the United States has experienced the sharpest rise of inequality. Demograhic factors, such as highly educated men marrying highly educated women, contribute to rising income inequality, but such forces only account for 15 percent of the observed rise. Institutional factors—the drastic decline in the power of labor unions—and political factors are the most important forces raising income inequality.Less

The Lobbyists *: Need For Legislation

A.G. Noorani

in CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND CITIZENS' RIGHTS: An Omnibus Comprising Constitutional Questions in India and Citizens' Rights, Judges and State Accountability

This chapter discusses the need to regulate lobbying in India. It discusses the case of the United States, where senators and Congressmen hold themselves out as guns for hire to both domestic ... More

This chapter discusses the need to regulate lobbying in India. It discusses the case of the United States, where senators and Congressmen hold themselves out as guns for hire to both domestic interests and foreign governments, in order to cope with the increasing expense of election campaigns. The chapter suggests that before the situation in India deteriorates and acquires American proportions, why not borrow a leaf from that country and trim it to suit India's needs? It describes laws such as the Regulation of Lobbying Act, 1946, which has provided for registration of lobbyists but was confined to lobbying in respect of legislation; and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, 1995 which covers the making and administration of policy, contract or loan, as well as legislation.Less

Between Democracy and Plutocracy

Mugambi Jouet

in Exceptional America: What Divides Americans from the World and from Each Other

Wealth inequality is much sharper in America than all other industrialized countries. The income of the richest 1% Americans has soared while the income of ordinary people either decreased or ... More

Wealth inequality is much sharper in America than all other industrialized countries. The income of the richest 1% Americans has soared while the income of ordinary people either decreased or stagnated in recent decades. However, America used to be a rather middle-class society. It was not before the 1980s that the G.O.P.’s far-right branch grew more influential in challenging the oppression of “big government.” New Deal era policies were gradually abandoned and wealth inequality soared. Ronald Reagan claimed that “fascism was really the basis for the New Deal,” and his heirs followed suit in denouncing the federal government’s “tyranny.” Overall, the center of the U.S. political debate on economic issues is drastically more to the right than in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The Democratic Party is far less devoted to the interests of the poor, the working-class, and the middle-class than other left-wing parties in the West. The G.O.P. tends to cater only to the richest of the rich, unlike virtually no other major conservative party in the modern Western world.Less

The Evolving Nature of EU Business Lobbying

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

This chapter examines business lobbying in the EU from a historical perspective. Conceptually, it discusses how the EU’s evolution has influenced interest intermediation in Brussels. In doing so, it ... More

This chapter examines business lobbying in the EU from a historical perspective. Conceptually, it discusses how the EU’s evolution has influenced interest intermediation in Brussels. In doing so, it addresses the increasing authority handed to the European Commission, the growth of European regulatory networks, and multi-level governance; and their influence on business and the strategic choices it makes. From the opposite perspective, it examines the impact that business has had on the EU’s integration, and its policy-making procedures. Empirically, the chapter draws on unique business surveys spanning from the mid-1990s up until today, and a large-N analysis of 12,000 registered organizations on the EU’s transparency register. It also provides a case study on business strategies, focused on the directive on tobacco control. Theoretically, this chapter contributes to discussions on European integration, interest group activity, business lobbying, and governance in the EU.,Less

Making Sense of the Complexity of Business-Government Relations in the EU

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

In this chapter, we develop a political theory of the firm that draws from a micro-, meso-, and macro-perspective. In doing so, we develop a theory that brings together a set of pieces that form a ... More

In this chapter, we develop a political theory of the firm that draws from a micro-, meso-, and macro-perspective. In doing so, we develop a theory that brings together a set of pieces that form a sum greater than its parts. Specifically, it looks at how the structure and functions of institutions affect how the firm behaves in the political arena. It goes on to look at the variation in business behaviour across policy areas and stages of the policy cycles and it concludes with the focus on the internal features of the company. The chapter concludes by providing some recommendations for scholars of business and politics, policy-makers, and lobbyists.Less

The Influence of Permit-Price Uncertainty and Lobbying on Energy Investments

Philipp Hieronymi and David Schüller

in Emissions Trading as a Policy Instrument: Evaluation and Prospects

In this model an investor can choose between replacing a pre-determined generation capacity by investing into wind or gas power. He also has the option to lobby in order to increase the profitability ... More

In this model an investor can choose between replacing a pre-determined generation capacity by investing into wind or gas power. He also has the option to lobby in order to increase the profitability of either energy type. If he chooses gas power, he has to obtain emission permits. The price of emissions develops according to a geometric Brownian Motion. We find that current permit prices are insufficient to induce renewable investment and wind power lobbying must be very effective in order to induce investment in this power type. The benefit of lobbying for gas power seems to low due to the low permit price. In a United States like situation with no permit market, no effective renewable support scheme, and very strong gas lobbying efforts, we find that close to no renewable capacity will be installed. Depending on the scenario, the social cost of subsidizing wind energy can be large.Less

Institutions, Finance, Trade

Wim Klooster and Gert Oostindie

in Realm between Empires: The Second Dutch Atlantic, 1680-1815

For governance, investment, and the shipment and sale of Atlantic goods the overseas Dutch depended on the United Provinces. The West India Company, which maintained its slave trade monopoly until ... More

For governance, investment, and the shipment and sale of Atlantic goods the overseas Dutch depended on the United Provinces. The West India Company, which maintained its slave trade monopoly until the 1730s, provided the umbrella for most activities in the Dutch Atlantic world, although Suriname and Berbice were ruled by separate entities in which the WIC was only a partner. In mid-century, the Dutch Guiana colonies offered Dutch investors attractive opportunities, which led to the transfer of tremendous amounts of credit. An artificial boom followed, which failed to produce high profits and ended in a credit crisis which would thwart the further plantation growth of Suriname. Cash crops from Suriname and the other New World colonies were carried in massive quantities to the Dutch Republic, while the Dutch slave trade not only provisioned the Dutch colonies, but also those of other empires.Less

Pressures for Government Action

Price Fishback, Jonathan Rose, and Kenneth Snowden

in Well Worth Saving: How the New Deal Safeguarded Home Ownership

The HOLC was passed during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration, and like other New Deal programs was directed at a pressing problem with a clear constituency in mind. Given the ... More

The HOLC was passed during the first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration, and like other New Deal programs was directed at a pressing problem with a clear constituency in mind. Given the foreclosure crisis described in the previous chapter, by early 1933 a variety of interest groups were putting great pressure on the federal government to pass a program to prevent foreclosures and stabilize the residential real estate market. Homeowners, lenders, and real estate builders all lobbied for action. The HOLC paralleled similar legislation for the farm mortgage sector, and followed less successful efforts to address the crisis, including state-level moratoria legislation, and the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank system.Less

Is the Political Class Corrupt?

Ron Formisano

in American Oligarchy: The Permanent Political Class

Is the political class corrupt or decent and just “well dressed”? Among the public, the perception of corruption persists.

Getting to grips with lobbying: regulated office-holders, unregulated lobbies

David Hine and Gillian Peele

in The regulation of standards in British public life: Doing the right thing?

This chapter deals with lobbying. In the United Kingdom, most regulation of lobbying activities has focussed on regulating those being lobbied, rather than the lobbyists themselves. However, the ... More

This chapter deals with lobbying. In the United Kingdom, most regulation of lobbying activities has focussed on regulating those being lobbied, rather than the lobbyists themselves. However, the increase in lobbying has created together created powerful pressure to regulate lobbyists directly and the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 has started the process of requiring some lobbyists to register. The chapter also examines the role of All-Party parliamentary groups(APGs) and their vulnerability to lobbying activity.Less

Integrity issues and devolution

David Hine and Gillian Peele

in The regulation of standards in British public life: Doing the right thing?

This chapter explores the different arrangements for ethical regulation in the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Initially, these arrangements were provided for in the ... More

This chapter explores the different arrangements for ethical regulation in the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Initially, these arrangements were provided for in the devolution legislation but over time the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies have developed and refined their own machinery in the light of experience. Although the three different jurisdictions differ in their approach to the regulation of standards, all have been giving increasing attention to the problem of ethical issues. In Scotland an early lobbying scandal (“lobbygate”) swiftly led to the establishment of a Code of Conduct and stronger regulatory machinery. Recent initiatives have produced a new approach to regulating lobbyists. Wales has also refined its standards machinery since devolution was introduced. Northern Ireland continues to lag behind the other two areas, although has learned from experience in Scotland and is catching up with improvements to its integrity arrangeemnts. The chapter analyses the distinctive features of the three systems and identifies continuing differences both from each other and the rest of the UK.Less

Working with local government

Nick Gallent and Steve Robinson

in Neighbourhood planning: Communities, networks and governance

This chapter examines the lobbying relationship that parish councils enter into with local government officers and considers how much local authorities might learn about the longer-term aspirations ... More

This chapter examines the lobbying relationship that parish councils enter into with local government officers and considers how much local authorities might learn about the longer-term aspirations of communities though this relationship. It is argued that this relationship is often characterised as ‘report-react’, with authorities using communities as a sounding board for consultation. The degree of genuine partnership generated is limitedLess

Lobbying and policy capture

David Miller, Claire Harkins, Matthias Schlögl, and Brendan Montague

in Impact of Market Forces on Addictive Substances and Behaviours: The web of influence of addictive industries

This chapter examines how policy is captured and aims to show how the capture of the other domains examined in this book relate to the ultimate prize of policy capture. Notable, however, policy can ... More

This chapter examines how policy is captured and aims to show how the capture of the other domains examined in this book relate to the ultimate prize of policy capture. Notable, however, policy can be captured variety of ways. The chapter considers two dimensions of policy capture—upstream and downstream. ‘Downstream’ refers to attempts to influence particular policy measures that might directly affect the industry concerned. ‘Upstream’ refers to influencing the agreed procedures by which decisions on particular matters will be taken in years to come. After that we turn to a relatively recent innovation in policy making that challenges the very categories adopted in policy studies. Partnership governance breaches the seemingly clear conceptual split between interest groups and government. We examine some key UK and EU examples in the addictions field, asking about the implications for public health and corporate power.Less

Business-Government Relations in the EU: Strategy and Complexity

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

This monograph charts and assesses business lobbying in Brussels, taking into consideration its nuances. Indeed, a number of disciplines, theories, and methodological approaches grapple with this ... More

This monograph charts and assesses business lobbying in Brussels, taking into consideration its nuances. Indeed, a number of disciplines, theories, and methodological approaches grapple with this subject. The EU is one of the largest trading blocs and lobbying environments in the world. It is also a unique socio-political arena, in constant flux over the last fifty years. Business has not been idle; expanding its reach outside of the national domain, since the 1970s it has developed a spectacular advocacy toolbox, particularly in Europe and the US. Government affairs offices in Brussels today hardly resemble those forty years ago in quality or quantity. The relationship, is multi-layered, multi-level, multi-actor, and cuts across a series of institutional, thematic, legal, social, and governmental networks. With this in mind, this monograph draws on two different disciplines that act as a theoretical prism: political science, and business and management studies. The former helps make sense of the demand side of the equation, the role of government in shaping business activity. The latter provides the supply side, the company’s inner workings and its strategic choice to mobilize and lobby the EU. We employ three analytic perspectives: (i) macro; (ii) meso; (iii) micro. Bringing together different perspectives to business-government affairs in the EU, we aim to provide a rounded theoretical understanding of the relationship, a rich set of conceptual tools for its examination, and a detailed empirical mapping.Less

Institutions and Business Strategies: Differences and Commonalities

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

This chapter focuses on business’ relationship with the EU’s institutions, in particular the European Commission and the European Parliament. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter discusses the ... More

This chapter focuses on business’ relationship with the EU’s institutions, in particular the European Commission and the European Parliament. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter discusses the role of legitimacy and information-expertise as central resources defining business access. It then examines the growing role of political parties, and the rise of political financing as an alternative lobbying resource. Empirically, the chapter draws from a large-N analysis of a population of 12,000 lobbyists, business, and policy-maker surveys, and an analysis EU-level political parties’ budgets. The chapter also includes a case study on the use of information and business strategies across institutional settings focusing on the European Emissions Trading Scheme. The chapter’s analyses shows how business interests mobilize in similar proportions across institutions. Interestingly, when lobbying members of the European Parliament they address parties across the ideological spectrum. Simultaneously, business donations to EU-level parties are increasing over time, with centre-right and Eurosceptic parties outperforming centre-left and left wing parties. In doing so this chapter contributes to discussions about, information-access, input/output legitimacy, political financing, and business lobbying politicization.Less

The Nature of the Policy Field and Business-Government Relations

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

This chapter studies the nature of the policy field and its impact on business-lobbying in the EU. Drawing from theories on institutional legitimacy and information-access it observes the variation ... More

This chapter studies the nature of the policy field and its impact on business-lobbying in the EU. Drawing from theories on institutional legitimacy and information-access it observes the variation in density and diversity across regulatory and (re)distributive policy fields, and committee hearings. Empirically, the chapter employs business group surveys, conducts meticulous analysis of a population of 12,000 interest groups lobbying preferences across multiple policy fields assessing their density and diversity as well as their clustering. It includes a case study on business diverse coalition building focusing on net neutrality. Finally, the chapter observes the distribution of business interests across the European Parliament’s committee hearings. In doing so, this chapter contributes to discussions on legitimacy and public policy, chameleon pluralism, business mobilization, and the nature of the policy good.Less

Agenda-Setting and Business-Government Relations across the EU’s Policy-Making Cycle

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

This chapter examines the policy cycle’s role in agenda-setting and business mobilization. The chapter draws from theories on agenda-setting and deliberative theory. It discusses agenda-setting ... More

This chapter examines the policy cycle’s role in agenda-setting and business mobilization. The chapter draws from theories on agenda-setting and deliberative theory. It discusses agenda-setting procedures in the EU’s context and their impact on business mobilization. Conversely, it addresses business strategies to influence the EU’s agenda, and policy outcomes across the policy-making process. Empirically, it employs extensive surveys of business and policy-makers. The chapter also includes a case study on business strategies across the policy cycle focusing on the car emissions scandal (Diesel-gate). Finally, the chapter provide a rare and systematic glimpse into members of the European Parliament’s perceptions of business lobbying across the policy cycle. In doing so, it contributes to discussions on influence, insiders/outsiders, consultations, business lobbying coalitions, and deliberation in policy-making.Less

Revolving Doors or Sliding Doors in Brussels? Lobbying Strategies and Capabilities

David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis, and Matia Vannoni

in Business Lobbying in the European Union

In this chapter, we explore the micro-level and concentrates on business and its government affairs offices in Brussels. We assess business strategic choices in hiring different types of staff, and ... More

In this chapter, we explore the micro-level and concentrates on business and its government affairs offices in Brussels. We assess business strategic choices in hiring different types of staff, and its variation across national and corporate lines. While business has overall similar tools to lobby the EU, it employs distinctly different approaches. We look at the educational and professional background of its staff, and the role it plays in its lobbying strategies. In doing so, we reveal substantial variation across firms’ strategic approaches and the central driving factors motivating the observed variance. Moreover, we underscore common approaches as a reaction to the EU’s evolution. Theoretically, the chapter builds on the firm’s micro-capabilities.Less