Iain McLean
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295297
- eISBN:
- 9780191599873
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295294.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
The first of two case studies of Lloyd George. Discusses his successes at widening the social base of the Liberal Party and at provoking the House of Lords into fighting and losing the constitutional ...
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The first of two case studies of Lloyd George. Discusses his successes at widening the social base of the Liberal Party and at provoking the House of Lords into fighting and losing the constitutional crisis of 1909–11. Considers why he failed to construct a hegemonic centre party after the First World War, or to stifle the rise of the Labour Party.Less
The first of two case studies of Lloyd George. Discusses his successes at widening the social base of the Liberal Party and at provoking the House of Lords into fighting and losing the constitutional crisis of 1909–11. Considers why he failed to construct a hegemonic centre party after the First World War, or to stifle the rise of the Labour Party.
Iain McLean
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295297
- eISBN:
- 9780191599873
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295294.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
The second of two case studies of Lloyd George. Explains how he was able to enact the Irish Treaty of 1921 in three parliaments and three executives, when he controlled a majority in only one of the ...
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The second of two case studies of Lloyd George. Explains how he was able to enact the Irish Treaty of 1921 in three parliaments and three executives, when he controlled a majority in only one of the six bodies, and that a very bare majority. Although his threat strategy was not credible, he forced the Irish delegate into a sequential game, because each Irish delegate, when forced to decide, in turn strictly preferred signing the Treaty to not signing it. Lloyd George succeeded in removing the Irish question from British politics for fifty years, and partly succeeded in removing the British question from Irish politics.Less
The second of two case studies of Lloyd George. Explains how he was able to enact the Irish Treaty of 1921 in three parliaments and three executives, when he controlled a majority in only one of the six bodies, and that a very bare majority. Although his threat strategy was not credible, he forced the Irish delegate into a sequential game, because each Irish delegate, when forced to decide, in turn strictly preferred signing the Treaty to not signing it. Lloyd George succeeded in removing the Irish question from British politics for fifty years, and partly succeeded in removing the British question from Irish politics.
DOUGLAS NEWTON
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198203148
- eISBN:
- 9780191675744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203148.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, European Modern History
The chapter introduces the essential context of the period 1918–19, the leading figures of the so-called ‘knock-out blow’ coalition, and the preoccupations of the governing elite at the moment of ...
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The chapter introduces the essential context of the period 1918–19, the leading figures of the so-called ‘knock-out blow’ coalition, and the preoccupations of the governing elite at the moment of victory. The knock-out blow label was used to describe not just the government which Lloyd George led but also a great assembly of quite disparate forces supporting the notion of no peace until victory. The label brought together all those who clung to the idea of a military victory as a panacea, and conversely all those who shared a horror of the alternative —not just defeat, but any adjustment downwards of British territorial and economic war aims in order that a negotiated settlement might be attempted.Less
The chapter introduces the essential context of the period 1918–19, the leading figures of the so-called ‘knock-out blow’ coalition, and the preoccupations of the governing elite at the moment of victory. The knock-out blow label was used to describe not just the government which Lloyd George led but also a great assembly of quite disparate forces supporting the notion of no peace until victory. The label brought together all those who clung to the idea of a military victory as a panacea, and conversely all those who shared a horror of the alternative —not just defeat, but any adjustment downwards of British territorial and economic war aims in order that a negotiated settlement might be attempted.
KEITH JEFFERY
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239672
- eISBN:
- 9780191719493
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239672.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Military History
At the War Cabinet, David Lloyd George outlined what he regarded as the four alternative policies for Britain with respect to World War I. First was concentration of the entire British forces on the ...
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At the War Cabinet, David Lloyd George outlined what he regarded as the four alternative policies for Britain with respect to World War I. First was concentration of the entire British forces on the Western Front; second was to concentrate mainly on the Western Front, but utilise the forces now in the various overseas theatres as actively as possible; the third option was essentially a holding operation until Russia recovered and the United States was supplying enough troops to ensure superiority; and the final one consisted of ‘knocking the props from under Germany’ by military and diplomatic operations against enemy allies such as Turkey and Bulgaria. The Prime Minister preferred for some combination of the second and last options. With this in mind, John French and Henry Wilson were to report on the current state of the war and the future prospects and future action to be taken.Less
At the War Cabinet, David Lloyd George outlined what he regarded as the four alternative policies for Britain with respect to World War I. First was concentration of the entire British forces on the Western Front; second was to concentrate mainly on the Western Front, but utilise the forces now in the various overseas theatres as actively as possible; the third option was essentially a holding operation until Russia recovered and the United States was supplying enough troops to ensure superiority; and the final one consisted of ‘knocking the props from under Germany’ by military and diplomatic operations against enemy allies such as Turkey and Bulgaria. The Prime Minister preferred for some combination of the second and last options. With this in mind, John French and Henry Wilson were to report on the current state of the war and the future prospects and future action to be taken.
Iain Mclean and Jennifer Nou
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199546954
- eISBN:
- 9780191720031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546954.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, UK Politics
1909 Budget and Lords' veto. Land tax. Lloyd George's strategy: partial success 1909 and failure 1914. What the Permanent Secretary was up to. Parliament Act 1911 and royal vetoes. Temporary ...
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1909 Budget and Lords' veto. Land tax. Lloyd George's strategy: partial success 1909 and failure 1914. What the Permanent Secretary was up to. Parliament Act 1911 and royal vetoes. Temporary expansion in number of veto players.Less
1909 Budget and Lords' veto. Land tax. Lloyd George's strategy: partial success 1909 and failure 1914. What the Permanent Secretary was up to. Parliament Act 1911 and royal vetoes. Temporary expansion in number of veto players.
William Bain
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199260263
- eISBN:
- 9780191600975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260265.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Starts by pointing out that if the Berlin and Brussels Acts and the experience of the Congo Free State (as discussed in the last chapter) are understood as representing the internationalization of ...
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Starts by pointing out that if the Berlin and Brussels Acts and the experience of the Congo Free State (as discussed in the last chapter) are understood as representing the internationalization of the idea of trusteeship, then the League of Nations mandates system might be understood as representing its institutionalization in international society. Examines the current of ideas from which the institutionalization of trusteeship arose out of the debates concerning the disposal of German colonies conquered during the First World War, and the subsequent compromise that resulted in the creation of the mandates system, which stands as a response to the problem of ordering relations of Europeans and non‐Europeans by reconciling the obligations of trusteeship and the search for national security in a single institutional arrangement. The victorious Allied powers divided Germany's colonial possessions amongst themselves, in no small part for reasons of national security, but in assuming administrative responsibility for these territories they also accepted the oversight of ‘international machinery’ to ensure that the work of civilization was being done. The seven sections of the chapter are: War and the Old Diplomacy; Trusteeship or Annexation?; From the New World—the effect of the Russian revolution and the entry into the First World War of the US on the French and British annexation policy and Woodrow Wilson's ideas for peace; The Mandates System—the birth of the League of Nations; Impasse at Versailles—the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Versailles Peace Treaty; Trusteeship or Deception—the obligations and defects of the League of Nations Covenant; and Novelty and Tradition—the compromise of the League of Nations system.Less
Starts by pointing out that if the Berlin and Brussels Acts and the experience of the Congo Free State (as discussed in the last chapter) are understood as representing the internationalization of the idea of trusteeship, then the League of Nations mandates system might be understood as representing its institutionalization in international society. Examines the current of ideas from which the institutionalization of trusteeship arose out of the debates concerning the disposal of German colonies conquered during the First World War, and the subsequent compromise that resulted in the creation of the mandates system, which stands as a response to the problem of ordering relations of Europeans and non‐Europeans by reconciling the obligations of trusteeship and the search for national security in a single institutional arrangement. The victorious Allied powers divided Germany's colonial possessions amongst themselves, in no small part for reasons of national security, but in assuming administrative responsibility for these territories they also accepted the oversight of ‘international machinery’ to ensure that the work of civilization was being done. The seven sections of the chapter are: War and the Old Diplomacy; Trusteeship or Annexation?; From the New World—the effect of the Russian revolution and the entry into the First World War of the US on the French and British annexation policy and Woodrow Wilson's ideas for peace; The Mandates System—the birth of the League of Nations; Impasse at Versailles—the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the Versailles Peace Treaty; Trusteeship or Deception—the obligations and defects of the League of Nations Covenant; and Novelty and Tradition—the compromise of the League of Nations system.
Grigg John
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206262
- eISBN:
- 9780191677052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206262.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George were the two outstanding British politicians of the first half of the twentieth century. Their careers overlapped and interacted to a large degree. During the ...
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Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George were the two outstanding British politicians of the first half of the twentieth century. Their careers overlapped and interacted to a large degree. During the early years of the twentieth century, they formed a partnership as radical reformers that decisively affected the course of British history at home. Both during the two world wars, they were colleagues who seemed to be joint, or alternative, men of destiny. Their association began in earnest when Churchill left the Conservative Party and joined the Liberal Party. In the way Churchill chose to execute his change of sides in Parliament, he emphasized a specific intention to ally himself with Lloyd George. It was most fortunate for Britain, and perhaps also rather fortunate for the world, that Churchill and Lloyd George lived when they did and were willing, for some years, to deploy their talents and energies in concert.Less
Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George were the two outstanding British politicians of the first half of the twentieth century. Their careers overlapped and interacted to a large degree. During the early years of the twentieth century, they formed a partnership as radical reformers that decisively affected the course of British history at home. Both during the two world wars, they were colleagues who seemed to be joint, or alternative, men of destiny. Their association began in earnest when Churchill left the Conservative Party and joined the Liberal Party. In the way Churchill chose to execute his change of sides in Parliament, he emphasized a specific intention to ally himself with Lloyd George. It was most fortunate for Britain, and perhaps also rather fortunate for the world, that Churchill and Lloyd George lived when they did and were willing, for some years, to deploy their talents and energies in concert.
KEITH JEFFERY
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199239672
- eISBN:
- 9780191719493
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239672.003.0012
- Subject:
- History, Military History
In the immediate aftermath of the war, both as a confidante of the Prime Minister and as professional head of the army, Henry Wilson continued to play a central role in the policy-making process. He ...
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In the immediate aftermath of the war, both as a confidante of the Prime Minister and as professional head of the army, Henry Wilson continued to play a central role in the policy-making process. He began to worry about future military commitments as the internal political turmoil which had steadily undermined the German war effort now threatened to engulf the whole state. There was also the need for the military to supply post-war garrisons across the British empire, as well as armies of occupation. Although Wilson foresaw the establishment of a long-service voluntary army on the pre-war model, he also pressed for the continuance of conscription. After the signing of the Versailles peace treaty, David Lloyd George turned from foreign to domestic affairs. The prospect he had offered in the 1918 election campaign of domestic reconstruction and reform was underpinned by a fundamental democratisation of the British political system.Less
In the immediate aftermath of the war, both as a confidante of the Prime Minister and as professional head of the army, Henry Wilson continued to play a central role in the policy-making process. He began to worry about future military commitments as the internal political turmoil which had steadily undermined the German war effort now threatened to engulf the whole state. There was also the need for the military to supply post-war garrisons across the British empire, as well as armies of occupation. Although Wilson foresaw the establishment of a long-service voluntary army on the pre-war model, he also pressed for the continuance of conscription. After the signing of the Versailles peace treaty, David Lloyd George turned from foreign to domestic affairs. The prospect he had offered in the 1918 election campaign of domestic reconstruction and reform was underpinned by a fundamental democratisation of the British political system.
Ian Beckett
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198222996
- eISBN:
- 9780191678561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198222996.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This chapter examines the publishing and financial aspects of writing memoirs related to World War I. It highlights the conflicts and controversies surrounding the memoirs written by soldiers and ...
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This chapter examines the publishing and financial aspects of writing memoirs related to World War I. It highlights the conflicts and controversies surrounding the memoirs written by soldiers and statesmen. These include the autobiographies of statesmen Horatio Herbert Kitchener and Lloyd George, and Western Front Commanders John French, Horace Smith-Dorien, and Hubert Gough. This chapter suggests that the controversies may have resulted from the fact that autobiography is a historical genre that is most susceptible to conscious manipulation by the author.Less
This chapter examines the publishing and financial aspects of writing memoirs related to World War I. It highlights the conflicts and controversies surrounding the memoirs written by soldiers and statesmen. These include the autobiographies of statesmen Horatio Herbert Kitchener and Lloyd George, and Western Front Commanders John French, Horace Smith-Dorien, and Hubert Gough. This chapter suggests that the controversies may have resulted from the fact that autobiography is a historical genre that is most susceptible to conscious manipulation by the author.
E. H. H. GREEN
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198205937
- eISBN:
- 9780191717116
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205937.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter reviews the Conservative decision at the Carlton Club meeting of 1922 to end the coalition with the Lloyd George Liberals, and examines the part played by the Conservative's identity as ...
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This chapter reviews the Conservative decision at the Carlton Club meeting of 1922 to end the coalition with the Lloyd George Liberals, and examines the part played by the Conservative's identity as the party of anti-socialism in this decision. Key issues discussed include the impact of taxation, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, and the activism of the middle classes with the formation of the Middle Class Union, the Anti-Waste League, and the People's Union for Economy.Less
This chapter reviews the Conservative decision at the Carlton Club meeting of 1922 to end the coalition with the Lloyd George Liberals, and examines the part played by the Conservative's identity as the party of anti-socialism in this decision. Key issues discussed include the impact of taxation, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, and the activism of the middle classes with the formation of the Middle Class Union, the Anti-Waste League, and the People's Union for Economy.
G. C. Peden
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198207078
- eISBN:
- 9780191677472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198207078.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Economic History
The First World War had a threefold effect on the Treasury: the functions of the department were extended on the finance side; Treasury control over public expenditure and establishments was greatly ...
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The First World War had a threefold effect on the Treasury: the functions of the department were extended on the finance side; Treasury control over public expenditure and establishments was greatly weakened in all aspects of government related to the war; and, there was strong political pressure after the war to make Treasury control over both expenditure and Civil Service establishments more effective in future. There is plenty of scope for argument as to the relative merits of the different approaches to war finance of Lloyd George on the one hand, and Reginald McKenna and the official Treasury on the other. The conduct of war finance enabled some Treasury officials to acquire greater competence in technical aspects of financial policy and greater confidence in dealing with the Bank of England. Treasury control of Whitehall was weakened for the duration of the war, but waste and extravagance on the part of uncoordinated spending departments led to political pressure for a restoration of Treasury control of expenditure and for an extension of Treasury control over the Civil Service.Less
The First World War had a threefold effect on the Treasury: the functions of the department were extended on the finance side; Treasury control over public expenditure and establishments was greatly weakened in all aspects of government related to the war; and, there was strong political pressure after the war to make Treasury control over both expenditure and Civil Service establishments more effective in future. There is plenty of scope for argument as to the relative merits of the different approaches to war finance of Lloyd George on the one hand, and Reginald McKenna and the official Treasury on the other. The conduct of war finance enabled some Treasury officials to acquire greater competence in technical aspects of financial policy and greater confidence in dealing with the Bank of England. Treasury control of Whitehall was weakened for the duration of the war, but waste and extravagance on the part of uncoordinated spending departments led to political pressure for a restoration of Treasury control of expenditure and for an extension of Treasury control over the Civil Service.
David French
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205593
- eISBN:
- 9780191676680
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205593.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
Lloyd George summarized the terms Britain sought as ‘restitution, reparation, and guarantee against repetition’. His government never contemplated making a negotiated peace in December 1916. After ...
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Lloyd George summarized the terms Britain sought as ‘restitution, reparation, and guarantee against repetition’. His government never contemplated making a negotiated peace in December 1916. After two years of fighting, it had come to power committed to continuing the war and to intensifying Britain's efforts to secure victory. Too many men had been killed and too much treasure had been expended to allow the new administration to end the war on the basis of the status quo.Less
Lloyd George summarized the terms Britain sought as ‘restitution, reparation, and guarantee against repetition’. His government never contemplated making a negotiated peace in December 1916. After two years of fighting, it had come to power committed to continuing the war and to intensifying Britain's efforts to secure victory. Too many men had been killed and too much treasure had been expended to allow the new administration to end the war on the basis of the status quo.
David French
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198205593
- eISBN:
- 9780191676680
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205593.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
By mid-September 1917 Lloyd George believed that the Flanders offensive had failed, that the public were becoming uneasy at the lack of news of definite progress and that the offensive should be ...
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By mid-September 1917 Lloyd George believed that the Flanders offensive had failed, that the public were becoming uneasy at the lack of news of definite progress and that the offensive should be halted. Six weeks of mounting casualties and scant progress meant that a number of his colleagues, including Milner and Bonar Law, shared Lloyd George's scepticism about the Flanders offensive. But they dared not act precipitately, for Robertson and Haig could still call upon some powerful allies. In the autumn and winter of 1917/18 the Prime Minister employed all of his political talents either to replace uncongenial colleagues and advisers, or, where that was politically impossible, to reduce their powers. By February 1918, after being in power for fourteen months, it appeared as if the Prime Minister had at last succeeded in foisting his own strategic policy on his government.Less
By mid-September 1917 Lloyd George believed that the Flanders offensive had failed, that the public were becoming uneasy at the lack of news of definite progress and that the offensive should be halted. Six weeks of mounting casualties and scant progress meant that a number of his colleagues, including Milner and Bonar Law, shared Lloyd George's scepticism about the Flanders offensive. But they dared not act precipitately, for Robertson and Haig could still call upon some powerful allies. In the autumn and winter of 1917/18 the Prime Minister employed all of his political talents either to replace uncongenial colleagues and advisers, or, where that was politically impossible, to reduce their powers. By February 1918, after being in power for fourteen months, it appeared as if the Prime Minister had at last succeeded in foisting his own strategic policy on his government.
Andrew Thorpe
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198202189
- eISBN:
- 9780191675195
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202189.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
This period saw a party in its death-throes. Only a year earlier, things had seemed quite promising for the Liberal Party. In October 1926, the party leadership had at last been wrenched from the ...
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This period saw a party in its death-throes. Only a year earlier, things had seemed quite promising for the Liberal Party. In October 1926, the party leadership had at last been wrenched from the dead hand of H. H. Asquith, and David Lloyd George was elected in his place. The Liberals did not enter the 1929 election campaign with only a glamorous if somewhat tarnished leader and an exciting if somewhat untried and unorthodox programme. It also had a degree of unity, even the Liberal Council, set up in 1927 to keep the flame of Asquithianism burning, desisted from parading its hatred for Lloyd George. In private, though, the feuds remained. Walter Runciman, for example, was as opposed to Lloyd George as ever, and had little faith in the new programme. However, Runciman and those who felt like him maintained a low profile, and waited for their leader to dig his own grave. This chapter chronicles the political fate of the Liberals from 1929 to 1931 in Britain.Less
This period saw a party in its death-throes. Only a year earlier, things had seemed quite promising for the Liberal Party. In October 1926, the party leadership had at last been wrenched from the dead hand of H. H. Asquith, and David Lloyd George was elected in his place. The Liberals did not enter the 1929 election campaign with only a glamorous if somewhat tarnished leader and an exciting if somewhat untried and unorthodox programme. It also had a degree of unity, even the Liberal Council, set up in 1927 to keep the flame of Asquithianism burning, desisted from parading its hatred for Lloyd George. In private, though, the feuds remained. Walter Runciman, for example, was as opposed to Lloyd George as ever, and had little faith in the new programme. However, Runciman and those who felt like him maintained a low profile, and waited for their leader to dig his own grave. This chapter chronicles the political fate of the Liberals from 1929 to 1931 in Britain.
Peter J. Yearwood
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199226733
- eISBN:
- 9780191710308
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226733.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
Soon after the outbreak of the First World War British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey began to insist that the United States would have to guarantee any peace to which it might be a party. ...
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Soon after the outbreak of the First World War British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey began to insist that the United States would have to guarantee any peace to which it might be a party. Although this was mainly intended to block any inopportune mediation attempt by Woodrow Wilson, Grey did believe that the European settlement would be more stable if Washington were committed to its maintenance. London's failure to respond to Wilson's feelers led to a sharp deterioration in Anglo‐American relations as Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916. However, the new Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, and his deputy Lord Robert Cecil, who had already worked out a plan intended to be more palatable to the United States by emphasizing economic rather than military sanctions, continued Grey's broadly pro‐American policy. The need for a guarantee was reaffirmed. American entry into the war would make this a practical possibility.Less
Soon after the outbreak of the First World War British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey began to insist that the United States would have to guarantee any peace to which it might be a party. Although this was mainly intended to block any inopportune mediation attempt by Woodrow Wilson, Grey did believe that the European settlement would be more stable if Washington were committed to its maintenance. London's failure to respond to Wilson's feelers led to a sharp deterioration in Anglo‐American relations as Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916. However, the new Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, and his deputy Lord Robert Cecil, who had already worked out a plan intended to be more palatable to the United States by emphasizing economic rather than military sanctions, continued Grey's broadly pro‐American policy. The need for a guarantee was reaffirmed. American entry into the war would make this a practical possibility.
Erik Goldstein
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198215844
- eISBN:
- 9780191678226
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198215844.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
This chapter examines the struggle for control in Great Britain's preparation for the 1919 peace conference. Foreign Office Under-Secretary Charles Hardinge had developed a carefully laid plan for ...
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This chapter examines the struggle for control in Great Britain's preparation for the 1919 peace conference. Foreign Office Under-Secretary Charles Hardinge had developed a carefully laid plan for the peace settlement through the Political Intelligence Department (PID) but it was significantly affected by the decision of Prime Minister David Lloyd George to attend personally the conference and appoint Arthur Balfour as chief delegate. In addition, Lloyd George had other ideas on how arrangements for the conference should be made and he appointed Maurice Hankey to handle administrative planning and General Jan Christiaan Smuts to prepare the peace brief.Less
This chapter examines the struggle for control in Great Britain's preparation for the 1919 peace conference. Foreign Office Under-Secretary Charles Hardinge had developed a carefully laid plan for the peace settlement through the Political Intelligence Department (PID) but it was significantly affected by the decision of Prime Minister David Lloyd George to attend personally the conference and appoint Arthur Balfour as chief delegate. In addition, Lloyd George had other ideas on how arrangements for the conference should be made and he appointed Maurice Hankey to handle administrative planning and General Jan Christiaan Smuts to prepare the peace brief.
Kenneth O. Morgan
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198217367
- eISBN:
- 9780191678233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198217367.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
What gave colour and form to politics in this period and enhanced its Welsh national characteristics, was the overwhelming ascendancy of the Liberal Party. It was more pronounced in Wales than in any ...
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What gave colour and form to politics in this period and enhanced its Welsh national characteristics, was the overwhelming ascendancy of the Liberal Party. It was more pronounced in Wales than in any other part of the British Isles. Wales became, and was to remain for a hundred years, a unique stronghold of the British left. It was in the late-19th century that the roots lay. The greater prominence of Wales in British politics owed much to a more intelligent understanding on the part of Britain politicians, from Gladstone downwards. The main reason for the success of the Welsh causes lay in the vitality and strength of its Liberal core, and in the extraordinarily able leaders that it threw up. Stuart Rendel, an Englishman of course, led the way in making the Welsh Parliamentary Party tactically effective.Less
What gave colour and form to politics in this period and enhanced its Welsh national characteristics, was the overwhelming ascendancy of the Liberal Party. It was more pronounced in Wales than in any other part of the British Isles. Wales became, and was to remain for a hundred years, a unique stronghold of the British left. It was in the late-19th century that the roots lay. The greater prominence of Wales in British politics owed much to a more intelligent understanding on the part of Britain politicians, from Gladstone downwards. The main reason for the success of the Welsh causes lay in the vitality and strength of its Liberal core, and in the extraordinarily able leaders that it threw up. Stuart Rendel, an Englishman of course, led the way in making the Welsh Parliamentary Party tactically effective.
Kenneth O. Morgan
- Published in print:
- 1980
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198217367
- eISBN:
- 9780191678233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198217367.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History
With the declaration of an armistice on November 11, 1918, Wales entered a prolonged period of reflection, that later turned to disillusion, cynicism, and even at times to despair. The mood of the ...
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With the declaration of an armistice on November 11, 1918, Wales entered a prolonged period of reflection, that later turned to disillusion, cynicism, and even at times to despair. The mood of the post-war period soon turned sour. Yet the advent of peace was briefly marked by the continuation of that patriotic frenzy which characterized so much of the war years. Lloyd George called a snap election for December 1918, even before the troops had begun to demobilize, to endorse his Coalition government of Unionists, Liberals, and a handful of ‘patriotic Labour’ men. In Wales, more than most parts of Britain or of Europe, the post-war mood, with its swirling eddies of change and its uprooting of historic, cherished landmarks, brought a revolution in assumptions and priorities.Less
With the declaration of an armistice on November 11, 1918, Wales entered a prolonged period of reflection, that later turned to disillusion, cynicism, and even at times to despair. The mood of the post-war period soon turned sour. Yet the advent of peace was briefly marked by the continuation of that patriotic frenzy which characterized so much of the war years. Lloyd George called a snap election for December 1918, even before the troops had begun to demobilize, to endorse his Coalition government of Unionists, Liberals, and a handful of ‘patriotic Labour’ men. In Wales, more than most parts of Britain or of Europe, the post-war mood, with its swirling eddies of change and its uprooting of historic, cherished landmarks, brought a revolution in assumptions and priorities.
David Thomas, David Carlton, and Anne Etienne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199260287
- eISBN:
- 9780191717390
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260287.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Drama
This chapter shows how playwrights at the beginning of the 20th century (notably G. B. Shaw and Harley Granville Barker) led the first serious challenge to the system of statutory theatre censorship. ...
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This chapter shows how playwrights at the beginning of the 20th century (notably G. B. Shaw and Harley Granville Barker) led the first serious challenge to the system of statutory theatre censorship. It also shows how they were supported by Robert Harcourt MP, whose parliamentary interventions persuaded the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, to establish in 1909 a Joint Select Committee to investigate theatre censorship. The chapter then demonstrates how the constitutional battle between Lords and Commons, ignited by David Lloyd George's People's Budget in 1909, had the effect of pushing to the sidelines reform of theatre censorship. Material from the Royal Archives reveals that Edward VII adamantly refused to countenance the abolition of theatre censorship. This was a significant factor in the Asquith Government's decision to ignore the recommendations of the 1909 Joint Select Committee to replace, with a voluntary system, the theatre censorship provisions of the 1843 Theatres Act.Less
This chapter shows how playwrights at the beginning of the 20th century (notably G. B. Shaw and Harley Granville Barker) led the first serious challenge to the system of statutory theatre censorship. It also shows how they were supported by Robert Harcourt MP, whose parliamentary interventions persuaded the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, to establish in 1909 a Joint Select Committee to investigate theatre censorship. The chapter then demonstrates how the constitutional battle between Lords and Commons, ignited by David Lloyd George's People's Budget in 1909, had the effect of pushing to the sidelines reform of theatre censorship. Material from the Royal Archives reveals that Edward VII adamantly refused to countenance the abolition of theatre censorship. This was a significant factor in the Asquith Government's decision to ignore the recommendations of the 1909 Joint Select Committee to replace, with a voluntary system, the theatre censorship provisions of the 1843 Theatres Act.
Paul Bew
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199561261
- eISBN:
- 9780191701832
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199561261.003.0009
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Political History
This chapter examines the effects of civil war, particularly on politics. The discussion looks closely at the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In January 1919, Sinn Fein members, having ...
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This chapter examines the effects of civil war, particularly on politics. The discussion looks closely at the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In January 1919, Sinn Fein members, having met in Dublin and proclaimed themselves Dail Eireann, the Parliament of the Irish Republic, reaffirmed the Easter Rising declaration of 1916, adopted a provisional constitution, and appointed delegates to attend the Peace Conference of the Allied Powers in Paris. The Dail unanimously adopted documents prepared by Sinn Fein committees — the Declaration of Independence. The first section of the chapter explores the negotiations regarding the Anglo–Irish treaty. The second section then looks at the impact of the partition between North–South relations.Less
This chapter examines the effects of civil war, particularly on politics. The discussion looks closely at the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In January 1919, Sinn Fein members, having met in Dublin and proclaimed themselves Dail Eireann, the Parliament of the Irish Republic, reaffirmed the Easter Rising declaration of 1916, adopted a provisional constitution, and appointed delegates to attend the Peace Conference of the Allied Powers in Paris. The Dail unanimously adopted documents prepared by Sinn Fein committees — the Declaration of Independence. The first section of the chapter explores the negotiations regarding the Anglo–Irish treaty. The second section then looks at the impact of the partition between North–South relations.
