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This chapter explains why President Bill Clinton created the Aspin-Brown Commission of 1995–1996, led by Les Aspin and later by Harold Brown. More specifically, it examines the confluence of events that gave birth to the commission, including the U.S. military's involvement in Somalia in 1992 as part of the United Nations's humanitarian relief operation. It also considers the Clinton administration's policy decisions that affected the military forces' capability to defend themselves in Somalia, along with the criticisms hurled against the nation's intelligence agencies for failing to respond adequately to the violence that erupted not only in Somalia but also in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kuwait, and Haiti. In addition, the chapter looks at other crises that hounded U.S. intelligence in the years that followed the end of the Cold War, including the controversies surrounding the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Finally, it discusses the debate that accompanied the creation of the Aspin Commission, together with its early agenda.

This chapter focuses on the first session of the Aspin-Brown Commission of 1995–1996. The chapter looks at the topics discussed during the session, including the political issues facing Washington, the search for a director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to replace James Woolsey, the restructuring of the intelligence community, the intelligence budget, improving human intelligence and counterintelligence, and the CIA. It also describes eleven task forces and the issues they were intended to address, including macro-organizational issues, military intelligence, imagery intelligence, liaison with foreign intelligence services, and intelligence personnel. Finally, it considers the commission's series of briefings to address the nuts and bolts of espionage.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's busy schedule as part of its bipartisan inquiry into the status of the nation's intelligence agencies. The chapter first looks at the Commission's interviews and “roundtables” featuring intelligence experts and critics to discuss some very specific questions/issues. It then considers the views of Mark Lowenthal, staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, about the quality of intelligence analysis and the plan of Central Intelligence Agency director John Mark Deutch to create a new imagery agency. It also examines the issue of human intelligence and the “Aspin Papers” that assessed the effectiveness of the intelligence community's collection and analysis against the Soviet Union's military targets during the Cold War. Finally, it reflects on Aspin's death in 1995 due to a massive stroke and its impact on the commission which he chaired.

Set at the White House on August 11, 1993, the chapter reviews the Clinton administration and Pentagon’s decision-making in the days leading up to the August 11 Rose Garden ceremony to nominate General John Shalikashvili, the current Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It provides an overview of the candidate pool, explains why Shalikashvili was the preferred candidate, and provides an insider’s account of how Shalikashvili repeatedly told Chairman Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and even President William J. Clinton that he didn’t want the job because he’d serve the country better by remaining at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The chapter also highlights some of Shalikashvili’s leadership successes as SACEUR, including establishing NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and getting NATO to approve airstrikes in Bosnia.

This chapter focuses on the selection of members of the Aspin-Brown Commission of 1995–1996. The appointees were chosen by either President Bill Clinton or Congress: two incumbent senators, two incumbent representatives, and four private citizens. Three of the members were Warren B. Rudman, Lew Allen Jr., J. James Exon, and Zöe Baird. The selection process was meant to ensure a bipartisan inquiry into the status of the nation's intelligence agencies, one that would combine the perspectives of the executive and legislative branches with those of the private sector. The chapter also looks at the staff chosen by Aspin to become part of the commission.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's discussions about the usefulness of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as part of the U.S. national security policy. The chapter first looks at the appointment of John Mark Deutch as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with his agenda for the agency. It then considers Deutch's friendship with Aspin that goes back to their student days at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It also discusses the functions of NIEs as well as the subjects they cover and the frequency of their production; the question of how to represent dissenting views in an NIE; and the importance for national intelligence officers to maintain good liaison relationships with consumers and among themselves. The chapter concludes by comparing “current intelligence” with “research intelligence” such as the NIE.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's work following Harold Brown's appointment as chairman to replace Les Aspin. The chapter first considers the commission's session with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who served as director of naval intelligence, vice director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It then looks at Inman's views on a range of intelligence-related issues, such as human intelligence, the director of central (or national) intelligence, the CIA's paramilitary capabilities, and high-frequency NSA coverage. It also discusses CIA director John Mark Deutch's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, along with the commission's meeting with a visiting delegation of British parliamentarians from the House of Commons. The chapter concludes by reflecting on Clinton's appointment of Brown and the latter's management style compared to Aspin.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's activities in the runup to its final report as part of its inquiry into the status of the nation's secret services, including briefing sessions with expert witnesses. The chapter first considers the global, national, and local events that worried the White House and the intelligence agencies, including the currency crisis in Mexico in 1994; the violence in Haiti and in the Balkans; the rising U.S. trade deficit; America's strained relations with France following an incident in Paris involving a Central Intelligence Agency operative; and the Clinton administration's tenuous relationship with the GOP-controlled Congress. It then discusses the various proposals to improve the country's intelligence work, along with the internal leakage of the commission's discussions. It also examines other meetings undertaken by the commission, including its visit to Congress and a briefing on military intelligence, before concluding with an assessment of its review of reform proposals.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's work following the death of its chairman, Les Aspin, in 1995. The chapter first considers the commission's interviews and briefing sessions with expert witnesses as it continued the search for information to help in the preparation of its final report. The chapter then discusses the issues tackled by the commission under Warren Rudman, who became acting chairman, including those relating to imagery intelligence, the perceived lack of effective cooperation between the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, economic intelligence, and the importance of timing in the world of intelligence. It also looks at the President's Daily Brief, a document written by the secret agencies and provided to senior policy officials. The chapter concludes by describing the commissioners' analysis of all the information it had gathered and its meeting with key lawmakers to update them about the commission's progress.

This chapter examines the impact of the Aspin-Brown Commission of 1995–1996. The chapter first considers the events that occurred in the aftermath of the forming of the commission, including allegations that officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headed by John Mark Deutch had been involved in peddling cocaine from Nicaragua in the back streets of Los Angeles. It then looks at Deutch's attempt to defend the CIA and his decision to leave his post in December 1996. It also discusses the commission's reform proposals that became policy, as well as the lessons learned about the intricacies of espionage, intelligence budgets, and organizations. The chapter concludes by analyzing the intelligence community's major shortcomings prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's retreat in Leesburg, its second after a similar retreat at Camp Peary near Williamsburg; both venues are in Virginia. The chapter first considers the commission's preparation of its options papers, including “The Consumer-Producer Relationship,” before turning to a discussion of its sessions with expert witnesses. It then looks at the topics tackled by the commission during the retreat, from economic intelligence to covert action and National Intelligence Estimates. It also discusses the reform agenda of Central Intelligence Agency director John Mark Deutch before concluding with an assessment of the approaches proposed by lawmakers with regards to intelligence oversight.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's report as part of its inquiry into the status of the nation's secret services. The chapter provides an overview of the work done by the commission during the twelve months following early 1995, including interviews and briefing sessions with numerous expert witnesses. It then considers the commission's overarching goals before discussing its major recommendations concerning various areas of intelligence that need improvement, including economic intelligence, counternarcotics, environmental intelligence, health intelligence, law enforcement, and space surveillance. It concludes by assessing public reaction to the report.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's retreat in the Virginia countryside to give members the opportunity to bond while also discussing the major reforms that needed consideration. The commissioners traveled to the Farm or Camp Peary, a “secret” base of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) near Williamsburg. The chapter considers the issues tackled by the commission, including counterintelligence, intelligence tasking, the creation of a director of national intelligence, and cabinet status for the director of central intelligence. It also looks at the commissioners' activities upon their return to Washington, along with the CIA's historical roots and the commission's growing agenda.