Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0006
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis ...
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A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis suggested that the interaction of partisanship and competition is a highly significant determinant of corporate governance change. In particular, significant shifts in a pro‐shareholder direction are associated with Left government – but not conservative government – in the context of high levels of competition. In contrast, neither Left nor conservative government is associated with corporate governance change in a low‐competition environment.Less
A panel data econometric analysis of corporate governance change is undertaken utilizing a data set of fifteen nonliberal market economies covering the period 1975–2003. The results of this analysis suggested that the interaction of partisanship and competition is a highly significant determinant of corporate governance change. In particular, significant shifts in a pro‐shareholder direction are associated with Left government – but not conservative government – in the context of high levels of competition. In contrast, neither Left nor conservative government is associated with corporate governance change in a low‐competition environment.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An increasingly shareholder–oriented approach to corporate governance has emerged in the nonliberal market economies of continental Europe over the last ten–fifteen years. However, Left parties have ...
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An increasingly shareholder–oriented approach to corporate governance has emerged in the nonliberal market economies of continental Europe over the last ten–fifteen years. However, Left parties have also enjoyed a strong presence in government during the same period. This presents a puzzle, as intuitive expectations regarding the economic policy preferences of political parties – and also Mark Roe's theory (2003) of the political determinants of corporate governance – imply that pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform is more likely to be a feature of conservative than Left government.Less
An increasingly shareholder–oriented approach to corporate governance has emerged in the nonliberal market economies of continental Europe over the last ten–fifteen years. However, Left parties have also enjoyed a strong presence in government during the same period. This presents a puzzle, as intuitive expectations regarding the economic policy preferences of political parties – and also Mark Roe's theory (2003) of the political determinants of corporate governance – imply that pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform is more likely to be a feature of conservative than Left government.
Roger M. Barker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576814
- eISBN:
- 9780191722509
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576814.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business, Corporate Governance and Accountability
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are ...
More
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are represented by conservative and Left parties respectively. Outsiders do not have their own party, and represent a potential source of new votes for both parties. However, they require a commitment to pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform in order to win their support. As long as economic rents are substantial (due to low levels of product market competition), neither the Left nor conservative parties are willing to solicit the support of outsiders. Both of their core constituents benefit from the sharing of economic rents. However, if economic rents decline, insider labor no longer has an interest in sustaining a self-regulatory blockholder model of corporate governance. In contrast, conservative parties remain the apologists of the blockholder model.Less
An analytical framework is outlined with three social actors: blockholders, insider labor, and outsiders. Each has differing corporate governance preferences. Blockholders and insider labor are represented by conservative and Left parties respectively. Outsiders do not have their own party, and represent a potential source of new votes for both parties. However, they require a commitment to pro‐shareholder corporate governance reform in order to win their support. As long as economic rents are substantial (due to low levels of product market competition), neither the Left nor conservative parties are willing to solicit the support of outsiders. Both of their core constituents benefit from the sharing of economic rents. However, if economic rents decline, insider labor no longer has an interest in sustaining a self-regulatory blockholder model of corporate governance. In contrast, conservative parties remain the apologists of the blockholder model.
