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This chapter examines the history of global environmental policies as foundation for a focused examination of ratification struggles over the Kyoto Protocol to lower greenhouse gas emissions. Five case studies are presented. Struggles over the Kyoto agreement in Australia and the United States may represent classic cases of domestic constraints on international commitments. In early 2001 both governments announced their decision not to ratify the treaty. The Kyoto Protocol also touched off an intense debate over international environmental policy and sovereignty in Canada. At the same time, France and Germany were leading players in international diplomacy that helped to develop the Kyoto Protocol, and they were instrumental in pushing for ratification by all EU member states.

This chapter applies the theory developed in this book to a current challenge: global climate change. It provides an introduction to the issue, summarizes the history of negotiations, and provides estimates of the costs and benefits of mitigation. It then explains why the Kyoto Protocol will not succeed in sustaining cooperation because it fails to do what the book explains all good treaties must do — it fails to restructure incentives. In particular, it can only work if its obligations can be enforced, and yet Kyoto fails to provide the means for enforcement. The chapter then considers a range of alternative treaty designs, and explains why these will also fail. Finally, it uses the logic of the book to develop an alternative approach that is likely to prove more fruitful. This alternative approach focuses on the development and diffusion of new technologies rather than on emission targets and timetables.

This chapter provides an introduction to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) system and the key institutions as well as to the processes leading up to, and from, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. It introduces some of the key concepts that will be further developed in later chapters. With the release of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report it is clear that radical action needs to be taken to avoid dangerous climate change. The Stern Review forcefully reminds us that early, radical action in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases is also the most economically sensible approach.

This chapter briefly reviews the history of the international climate change negotiations leading up to and culminating in the drafting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and, subsequently, the Kyoto Protocol. The discussion examines the role of the US and the EU in the negotiating process; focusing on how the US and the EU influenced the substantive content of the Kyoto Protocol. It then explores the importance of the EU and the US as political actors in global climate politics, as past and present contributors to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, and as symbolic and substantive ‘role models’ in the international climate regime.

On 29 April 1998, the European Community (EC) and the initial fifteen EU member states signed the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EC and the EU member states are committed to jointly reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions during the period 2008-2012 by a total of 8% below 1990 GHG emissions levels. Soon after signing the Kyoto Protocol, the EU started exploring the potential of an emissions trading scheme to help its member states comply with its GHG emission reduction targets under the Burden Sharing Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the Kyoto Protocol not being in force and strong opposition from powerful EU member states — such as Germany and France — the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was finally adopted in October 2003 with the objective of reducing EU GHG emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner. This chapter provides historic and legal background information on the EU ETS and puts the EU ETS in the context of overall EU climate policy. It also discusses the cornerstones of the EU ETS and its linkages to the Kyoto Protocol and other emission trading schemes in light of the current amendments to the EU ETS structure for the post-2012 era.

This chapter begins with a short history of climate change as a policy issue, explaining the scientific basics of the phenomenon and culminating with an examination of current controversies over the scientific evidence establishing the existence and consequences of anthropogenic climate change as well as recent efforts to defeat mandatory national greenhouse gas emission caps. In particular, it examines the international climate policy process that generated the Kyoto Protocol, the industry-led campaigns of climate skepticism designed to defeat ratification of that treaty in the United States, and the development of U.S. climate policy through the secretive Cheney Energy Task Force, which effectively set the Bush administration's climate policy for its two terms. Finally, it considers the bases for ongoing rifts over climate policy between the U.S. and Europe as well as between industrialized and developing nations.

The Kyoto Protocol has introduced the first ever global scheme of emissions trading. Parties included in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with greenhouse gas (GHG) emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Parties) can achieve their commitments not only by taking domestic measures, but also by making use of the so-called ‘flexible mechanisms’ of the Kyoto Protocol: International Emissions Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Although the mechanism of IET under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol is mostly referred to in the context of trading Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), it covers the international transfer of all Kyoto emission rights. The first part of this chapter sets out the legal framework of IET. The second part describes the principles and challenges of IET under Green Investment Schemes, where traded AAUs are ‘greened’ by investing the purchase price in environmental activities in the seller country.

The Kyoto Protocol creates sovereign rights for parties trading Kyoto units. Kyoto parties can then authorize private entities to participate in trading under the international instrument. This chapter analyzes the legal nature and characteristics of the different units. Clear decisions on the nature and the treatment of these units are important to give legal security and certainty to both governments and private (or public) entities, and provide security and confidence to the trading system. Where legislation defines tradable units differently, but where the trading systems are linked, such as in the EU ETS, difference in treatment can make one sub-market of the overall system more attractive than others. Different treatment can thus lead to intended and — worse — unintended distortions of the market.

Climate change results from the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG)s within the earth’s atmosphere that bring about unusual warming from land conversion and the combustion of fossil fuel. While the climate regime is believed to include all categories of differential treatment, this regime, specifically the Kyoto Protocol, is generally accepted by many to be the most understandable measure to transform, set off, and implement the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) principle to a mere legal concept into a policy instrument. Although there may be norms that have effortlessly embedded themselves into such efforts, there are some norms that vary with industrial and developing countries that are still subject to various disputes that potentially destabilize the said regime. This chapter seeks to analyse the differential treatments associated with the climate regime and traces the evolution of the regime.

In the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union accommodated US demands for softer emission reduction targets and flexibility provisions to win its backing. Yet when the new Bush administration rejected the agreement, the EU took the leadership to bring it in force without US participation. The chapter shows that these responses to US climate policy are well explained by concerns for treaty effectiveness. While accommodating the US in the original negotiations came at a high environmental cost, it would have been more detrimental to lose the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. After the US withdrawal, however, non-hegemonic cooperation was more beneficial than the alternative of abandoning the protocol, particularly because European negotiators hoped for an eventual US return to the Kyoto framework. The perception that the US withdrawal violated norms of equity and appropriate diplomatic conduct additionally hardened the European resolve to rescue Kyoto, despite business concerns about potential competitive disadvantages.

This chapter focuses on Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. It looks into the significance of various factors which have affected the ratification and implementation path of Russia, including domestic institutions, interests, and ideas. The interaction of these factors with one another at various stages is also discussed. Apart from international factors, domestic configurations of policymakers’ ideas, electoral and economic interests, and political institutions played a vital role in the ratification decision of the Russian government. Implementation of the agreement depends primarily on domestic process, not like Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The implementation process proceeds effectively if government officials and institutions believe it enhances their institutional authority and if private-sector actors consider themselves potential beneficiaries from Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms.

This chapter discusses the responsibility of the Executive Board (EB), a UN body set up under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to govern the environmental integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). As there is increasing evidence that a high level of environmental integrity has not yet been achieved, the issue dealt with in the chapter is the possibility for judicial review of EB decisions, both within the international climate regime by a review panel (internal review) and separate from it (external review).

Although the term Joint Implementation itself is not mentioned anywhere in the Kyoto Protocol, Article 6 of the Protocol establishes the basis for what has become known as ‘Joint Implementation’ (JI). Jointly with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), JI belongs to the project-based flexible mechanisms defined by the Kyoto Protocol. JI involves the transfer of Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) between Annex I parties that have been generated by projects developed by Parties to the Protocol or authorized legal entities. This chapter first describes the current state of play for JI, explaining the procedural requirements for a successful participation in JI, including providing insights into the so-called Track 1 JI, a modality of the JI mechanism that is often overlooked due to its national rather than global character. Next, the claim that that JI has to accept a life as a wallflower compared to the more glamorous CDM is examined and argued to be untrue. Finally, the post-2012 future of JI is discussed, elaborating upon options for JI reform as well as proposals to introduce new elements to expand the mechanisms' sectoral coverage.

This chapter focuses on the leadership of Japan and post-2001 Kyoto Protocol politics. It addresses a series of issues, including the reason behind the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the commitment made by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda relating to 60 to 80 percent cuts in emissions by 2050. The chapter examines how interests, institutions, and ideas affect decision making and looks at ideas and embedded symbols with the presentation of a political framework for the constitution of such symbols. Finally, it analyzes the empirical sequence leading to ratification and also contrasts ratification with the politics of implementation.

This chapter proposes the creation of global market mechanisms to forestall the rapid and possibly irreversible loss of species and ecosystems. Several distinct mechanisms are proposed here, each addressing a different aspect of the global environment challenge: watersheds, biodiversity, indigenous knowledge, and the global spectrum. All the mechanisms proposed address the same overall topic and follow the same fundamental principles. The global commons is the overriding topic, and each mechanism addresses one aspect of this, and all the mechanisms proposed here are based on the same fundamental principles or imperatives: promoting sustainable use of the Earth's resources, a harmonious relationship between humans and ecosystems, using market-based and self-funded mechanisms that require no donations for their implementation, and decreasing the wealth gap between rich and poor nations and more generally between high- and low-income people, women, men, and children.

Aviation emissions are the fastest growing source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Aviation emissions from Annex I Countries increased by 67% between 1990 and 2005 and, according to some estimates, by as much as 90% when aviation emissions from non-Annex I Countries are included for this period. This chapter examines the current status of international aviation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the ongoing debate over developing measures under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or including the sector in a post-2012 agreement, the moves by the EU to bring international aviation under the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and issues that will need to be considered when implementing measures at the international level to reduce the sector's emissions.

This chapter examines why states decided to delegate key monitoring tasks to private actors in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. It first provides an overview of the origins of the CDM before discussing the involvement of the Global Environment Facility, the World Bank, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the CDM. It also presents three reasons behind delegated authority in the CDM, and specifically why private actors were selected to serve as the “atmospheric police” of the CDM. First, the private sector had relatively long-standing experience in the intricacies of measuring carbon offsets. Second, powerful states agreed that this market mechanism should be part of the Protocol, and that a third-party verifier was needed to monitor the quality of offset projects. Finally, there was a focal institution, the CDM Executive Board, to screen and oversee agents.

This chapter updates the previous chapter. It explains that while the Kyoto Protocol has entered into force, it is still unlikely to change behavior because the fundamental problems with this agreement have not been addressed. It illustrates the case for failure by the example of another, seemingly ingenious agreement — the Stability and Growth Pact that underpins European Monetary Union. This chapter also reconsiders the goals of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. It argues that the aim of avoiding “dangerous interference” with the climate system is unhelpful, since this level of atmospheric concentrations cannot be identified, and this approach focuses attention on quantitative limits when it would be better to focus efforts on taking “appropriate measures”.