Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean ...
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The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. Paul Horwich’s answer takes off from Wittgenstein’s appealingly demystifying remark, that the meaning of a term is nothing over and above its use, and proceeds with a groundbreaking articulation and defence of that idea, showing how it can deal successfully with Quinean and Kripkean forms of scepticism about meaning, with the various normative features of thought and language, with the paradoxical phenomenon of vagueness, with the way that word-meanings combine to yield sentence-meanings, and with Chomsky-style models of the language faculty. The main lines of this theory were first suggested in Horwich’s 1998 book, Meaning. The present volume (which requires no familiarity with its predecessor) provides a host of improved, formulations, fresh arguments, responses to criticism, and extensions of the position into new areas.Less
The broad aim of this work is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental/neural symbols are able to capture the world, that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. Paul Horwich’s answer takes off from Wittgenstein’s appealingly demystifying remark, that the meaning of a term is nothing over and above its use, and proceeds with a groundbreaking articulation and defence of that idea, showing how it can deal successfully with Quinean and Kripkean forms of scepticism about meaning, with the various normative features of thought and language, with the paradoxical phenomenon of vagueness, with the way that word-meanings combine to yield sentence-meanings, and with Chomsky-style models of the language faculty. The main lines of this theory were first suggested in Horwich’s 1998 book, Meaning. The present volume (which requires no familiarity with its predecessor) provides a host of improved, formulations, fresh arguments, responses to criticism, and extensions of the position into new areas.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means ...
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This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.Less
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199230747
- eISBN:
- 9780191710933
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230747.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This brief chapter summarizes what has been achieved in the previous three chapters, and compares the results to the internal Kleene-based Kripke theory, and also to the attempt to get a naïve truth ...
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This brief chapter summarizes what has been achieved in the previous three chapters, and compares the results to the internal Kleene-based Kripke theory, and also to the attempt to get a naïve truth theory for continuum-valued semantics.Less
This brief chapter summarizes what has been achieved in the previous three chapters, and compares the results to the internal Kleene-based Kripke theory, and also to the attempt to get a naïve truth theory for continuum-valued semantics.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in ...
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There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence, caring, and compassion and their place in the moral life. This book seeks to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so primarily in terms of the notion of empathy. Hume tried to do something like this more than two centuries ago, though he didn't have the word empathy and used the term sympathy instead. But Hume misconstrued the phenomenology of moral approval and disapproval, and the nascent theories of moral meaning he grounded in approval and disapproval allow for (much) less objectivity than moral judgments seem to possess. The present book uses a semi‐Kripkean reference‐fixing view of terms like right and wrong to show how moral claims can be objectively valid a priori and yet at the same time action‐guiding and motivating — something that Kantian ethics seeks to provide, but sentimentalism turns out to be more capable of giving us. In addition to dealing with semantic issues, this book shows how sentimentalist forms of moral education and moral learning are possible; and in its later chapters, it also focuses on normative issues of public morality: discussing respect, autonomy, justice, and objectivity itself in strictly sentimentalist care‐ethical terms and demonstrating that such an approach can be thoroughly feminist in its implications and goals. Rationalism now dominates the scene in moral philosophy, but there are signs of change, and this book works to encourage those possibilities.Less
There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence, caring, and compassion and their place in the moral life. This book seeks to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so primarily in terms of the notion of empathy. Hume tried to do something like this more than two centuries ago, though he didn't have the word empathy and used the term sympathy instead. But Hume misconstrued the phenomenology of moral approval and disapproval, and the nascent theories of moral meaning he grounded in approval and disapproval allow for (much) less objectivity than moral judgments seem to possess. The present book uses a semi‐Kripkean reference‐fixing view of terms like right and wrong to show how moral claims can be objectively valid a priori and yet at the same time action‐guiding and motivating — something that Kantian ethics seeks to provide, but sentimentalism turns out to be more capable of giving us. In addition to dealing with semantic issues, this book shows how sentimentalist forms of moral education and moral learning are possible; and in its later chapters, it also focuses on normative issues of public morality: discussing respect, autonomy, justice, and objectivity itself in strictly sentimentalist care‐ethical terms and demonstrating that such an approach can be thoroughly feminist in its implications and goals. Rationalism now dominates the scene in moral philosophy, but there are signs of change, and this book works to encourage those possibilities.
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199247295
- eISBN:
- 9780191601781
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199247293.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
At least since the work of Tarski, the Liar paradox has stood in the way of an acceptable account of the notion of truth. It has been less noticed that once one admits a truth predicate into a formal ...
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At least since the work of Tarski, the Liar paradox has stood in the way of an acceptable account of the notion of truth. It has been less noticed that once one admits a truth predicate into a formal language, along with intuitively valid inferences involving the truth predicate, standard classical logic becomes inconsistent. So, any acceptable account of truth must both explicate how sentences get the truth values they have and amend classical logic to avoid the inconsistency. A natural account of a trivalent semantics arises from treating the problem of assigning truth values to sentences as akin to a boundary‐value problem in physics. The resulting theory solves the Liar paradox while avoiding the usual ‘revenge’ problems. It also suggests a natural modification of classical logic that blocks the paradoxical reasoning. This semantic theory is wedded to an account of the normative standards governing assertion and denial of sentence and a metaphysical analysis truth and factuality. The result is an account in which sentences like the Liar sentence are neither true nor false, and correspond to no facts.Less
At least since the work of Tarski, the Liar paradox has stood in the way of an acceptable account of the notion of truth. It has been less noticed that once one admits a truth predicate into a formal language, along with intuitively valid inferences involving the truth predicate, standard classical logic becomes inconsistent. So, any acceptable account of truth must both explicate how sentences get the truth values they have and amend classical logic to avoid the inconsistency. A natural account of a trivalent semantics arises from treating the problem of assigning truth values to sentences as akin to a boundary‐value problem in physics. The resulting theory solves the Liar paradox while avoiding the usual ‘revenge’ problems. It also suggests a natural modification of classical logic that blocks the paradoxical reasoning. This semantic theory is wedded to an account of the normative standards governing assertion and denial of sentence and a metaphysical analysis truth and factuality. The result is an account in which sentences like the Liar sentence are neither true nor false, and correspond to no facts.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195123357
- eISBN:
- 9780199872114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195123352.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is ...
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Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.Less
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145281
- eISBN:
- 9780199833702
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145283.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In ...
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In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames strengthens Kripke's attack, while also providing a positive theory of the semantics and pragmatics of names. Using a new conception of how the meaning of a sentence relates to the information asserted and conveyed by utterances, Soames argues that the meaning of a linguistically simple name is its referent, and that the meaning of a linguistically complex, partially descriptive, name is a compound that includes both its referent and a partial description. After illustrating these analyses with simple sentences containing names, Soames extends them to sentences that report the assertions and beliefs of agents. Appealing again to his new understanding of the relationship between meaning and information asserted and conveyed, Soames attempts to reconcile the central semantic doctrines of Millianism and Russellianism with Fregean intuitions about the information carried by belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions. Finally, Soames investigates the relationship between proper names and natural kind terms, including mass nouns, count nouns, and adjectives functioning as predicates. After showing that natural kind predicates do not fit reasonable definitions of rigidity, he argues that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Finally, Soames uses key elements of Kripke's discussion to construct an alternative explanation of the necessary a posteriori character of these sentences that is based on the nondescriptionality of simple natural kind predicates, and the manner in which their meaning and reference is determined.Less
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke undermined descriptive analyses of names by showing that names are rigid designators; thereby telling us what their meanings are not, but not what they are. In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames strengthens Kripke's attack, while also providing a positive theory of the semantics and pragmatics of names. Using a new conception of how the meaning of a sentence relates to the information asserted and conveyed by utterances, Soames argues that the meaning of a linguistically simple name is its referent, and that the meaning of a linguistically complex, partially descriptive, name is a compound that includes both its referent and a partial description. After illustrating these analyses with simple sentences containing names, Soames extends them to sentences that report the assertions and beliefs of agents. Appealing again to his new understanding of the relationship between meaning and information asserted and conveyed, Soames attempts to reconcile the central semantic doctrines of Millianism and Russellianism with Fregean intuitions about the information carried by belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions. Finally, Soames investigates the relationship between proper names and natural kind terms, including mass nouns, count nouns, and adjectives functioning as predicates. After showing that natural kind predicates do not fit reasonable definitions of rigidity, he argues that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Finally, Soames uses key elements of Kripke's discussion to construct an alternative explanation of the necessary a posteriori character of these sentences that is based on the nondescriptionality of simple natural kind predicates, and the manner in which their meaning and reference is determined.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. ...
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The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.Less
The distinction between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity is examined. An account is advanced of the logical form of statements of natural law, contrasting with that of D. M. Armstrong. The relationship between law-statements and counterfactual conditionals is discussed. The claim of scientific essentialists that natural laws are metaphysically necessary is challenged as resting on a questionable account of the identity conditions of properties. It is argued that Saul Kripke’s model of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths does not enable us to understand how knowledge of natural laws is possible on the scientific essentialist view of them.
P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Consists of 13 thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein’s ...
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Consists of 13 thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the following essays fall into two classes: those that investigate connections between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and other philosophers and philosophical trends, and those which enter into some of the controversies that, over the last two decades, have raged over the interpretation of one aspect or another of Wittgenstein’s writings. The connections that are explored include the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the humanistic and hermeneutic traditions in European philosophy, Wittgenstein’s response to Frazer’s Golden Bough and the interpretation of ritual actions, his attitude towards and criticisms of Frege (both in the Tractatus and in the later philosophy), the relationship between his ideas and those of members of the Vienna Circle on the matter of ostensive definition, and a comparison of Carnap’s conception of the elimination of metaphysics and of Strawson’s rehabilitation of metaphysics with Wittgenstein's later criticisms of metaphysics. The controversies into which Hacker enters include the Diamond–Conant interpretation of the Tractatus (which is shown to be inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus and with Wittgenstein’s explanations of and comments on his book), Winch's interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule (which is demonstrated to be remote from Wittgenstein’s intentions), and Malcolm’s defence of the idea that Wittgenstein claimed that mastery of a language logically requires that the language be shared with other speakers. These far-ranging essays, several of them difficult to find or not published elsewhere, shed much light on different aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, and on the controversies that it has stimulated.Less
Consists of 13 thematically linked essays on different aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, by one of the leading commentators on his work. After an opening overview of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the following essays fall into two classes: those that investigate connections between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and other philosophers and philosophical trends, and those which enter into some of the controversies that, over the last two decades, have raged over the interpretation of one aspect or another of Wittgenstein’s writings. The connections that are explored include the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the humanistic and hermeneutic traditions in European philosophy, Wittgenstein’s response to Frazer’s Golden Bough and the interpretation of ritual actions, his attitude towards and criticisms of Frege (both in the Tractatus and in the later philosophy), the relationship between his ideas and those of members of the Vienna Circle on the matter of ostensive definition, and a comparison of Carnap’s conception of the elimination of metaphysics and of Strawson’s rehabilitation of metaphysics with Wittgenstein's later criticisms of metaphysics. The controversies into which Hacker enters include the Diamond–Conant interpretation of the Tractatus (which is shown to be inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus and with Wittgenstein’s explanations of and comments on his book), Winch's interpretation of the Tractatus conception of names, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule (which is demonstrated to be remote from Wittgenstein’s intentions), and Malcolm’s defence of the idea that Wittgenstein claimed that mastery of a language logically requires that the language be shared with other speakers. These far-ranging essays, several of them difficult to find or not published elsewhere, shed much light on different aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought, and on the controversies that it has stimulated.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an ...
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Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.Less
Following Nathan Salmon and D. H. Mellor, this chapter argues that natural kind essentialism of the type advocated by Kripke and Putnam is not an inevitable consequence of the adoption of an anti-descriptivist semantic theory of natural kind terms. It attempts to clarify various issues about the characteristics of natural kind essentialism and its relation to semantic theory, as well as reinforcing the distinction made earlier in the book between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds. The author remains agnostic on the question of the truth of essentialism about natural kinds, but suggests reasons for scepticism about its plausibility in comparison with some weaker views, such as the theory that a natural kind has a Lockean ‘real essence’ which need not belong to the kind in all possible worlds.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view ...
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This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view emerges when we notice that Kripke, the philosopher who did most to make it prominent, also considered and rejected it. The lesson of Kripke’s discussion on this point is that the mere idea of a posteriori entailment does not solve the problem of experience, and therefore that a proponent of the a posteriori entailment view is obliged to add further material. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a posteriori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.Less
This chapter presents the view that the supervenience of the experiential on the non-experiential is irreducibly a posteriori — the a posteriori entailment view. The main problem for this view emerges when we notice that Kripke, the philosopher who did most to make it prominent, also considered and rejected it. The lesson of Kripke’s discussion on this point is that the mere idea of a posteriori entailment does not solve the problem of experience, and therefore that a proponent of the a posteriori entailment view is obliged to add further material. On the other hand, an examination of what this further material might be yields the result that either the a posteriori entailment view has no answer to the arguments, or else collapses into the epistemic view.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the intuitive appeal of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis can be explained by seeing the thesis as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical ‘branching model’ of de re ...
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This chapter argues that the intuitive appeal of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis can be explained by seeing the thesis as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical ‘branching model’ of de re possibilities, which, in turn, rests on two principles concerning possibility, time, and identity called ‘the assumption of open futures’ and ‘the overlap requirement’. This explanation of the necessity of origin intuition is defended against a standard objection, and compared with two other proposed explanations. It is also argued that the explanation of the intuitive appeal of the necessity of origin thesis does not justify that thesis, principally because the ultimate defensibility of the overlap requirement is doubtful. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the necessity of origin thesis advocated by Kripke and others should be rejected in favour of a weaker thesis called ‘the tenacity of origin’, that does not imply that distinctive features of an individual’s origin are among its essential properties.Less
This chapter argues that the intuitive appeal of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis can be explained by seeing the thesis as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical ‘branching model’ of de re possibilities, which, in turn, rests on two principles concerning possibility, time, and identity called ‘the assumption of open futures’ and ‘the overlap requirement’. This explanation of the necessity of origin intuition is defended against a standard objection, and compared with two other proposed explanations. It is also argued that the explanation of the intuitive appeal of the necessity of origin thesis does not justify that thesis, principally because the ultimate defensibility of the overlap requirement is doubtful. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the necessity of origin thesis advocated by Kripke and others should be rejected in favour of a weaker thesis called ‘the tenacity of origin’, that does not imply that distinctive features of an individual’s origin are among its essential properties.
Paul Horwich
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199251247
- eISBN:
- 9780191603983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925124X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of ...
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It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of all dogs and only of dogs. This chapter makes explicit and criticizes the assumptions on which Kripke’s position is founded. First, that in order for the meaning of a given word (e.g., dog) to be constituted by its having a given use, we would have to be able to read off (and hence give an explanation of) the word’s extension on the basis of that use. Second, for this to be possible, there would have to be some way of weeding out those uses that are errors (i.e., cases in which the word is applied to things other than dogs). It is argued that these assumptions are incorrect, since they are affiliated with an anti-deflationary conception of truth.Less
It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of all dogs and only of dogs. This chapter makes explicit and criticizes the assumptions on which Kripke’s position is founded. First, that in order for the meaning of a given word (e.g., dog) to be constituted by its having a given use, we would have to be able to read off (and hence give an explanation of) the word’s extension on the basis of that use. Second, for this to be possible, there would have to be some way of weeding out those uses that are errors (i.e., cases in which the word is applied to things other than dogs). It is argued that these assumptions are incorrect, since they are affiliated with an anti-deflationary conception of truth.
Neil Feit
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195341362
- eISBN:
- 9780199866922
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter applies the property theory of content to an important problem in the philosophy of mind and philosophical semantics, namely, Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. The first section ...
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This chapter applies the property theory of content to an important problem in the philosophy of mind and philosophical semantics, namely, Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. The first section discusses the details of the puzzle and the principles associated with it. The puzzle gives rise to an argument that seems to refute one of the basic principles underlying our ordinary discourse about what we believe. This argument is the subject of the second section, wherein it is suggested that in addition to the principles discussed by Kripke, there are other, more dubious, principles behind some of the premises. The third section contains a diagnosis of the argument, according to which each of the new principles is ambiguous, and each is false on one of its readings. The upshot is that there is a satisfying, property-theoretic way to solve Kripke's puzzle by distinguishing two senses in which a subject can be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer, but Kripke's puzzle is concerned only with the other one. Finally, the fourth section considers variants of Kripke's puzzle that have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms.Less
This chapter applies the property theory of content to an important problem in the philosophy of mind and philosophical semantics, namely, Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. The first section discusses the details of the puzzle and the principles associated with it. The puzzle gives rise to an argument that seems to refute one of the basic principles underlying our ordinary discourse about what we believe. This argument is the subject of the second section, wherein it is suggested that in addition to the principles discussed by Kripke, there are other, more dubious, principles behind some of the premises. The third section contains a diagnosis of the argument, according to which each of the new principles is ambiguous, and each is false on one of its readings. The upshot is that there is a satisfying, property-theoretic way to solve Kripke's puzzle by distinguishing two senses in which a subject can be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer, but Kripke's puzzle is concerned only with the other one. Finally, the fourth section considers variants of Kripke's puzzle that have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Kripke's claim that the sentence ‘The Standard Meter (if it exists) is exactly one metre long’ is contingent a priori is criticized. It is argued that although the Meter sentence is indeed ...
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Kripke's claim that the sentence ‘The Standard Meter (if it exists) is exactly one metre long’ is contingent a priori is criticized. It is argued that although the Meter sentence is indeed contingent, it is also a posteriori, because the information semantically contained is not the sort of thing that can be known without recourse to experience. An epistemic paradox is extracted from Wittgenstein's enigmatic observation that the Standard cannot be said to be one metre long, but also cannot be said not to be one meter long.Less
Kripke's claim that the sentence ‘The Standard Meter (if it exists) is exactly one metre long’ is contingent a priori is criticized. It is argued that although the Meter sentence is indeed contingent, it is also a posteriori, because the information semantically contained is not the sort of thing that can be known without recourse to experience. An epistemic paradox is extracted from Wittgenstein's enigmatic observation that the Standard cannot be said to be one metre long, but also cannot be said not to be one meter long.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends the idea that there are analytic entailments among our sentences against two sorts of prominent objections. In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic ...
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This chapter defends the idea that there are analytic entailments among our sentences against two sorts of prominent objections. In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, it suggests that analytic interrelations may be understood as grounded in (tacit, collective) legislations of the rules of use for our terms. Against objections based on a Kripkean approach to reference, it argues that those inclined to causal theories should accept a hybrid theory of reference in order to overcome both the qua problem and the problem of singular nonexistence claims. This hybrid theory acknowledges that our general and singular nominative terms have determinate reference only to the extent that they are associated with frame-level conceptual content, in the form of application and coapplication conditions that fix the category of entity to be referred to. This minimal conceptual content can underpin the analytic entailments discussed in Chapter 1.Less
This chapter defends the idea that there are analytic entailments among our sentences against two sorts of prominent objections. In response to Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, it suggests that analytic interrelations may be understood as grounded in (tacit, collective) legislations of the rules of use for our terms. Against objections based on a Kripkean approach to reference, it argues that those inclined to causal theories should accept a hybrid theory of reference in order to overcome both the qua problem and the problem of singular nonexistence claims. This hybrid theory acknowledges that our general and singular nominative terms have determinate reference only to the extent that they are associated with frame-level conceptual content, in the form of application and coapplication conditions that fix the category of entity to be referred to. This minimal conceptual content can underpin the analytic entailments discussed in Chapter 1.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the purpose of the book, which is to defend semantic realism against Kripke's sceptical attack. According to the semantic realist, to understand ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the purpose of the book, which is to defend semantic realism against Kripke's sceptical attack. According to the semantic realist, to understand the meaning of a word (mental representation) is to know its correctness conditions, and that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth conditions. Semantic realism, on this definition, is compatible with a variety of metaphysical theories of which grasp of correctness conditions or truth conditions consist in. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the purpose of the book, which is to defend semantic realism against Kripke's sceptical attack. According to the semantic realist, to understand the meaning of a word (mental representation) is to know its correctness conditions, and that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth conditions. Semantic realism, on this definition, is compatible with a variety of metaphysical theories of which grasp of correctness conditions or truth conditions consist in. An overview of the succeeding chapters is presented.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents the sceptical argument as Kripke formulated it. It argues that the argument is deficient in a number of respects, and suggests how the thesis that meaning is normative — to ...
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This chapter presents the sceptical argument as Kripke formulated it. It argues that the argument is deficient in a number of respects, and suggests how the thesis that meaning is normative — to which Kripke subscribes — can remove the deficiencies.Less
This chapter presents the sceptical argument as Kripke formulated it. It argues that the argument is deficient in a number of respects, and suggests how the thesis that meaning is normative — to which Kripke subscribes — can remove the deficiencies.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter lays out the meta-ethical arguments and assumptions Kripke would need to make in order to remove the gaps in the sceptical argument as he presents it. It considers a more detailed ...
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This chapter lays out the meta-ethical arguments and assumptions Kripke would need to make in order to remove the gaps in the sceptical argument as he presents it. It considers a more detailed account of the thesis that meaning is normative and its role in the sceptical argument. It argues that the assumption that meaning is normative does not follow directly from semantic realism, but from the assumption that understanding the meaning of a word is analogous to following a rule for its correct use. This, however, gives rise to two alternative interpretations of the claim that meaning is normative: Norm-Relativity and Normativity. It then argues that if meaning is normative, arguments commonly made in meta-ethics with regard to moral statements, can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to meaning statements. These arguments can be made against both reductive and non-reductive accounts of the facts that putatively make meaning ascriptions true. If the sceptic is entitled to the thesis that meaning is normative, and if he is entitled to certain meta-ethical claims, he seems to be able to argue, a priori, that there is no fact of the matter to what anybody means. In contrast, if meaning is merely norm-relative, no such disastrous conclusion follows.Less
This chapter lays out the meta-ethical arguments and assumptions Kripke would need to make in order to remove the gaps in the sceptical argument as he presents it. It considers a more detailed account of the thesis that meaning is normative and its role in the sceptical argument. It argues that the assumption that meaning is normative does not follow directly from semantic realism, but from the assumption that understanding the meaning of a word is analogous to following a rule for its correct use. This, however, gives rise to two alternative interpretations of the claim that meaning is normative: Norm-Relativity and Normativity. It then argues that if meaning is normative, arguments commonly made in meta-ethics with regard to moral statements, can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to meaning statements. These arguments can be made against both reductive and non-reductive accounts of the facts that putatively make meaning ascriptions true. If the sceptic is entitled to the thesis that meaning is normative, and if he is entitled to certain meta-ethical claims, he seems to be able to argue, a priori, that there is no fact of the matter to what anybody means. In contrast, if meaning is merely norm-relative, no such disastrous conclusion follows.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion ...
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This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a ‘sceptical solution’ which purports to show that although semantic realism is false, our ascriptions of meaning and content are nevertheless legitimate. Since the appearance of a paradox in the sceptical conclusion cannot be resolved, the chapter provisionally concludes that the argument must falter somewhere.Less
This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a ‘sceptical solution’ which purports to show that although semantic realism is false, our ascriptions of meaning and content are nevertheless legitimate. Since the appearance of a paradox in the sceptical conclusion cannot be resolved, the chapter provisionally concludes that the argument must falter somewhere.