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Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

Chapter 2 provides a chronological as well as theoretically founded introduction to the origins of Albanian organized crime in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia. It studies the impact of wars, institutional ambivalence, and normlessness (or “culture conflict”) on the strengthening of criminal-political ties and the rise in organized crime in post-communist Albanian society. The effects of neoliberalism, consumerism, and economic strain have been examined in this context, too. This chapter argues that understanding the impact of emotions and non-economic interests is essential for understanding human behavior. The chapter pursues the following questions: Is organized crime as much about hatred, frustration and excitement as it is about poverty, possessing, and wealth? Has the Albanian customary Kanun laws led to a drastic increase in violent and organized crime in Albania? What can a study of societies permeated by a history of violence, patriarchate, and incomplete modernization tell us about the motivations and decision-making processes of organized crime figures? This chapter shed lights on the rational and normative-affective dimensions of organized crime to understand Albanian criminality.

Pardew shifts to the State Department effort to respond to growing tensions between Serbia and the Albanians in Kosovo. When traditional Kosovo Albanian leaders fail to restore autonomy by political means, the Kosovo Liberation Army demands independence and attacks Serbian security forces. Milosevic, declaring a special Serbian historical claim to Kosovo, orders a military and police crackdown on the Albanians there. Secretary Albright is determined to prevent Milosevic from doing in Kosovo what he did in Bosnia.

This chapter focuses on Albania’s involvement in the Kosovo war of 1998–1999. Most Albanians in Kosovo cheered the establishment of pluralism in Albania and the creation of the Democratic Party (DP) headed by Sali Berisha. Berisha’s ardent calls for national unity in the early days of the DP gave the Kosovo Albanians hope that Albania would finally come to their aid. This chapter examines the role of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the Kosovo conflict. It considers the link between Xhavit Haliti, one of the KLA’s key founders, and Albanian President Ramiz Alia, who believed that Kosovo could be liberated only by force, and Berisha’s collaboration with Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo. It also discusses the signing of the Dayton Accords, which brought the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Bosnia and created a bifurcated Bosnia with one part for the Croats and Muslims and another for the Serbs. Finally, it looks at the stand of the new Albanian government of Fatos Nano regarding the war in Kosovo.

This chapter focuses on Albania’s clandestine support of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the Kosovo war of 1998–1999. On March 5, 1998, Serbian forces attacked Adem Jashari, a local KLA fighter in the nearby village of Prekaz, killing him and an estimated forty-two members of his family. The killings incited Albanians in Kosovo and drove villagers to join the KLA. Prime Minister Fatos Nano agreed that the Albanian intelligence service could continue its clandestine support of the KLA, but the government could not be publicly involved. According to the formula, Albanian diplomacy supported mediation efforts with Ibrahim Rugova, while trying to convince Europe and the United States to trust the KLA. Meanwhile, Albania’s Shërbimi Informativ Kombëtar (SHIK) continued to help the KLA organize and arm. The KLA, for its part, tried to fulfill the three promises it had made to the Central Intelligence Agency: no actions outside Kosovo, no Islamic help, and no funding from drugs.

This chapter focuses on Albania’s role in the Kosovo war of 1998–1999. The ceasefire in Kosovo, combined with international monitors, benefited the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Slobodan Milosevic also used the time to rearm, apparently thinking he could resist international pressure and repel the KLA challenge with force. The Kosovo conflict ended on June 9, 1999, when Milosevic signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Serbian and Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, the entrance of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops, and the province’s administration by the United Nations. In Kosovo, the KLA established a provisional government and tried to assert control. In 2010, a Council of Europe report accused the KLA’s so-called Drenica Group of post-war abductions, killings, and a “handful” of organ theft cases in Albania, plus ties to organized crime. Kosovo found itself fighting a new war: the fight against corruption.

By 2003 ethnic Albanian organized crime reached its height on the agendas of many Western countries. International and governmental agencies have depicted Albanian organized crime as an emerging and serious threat to “civil society” and “national security.” Despite its publicity, however, Albanian organized crime remains an understudied topic. This chapter introduces the numerous myths that arose in the late 1990s about a ruthless, hierarchically structured and ethnically homogenous Albanian Mafia that was quickly taking control over foreign territories. It also elaborates on the research methods used to collect data on organized crime, ranging from interviews with organized crime offenders, victims and law enforcement officials to analysis of court and police files.