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This chapter rejects the view that Wiggins’s and McDowell’s theories of moral motivation postulate an objectionable form of inherent normativity in a moral agent’s recognition of value. Their position is no worse off in this regard than anyone else’s, specifically Korsgaard’s. McDowell’s position, and the conflation of different considerations in his metaphor of ‘silencing’ and Wiggins’s genealogy of categorical obligations are described.

Christine Korsgaard surveys several ways of warranting ethics (Hobbes, Puffendorff, Moore, Ross, Nagel, Hutcheson, Hume, Mill, Williams). She chooses a neo‐Kantian approach. But Goodman finds her solution suppositious and her problematic artificial. Ethics, he argues, needs no justification. The dependence of all values on God does not imply an arbitrary authority. Indeed, monotheism finds incoherent the notion that divine authority would be arbitrary. Goodman engages critically with exponents of Jewish legal positivism and with Hare regarding divine command ethics, arguing against the ideas of original sin and the inadequacy of the Mosaic law.

Recent interpreters of Kant, such as Wood and Korsgaard, have identified several powerful arguments that purport to refute all ethical theories other than Kant’s own. But Buddhists have the resources to respond to these arguments. They can block the regress to humanity as an end by rejecting Kant’s criticisms of the intrinsic value of happiness. Kant argues that autonomous self-legislation is the only possible source of moral obligation. But Kant’s views depend on regarding the rational mind as an autonomous self, an indefensible attitude. Buddhists present an ethical perspective that does not involve autonomy or a self. Wood’s transcendental argument for the necessity of seeing ourselves as free is a failure. And Korsgaard’s arguments for the practical necessity of the idea of freedom apply only to ordinary people, and not to advanced spiritual practitioners, who have access to a better state that doesn’t involve constructing an identity.

These introduce the idea of a social picture of reasoning as a picture of an activity of living together that is obscured by trying to understand this activity from within a picture of reasoning as end-driven and calculative. It discusses five central features of the social picture of reasoning: that reasoning is (1) an activity that is (2) social, (3) ongoing and consists in (4) issuing invitations to others to (5) accept what we say as speaking for them as well. These features are contrasted with features of the standard picture of reason which (1) analyzes reasoning in terms of reason, (2) does not make reason essentially social, (3) takes reasoning to be end-directed, (4) regards reasons as law-like and thus on the order of commands and (5) are concerned not with what we can say but what is the case. The chapter ends with a discussion of the methodology of the book and a plan of the rest of the book.

Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Imperative express basic requirements to universalize our maxims, respect humanity as an end in itself, and conform to the more specific moral principles that we do or would will as rational persons with autonomy. Kantians disagree about the interpretation and relative importance of these various formulations, but most now agree that, although they provide no algorithms, the formulations can be helpful in guiding moral deliberation and judgment. This chapter explains the basic features of the formulations, reviews different interpretations, and notes various problems that each formulation raises. Views of Alan Donagan, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, H.J. Paton, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, and Allen Wood are reviewed briefly A primary aim is to call attention to the different ways in which contemporary Kantians have attempted to develop Kant’s normative ethics. A secondary aim is to show how Kantian ethics, under different interpretations, addresses the question when and why we are morally required to help others. Kant’s theory is justly famous for its insistence that pursuit of happiness, for oneself and others, is constrained by moral requirements of justice and respect for human dignity. Kant also argues, however, that it is categorically imperative for us to make it our maxim to promote the happiness of others. It is currently a matter of controversy how much latitude this requirement is supposed to leave us to pursue non-obligatory projects of our own. Focusing on beneficence to illustrate various contemporary developments in Kantian ethical theory helps to bring out similarities and differences among them and may reveal some relative strengths and weaknesses.

Chapter 4 draws some of the broader consequences of the anti-naturalist assumptions of the theory of autonomy defended here, by looking both at alternative readings of Kant and at broader questions addressed in contemporary moral philosophy about the precise force of practical reasons in our lives. First, focusing on Guyer’s and Korsgaard’s arguments, it is shown that naturalism provides the framework for influential contemporary interpretations of Kantian autonomy but that its support is dispensable. Following this, the chapter addresses the external reasons and categoricity debates and examines their application to Kantian autonomy. The aim is to show that it is possible to develop an account that is externalist and so anti-Humean about practical reasons but not necessarily anti-Humean about motivation. Having established this, attention turns to the ethical substance of autonomy, its intersubjective normative content. This discussion links up with the first chapter and addresses the universalizability formula of right and apriority in ethics. Consistent with the argument of the previous chapter that focuses on ‘right’ rather than the derivation of specific duties, it is argued that universalizability has moral content and the different ways it can guide our moral thinking are shown.

This chapter asks what positive reason we might have to accept the searchlight view. Because the searchlight view holds that agents are responsible only for the features of their acts of which they were aware when they deliberated, the chapter examines the hypothesis that that view codifies a conception of responsibility that has its origins in the deliberative perspective. The idea that responsibility is a practical concept has been defended by Christine Korsgaard and Hilary Bok, so the chapter takes its lead from their discussions. Its main conclusions are that the practical approach to responsibility cannot capture the concept's applicability to (1) acts we have already performed and (2) the acts of others.

An ambitious vindication of morality – an argument beginning from premises that an Egoist will accept that Egoism is false – is the Holy Grail of moral philosophy. This chapter discusses some recent attempts to give this kind of vindication. The first strategy considered is an argument that no adequate theory of practical reason can include only Egoist reasons. Nagel, Korsgaard, and Allison all offer different versions of this argument. Nagel claims that an Egoist is guilty of ‘practical solipsism’; Korsgaard, that Egoist reasons are improperly ‘private’; and Allison, working within a Kantian framework, tries to show that only someone who acts for moral reasons can be autonomous. The second strategy is to attack the metaphysical presuppositions of the theory. Parfit argues that Egoism is inconsistent with the most plausible metaphysics of personal identity. It is argued that all these arguments fail, and the implication of these failures is assessed.

In several works, Kant claims that lying is always wrong, no matter what. He is probably the most well‐known defender of an absolute prohibition against lying in the history of Western philosophy. The chapter surveys what Kant says about lying in his writings. It is noteworthy that he never directly appeals to the categorical imperative in any of his arguments to show that lying is always wrong. The chapter argues that the universal law version of the categorical imperative does not imply that lying is always wrong – one can consistently will that everyone follows maxims or principles that sometimes permit lying. Korsgaard to the contrary, the second version of the categorical imperative, which says that we should never treat another person as a mere means, does not imply that lying is never permissible. The chapter contends that Korsgaard's arguments rest on contentious interpretations of several ambiguous passages in Kant. None of the versions of the categorical imperative commits Kant to an absolute prohibition against lying. Not only does Kant fail to give a compelling argument for an absolute prohibition against lying, there are positive reasons to reject his absolutism. The duty not to lie can conflict with other moral duties. If lying is always wrong no matter what, then the duty not to lie must always be more important than any conflicting duty. However, it is most implausible to hold that the duty not to lie is always more important than any conflicting duty. Kant's own example of lying to thwart the plans of a would‐be murderer is one of the best illustrations of this.

For Kant, moral reciprocity is intensely present in love and friendship, but he is gloomy about sexual love, which can make a person into ‘an object of appetite’. Two interpretations: sexual love can be reductive, regarding the other as a mere body, for physical gratification (Herman); it can be invasive, regarding the other as a person, but one to be annexed, taken over (Korsgaard) — here Proust's description of love provides a ghastly illustration. Both pathologies are solipsistic: the other person disappears, whether by reduction, or by absorption. What is the remedy for this solipsism? The reciprocity in love and friendship, as Kant described.

This article considers Christine Korsgaard's argument for the value of humanity, and the role that her transcendental argument plays in this, to the effect that an agent must value her own humanity. Two forms of that argument are considered, and the second is defended. The analysis of her position is also put in the context of debates about transcendental arguments more generally.

The possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e., the phenomenon of agents acting against their best judgement or reasons, presents a problem for internalism. This chapter reviews and rejects a number of accounts of weakness of will by Donald Davidson, Christine Korsgaard, Alfred Mele, Gary Watson and others. It ends by providing an account weakness of will which is consistent with internalism, as acting against the best reasons that are dispositionally stored in the agent’s mind, but which fail to be causally operative by failing to become occurrent.

The theory on how people evaluate valuable things in life as it is influenced by social conditions is explained in this book, which presents a revised text from the Tanner Lectures on Human Values delivered by the author in March 2001 at the University of California in Berkeley. Philosophers including Christine Korsgaard, Robert Pippin, and Bernard Williams contribute their commentaries on divergent approaches to moral and social philosophy issues. Raz expounds on the social dependence of value by focusing on pluralism, change, and understanding. He also takes critical responses from his commentators, one of which is from Korsgaard, challenging views based on Aristotle and Immanuel Kant, while Pippin scrutinises social dependence in its ironic form as Williams agrees with Pippin’s arguments. Reflecting on responses from Raz, this introduction examines the holistic method that Raz himself deploys in reaching his conclusion about social dependence.

This chapter argues that the doctrine of relativism is almost useless and points out exceptions. This chapter presents in a logical manner the existence of value. Changes in nature and of developing tastes are examined along with political values and Robert Pippin’s views on the connection of historical enquiry to values. It cites Christine Korsgaard’s points of views and considers the failure of teleological tales. Explained further in this commentary is that value pluralism is not a political or ethical ideal but rather a thesis about values.

This chapter distinguishes agential authority from subjective normative authority, argues that a theory of strong forms of human agency needs to provide a coordinated treatment of both, and explains how an appeal to higher-order self-governing policies aims to do this. A basic role of self-governing policies is to support the cross-temporal organization of the deliberation and action of temporally persisting agents like us. A recognition of such policies, and of their role in the temporally extended structure of agency, is a key to a plausible account of kinds of agency and deliberation central to our lives. This chapter explores how one can be led to these ideas by reflection on two interrelated problems in the philosophy of action, and on recent work on these problems by Harry G. Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard. The first problem concerns deliberation while the second deals with the metaphysics of agency.

This chapter is concerned with the Doctrine of Double Effect as well as the Doctrine of Triple Effect. It examines why a rational agent need not intend the means to his end and argues that when an act we have some reason to do causes harm as a side effect, that side effect can contribute to giving us a sufficient reason to do the act that causes the harm because of the causal role of the harm, and yet we need not intend the harm. Sometimes in these cases it is permissible to act even if it would not be permissible to do an act while intending the harm. This point, the chapter claims, will help us to understand better some of the variations of the Trolley Problem. This chapter also discusses the work of Christine Korsgaard on instrumental rationality, Judith Jarvis Thomson's variation on the so-called Trolley Case known as the Loop Case, evil as a cause of good, and Michael Bratman's test for intention.

In one sense, moral status can be defined as what it is morally permissible or impermissible to do to some entity. In this sense, rocks may have the moral status of entities to which, just considering them, it is morally permissible to do anything. Christine Korsgaard has argued that some things may be ends in virtue of their intrinsic properties that give them their intrinsic value, but others may be ends in virtue of their extrinsic properties. There is a difference between one's having a duty to do something and having a duty to a specific entity to do it. If only rational beings can, strictly, be the subjects of directed duties or have rights, what shall we say of infants or the severely retarded? Thomas Scanlon's view seems to be that in virtue of their relation to rational beings—that is, they are early or failed members of a type whose norm it is to be rational—they too have some rights.

According to Kant, we become radically evil when we subordinate the moral law to our own self‐interest (prudence). He holds that we never do wrong for the sake of doing wrong but only for the sake of prudence or from inclinations to more limited goods. Kant neglects the existence of evil interests and desires, and offers a narrow view of possible immoral principles, overlooking principles of national chauvinism, for example, which need not even appear to be prudent. His neglect of suffering and harm to victims results in a theoretical failure to distinguish what is wrong with evils, such as murder and mayhem, from what is wrong with ordinary transgressions, such as petty theft. Although the sources of evil remain a mystery for Kant, Christine Korsgaard's analysis of normativity and Lorna Smith Benjamin's theory of social behavior suggest an answer to Kant's mystery, namely, that our practical principles (whether good or evil) are based on our wishes to be the kind of person who would be worthy of the love or esteem of someone who is (or was) important to us (someone who may be good or evil) and that our principles can change as we abandon those wishes.