Andrew P. N. Eardmann
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198294689
- eISBN:
- 9780191601538
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294689.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any ...
More
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.Less
For Eisenhower, it was nuclear weapons’ destructive potential, not the image of a protracted conventional war, that destroyed the ’logic’ of war. He believed that thermonuclear weapons made any notion of victory incoherent. Meaningful defence could then only be deterrence. Facing this new setting, Eisenhower reassessed the dynamics of international relations and altered his behaviour accordingly. During his first three years as president, he relied on the ’Detroit Deterrent’, the belief that the US industrial capacity would enable it to triumph in any such war of attrition. By 1956, however, the combination of thermonuclear weapons and growing Soviet intercontinental delivery capabilities made Detroit Deterrent obsolete in his mind. By the end of his presidency, therefore, superpower relations had begun to operate according to this new logic, the logic of ’thermonuclear revolution’.
Austin Carson
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780691181769
- eISBN:
- 9780691184241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691181769.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter shifts the focus to the early Cold War, as conflict between North and South Korea threatened to again plunge the wider international system into war. The Korean War, fought from 1950 to ...
More
This chapter shifts the focus to the early Cold War, as conflict between North and South Korea threatened to again plunge the wider international system into war. The Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953, grew to include multiple outside interventions. Yet despite Soviet, American, and Chinese combat participation, the war was successfully limited to the Korean peninsula. As such, this chapter reviews primary materials on a poorly understood aspect of the Korean War: Soviet–American air-to-air combat over North Korea. Records released since the end of the Cold War document how Washington and Moscow engaged in a deadly multiyear struggle for air supremacy and used secrecy to contain its effects. The chapter includes new archival material on American intelligence showing anticipation, detection, and concealment of the Soviet covert entry. It also assesses the United States' initial decision to intervene overtly, its turn to covert action against mainland China, and China's complex role in the war. This chapter argues that China's initial ground intervention used secrecy to achieve surprise, following an operational security logic, but used an unacknowledged “volunteer” intervention to limit the war.Less
This chapter shifts the focus to the early Cold War, as conflict between North and South Korea threatened to again plunge the wider international system into war. The Korean War, fought from 1950 to 1953, grew to include multiple outside interventions. Yet despite Soviet, American, and Chinese combat participation, the war was successfully limited to the Korean peninsula. As such, this chapter reviews primary materials on a poorly understood aspect of the Korean War: Soviet–American air-to-air combat over North Korea. Records released since the end of the Cold War document how Washington and Moscow engaged in a deadly multiyear struggle for air supremacy and used secrecy to contain its effects. The chapter includes new archival material on American intelligence showing anticipation, detection, and concealment of the Soviet covert entry. It also assesses the United States' initial decision to intervene overtly, its turn to covert action against mainland China, and China's complex role in the war. This chapter argues that China's initial ground intervention used secrecy to achieve surprise, following an operational security logic, but used an unacknowledged “volunteer” intervention to limit the war.
Thomas J. Christensen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142609
- eISBN:
- 9781400838813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142609.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines two intrawar deterrence failures in Korea in late summer and fall 1950, both of which were related to alliance politics. It shows that lack of coordination and mistrust in the ...
More
This chapter examines two intrawar deterrence failures in Korea in late summer and fall 1950, both of which were related to alliance politics. It shows that lack of coordination and mistrust in the communist camp rendered the alliance incapable of sending clear and timely signals of resolve to the United States that might have deterred the Americans from crossing the 38th parallel in the crucial three weeks following Douglas MacArthur's successful Inchon landing. This same lack of coordination undercut communist efforts at coercive diplomacy. U.S. policies in the early weeks of the Korean War had a powerful impact on strategic thinking in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China about the long-term implications of the military defeat of the North Korean communist regime and the unification of the Korean peninsula under a government friendly to the United States.Less
This chapter examines two intrawar deterrence failures in Korea in late summer and fall 1950, both of which were related to alliance politics. It shows that lack of coordination and mistrust in the communist camp rendered the alliance incapable of sending clear and timely signals of resolve to the United States that might have deterred the Americans from crossing the 38th parallel in the crucial three weeks following Douglas MacArthur's successful Inchon landing. This same lack of coordination undercut communist efforts at coercive diplomacy. U.S. policies in the early weeks of the Korean War had a powerful impact on strategic thinking in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China about the long-term implications of the military defeat of the North Korean communist regime and the unification of the Korean peninsula under a government friendly to the United States.
Thomas J. Christensen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142609
- eISBN:
- 9781400838813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142609.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines how problems and politics in the nascent alliances and alignments in both the communist and anticommunist camps affected security relations between the two camps in the first ...
More
This chapter examines how problems and politics in the nascent alliances and alignments in both the communist and anticommunist camps affected security relations between the two camps in the first years of the Cold War. It shows how the uncertain and poorly defined nature of U.S. commitment to its partners in East Asia undercut the credibility of the nation's near-term threats and long-term assurances in coercive diplomacy. It argues that North Korea's invasion of South Korea that started the Korean War was rooted in a combination of communist elites' underestimation of the resolve and power of the United States to counter such an aggression in the near term and an inflated view of Japan's likely future role in the security politics of the region after its full economic and military recovery from World War II.Less
This chapter examines how problems and politics in the nascent alliances and alignments in both the communist and anticommunist camps affected security relations between the two camps in the first years of the Cold War. It shows how the uncertain and poorly defined nature of U.S. commitment to its partners in East Asia undercut the credibility of the nation's near-term threats and long-term assurances in coercive diplomacy. It argues that North Korea's invasion of South Korea that started the Korean War was rooted in a combination of communist elites' underestimation of the resolve and power of the United States to counter such an aggression in the near term and an inflated view of Japan's likely future role in the security politics of the region after its full economic and military recovery from World War II.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first ...
More
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.Less
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks at the halting and sometimes chaotic efforts of Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. It examines the relationships that they and their subordinates developed with a host of other institutions, from Congress and the press to Hollywood and labor. And it assesses the complex and fraught interactions between the military and war correspondents in the battlefield theater itself. From high politics to bitter media spats, this book guides the reader through the domestic debates of this messy, costly war. It highlights the actions and calculations of colorful figures, including Taft, McCarthy, and MacArthur. It details how the culture and work routines of Congress and the media influenced political tactics and daily news stories. And the book explores how different phases of the war threw up different problems.
Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195390964
- eISBN:
- 9780199776788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390964.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Through a series of empirical analyses of individual-level survey data from the National Election Study and the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, as well as analysis of aggregate electoral turnout ...
More
Through a series of empirical analyses of individual-level survey data from the National Election Study and the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, as well as analysis of aggregate electoral turnout data at the county level, this chapter examines the immediate and lasting effects of the considerable variance in communities' wartime experience in Vietnam, Korea, and World War II, on their residents' patterns of political engagement and participation. The analysis reveals very different dynamics in the wake of the three conflicts. Across the data sets, statistical models find that respondents from communities that suffered higher casualty rates in Vietnam and Korea reported lower levels of trust in government, interest in politics, and electoral and nonelectoral political participation than respondents with identical demographic characteristics from cities and towns that sustained lower casualty rates in these conflicts. By contrast, respondents from communities that endured the heaviest burdens in World War II were just as politically engaged as their peers, if not more so. However, while the conflicts in Vietnam and Korea may have fundamentally reshaped citizens' relationship with the federal government, citizens did not let their resentment toward government policies affect all of their participatory activities. More nuanced data from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey reveal that Vietnam casualty rates had no discernible impact on nonpolitical forms of civic engagement such as charitable giving, volunteering, and organizational activity.Less
Through a series of empirical analyses of individual-level survey data from the National Election Study and the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, as well as analysis of aggregate electoral turnout data at the county level, this chapter examines the immediate and lasting effects of the considerable variance in communities' wartime experience in Vietnam, Korea, and World War II, on their residents' patterns of political engagement and participation. The analysis reveals very different dynamics in the wake of the three conflicts. Across the data sets, statistical models find that respondents from communities that suffered higher casualty rates in Vietnam and Korea reported lower levels of trust in government, interest in politics, and electoral and nonelectoral political participation than respondents with identical demographic characteristics from cities and towns that sustained lower casualty rates in these conflicts. By contrast, respondents from communities that endured the heaviest burdens in World War II were just as politically engaged as their peers, if not more so. However, while the conflicts in Vietnam and Korea may have fundamentally reshaped citizens' relationship with the federal government, citizens did not let their resentment toward government policies affect all of their participatory activities. More nuanced data from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey reveal that Vietnam casualty rates had no discernible impact on nonpolitical forms of civic engagement such as charitable giving, volunteering, and organizational activity.
Geir Lundestad
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266685
- eISBN:
- 9780191601057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266689.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The US and the Western European countries certainly had their differences over various European questions, but all debate took place against the background of a Soviet threat that disturbed the ...
More
The US and the Western European countries certainly had their differences over various European questions, but all debate took place against the background of a Soviet threat that disturbed the entire ‘free world’ and a NATO framework that had been established to deal with this threat. However, disagreements over out‐of‐area disputes (i.e. disputes outside the area covered by core Article 5 of the NATO treaty) between the US and many Western European countries were even more frequent and the common framework much weaker. At the beginning of the post‐war period, the US definitely saw itself as an anti‐colonial power, and its strong anti‐colonial views spurred progress towards independence not only for India and other British colonial territories, but also for those of other European colonies. The different sections of this chapter look at the changing nature of America's colonial policy, particularly in the face of prospects that communists might take control of a former European territory, and at its increasing role in other out‐of‐area questions, over the period 1945–1975. The areas discussed are East Asia (French Indo‐china, China, and the Korean and Vietnamese wars), the Middle East, and Southern Africa and Cuba. In addition a whole separate section is devoted to the Vietnam conflict, and another to the various disputes that led the Nixon administration to pronounce 1973 the ‘Year of Europe’ in an effort to bring the US and Western Europe close after a period of dispute that had involved, in particular, American support to Israel.Less
The US and the Western European countries certainly had their differences over various European questions, but all debate took place against the background of a Soviet threat that disturbed the entire ‘free world’ and a NATO framework that had been established to deal with this threat. However, disagreements over out‐of‐area disputes (i.e. disputes outside the area covered by core Article 5 of the NATO treaty) between the US and many Western European countries were even more frequent and the common framework much weaker. At the beginning of the post‐war period, the US definitely saw itself as an anti‐colonial power, and its strong anti‐colonial views spurred progress towards independence not only for India and other British colonial territories, but also for those of other European colonies. The different sections of this chapter look at the changing nature of America's colonial policy, particularly in the face of prospects that communists might take control of a former European territory, and at its increasing role in other out‐of‐area questions, over the period 1945–1975. The areas discussed are East Asia (French Indo‐china, China, and the Korean and Vietnamese wars), the Middle East, and Southern Africa and Cuba. In addition a whole separate section is devoted to the Vietnam conflict, and another to the various disputes that led the Nixon administration to pronounce 1973 the ‘Year of Europe’ in an effort to bring the US and Western Europe close after a period of dispute that had involved, in particular, American support to Israel.
Thomas J. Christensen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691142609
- eISBN:
- 9781400838813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691142609.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the mixed blessing of enhanced communist coordination during the mid-1950s. During this period, a relatively well-coordinated and organized communist alliance allowed for more ...
More
This chapter examines the mixed blessing of enhanced communist coordination during the mid-1950s. During this period, a relatively well-coordinated and organized communist alliance allowed for more moderation and clearer signaling during the negotiations that ended fighting in the Korean War and the conflict in Indochina. The chapter considers the United States' formation of regional alliances and how the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted in 1954. It shows how a relatively unified allied position on Southeast Asia in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) served as a restraint on the most aggressive members of the alliance, the local communists involved in civil wars: Kim Il-sung and Ho Chi Minh. Aside from Beijing's nationalistic reaction in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese foreign policy would be relatively moderate in the middle 1950s and fully in tune with Soviet designs for a breathing spell in the Cold War.Less
This chapter examines the mixed blessing of enhanced communist coordination during the mid-1950s. During this period, a relatively well-coordinated and organized communist alliance allowed for more moderation and clearer signaling during the negotiations that ended fighting in the Korean War and the conflict in Indochina. The chapter considers the United States' formation of regional alliances and how the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted in 1954. It shows how a relatively unified allied position on Southeast Asia in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) served as a restraint on the most aggressive members of the alliance, the local communists involved in civil wars: Kim Il-sung and Ho Chi Minh. Aside from Beijing's nationalistic reaction in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese foreign policy would be relatively moderate in the middle 1950s and fully in tune with Soviet designs for a breathing spell in the Cold War.
Douglas L. Kriner and Francis X. Shen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195390964
- eISBN:
- 9780199776788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195390964.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter presents data that provide strong evidence that U.S. combat casualties are not distributed uniformly across society. Beginning with the Korean War, some communities, particularly those ...
More
This chapter presents data that provide strong evidence that U.S. combat casualties are not distributed uniformly across society. Beginning with the Korean War, some communities, particularly those like Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, have borne a disproportionate share of America's wartime sacrifice. The size of the differences in casualty rates between rich and poor communities may not be as great as some of the rhetoric from the Left suggests. While socioeconomically disadvantaged communities do bear disproportionately large shares of the casualty burden, some wealthy and highly educated communities have also suffered significant numbers of casualties. However, contra the protestations of some on the Right, the casualty gap is real, and, perhaps equally significantly, the data suggest that this gap may have widened over time.Less
This chapter presents data that provide strong evidence that U.S. combat casualties are not distributed uniformly across society. Beginning with the Korean War, some communities, particularly those like Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, have borne a disproportionate share of America's wartime sacrifice. The size of the differences in casualty rates between rich and poor communities may not be as great as some of the rhetoric from the Left suggests. While socioeconomically disadvantaged communities do bear disproportionately large shares of the casualty burden, some wealthy and highly educated communities have also suffered significant numbers of casualties. However, contra the protestations of some on the Right, the casualty gap is real, and, perhaps equally significantly, the data suggest that this gap may have widened over time.
Melinda L. Pash
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814767696
- eISBN:
- 9780814789223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814767696.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines the process of leaving Korea and what happened to veterans once they returned to the home front. In contrast to previous wars, Korean War veterans returned home individually, ...
More
This chapter examines the process of leaving Korea and what happened to veterans once they returned to the home front. In contrast to previous wars, Korean War veterans returned home individually, rotating out after collecting a set number of points based on length and type of service in country. Some were greeted with parades or welcoming bands, but most experienced a quieter homecoming. Instead of celebrating the end of the war as in 1945, Americans gave little thought to it and seemed anxious to simply put Korea behind them as soon as possible. Congress passed a Korean GI Bill in 1952, but it was less generous than that of World War II in its readjustment benefits. This chapter considers the problems and issues that Korean War veterans had to deal with upon their return to their homeland and in trying to readjust to civilian life, including those relating to compensation and other benefits, employment, posttraumatic stress disorder, physical impairments and injuries, and segregation.Less
This chapter examines the process of leaving Korea and what happened to veterans once they returned to the home front. In contrast to previous wars, Korean War veterans returned home individually, rotating out after collecting a set number of points based on length and type of service in country. Some were greeted with parades or welcoming bands, but most experienced a quieter homecoming. Instead of celebrating the end of the war as in 1945, Americans gave little thought to it and seemed anxious to simply put Korea behind them as soon as possible. Congress passed a Korean GI Bill in 1952, but it was less generous than that of World War II in its readjustment benefits. This chapter considers the problems and issues that Korean War veterans had to deal with upon their return to their homeland and in trying to readjust to civilian life, including those relating to compensation and other benefits, employment, posttraumatic stress disorder, physical impairments and injuries, and segregation.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
Although the Korean War was the first limited war the United States fought in the modern period, and although historians now view it as a watershed moment in the growth of the “national security ...
More
Although the Korean War was the first limited war the United States fought in the modern period, and although historians now view it as a watershed moment in the growth of the “national security state,” no one has undertaken a systematic analysis of the domestic debates sparked by the war. This chapter first examines the reasons for this gap in the literature. The remainder of the chapter then sets out the book's methodological background: the central individuals and organizations that were engaged in domestic propaganda; how they interacted with the “clubby” yet highly partisan Congress of this era; and the opportunities and difficulties they faced when dealing with a media that, while generally wedded to norms of objective reporting, was a highly complex and diverse entity.Less
Although the Korean War was the first limited war the United States fought in the modern period, and although historians now view it as a watershed moment in the growth of the “national security state,” no one has undertaken a systematic analysis of the domestic debates sparked by the war. This chapter first examines the reasons for this gap in the literature. The remainder of the chapter then sets out the book's methodological background: the central individuals and organizations that were engaged in domestic propaganda; how they interacted with the “clubby” yet highly partisan Congress of this era; and the opportunities and difficulties they faced when dealing with a media that, while generally wedded to norms of objective reporting, was a highly complex and diverse entity.
Steven Casey
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195306927
- eISBN:
- 9780199867936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306927.003.0014
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book. The Truman administration's efforts to sell the Korean War went through two phases. In the first year, the government was plagued by the problems of ...
More
This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book. The Truman administration's efforts to sell the Korean War went through two phases. In the first year, the government was plagued by the problems of selling a limited war. As the fighting progressed, however, officials learned from their mistakes, introduced more effective bureaucratic structures, and stiffened their rhetoric. In both phases, the government's efforts had important consequences: in the first, its low‐key posture left an opportunity for political rivals to launch effective attacks; in the second, its steady improvements helped to create a relatively stable floor during much of 1952, beyond which popular disapproval never plungedLess
This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book. The Truman administration's efforts to sell the Korean War went through two phases. In the first year, the government was plagued by the problems of selling a limited war. As the fighting progressed, however, officials learned from their mistakes, introduced more effective bureaucratic structures, and stiffened their rhetoric. In both phases, the government's efforts had important consequences: in the first, its low‐key posture left an opportunity for political rivals to launch effective attacks; in the second, its steady improvements helped to create a relatively stable floor during much of 1952, beyond which popular disapproval never plunged
John Tirman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780195381214
- eISBN:
- 9780190252373
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195381214.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular ...
More
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on America's fixation on eradicating communism by trying to contain China and the Soviet Union, as well as the war's strategic implications through the use of atomic bombs. It also assesses the enormous number of casualties and the stark contrast between American indifference and Korean suffering. In addition, it considers why the American public forgot the war so soon while it was being waged and why they seemed to show more interest in its politics than in the carnage it caused to civilians. Finally, the chapter discusses America's decision to put Syngman Rhee in power by creating the Republic of Korea in 1948.Less
This chapter focuses on the three-year war in Korea (1950–1953) pitting South Korea and United Nations forces versus North Korea and China. It examines the politics of the Korean War, with particular emphasis on America's fixation on eradicating communism by trying to contain China and the Soviet Union, as well as the war's strategic implications through the use of atomic bombs. It also assesses the enormous number of casualties and the stark contrast between American indifference and Korean suffering. In addition, it considers why the American public forgot the war so soon while it was being waged and why they seemed to show more interest in its politics than in the carnage it caused to civilians. Finally, the chapter discusses America's decision to put Syngman Rhee in power by creating the Republic of Korea in 1948.
Viet Thanh Nguyen
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9789888455775
- eISBN:
- 9789882204034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Hong Kong University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5790/hongkong/9789888455775.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This paper argues that the Other Korean Warin Viet Nam hardly means foregrounding Asians solely as victims or noblenatives. Such re-centering means acknowledging the full subjectivity of Asians, ...
More
This paper argues that the Other Korean Warin Viet Nam hardly means foregrounding Asians solely as victims or noblenatives. Such re-centering means acknowledging the full subjectivity of Asians, includingtheir agency, their complicity, their cruelty, and their own strategic designs forpower and profit at the expense of the weaker ones in their own societies and theirenemies and neighbors. HowKorea deals with Viet Nam of the present, the Viet Nam of its past, and the shadowof its American patron has everything to do with Korea’s transformation from oneof the world’s backwater provinces, humiliated by Japan and subordinated by theUnited States, to a chic and sleek global minipower whose projection of itself takesplace notonly in the factory, the boardroom, the stock market, and the UnitedNations, but in movie theaters, on family televisions, in the hands of readers, and inarchitecture signifying might and prowess, meant to intimidate and impress bothcitizen and tourist.Less
This paper argues that the Other Korean Warin Viet Nam hardly means foregrounding Asians solely as victims or noblenatives. Such re-centering means acknowledging the full subjectivity of Asians, includingtheir agency, their complicity, their cruelty, and their own strategic designs forpower and profit at the expense of the weaker ones in their own societies and theirenemies and neighbors. HowKorea deals with Viet Nam of the present, the Viet Nam of its past, and the shadowof its American patron has everything to do with Korea’s transformation from oneof the world’s backwater provinces, humiliated by Japan and subordinated by theUnited States, to a chic and sleek global minipower whose projection of itself takesplace notonly in the factory, the boardroom, the stock market, and the UnitedNations, but in movie theaters, on family televisions, in the hands of readers, and inarchitecture signifying might and prowess, meant to intimidate and impress bothcitizen and tourist.
Sonia Ryang
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520098633
- eISBN:
- 9780520916197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520098633.003.0001
- Subject:
- Anthropology, Asian Cultural Anthropology
The demographic map of Koreans residing outside of their homeland reveals the cartographic traces of colonialism, World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War. Koreans in Japan in particular are ...
More
The demographic map of Koreans residing outside of their homeland reveals the cartographic traces of colonialism, World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War. Koreans in Japan in particular are marked as reminders of Japan's colonial rule of Korea and the ensuing wars that shaped the global Korean diaspora. Western academic treatment of this subject appears conforming to the Japanese notion of monoethnicity. This text seeks to fill the existing gap between Korean studies and diaspora studies by locating Koreans in Japan in current western discourses of diaspora. Specifically, it deals with the community of Zainichi Koreans. Japanese colonial rule of Korea and Koreans did not simply involve oppression and exclusion. Resident Koreans in Japan lived in more ambiguous situations. Instruments predating Japanese colonization of Korea such as the household registry were appropriated under colonial rule to serve totally distinct ends, specifically lineage and racial profiling.Less
The demographic map of Koreans residing outside of their homeland reveals the cartographic traces of colonialism, World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War. Koreans in Japan in particular are marked as reminders of Japan's colonial rule of Korea and the ensuing wars that shaped the global Korean diaspora. Western academic treatment of this subject appears conforming to the Japanese notion of monoethnicity. This text seeks to fill the existing gap between Korean studies and diaspora studies by locating Koreans in Japan in current western discourses of diaspora. Specifically, it deals with the community of Zainichi Koreans. Japanese colonial rule of Korea and Koreans did not simply involve oppression and exclusion. Resident Koreans in Japan lived in more ambiguous situations. Instruments predating Japanese colonization of Korea such as the household registry were appropriated under colonial rule to serve totally distinct ends, specifically lineage and racial profiling.
CHI-KWAN MARK
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199273706
- eISBN:
- 9780191706240
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273706.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, World Modern History
This chapter examines the Anglo–American cooperation or conflict over intelligence, propaganda, and covert operations in Hong Kong. It shows that US intelligence and propaganda operations in Hong ...
More
This chapter examines the Anglo–American cooperation or conflict over intelligence, propaganda, and covert operations in Hong Kong. It shows that US intelligence and propaganda operations in Hong Kong, though valuable, were not of such importance that Washington would risk damaging relations with London. Unlike the introduction of export controls during the Korean War, they rarely commanded the attention of top decision-makers; nor did they become a controversial issue in US domestic politics. Consequently, decision-makers in Washington seldom brought pressure to bear on US officials in Hong Kong, whose views might have been closer to the colonial authorities than to their home government's.Less
This chapter examines the Anglo–American cooperation or conflict over intelligence, propaganda, and covert operations in Hong Kong. It shows that US intelligence and propaganda operations in Hong Kong, though valuable, were not of such importance that Washington would risk damaging relations with London. Unlike the introduction of export controls during the Korean War, they rarely commanded the attention of top decision-makers; nor did they become a controversial issue in US domestic politics. Consequently, decision-makers in Washington seldom brought pressure to bear on US officials in Hong Kong, whose views might have been closer to the colonial authorities than to their home government's.
Melinda L. Pash
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814767696
- eISBN:
- 9780814789223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814767696.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter examines the circumstances that compelled Americans to accept military service as well as the experience of mustering into the armed forces in the early 1950s. The Korean War revived a ...
More
This chapter examines the circumstances that compelled Americans to accept military service as well as the experience of mustering into the armed forces in the early 1950s. The Korean War revived a dying Selective Service System that in fiscal years 1948 and 1950 had not drafted anyone. Even after the United States entered the Korean War, however, inductees rarely comprised more than 38 percent of those entering the U.S. military. Volunteers, National Guardsmen, and reservists accounted for the majority of those who served. The chapter considers the reasons why Americans chose to enter voluntarily into wartime military service and why the older volunteers enlisted in the first place. It also looks at the Korean War draft and how it set the stage for some of the draft inequalities associated with the Vietnam War era.Less
This chapter examines the circumstances that compelled Americans to accept military service as well as the experience of mustering into the armed forces in the early 1950s. The Korean War revived a dying Selective Service System that in fiscal years 1948 and 1950 had not drafted anyone. Even after the United States entered the Korean War, however, inductees rarely comprised more than 38 percent of those entering the U.S. military. Volunteers, National Guardsmen, and reservists accounted for the majority of those who served. The chapter considers the reasons why Americans chose to enter voluntarily into wartime military service and why the older volunteers enlisted in the first place. It also looks at the Korean War draft and how it set the stage for some of the draft inequalities associated with the Vietnam War era.
C. T. Sandars
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198296874
- eISBN:
- 9780191685293
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296874.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter discusses the U.S. government's determination to take sole control of Japan and the Pacific region after World War II. The U.S. was determined to keep other allies, particularly Russia, ...
More
This chapter discusses the U.S. government's determination to take sole control of Japan and the Pacific region after World War II. The U.S. was determined to keep other allies, particularly Russia, out of Japan, to prevent their development of offensive bases on the home islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were keen on building military bases on the Ryukyus Islands and in Okinawa, but not on a long-term basis. However, they were compelled to maintain a permanent presence on the mainland and home islands to ensure peace and stability along the areas bordering the Yellow Sea and because of the outbreak of the Korean War.Less
This chapter discusses the U.S. government's determination to take sole control of Japan and the Pacific region after World War II. The U.S. was determined to keep other allies, particularly Russia, out of Japan, to prevent their development of offensive bases on the home islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were keen on building military bases on the Ryukyus Islands and in Okinawa, but not on a long-term basis. However, they were compelled to maintain a permanent presence on the mainland and home islands to ensure peace and stability along the areas bordering the Yellow Sea and because of the outbreak of the Korean War.
S. P. MacKenzie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199656028
- eISBN:
- 9780191744624
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656028.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, Military History
During the Korean War nearly a thousand British servicemen, along with a handful of British civilians, were captured by North Korean and Red Chinese forces. In various camps in the vicinity of ...
More
During the Korean War nearly a thousand British servicemen, along with a handful of British civilians, were captured by North Korean and Red Chinese forces. In various camps in the vicinity of Pyongyang and villages along the Yalu River these men found themselves subjected to a prolonged effort by the enemy to undermine their allegiance to the Crown and enlist them in various propaganda campaigns directed against the UN war effort. This is the first academic study to examine in detail exactly what happened to the major groups of British military and civilian prisoners held in different locations at various junctures between 1950 and 1953. It explores the extent to which factors such as exposure to the actions of the North Koreans as against the Red Chinese, evolving physical conditions, enemy re-education efforts, communist attempts at blackmail, British attitudes towards the Americans, and personal background and leadership qualities among captives themselves influenced the willingness and ability of the British prisoners to collaborate or resist. Thanks to the availability of hitherto classified or underutilized source materials, it is now possible to test the common popular assumption—based on official accounts and memoirs from the 1950s—that, in marked contrast to their American cousins, British captives in the Korean War were pretty much immune to communist efforts at subverting their loyalty. The results suggest that British attitudes and actions while in enemy hands were rather more nuanced and varied than previously assumed.Less
During the Korean War nearly a thousand British servicemen, along with a handful of British civilians, were captured by North Korean and Red Chinese forces. In various camps in the vicinity of Pyongyang and villages along the Yalu River these men found themselves subjected to a prolonged effort by the enemy to undermine their allegiance to the Crown and enlist them in various propaganda campaigns directed against the UN war effort. This is the first academic study to examine in detail exactly what happened to the major groups of British military and civilian prisoners held in different locations at various junctures between 1950 and 1953. It explores the extent to which factors such as exposure to the actions of the North Koreans as against the Red Chinese, evolving physical conditions, enemy re-education efforts, communist attempts at blackmail, British attitudes towards the Americans, and personal background and leadership qualities among captives themselves influenced the willingness and ability of the British prisoners to collaborate or resist. Thanks to the availability of hitherto classified or underutilized source materials, it is now possible to test the common popular assumption—based on official accounts and memoirs from the 1950s—that, in marked contrast to their American cousins, British captives in the Korean War were pretty much immune to communist efforts at subverting their loyalty. The results suggest that British attitudes and actions while in enemy hands were rather more nuanced and varied than previously assumed.
Elizabeth A. Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804762694
- eISBN:
- 9780804772372
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804762694.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy
This book begins by developing a theory about the domestic obstacles to making peace and the role played by shifts in states' governing coalitions in overcoming these obstacles. In particular, it ...
More
This book begins by developing a theory about the domestic obstacles to making peace and the role played by shifts in states' governing coalitions in overcoming these obstacles. In particular, it explains how the longer the war, the harder it is to end, because domestic obstacles to peace become institutionalized over time. Next, it tests this theory with a mixed methods approach—through historical case studies and quantitative statistical analysis. Finally, it applies the theory to an in-depth analysis of the ending of the Korean War. By analyzing the domestic politics of the war's major combatants—the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and North and South Korea—it explains why the final armistice terms accepted in July 1953 were little different from those proposed at the start of negotiations in July 1951, some 294,000 additional battle-deaths later.Less
This book begins by developing a theory about the domestic obstacles to making peace and the role played by shifts in states' governing coalitions in overcoming these obstacles. In particular, it explains how the longer the war, the harder it is to end, because domestic obstacles to peace become institutionalized over time. Next, it tests this theory with a mixed methods approach—through historical case studies and quantitative statistical analysis. Finally, it applies the theory to an in-depth analysis of the ending of the Korean War. By analyzing the domestic politics of the war's major combatants—the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and North and South Korea—it explains why the final armistice terms accepted in July 1953 were little different from those proposed at the start of negotiations in July 1951, some 294,000 additional battle-deaths later.
