Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
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The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
Michael Devitt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199250967
- eISBN:
- 9780191603945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250960.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter places some historically interesting actual positions among the possible positions on psychological reality, on linguistic competence. There is strong evidence that Chomsky is committed ...
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This chapter places some historically interesting actual positions among the possible positions on psychological reality, on linguistic competence. There is strong evidence that Chomsky is committed to the Representational Thesis (RT), but that commitment is open to question. Although Fodor, Bever, and Garrett, Bresnan and Kaplan, and Berwick and Weinberg all seem to subscribe to RT, it is often unclear what role, if any, RT plays in their theories of language use. Matthews rejects RT. His view of the psychological reality is hard to distinguish from the uncontroversial minimal position according to which the processing rules simply “respect” the linguistic rules.Less
This chapter places some historically interesting actual positions among the possible positions on psychological reality, on linguistic competence. There is strong evidence that Chomsky is committed to the Representational Thesis (RT), but that commitment is open to question. Although Fodor, Bever, and Garrett, Bresnan and Kaplan, and Berwick and Weinberg all seem to subscribe to RT, it is often unclear what role, if any, RT plays in their theories of language use. Matthews rejects RT. His view of the psychological reality is hard to distinguish from the uncontroversial minimal position according to which the processing rules simply “respect” the linguistic rules.
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
‘Rule theory’, or the claim that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I, is a myth. Theorists have not shown that it is even possible to say what this rule is, what it means, what it ...
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‘Rule theory’, or the claim that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I, is a myth. Theorists have not shown that it is even possible to say what this rule is, what it means, what it determines, or what functions as its context. No such rule could be sufficient to give the meaning of I because there are areas which it does not cover, there are areas in which it applies but is insufficient, there are occasions on which it should not be applied, and there are occasions on which it cannot be applied.Less
‘Rule theory’, or the claim that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I, is a myth. Theorists have not shown that it is even possible to say what this rule is, what it means, what it determines, or what functions as its context. No such rule could be sufficient to give the meaning of I because there are areas which it does not cover, there are areas in which it applies but is insufficient, there are occasions on which it should not be applied, and there are occasions on which it cannot be applied.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a ...
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Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a proposition that is true for one judge, and false for another. This chapter explains and criticizes various versions of relativism about knowledge attributions.Less
Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a proposition that is true for one judge, and false for another. This chapter explains and criticizes various versions of relativism about knowledge attributions.
Berit Brogaard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199796908
- eISBN:
- 9780199933235
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199796908.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
David Kaplan was one of the most vivid supporters of the view that there are temporal contents which tense operators operate on. The conclusion that the truth-value of sentence content may be ...
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David Kaplan was one of the most vivid supporters of the view that there are temporal contents which tense operators operate on. The conclusion that the truth-value of sentence content may be sensitive to time shifts does not by itself qualify as temporalism. If there are tense operators in English, then Kaplan’s argument succeeds in establishing that temporal contents satisfy the condition that they are contents that some intensional operators operate on. Since we have already argued that temporal contents satisfy the other conditions for being a proposition, we could take Kaplan’s argument to show that temporal contents are propositions. In response to Kaplan’s argument, several eternalists have defended the view that sentences have two kinds of content, temporal and eternal, but that only eternal content has proposition-status. The two kinds of content are also known as ‘compositional content’ and ‘assertoric content’. Rather than simply referring back to the general objections to eternalism provided in the first three chapters, I shall here offer independent arguments against each of the double-content strategies.Less
David Kaplan was one of the most vivid supporters of the view that there are temporal contents which tense operators operate on. The conclusion that the truth-value of sentence content may be sensitive to time shifts does not by itself qualify as temporalism. If there are tense operators in English, then Kaplan’s argument succeeds in establishing that temporal contents satisfy the condition that they are contents that some intensional operators operate on. Since we have already argued that temporal contents satisfy the other conditions for being a proposition, we could take Kaplan’s argument to show that temporal contents are propositions. In response to Kaplan’s argument, several eternalists have defended the view that sentences have two kinds of content, temporal and eternal, but that only eternal content has proposition-status. The two kinds of content are also known as ‘compositional content’ and ‘assertoric content’. Rather than simply referring back to the general objections to eternalism provided in the first three chapters, I shall here offer independent arguments against each of the double-content strategies.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to ...
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This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to form the complete expression, while embracing the anti-Fregean thesis that demonstratives are directly referential. Against the former it is argued that demonstrations form part of the context, not the expression, and that consequently demonstratives are pure indexicals. A semantic rule for complex demonstratives is proposed and its philosophical implications explored.Less
This chapter investigates the philosophical semantics of demonstratives. It is argued that Kaplan endorses Frege's thesis that a demonstration supplements a demonstrative (the bare expression) to form the complete expression, while embracing the anti-Fregean thesis that demonstratives are directly referential. Against the former it is argued that demonstrations form part of the context, not the expression, and that consequently demonstratives are pure indexicals. A semantic rule for complex demonstratives is proposed and its philosophical implications explored.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284726
- eISBN:
- 9780191713774
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284726.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The title question is disambiguated. One reading is given an affirmative response, the other a negative. Quine's argument against reducibility is criticized, Kaplan's contrary argument that ...
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The title question is disambiguated. One reading is given an affirmative response, the other a negative. Quine's argument against reducibility is criticized, Kaplan's contrary argument that reducibility is required is also criticized, and Burge's response to Kaplan on Quine's behalf is also criticized. A modest form of reducibility is defended. Kaplan's argument is modified to show that modest reducibility of de re belief to de dicto shows more about the latter than the former.Less
The title question is disambiguated. One reading is given an affirmative response, the other a negative. Quine's argument against reducibility is criticized, Kaplan's contrary argument that reducibility is required is also criticized, and Burge's response to Kaplan on Quine's behalf is also criticized. A modest form of reducibility is defended. Kaplan's argument is modified to show that modest reducibility of de re belief to de dicto shows more about the latter than the former.
Robert W. Scapens
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199283361
- eISBN:
- 9780191712623
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283361.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This chapter discusses the changes that have been taking place in management accounting research and practice in recent years, focusing on management accounting research and practice in the UK. The ...
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This chapter discusses the changes that have been taking place in management accounting research and practice in recent years, focusing on management accounting research and practice in the UK. The chapter begins with a brief history of management accounting thought over the last thirty-five years. Following this, some of the UK responses to Johnson and Kaplan's claim about management accounting's lost relevance are discussed. The changing nature of management accounting practices in the UK over subsequent years is described, followed by a discussion of recent trends in management accounting research. Some current issues in management accounting are outlined. The chapter concludes with some comments on the nature of UK management accounting research and directions for the future.Less
This chapter discusses the changes that have been taking place in management accounting research and practice in recent years, focusing on management accounting research and practice in the UK. The chapter begins with a brief history of management accounting thought over the last thirty-five years. Following this, some of the UK responses to Johnson and Kaplan's claim about management accounting's lost relevance are discussed. The changing nature of management accounting practices in the UK over subsequent years is described, followed by a discussion of recent trends in management accounting research. Some current issues in management accounting are outlined. The chapter concludes with some comments on the nature of UK management accounting research and directions for the future.
Michael L. Morgan
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195148626
- eISBN:
- 9780199870011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195148622.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This chapter examines the way in which post‐Holocaust Jewish thought began to emerge in the 1960s and its role within Jewish religious thought. These post‐Holocaust Jewish thinkers did not constitute ...
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This chapter examines the way in which post‐Holocaust Jewish thought began to emerge in the 1960s and its role within Jewish religious thought. These post‐Holocaust Jewish thinkers did not constitute a school, nor did they have common views, except in some fairly general ways, and in the fact that they all confronted the Holocaust. The five main thinkers in particular (Richard Rubinstein, Eliezer Berkovits, Irving Greenberg, Arthur Cohen, and Emil Fackenheim) did not believe that responsible and honest Jewish self‐understanding could proceed, and yet ignore, the horrors of the death camps. The thinkers whose work is discussed in this chapter are Richard Rubinstein (the earliest Jewish theologian to write about the importance of the death camps for the Jewish faith), Emil Fackenheim, Irving Greenberg, Moredecai Kaplan, and Steven Schwarzchild.Less
This chapter examines the way in which post‐Holocaust Jewish thought began to emerge in the 1960s and its role within Jewish religious thought. These post‐Holocaust Jewish thinkers did not constitute a school, nor did they have common views, except in some fairly general ways, and in the fact that they all confronted the Holocaust. The five main thinkers in particular (Richard Rubinstein, Eliezer Berkovits, Irving Greenberg, Arthur Cohen, and Emil Fackenheim) did not believe that responsible and honest Jewish self‐understanding could proceed, and yet ignore, the horrors of the death camps. The thinkers whose work is discussed in this chapter are Richard Rubinstein (the earliest Jewish theologian to write about the importance of the death camps for the Jewish faith), Emil Fackenheim, Irving Greenberg, Moredecai Kaplan, and Steven Schwarzchild.
Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199844845
- eISBN:
- 9780199933501
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844845.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose ...
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Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose insights reached into metaphysics, action theory, the history of philosophy, and of course the philosophy of mind and language. This volume collects the best critical work on Donnellan’s forty-year body of work. The pieces by such noted philosophers as Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and John Perry, discuss Donnellan’s various insights particularly offering new readings of his views on language and mind.Less
Keith Donnellan of UCLA is one of the founding fathers of contemporary philosophy of language, along with David Kaplan and Saul Kripke. Donnellan was and is an extremely creative thinker whose insights reached into metaphysics, action theory, the history of philosophy, and of course the philosophy of mind and language. This volume collects the best critical work on Donnellan’s forty-year body of work. The pieces by such noted philosophers as Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and John Perry, discuss Donnellan’s various insights particularly offering new readings of his views on language and mind.
Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199560554
- eISBN:
- 9780191720963
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560554.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter is divided into four parts. Section 1 presents and rejects a Kaplanian argument against Simplicity, the so-called Operator Argument. Section 2 presents and rejects an argument against ...
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This chapter is divided into four parts. Section 1 presents and rejects a Kaplanian argument against Simplicity, the so-called Operator Argument. Section 2 presents and rejects an argument against Simplicity based on the anaphoric ‘that’. Section 3 briefly elaborates on Contingency and Temporality in the light of earlier discussions. Section 4 presents some direct evidence against the positive view endorsed by Kaplan (and, e.g., Lewis, Dummett, MacFarlane, and Stanley) — evidence based on the Agreement diagnostic developed in Chapter 2. It is argued that Kaplanian operator arguments against Simplicity typically rely on dubious and unmotivated semantic and syntactic assumptions. There is a strong case against the approach to temporality that is introduced by Kaplan and that forms one of the key motivating threads of contemporary anti-Simplicity semantics.Less
This chapter is divided into four parts. Section 1 presents and rejects a Kaplanian argument against Simplicity, the so-called Operator Argument. Section 2 presents and rejects an argument against Simplicity based on the anaphoric ‘that’. Section 3 briefly elaborates on Contingency and Temporality in the light of earlier discussions. Section 4 presents some direct evidence against the positive view endorsed by Kaplan (and, e.g., Lewis, Dummett, MacFarlane, and Stanley) — evidence based on the Agreement diagnostic developed in Chapter 2. It is argued that Kaplanian operator arguments against Simplicity typically rely on dubious and unmotivated semantic and syntactic assumptions. There is a strong case against the approach to temporality that is introduced by Kaplan and that forms one of the key motivating threads of contemporary anti-Simplicity semantics.
David Bostock
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199651443
- eISBN:
- 9780191741197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199651443.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Russell invokes acquaintance with particular objects, with universals, and (tentatively) with the concepts of logic, in each case as the explanation of our understanding of propositions. The first ...
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Russell invokes acquaintance with particular objects, with universals, and (tentatively) with the concepts of logic, in each case as the explanation of our understanding of propositions. The first does appear to be needed, for definite descriptions cannot account for all reference to particular objects, and ‘direct reference’ is therefore required. But Russell himself later came to recognise that acquaintance with universals was not required, and the same surely applies to the concepts of logic. As for particulars, Russell supposed that one could be acquainted only with one’s own sense-data; one refers to these by using a ‘logical proper name’, e.g. the demonstrative ‘this’. He failed to see Kaplan’s point, that in common use this word is accompanied by a demonstration, which associates it with what Frege might call a ‘sense’, i.e. a ‘mode of presentation’. But, to use Kripke’s language, this ‘sense’ merely ‘fixes the reference’, and does not ‘give the meaning’. Once this point is seen, one can resist Russell’s claim that only sense-data can be objects of ‘direct reference’.Less
Russell invokes acquaintance with particular objects, with universals, and (tentatively) with the concepts of logic, in each case as the explanation of our understanding of propositions. The first does appear to be needed, for definite descriptions cannot account for all reference to particular objects, and ‘direct reference’ is therefore required. But Russell himself later came to recognise that acquaintance with universals was not required, and the same surely applies to the concepts of logic. As for particulars, Russell supposed that one could be acquainted only with one’s own sense-data; one refers to these by using a ‘logical proper name’, e.g. the demonstrative ‘this’. He failed to see Kaplan’s point, that in common use this word is accompanied by a demonstration, which associates it with what Frege might call a ‘sense’, i.e. a ‘mode of presentation’. But, to use Kripke’s language, this ‘sense’ merely ‘fixes the reference’, and does not ‘give the meaning’. Once this point is seen, one can resist Russell’s claim that only sense-data can be objects of ‘direct reference’.
Kevin Scharp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199890576
- eISBN:
- 9780199980031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. This chapter argues that when properly interpreted, Sellars is a staunch ...
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The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. This chapter argues that when properly interpreted, Sellars is a staunch anti-descriptivist. Not only does it accept most of the conclusions drawn by the anti-descriptivists, it goes beyond their critiques to reject the fundamental tenant of descriptivism—that understanding a linguistic expression consists in mentally grasping its meaning and associating that meaning with the expression. The chapter shows that Sellars' accounts of language and the mind provide novel justifications for the anti-descriptivists' conclusions. It presents what he takes to be a Sellarsian analysis of the relation between metaphysical modal and epistemic modal notions. The chapter's account involves extension of the strategy Sellars uses to explain both the relation between physical object concepts and sensation concepts, and the relation between concepts that apply to linguistic activity and those that apply to conceptual activity.Less
The work of Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, and others initiated a tradition that has come to be known as anti-descriptivism. This chapter argues that when properly interpreted, Sellars is a staunch anti-descriptivist. Not only does it accept most of the conclusions drawn by the anti-descriptivists, it goes beyond their critiques to reject the fundamental tenant of descriptivism—that understanding a linguistic expression consists in mentally grasping its meaning and associating that meaning with the expression. The chapter shows that Sellars' accounts of language and the mind provide novel justifications for the anti-descriptivists' conclusions. It presents what he takes to be a Sellarsian analysis of the relation between metaphysical modal and epistemic modal notions. The chapter's account involves extension of the strategy Sellars uses to explain both the relation between physical object concepts and sensation concepts, and the relation between concepts that apply to linguistic activity and those that apply to conceptual activity.
Gary Ebbs
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557936
- eISBN:
- 9780191721403
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557936.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The Tarski–Quine thesis and the Intersubjectivity Constraint appear incompatible. This chapter argues that the appearance is rooted in our acceptance of a standard conception of words, according to ...
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The Tarski–Quine thesis and the Intersubjectivity Constraint appear incompatible. This chapter argues that the appearance is rooted in our acceptance of a standard conception of words, according to which the word-type of a word-token is determined by its spelling or pronunciation in combination with explanatory facts about how the word is used. Drawing on work by Nelson Goodman and David Kaplan, the chapter constructs an alternative conception of words that is governed by a context principle according to which one should never ask for the word-type of a word-token in isolation, but only in the context of one's practical judgments of sameness of satisfaction for that word-token. The chapter presents a conception of words that obeys this context principle, and shows that if we adopt this alternative conception of words, we can satisfy the Intersubjectivity Constraint without rejecting the Tarski–Quine thesis.Less
The Tarski–Quine thesis and the Intersubjectivity Constraint appear incompatible. This chapter argues that the appearance is rooted in our acceptance of a standard conception of words, according to which the word-type of a word-token is determined by its spelling or pronunciation in combination with explanatory facts about how the word is used. Drawing on work by Nelson Goodman and David Kaplan, the chapter constructs an alternative conception of words that is governed by a context principle according to which one should never ask for the word-type of a word-token in isolation, but only in the context of one's practical judgments of sameness of satisfaction for that word-token. The chapter presents a conception of words that obeys this context principle, and shows that if we adopt this alternative conception of words, we can satisfy the Intersubjectivity Constraint without rejecting the Tarski–Quine thesis.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567881
- eISBN:
- 9780191722783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Three competing accounts of belief de re (Russellian primary occurrence, “relational” belief, quantification into a belief context) are extracted from David Kaplan's classic article “Quantifying In”: ...
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Three competing accounts of belief de re (Russellian primary occurrence, “relational” belief, quantification into a belief context) are extracted from David Kaplan's classic article “Quantifying In”: one neo‐Quinean, one neo‐Fregean, and one neo‐Russellian. A strict‐constructionist reading of “Quantifying In” yields the standard, neo‐Quinean reading. The Quinean motivation for this account, however, rests on confusion. Correcting the confusion while remaining faithful to the philosophical spirit of “Quantifying In” yields a neo‐Fregean reconstruction of the project. On this interpretation, Russellian singular propositions are merely a logical construct out of special Fregean propositions—representational thoughts. However, even if Russellian singular propositions are embraced as genuine propositions, and not merely as a logical construct, the account in “Quantifying In” insightfully yields an ingenious solution to a remaining philosophical problem: Why do we not have cognitive access to some singular propositions and not others, and how do we access those singular propositions that we are able to access?Less
Three competing accounts of belief de re (Russellian primary occurrence, “relational” belief, quantification into a belief context) are extracted from David Kaplan's classic article “Quantifying In”: one neo‐Quinean, one neo‐Fregean, and one neo‐Russellian. A strict‐constructionist reading of “Quantifying In” yields the standard, neo‐Quinean reading. The Quinean motivation for this account, however, rests on confusion. Correcting the confusion while remaining faithful to the philosophical spirit of “Quantifying In” yields a neo‐Fregean reconstruction of the project. On this interpretation, Russellian singular propositions are merely a logical construct out of special Fregean propositions—representational thoughts. However, even if Russellian singular propositions are embraced as genuine propositions, and not merely as a logical construct, the account in “Quantifying In” insightfully yields an ingenious solution to a remaining philosophical problem: Why do we not have cognitive access to some singular propositions and not others, and how do we access those singular propositions that we are able to access?
Robert Stalnaker
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195367881
- eISBN:
- 9780199867585
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter brings out some of the interconnections between the specific issues about the logical form of de re belief attributions and the broader issues about intentionality. It begins by going ...
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This chapter brings out some of the interconnections between the specific issues about the logical form of de re belief attributions and the broader issues about intentionality. It begins by going over some familiar ground: reviewing the Quine/Kaplan analysis, spelling out the problem that originally motivated it, and considering some different assumptions about the objects or contents of belief. It then looks at Kaplan's modifications of Quine's analysis, and at a way that it might be further generalized, in light of its internalist motivation. The chapter concludes by looking at de re belief, and belief generally, from a contrasting externalist perspective.Less
This chapter brings out some of the interconnections between the specific issues about the logical form of de re belief attributions and the broader issues about intentionality. It begins by going over some familiar ground: reviewing the Quine/Kaplan analysis, spelling out the problem that originally motivated it, and considering some different assumptions about the objects or contents of belief. It then looks at Kaplan's modifications of Quine's analysis, and at a way that it might be further generalized, in light of its internalist motivation. The chapter concludes by looking at de re belief, and belief generally, from a contrasting externalist perspective.
John Hawthorne and David Manley
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693672
- eISBN:
- 9780191739002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693672.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind
The discovery of the twin categories of reference and singular thought is widely felt to be one of the landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On the one hand there is the ...
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The discovery of the twin categories of reference and singular thought is widely felt to be one of the landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On the one hand there is the distinction between bona fide referential expressions of natural language and those that are about objects only in some looser sense. On the other hand there is a corresponding distinction between a thought that is loosely about an object, and one whose bond with an object is robust enough for it to count as genuinely ‘singular’ or ‘de re’. This chapter tries to shed light on these two ideas by focusing on semantic ideas connected with Russell’s category of logically proper names that have been widely brought to bear on their successors.Less
The discovery of the twin categories of reference and singular thought is widely felt to be one of the landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On the one hand there is the distinction between bona fide referential expressions of natural language and those that are about objects only in some looser sense. On the other hand there is a corresponding distinction between a thought that is loosely about an object, and one whose bond with an object is robust enough for it to count as genuinely ‘singular’ or ‘de re’. This chapter tries to shed light on these two ideas by focusing on semantic ideas connected with Russell’s category of logically proper names that have been widely brought to bear on their successors.
Nathan Salmon
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199284719
- eISBN:
- 9780191603235
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199284717.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
It is demonstrated how to incorporate the traditional notion of a proposition as eternal and unvarying in truth value into a semantic theory like that of David Kaplan, by distinguishing among not ...
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It is demonstrated how to incorporate the traditional notion of a proposition as eternal and unvarying in truth value into a semantic theory like that of David Kaplan, by distinguishing among not three (as in Kaplan’s work), but four levels of semantic value: extension, content, content base, and meaning. Unlike the semantic content, the content base of a sentence may be temporally neutral, and may thus vary in truth-value with time. This semantic theory supports that generally unrecognized fact that the semantic content of a predicate, like ‘is reading’, is a temporally indexed attribute (reading at t, t a time), and hence changes as the predicate is evaluated with respect to different times.Less
It is demonstrated how to incorporate the traditional notion of a proposition as eternal and unvarying in truth value into a semantic theory like that of David Kaplan, by distinguishing among not three (as in Kaplan’s work), but four levels of semantic value: extension, content, content base, and meaning. Unlike the semantic content, the content base of a sentence may be temporally neutral, and may thus vary in truth-value with time. This semantic theory supports that generally unrecognized fact that the semantic content of a predicate, like ‘is reading’, is a temporally indexed attribute (reading at t, t a time), and hence changes as the predicate is evaluated with respect to different times.
Howard Wettstein
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195160529
- eISBN:
- 9780199835072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195160525.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
“Cognitive significance” puzzles are especially problematic for anti-Fregean theories of reference, which, in particular, make it difficult to explain the informativeness of such identity sentences ...
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“Cognitive significance” puzzles are especially problematic for anti-Fregean theories of reference, which, in particular, make it difficult to explain the informativeness of such identity sentences as “Hesperus is Phosphorous”. Frege can explain this in terms of the different senses associated with the names, Russell by appealing to different associated definite descriptions. It is argued that the “classical” direct reference solution to the puzzle advanced by Kaplan and Perry, which combines singular propositions with modifications of Frege’s modes of presentation, fails. The views of Putnam and Kripke are discussed in support of the idea that modes of presentation are not central to cognitive significance.Less
“Cognitive significance” puzzles are especially problematic for anti-Fregean theories of reference, which, in particular, make it difficult to explain the informativeness of such identity sentences as “Hesperus is Phosphorous”. Frege can explain this in terms of the different senses associated with the names, Russell by appealing to different associated definite descriptions. It is argued that the “classical” direct reference solution to the puzzle advanced by Kaplan and Perry, which combines singular propositions with modifications of Frege’s modes of presentation, fails. The views of Putnam and Kripke are discussed in support of the idea that modes of presentation are not central to cognitive significance.
David Lewis
- Published in print:
- 1983
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195032048
- eISBN:
- 9780199833382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195032047.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the ...
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In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the importance of self‐ascribing attitudes (i.e. what he coins ‘de se’ attitudes), arguing that “the de se subsumes the de dicto, but not vice versa.” Along the way, a host of topics are discussed, including time‐slices of continuant persons, centered possible worlds, and decision theory.Less
In this wide‐ranging paper, Lewis defends the view that propositional attitudes consist in relations to properties, which themselves are sets of possible individuals. In so doing, he champions the importance of self‐ascribing attitudes (i.e. what he coins ‘de se’ attitudes), arguing that “the de se subsumes the de dicto, but not vice versa.” Along the way, a host of topics are discussed, including time‐slices of continuant persons, centered possible worlds, and decision theory.
