Joel J. Kupperman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195308198
- eISBN:
- 9780199867325
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308198.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions ...
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This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and it struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a moral order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as “reasonable” is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as “reasonable.” Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements (e.g., the rejection of racism and sexism) that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery.Less
This book looks at what enters into ethical judgment and choice. Interpretation of a case and of what the options are is always a factor, as is a sense of the possible values at stake. Intuitions also enter in, but often are unreliable. For a long time it seemed only fair that oldest sons inherited, and it struck few people as unfair that women were not allowed to attend universities. A moral judgment is putatively part of a moral order in a society that any reasonable person would accept. But what counts as “reasonable” is generally contestable. The unreliability of intuitions leads naturally to ethical theory. Kantian, contractualist, and consequentialist theories all have some important truth in them, but not the whole truth. Contractualism lacks the resources required for a fully determinate account of what counts as “reasonable.” Broad general rules are important to Kant and are at the center of everyday morality. But can Kantian ethics explain why they have to have this central role? Our evolving social contract now contains elements (e.g., the rejection of racism and sexism) that once would have seemed counter-intuitive to most people. But could consequentialists have predicted with entire confidence the consequences of social changes that we now think were desirable? The last part of this book contains a double argument. One is that ethical theory is employed by humans in a state of semi-ignorance of relevant factors, grasping at likely truths and evolved intuitions. The other is that consequentialist considerations have a major role at the fundamental level, but much more in justification or criticism than in ethical discovery.
Gerald Mckenny
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199582679
- eISBN:
- 9780191722981
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582679.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
If ethics is to attest God's grace to humanity (the ethics of human confirmation of divine grace) rather than betraying it (the ethics of human self‐assertion), then it must be carried out as the ...
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If ethics is to attest God's grace to humanity (the ethics of human confirmation of divine grace) rather than betraying it (the ethics of human self‐assertion), then it must be carried out as the investigation of human life and conduct from the standpoint of the revelation of the Word and work of God's grace in Jesus Christ and thus as a part of dogmatics. This approach differs from most contemporary approaches in moral theology, which ground ethics either in reason or nature in relative independence from dogmatics or in the life of the church. This chapter reconstructs Barth's position in response to criticisms that it is remote from the concrete contexts in which moral issues arise, that it does violence to ethics, and that it accords no legitimacy to nontheological approaches to ethics.Less
If ethics is to attest God's grace to humanity (the ethics of human confirmation of divine grace) rather than betraying it (the ethics of human self‐assertion), then it must be carried out as the investigation of human life and conduct from the standpoint of the revelation of the Word and work of God's grace in Jesus Christ and thus as a part of dogmatics. This approach differs from most contemporary approaches in moral theology, which ground ethics either in reason or nature in relative independence from dogmatics or in the life of the church. This chapter reconstructs Barth's position in response to criticisms that it is remote from the concrete contexts in which moral issues arise, that it does violence to ethics, and that it accords no legitimacy to nontheological approaches to ethics.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195093926
- eISBN:
- 9780199833689
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195093925.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism ...
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There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. However, others have argued that a freestanding and systematic form of virtue ethics would have advantages over other large‐scale approaches. The present work is the first to attempt such a systematic and freestanding or independent virtue ethics.Less
There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. However, others have argued that a freestanding and systematic form of virtue ethics would have advantages over other large‐scale approaches. The present work is the first to attempt such a systematic and freestanding or independent virtue ethics.
David Cummiskey
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195094534
- eISBN:
- 9780199833146
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195094530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or ...
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Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.Less
Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.
Steven Kepnes
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313819
- eISBN:
- 9780199785650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313819.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
Cohen's Religion of Reason is based on careful textual reasonings of Torah and creative interpretations of Jewish liturgies such as the Sabbath and High Holidays. Cohen places liturgy at the crucial ...
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Cohen's Religion of Reason is based on careful textual reasonings of Torah and creative interpretations of Jewish liturgies such as the Sabbath and High Holidays. Cohen places liturgy at the crucial bridge points between the self and the other, the self and the community, and the self and God. Cohen uses liturgy to map out a path for the growth of the self into moral autonomy. I refer to this moral self as a “liturgical self.” What Cohen's liturgical self explains, and Kantian ethics does not, is how the individual becomes at once autonomous and moral, at once for others, for itself, and for its community. Cohen's textual and liturgical thinking makes him an important resource to critique both modern foundational and postmodern views of the self‐other relation.Less
Cohen's Religion of Reason is based on careful textual reasonings of Torah and creative interpretations of Jewish liturgies such as the Sabbath and High Holidays. Cohen places liturgy at the crucial bridge points between the self and the other, the self and the community, and the self and God. Cohen uses liturgy to map out a path for the growth of the self into moral autonomy. I refer to this moral self as a “liturgical self.” What Cohen's liturgical self explains, and Kantian ethics does not, is how the individual becomes at once autonomous and moral, at once for others, for itself, and for its community. Cohen's textual and liturgical thinking makes him an important resource to critique both modern foundational and postmodern views of the self‐other relation.
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252633
- eISBN:
- 9780191597695
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252637.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The essays in this collection interpret and develop Kant's ideas on ethics. The first part of the book focuses on basic concepts: a priori method, good will, categorical imperatives, autonomy, and ...
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The essays in this collection interpret and develop Kant's ideas on ethics. The first part of the book focuses on basic concepts: a priori method, good will, categorical imperatives, autonomy, and constructivist strategies of argument. The second part concerns issues regarding human welfare: the moral significance of altruistic sentiments, the source of other‐regarding and self‐regarding reasons, different conceptions of happiness and personal values, and interpretation of the duty of beneficence. The third part concerns the moral assessment of persons as guilty or innocent, deserving or undeserving, motivated in a worthy way or not. More specifically, these last essays compare Kant's conception of conscience with other conceptions, contrast his theory of punishment with utilitarian and deeply retributivist theories, and distinguish morally worthy from unworthy motivation by conscience and punishment. The final essay proposes a Kantian perspective on moral dilemmas, gaps in moral theory, and residual feelings of guilt and regret in cases of irresolvable moral conflicts. Although the essays are often critical of Kant's particular views, they show how many familiar objections miss the mark. They emphasize features of Kant's ethics that remain worthy of attention today. They attempt to develop these independently of Kant's more dubious beliefs, for example, his rigorism regarding particular substantive principles and his transcendental idealism. The essays often propose readings of specific controversial texts and challenge common interpretations, but they also explore ways that Kantian ethics can be valuable in addressing moral, social, and political problems.Less
The essays in this collection interpret and develop Kant's ideas on ethics. The first part of the book focuses on basic concepts: a priori method, good will, categorical imperatives, autonomy, and constructivist strategies of argument. The second part concerns issues regarding human welfare: the moral significance of altruistic sentiments, the source of other‐regarding and self‐regarding reasons, different conceptions of happiness and personal values, and interpretation of the duty of beneficence. The third part concerns the moral assessment of persons as guilty or innocent, deserving or undeserving, motivated in a worthy way or not. More specifically, these last essays compare Kant's conception of conscience with other conceptions, contrast his theory of punishment with utilitarian and deeply retributivist theories, and distinguish morally worthy from unworthy motivation by conscience and punishment. The final essay proposes a Kantian perspective on moral dilemmas, gaps in moral theory, and residual feelings of guilt and regret in cases of irresolvable moral conflicts. Although the essays are often critical of Kant's particular views, they show how many familiar objections miss the mark. They emphasize features of Kant's ethics that remain worthy of attention today. They attempt to develop these independently of Kant's more dubious beliefs, for example, his rigorism regarding particular substantive principles and his transcendental idealism. The essays often propose readings of specific controversial texts and challenge common interpretations, but they also explore ways that Kantian ethics can be valuable in addressing moral, social, and political problems.
Thomas E. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252633
- eISBN:
- 9780191597695
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252637.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible ...
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Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they prefer. Kant's understanding of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness.Less
Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they prefer. Kant's understanding of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness.
Joel J. Kupperman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195308198
- eISBN:
- 9780199867325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308198.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time, and in particular the variations in Kantian and consequentialist ethical theories. It argues that if offered a choice ...
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This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time, and in particular the variations in Kantian and consequentialist ethical theories. It argues that if offered a choice between (a) the case-by-case approach of act consequentialism, and (b) unswerving loyalty to what is (by some consequentialist standards) an optimal set of rules, we should reject both. It also discusses ways to move beyond act consequentialism and at the same time emphasize the power of the underlying consequentialist intuition.Less
This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time, and in particular the variations in Kantian and consequentialist ethical theories. It argues that if offered a choice between (a) the case-by-case approach of act consequentialism, and (b) unswerving loyalty to what is (by some consequentialist standards) an optimal set of rules, we should reject both. It also discusses ways to move beyond act consequentialism and at the same time emphasize the power of the underlying consequentialist intuition.
Thomas E. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238348
- eISBN:
- 9780191597688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238347.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This essay characterizes the type of ethical theory that Kant developed, comparing it with contemporary theories along several dimensions. The essay distinguishes several senses in which an ethical ...
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This essay characterizes the type of ethical theory that Kant developed, comparing it with contemporary theories along several dimensions. The essay distinguishes several senses in which an ethical theory might be pluralistic and argues that, in some important senses (but not others), Kant's theory is pluralistic. Issues considered are whether there is one basic principle or many, whether there are incommensurable values, in what sense the right is prior to the good, and to what extent Kantian ethics is intrusive, dogmatic, and judgemental. Kant's ethics, perhaps surprisingly, is responsive to many of the practical concerns commonly advocated under the label pluralism.Less
This essay characterizes the type of ethical theory that Kant developed, comparing it with contemporary theories along several dimensions. The essay distinguishes several senses in which an ethical theory might be pluralistic and argues that, in some important senses (but not others), Kant's theory is pluralistic. Issues considered are whether there is one basic principle or many, whether there are incommensurable values, in what sense the right is prior to the good, and to what extent Kantian ethics is intrusive, dogmatic, and judgemental. Kant's ethics, perhaps surprisingly, is responsive to many of the practical concerns commonly advocated under the label pluralism.
Joel J. Kupperman
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195096545
- eISBN:
- 9780199852918
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195096545.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time and, in particular, variations in Kantian ethical theories. The chapter argues that a Kantian could say that we have ...
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This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time and, in particular, variations in Kantian ethical theories. The chapter argues that a Kantian could say that we have duties to particular people as part of ongoing commitments, but an adequate and sufficient account of good and poor decisions in personal relationships cannot be based entirely on the categorical imperative, nor can we do justice to seriously wrong decisions by regarding them as violations of duty. Any ethical philosophy, which includes an adequate account of ongoing personal commitments, will have to recognize that our judgments of what is wrong are of more than one sort and are made, so to speak, in more than one kind of voice.Less
This chapter explores ways in which an ethical theory can develop through time and, in particular, variations in Kantian ethical theories. The chapter argues that a Kantian could say that we have duties to particular people as part of ongoing commitments, but an adequate and sufficient account of good and poor decisions in personal relationships cannot be based entirely on the categorical imperative, nor can we do justice to seriously wrong decisions by regarding them as violations of duty. Any ethical philosophy, which includes an adequate account of ongoing personal commitments, will have to recognize that our judgments of what is wrong are of more than one sort and are made, so to speak, in more than one kind of voice.
Roger Crisp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752349
- eISBN:
- 9780191597251
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752342.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical ...
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Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good, vices, emotions, politics, feminism and moral education, and community.Less
Contains 14 specially commissioned papers on aspects of virtue ethics, and a substantial introduction that also serves as an introduction to virtue ethics. Topics covered include the practical application of the theory, ancient views, partiality, Kant, utilitarianism, human nature, natural and artificial virtues, virtues and the good, vices, emotions, politics, feminism and moral education, and community.
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804755870
- eISBN:
- 9780804768269
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804755870.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that Kantian Law is philosophically prior rather than an encryption of the Oedipus complex. Its priority is not the fictional priority of that which has abstracted from the ...
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This chapter argues that Kantian Law is philosophically prior rather than an encryption of the Oedipus complex. Its priority is not the fictional priority of that which has abstracted from the biological and psychological desires of the organism. The claim for the priority of the Law rests on Kant's definition of desire. Kantian Law originates in a domain that preexists oedipalization. This is also the domain of Kleist's Penthesilea. The chapter presents a reading of Kantian ethics in conjunction with Kleist's pre-classical tragedy to demonstrate that more is involved here than a play upon Freud's classicist terminology.Less
This chapter argues that Kantian Law is philosophically prior rather than an encryption of the Oedipus complex. Its priority is not the fictional priority of that which has abstracted from the biological and psychological desires of the organism. The claim for the priority of the Law rests on Kant's definition of desire. Kantian Law originates in a domain that preexists oedipalization. This is also the domain of Kleist's Penthesilea. The chapter presents a reading of Kantian ethics in conjunction with Kleist's pre-classical tragedy to demonstrate that more is involved here than a play upon Freud's classicist terminology.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
Free choice is the ability to keep justice, which Anselm defines as rightness of will kept for its own sake. He proposes a hierarchical analysis of free choice which prefigures the work of Harry ...
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Free choice is the ability to keep justice, which Anselm defines as rightness of will kept for its own sake. He proposes a hierarchical analysis of free choice which prefigures the work of Harry Frankfurt. Contrary to one common interpretation, he does not foreshadow a Kantian ethic, but rather adheres to the standard eudaemonism of his day.Less
Free choice is the ability to keep justice, which Anselm defines as rightness of will kept for its own sake. He proposes a hierarchical analysis of free choice which prefigures the work of Harry Frankfurt. Contrary to one common interpretation, he does not foreshadow a Kantian ethic, but rather adheres to the standard eudaemonism of his day.
Thomas E. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238348
- eISBN:
- 9780191597688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238347.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Reviews at length Alan Donagan's Kantian ethical theory, as primarily expressed in his book, The Theory of Morality. Donagan's method of developing the theory by examining a tradition of ...
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Reviews at length Alan Donagan's Kantian ethical theory, as primarily expressed in his book, The Theory of Morality. Donagan's method of developing the theory by examining a tradition of Judeo‐Christian ethical beliefs is contrasted with Kant's method, which like Rousseau's, analyses relatively formal features of moral judgements to determine their basic presuppositions. Then, doubts are raised about Donagan's attempt to derive a list of strict substantive moral rules from the imperative to respect humanity. Arguably, at least in the Groundwork, Kant's idea that rational nature is an end in itself is a ‘thinner’, a more formal moral requirement than Donagan's. Thus interpreted, the idea makes the Kantian basic moral framework better able to serve as a guide for conflict resolution and conscientious judgement in a world of diverse values, moral disagreement, and uncertainty.Less
Reviews at length Alan Donagan's Kantian ethical theory, as primarily expressed in his book, The Theory of Morality. Donagan's method of developing the theory by examining a tradition of Judeo‐Christian ethical beliefs is contrasted with Kant's method, which like Rousseau's, analyses relatively formal features of moral judgements to determine their basic presuppositions. Then, doubts are raised about Donagan's attempt to derive a list of strict substantive moral rules from the imperative to respect humanity. Arguably, at least in the Groundwork, Kant's idea that rational nature is an end in itself is a ‘thinner’, a more formal moral requirement than Donagan's. Thus interpreted, the idea makes the Kantian basic moral framework better able to serve as a guide for conflict resolution and conscientious judgement in a world of diverse values, moral disagreement, and uncertainty.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199289905
- eISBN:
- 9780191728471
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289905.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter begins with a discussion of Murdoch’s preference for attention to detail over general moral theory. An example of heroic action is then provided to facilitate such attention, and it is ...
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The chapter begins with a discussion of Murdoch’s preference for attention to detail over general moral theory. An example of heroic action is then provided to facilitate such attention, and it is discussed in the light of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. Problems with each approach are explained against the background of Murdoch’s emphasis on the importance of nobility or moral value, and the chapter concludes that a central issue in philosophical ethics must be whether the appearance of such value is veridical.Less
The chapter begins with a discussion of Murdoch’s preference for attention to detail over general moral theory. An example of heroic action is then provided to facilitate such attention, and it is discussed in the light of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. Problems with each approach are explained against the background of Murdoch’s emphasis on the importance of nobility or moral value, and the chapter concludes that a central issue in philosophical ethics must be whether the appearance of such value is veridical.
John Cottingham
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752349
- eISBN:
- 9780191597251
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752342.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues that the ethical excellences unfolded in the classical Aristotelian conception of the virtuous life presupposes a pre‐existing network of partialistic preferences, and that its resulting ...
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Argues that the ethical excellences unfolded in the classical Aristotelian conception of the virtuous life presupposes a pre‐existing network of partialistic preferences, and that its resulting rootedness in the real world gives virtue theory a decisive edge over its more abstract competitors. The ‘autocentric’ perspective of virtue ethics need not, however, imply a complacent and unfeeling social conservatism. Finally, charts the shift between such autocentric conceptions of ethics and more universalist accounts of morality, with special reference to Cartesian ethics, where we find an uneasy blend of traditional ‘aretic’ and proto‐Kantian elements.Less
Argues that the ethical excellences unfolded in the classical Aristotelian conception of the virtuous life presupposes a pre‐existing network of partialistic preferences, and that its resulting rootedness in the real world gives virtue theory a decisive edge over its more abstract competitors. The ‘autocentric’ perspective of virtue ethics need not, however, imply a complacent and unfeeling social conservatism. Finally, charts the shift between such autocentric conceptions of ethics and more universalist accounts of morality, with special reference to Cartesian ethics, where we find an uneasy blend of traditional ‘aretic’ and proto‐Kantian elements.
Onora O'Neill
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198752349
- eISBN:
- 9780191597251
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198752342.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Kant's ethics is often but wrongly criticized for neglecting the virtues or offering a poor account of them. He in fact offers a rich and careful account, and a plausible reading of his theory of ...
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Kant's ethics is often but wrongly criticized for neglecting the virtues or offering a poor account of them. He in fact offers a rich and careful account, and a plausible reading of his theory of action shows that it is neither too inward nor too individualistic. In particular, maxims of virtue are ‘not objects of introspection’ (Kant denies that we have adequate self‐knowledge) and ‘not constructed by ascription’ (their relation to action is too indeterminate). Rather, Kant sees maxims of virtue as ‘prescriptions’, which can be used to guide virtuous action, but may provide no way of showing whether virtue has been achieved.Less
Kant's ethics is often but wrongly criticized for neglecting the virtues or offering a poor account of them. He in fact offers a rich and careful account, and a plausible reading of his theory of action shows that it is neither too inward nor too individualistic. In particular, maxims of virtue are ‘not objects of introspection’ (Kant denies that we have adequate self‐knowledge) and ‘not constructed by ascription’ (their relation to action is too indeterminate). Rather, Kant sees maxims of virtue as ‘prescriptions’, which can be used to guide virtuous action, but may provide no way of showing whether virtue has been achieved.
Robert B. Louden
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195072921
- eISBN:
- 9780199852925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195072921.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly skeptical towards both morality and moral theory. The skepticism concerning morality stems from the argument that moral considerations are not always ...
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Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly skeptical towards both morality and moral theory. The skepticism concerning morality stems from the argument that moral considerations are not always the most important considerations and that it is not always good to be morally better. The skepticism concerning moral theory stems from the argument that moral theory is a radically misguided enterprise—one that does not illuminate moral practice and fulfills no useful functions. The succeeding chapters provide a response to the arguments of both “antimorality” and “antitheory” skeptics. The aim is to defuse such skepticism by putting forward alternative conceptions of morality and moral theory—conceptions that owe more to central texts within the canon of Western philosophical ethics (particularly Kantian and Aristotelian) than to sheer conceptual virtuosity.Less
Contemporary philosophers have grown increasingly skeptical towards both morality and moral theory. The skepticism concerning morality stems from the argument that moral considerations are not always the most important considerations and that it is not always good to be morally better. The skepticism concerning moral theory stems from the argument that moral theory is a radically misguided enterprise—one that does not illuminate moral practice and fulfills no useful functions. The succeeding chapters provide a response to the arguments of both “antimorality” and “antitheory” skeptics. The aim is to defuse such skepticism by putting forward alternative conceptions of morality and moral theory—conceptions that owe more to central texts within the canon of Western philosophical ethics (particularly Kantian and Aristotelian) than to sheer conceptual virtuosity.
Thomas E. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238348
- eISBN:
- 9780191597688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238347.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Explores the implications of respect for humanity when interpreted as appropriately valuing persons as valuers. After briefly contrasting other historical views, the essay proposes ways for ...
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Explores the implications of respect for humanity when interpreted as appropriately valuing persons as valuers. After briefly contrasting other historical views, the essay proposes ways for supplementing Kant's ethics by a richer account of how we actually value various things—i.e. an account sensitive to the fact that we are not merely ‘free and rational’ but also socially and historically embedded persons. The essay then explores the significance of this expanded perspective for dealing with problems raised by cultural diversity, concluding with comments on whether the ‘canon’ of college and university literature should be replaced by more culturally diverse readings.Less
Explores the implications of respect for humanity when interpreted as appropriately valuing persons as valuers. After briefly contrasting other historical views, the essay proposes ways for supplementing Kant's ethics by a richer account of how we actually value various things—i.e. an account sensitive to the fact that we are not merely ‘free and rational’ but also socially and historically embedded persons. The essay then explores the significance of this expanded perspective for dealing with problems raised by cultural diversity, concluding with comments on whether the ‘canon’ of college and university literature should be replaced by more culturally diverse readings.
Thomas E. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252633
- eISBN:
- 9780191597695
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252637.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Distinguishes basic and more extreme ideas underlying three related Kantian themes: that fundamental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori method, that moral duties are conceived as ...
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Distinguishes basic and more extreme ideas underlying three related Kantian themes: that fundamental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori method, that moral duties are conceived as categorical imperatives, and that moral agents have autonomy of the will. Arguably, an a priori method is needed for analysis and assessment of rationality claims, and we can act on moral reasons implicit in the humanity formula without a sense of constraint or an objectionably impartial attitude. The idea of a noumenal world is not a premise of Kantian ethics, but a conclusion to which Kant thought his ethics inevitably led.Less
Distinguishes basic and more extreme ideas underlying three related Kantian themes: that fundamental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori method, that moral duties are conceived as categorical imperatives, and that moral agents have autonomy of the will. Arguably, an a priori method is needed for analysis and assessment of rationality claims, and we can act on moral reasons implicit in the humanity formula without a sense of constraint or an objectionably impartial attitude. The idea of a noumenal world is not a premise of Kantian ethics, but a conclusion to which Kant thought his ethics inevitably led.
