Search Results

This introductory chapter considers perspectives on modern Kachin ethno-nationalism from the vantage point of different communities in Burma, India, China, and Thailand. It discusses anthropological representations of ‘the Kachin’ in the work of Edmund Leach, Jonathan Friedman, and lately that of James C. Scott, and examines the political implications of these representations. The chapter also considers why historians have found it difficult to undertake detailed studies of this region and the dangers of over-privileging the mandala as the defining historical intellectual apparatus. The methodological approach and objectives of the book are outlined in relation to these issues, with a particular focus on Jinghpaw dynamic political expansionism as a critical historical construct. The chapter concludes by briefly outlining each chapter to follow.

This chapter considers the impact of World War II on the Kachin region. It examines evidence for the motivations of Kachin volunteers during the war in the Kachin Levies and other organisations. It examines the demographics of this conflict and its impact on the development of politicised Kachin youth groups. It discusses their role in developing political strategy for Kachin State in the Union of Burma at the Panglong Conference and Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry in 1947. The chapter also looks at the developments in this region in a broader regional context to understand how related communities in Burma, India, and China interacted with each other and with their respective national governments during the early post-World War II years.

This chapter considers how many indigenous ethnic groups in Burma struggle for the right to express their own cultural and political identities against the Burmans. Unlike the immigrants to Burma during colonial rule who constituted the plural society, at least the Karen, Chin, Mon, Kachin, Shan, and others (but not the Rohingya) have always been formally accepted as indigenous peoples by the majority Burmans, as defined in the 1982 Citizenship Act. Officially, indigenous peoples are considered equal citizens with the Burmans, however, they have instead been discriminated against and treated as second-class citizens. Thus, the division between the ethnic Burmans and the ethnic groups remains the most serious fault line in the country. The chapter shows how the Kachin State can reveal the differences between the ethnic minority groups and the ruling Burmans at their most stark, and how it can become a possible seat of reform.

Karin Eberhardt discusses the life of a Kachin man in the Shan State of Burma. The son of a duwa (village area chief), shaman, and opium cultivator, Sara Brang Awng (a pseudonym) grew up to become an educated civil servant, a Christian, and a champion of sustainable agricultural technologies. His life spans the transformation of the northern Shan State world through collisions of cultures, and also through the random chronology of local human events. Eberhardt’s narrative explores how Sara Brang Awng both helped shape and was in turn shaped by seven decades of change in the culturally diverse and economically and politically complex context of northern Shan State. The story illustrates how the protagonist deliberately draws from his traditional roots to explore and embrace the possibilities of modernity, turning this apparent temporal rift into his greatest source of strength.

Mandy Sadan explores the life story of Maran Ja Bang, a Kachin woman born in Shan State (and also the author’s mother-in-law) who later lived in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. Sadan’s narrative attempts to outline the twists and turns of her family’s fortunes over four decades in order to raise questions about the invisibility of women in the history of the Kachin region of Burma, and the implications of this for our understanding of recent history. This life story also discusses in parallel the life of Mandy’s husband, Sadan Awng Tu―pointing to the ways in which gendered economies have influenced the everyday lives of those caught up in one of Burma’s longest conflicts.

This chapter examines the self-protection strategies of three conflict-affected communities in Myanmar. It considers the relative importance of self-protection in the Myanmar context and implications for the future of civilian protection in the twenty-first century. The chapter assesses the challenges and self-protection strategies in Karen State, which is located along the Myanmar—Thailand border and is home to the longest running internal conflict in Myanmar. The second case study investigates civilian protection in Kachin State, along the Myanmar—China border, and in which conflict has recently re-emerged. The Kachin are the last ethnic nationality without a ceasefire agreement between the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar military, and its main non-state armed group, the Kachin Independence Army. The final case study focuses on the absence of civilian protection in Rakhine State, aside the Myanmar—Bangladesh border, where riots, mass displacement, and fatal violence have disproportionately affected the Muslim minorities, overwhelmingly the self-identified Rohingya.

If locals in rural frontiers are in the thrall of powerful globals based in a network of world cities, they are not without power themselves. In the global core as well as the periphery, countrysides are the sources and scenes of resistance to decisions and actions taken in capitals and corporate boardrooms. French farmers seeing their privileges endangered by economic reforms demonstrate, and occasionally riot, in the streets of Paris. Often their banners proclaim their causes, but sometimes they show the name of a French region or even the flag of a département, reminding the authorities that they are dealing with an entity that has emotional resonance as well as economic interests. Chinese villagers organize to protest grievances ranging from the summary expropriation of land for factory building by industrialists empowered by the Beijing government, to oppressive rule by bosses whose loyalties are to the Communist Party rather than to the locals they are supposed to serve. They decry a new two-China policy—not involving Beijing and Taipei, but dividing their country into eastern “haves” and western “have-nots.” South Africans in rural KwaZulu-Natal stage rallies in support of their embattled deputy president facing charges in urban courtrooms including rape and corruption, certain that his trials constitute a political assault on the Zulu nation he represents and shouting not only for justice but also for secession. Ours may be an era of globalization and worldly flattening, but we also witness the resurgence of another of humanity’s ancient predispositions: the territorial imperative. The very Internet-enabled dissemination of information driving the breakdown of barriers among globals also spreads ideas about power and autonomy among locals that arouse the kinds of nationalisms and ethnic aspirations economic globalization is supposed to mitigate. On a planet fractured into nearly 200 countries, the European Union (EU) has taken a lead by enmeshing 27 of them in a multinational entity designed to integrate economies and coordinate laws, but the European paradox is that a widespread revival of chauvinism seeks to reverse this unifying, globalizing process. In several areas of Europe, there are provinces, regions, and other entities that press for more self-determination as opposed to international integration.

Important changes have taken place in Myanmar’s domestic policies and foreign relations since a new government assumed power in March 2011. Myanmar has distanced itself from China, until then the country’s main foreign ally, trading partner and most important supplier of military hardware, while Western nations had downgraded relations and imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s military government because of its abysmal human-rights record. The release of political prisoners, more press freedom and freedom to political organizations operate freely should be seen in this context: China’s embrace had become too strong and Myanmar’s leaders feared the country could lose its independence . Reforms were needed to improve relations with the West. Predictably, the West and India, which were concerned about China’s influence, have responded favourably to Myanmar’s new policies.

Asian Americans also joined Special Operations. Their work for this section involved engaging in guerrilla warfare against the Imperial Japanese forces in Burma. Led by Carl Eifler, they were immensely successful against the enemy who outnumbered their units operating behind the battle lines. While they found their linguistic and cultural skills used far less than imagined, they nevertheless contributed to the defeat of the Imperial Japanese forces in the region. Other Asian Americans planned, trained for, and were about to penetrate Japanese-occupied Korea before the war ended. Two of these missions, known as Eagle and Napko, involved the former contacting the Korean underground movement and the latter planning to use YuHan Corporation pharmaceutical offices as their safe houses while operating covertly inside Korea. Both projects, however, were cancelled once the war ended.