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If it’s clear, then it’s clear that it’s clear, or is it? Higher-order vagueness and the S4 axiom ⋆

Susanne Bobzien

in Episteme, etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2012
ISBN:
9780199696482
eISBN:
9780191738036
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696482.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This paper challenges some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom S4 in theories of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, S4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it’s clear ... More


Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits

Ernest Sosa

in Williamson on Knowledge

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199287512
eISBN:
9780191713620
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General

This chapter has four parts. The first lays out Williamson's account of mental concepts and mental states, and his characterization of knowledge as the most general factive stative attitude. The ... More


Margins and Iterations

Timothy Williamson

in Knowledge and its Limits

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199256563
eISBN:
9780191598678
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019925656X.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The anti‐luminosity argument is used to refute the KK principle that if one knows and one knows that one knows, or at least is in a position to know that one knows. Further iterations of knowledge ... More


Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Jody Azzouni

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The word “know” is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive, and criterion-transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. ... More


Luminosity

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 11 defends the thesis that some phenomenal and epistemic conditions are luminous in the sense that you’re always in a position to know whether or not they obtain. Section 11.1 draws a ... More


Confidence, Belief, and Knowledge; The Vagueness of “Know(s)”

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Knowledge does not require confidence. An agent may know without confidence because of misleading evidence or for other reasons. An agent may not believe what she knows. Misleading evidence never ... More


Usage Traps in the Language of Iterated Knowledge Attributions

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

How we easily slip between metacognitive thought and assertion and ground-floor thought and assertion is illustrated; how, as a result, we easily confuse the two is also illustrated. “Do you know the ... More


Iterated and Ground-Floor Cognition, KK and K¬K Arguments and Empirical Studies

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A distinction between Cartesian knowers (who are capable of all forms of metacognition) and ground-floor cognizers are drawn. B.B., a virtual ground-floor cognizer, is extensively described: what it ... More


Knowledge and Belief from Plato to Locke

Michael Ayers and Maria Rosa Antognazza

in Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a new empiricism

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780198833567
eISBN:
9780191871993
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833567.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This essential historical introduction to the main themes of the book starts with a close, sympathetic, and significantly novel analysis (with reference to associated arguments) of a famous argument ... More


Perception and Primary Knowledge

Michael Ayers

in Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a new empiricism

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780198833567
eISBN:
9780191871993
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833567.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A phenomenological analysis of perceptual experience, conducted with an eye on experimental psychology, addresses a series of questions. What is phenomenology? What makes perception of one’s ... More


Conceptualism and Perceptual Knowledge

Michael Ayers

in Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a new empiricism

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780198833567
eISBN:
9780191871993
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198833567.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Brief accounts of the motivation and form of some pre-Kantian conceptualist theories and of Kant’s transcendental idealism lead into discussion of the source of the conceptualist assumptions of much ... More


Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence

Daniel Greco

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The concept of higher-order evidence—roughly, evidence about what our evidence supports—promises epistemological riches; it has struck many philosophers as necessary for explaining how to rationally ... More


Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism?

James R. Beebe

in Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
January 2018
ISBN:
9780198746904
eISBN:
9780191809125
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198746904.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Explanationist (or abductivist) responses to skepticism maintain that our commonsense beliefs about the external world can be rationally preferred to skeptical hypotheses on the grounds that the ... More


Subjectivity and Credal Necessities

David Hunter

in On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities

Published in print:
2022
Published Online:
March 2022
ISBN:
9780192859549
eISBN:
9780191949913
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192859549.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter explores the essential subjectivity of belief, what marks a person’s perspective on the world as essentially hers. It argues that this subjectivity concerns, not what a person does ... More


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