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This chapter discusses a particular form of a guarantee for an obligation, namely the transfer of ownership used as a security for debt in place of the canonical pledge or mortgage. The object of the chapter is a study of a few cases from the late Antique legal practice, all from the Byzantine Egypt. The examples are provided by the Dublin papyri 32, 33, 34 (three deeds concerning property of a cell and its conveyance in a monastic milieu) as well as by the Archive of Patermouthis and Kako (subsequent sales of the same property by Aurelia Tapia as well as by her son-in-law Patermouthis : P. Münch. I 9 + P. Lond. V 1734, P. Lond. V 1724, 1729, 1733, P. Münch. 11 and 12). An analysis of the typical late antique pledges allows us to establish that the content of the rights passed to the pledgee becomes very similar to full ownership in late Antiquity. Finally the chapter suggests that this figure of security is inherent to legal anthropology and hence legal practice (be it in a form of Roman Fiducia, Greek one en pistei, Egyptian conditional sales or modern German Sicherungsübereignung).

Some question the possibility of consensus, others doubt its desirability. Pluralist skeptics argue that consensus is impossible because of social complexity and hyper-pluralism, and cognitive skeptics find consensus to be impossible as a consequence of the limits of rationality. Pluralist critics condemn consensus because it threatens the repression of diversity, and cognitive critics think consensus undesirable because of the risks it poses of poor decision making. The juristic approach to democracy offers responses to each of these clusters of doubt and criticism, providing a normative framework for a path of evolving practical solutions to otherwise intractable problems faced by an emergent system of earth system governance. Consensus is both possible and desirable. Similar pragmatic responses to environmental challenges recur across cultures and populations precisely because they work. Activity in the international public sphere—marked as it is by an unavoidable search for consensus—can lead the way toward more just resolutions of disputes. It does not have to labor under a democratic deficit. With respect to matters environmental, the fruit of the natural and social sciences can be brought to bear on processes of solving concrete problems in ways that increasingly square with identifiable consensual norms about right and wrong.