Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547807
- eISBN:
- 9780191720758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547807.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
The introduction explains the position and status of Habermas' theory in modern philosophy as well as the reasons for the significant interest it has generated. It also informs the reader how the ...
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The introduction explains the position and status of Habermas' theory in modern philosophy as well as the reasons for the significant interest it has generated. It also informs the reader how the analysis will proceed.Less
The introduction explains the position and status of Habermas' theory in modern philosophy as well as the reasons for the significant interest it has generated. It also informs the reader how the analysis will proceed.
Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547807
- eISBN:
- 9780191720758
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547807.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an “emphatical”, “uncurtailed” conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called ...
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Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an “emphatical”, “uncurtailed” conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called scientism (which would include critical rationalism and the greater part of analytical philosophy) on the other. His objection to the former is that it is self-contradictory and politically defeatist; his objection to the latter is that, thanks to a standard of rationality derived from the natural sciences or from Weber's concept of purposive rationality, it leaves normative questions to irrational decisions. Wishing to offer an alternative, Habermas tries to develop a theory of communicative action that can clarify the normative foundations of a critical theory of society as well as provide a fruitful theoretical framework for empirical social research. This study is a comprehensive and detailed analysis and a sustained critique of Habermas' philosophical system starting with his pragmatist turn in the seventies. It clearly and precisely depicts its long path from an analysis of speech acts to a discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state via the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and the attempts to apply the approach to, and support it with, empirical theories.Less
Jürgen Habermas seeks to defend the Enlightenment and with it an “emphatical”, “uncurtailed” conception of reason against the post-modern critique of reason on the one hand, and against so-called scientism (which would include critical rationalism and the greater part of analytical philosophy) on the other. His objection to the former is that it is self-contradictory and politically defeatist; his objection to the latter is that, thanks to a standard of rationality derived from the natural sciences or from Weber's concept of purposive rationality, it leaves normative questions to irrational decisions. Wishing to offer an alternative, Habermas tries to develop a theory of communicative action that can clarify the normative foundations of a critical theory of society as well as provide a fruitful theoretical framework for empirical social research. This study is a comprehensive and detailed analysis and a sustained critique of Habermas' philosophical system starting with his pragmatist turn in the seventies. It clearly and precisely depicts its long path from an analysis of speech acts to a discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state via the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, and the attempts to apply the approach to, and support it with, empirical theories.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236016
- eISBN:
- 9780191679162
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, General
This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. ...
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This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.Less
This book presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, it rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, it opposes the rationalism inherent in new-contractarian theory — both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by Jürgen Habermas, and in the idealized social-contract version of the theory promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, this pluralist approach takes a more realistic and pragmatic line, eschewing the convenient recourse of idealization in cognitive and practical matters. Instead of a utopianism that looks to a uniquely perfect order that would prevail under ideal conditions, it advocates incremental improvements within the framework or arrangements that none of us will deem perfect, but that all of us ‘can live with’. Such an approach replaces the yearning for an unattainable consensus with the institution of pragmatic arrangements in which the community will acquiesce — not through agreeing on their optimality, but through a shared recognition among the dissonant parties that the available options are even worse.
Nigel Biggar
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199566624
- eISBN:
- 9780191722042
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199566624.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Religion and Society
This chapter opposes the secularist view that religious or theological speech should be banned from public discourse or translated into publicly accessible language. First, it presents an argument ...
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This chapter opposes the secularist view that religious or theological speech should be banned from public discourse or translated into publicly accessible language. First, it presents an argument against the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, which, it claims, is at once thoroughly theological and publicly accessible. This involves critical reflection on what it means to be ‘thoroughly theological’ and ‘publicly accessible’. Next, against this understanding of a theological argument the chapter proceeds to assess the relevant theories of Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and Jeffrey Stout. This assessment analyzes the variety of things that ‘public reason’ can mean, and it explains why the requirement that theological speech be translated into secular discourse is wrong. Finally, the chapter concludes that Stout's model of candid public conversation is implicit in the unofficial late Rawls, and is more satisfactory than the model of translation espoused even by the recent, religion-friendlier Habermas.Less
This chapter opposes the secularist view that religious or theological speech should be banned from public discourse or translated into publicly accessible language. First, it presents an argument against the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, which, it claims, is at once thoroughly theological and publicly accessible. This involves critical reflection on what it means to be ‘thoroughly theological’ and ‘publicly accessible’. Next, against this understanding of a theological argument the chapter proceeds to assess the relevant theories of Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and Jeffrey Stout. This assessment analyzes the variety of things that ‘public reason’ can mean, and it explains why the requirement that theological speech be translated into secular discourse is wrong. Finally, the chapter concludes that Stout's model of candid public conversation is implicit in the unofficial late Rawls, and is more satisfactory than the model of translation espoused even by the recent, religion-friendlier Habermas.
Monique Deveaux
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199289790
- eISBN:
- 9780191711022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289790.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter argues that deliberative democracy theory is an invaluable resource for thinking about how liberal democracies and minority cultural groups might mediate conflicts of culture. However, ...
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This chapter argues that deliberative democracy theory is an invaluable resource for thinking about how liberal democracies and minority cultural groups might mediate conflicts of culture. However, it needs to be amended in important ways if it is to respond to the needs of minority cultural communities. This chapter makes the case for a deliberative democratic approach to resolving tensions between gender equality and cultural recognition, grounding it in principle of political inclusion and democratic legitimacy. This conception of democratic deliberation is open-ended with respect to outcomes, and takes its cue from an agonistic account of power and dialogue rather than the reasoned deliberation usually urged by proponents of discourse ethics, such as Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen, and Seyla Benhabib. This approach to negotiating conflicts, which emphasizes negotiation and compromise, can also help to empower vulnerable members of cultural groups who dissent from prevailing cultural roles and arrangements in their communities.Less
This chapter argues that deliberative democracy theory is an invaluable resource for thinking about how liberal democracies and minority cultural groups might mediate conflicts of culture. However, it needs to be amended in important ways if it is to respond to the needs of minority cultural communities. This chapter makes the case for a deliberative democratic approach to resolving tensions between gender equality and cultural recognition, grounding it in principle of political inclusion and democratic legitimacy. This conception of democratic deliberation is open-ended with respect to outcomes, and takes its cue from an agonistic account of power and dialogue rather than the reasoned deliberation usually urged by proponents of discourse ethics, such as Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen, and Seyla Benhabib. This approach to negotiating conflicts, which emphasizes negotiation and compromise, can also help to empower vulnerable members of cultural groups who dissent from prevailing cultural roles and arrangements in their communities.
Amy Bartholomew
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199781577
- eISBN:
- 9780199932887
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199781577.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Amy Bartholomew argues the ‘global war on terror’ has generated rightlessness but not lawlessness. Rule by law threatens to produce a constitutive undoing of the post World War II international legal ...
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Amy Bartholomew argues the ‘global war on terror’ has generated rightlessness but not lawlessness. Rule by law threatens to produce a constitutive undoing of the post World War II international legal architecture, or ‘law’s empire’. The current threat to human rights and the future of legality may be understood as ‘empire’s law,’ a development that arms neoliberal globalization with a neoconservative political order of global rule by an American empire. To analyze these developments a critical analysis of international law that can conceptualize the universalist core of legitimate legality which authors like Franz Neumann and, above all, Jürgen Habermas provide is necessary. Both ‘egalitarian universalism’ as key to legality’s internal legitimacy and democratic legitimation as a necessary but still far off condition for external legitimacy are important ideas to further develop in our political theory of legitimate legality and to defend in our struggles to resist empire’s law, a form of rule that threatens humanity’s future.Less
Amy Bartholomew argues the ‘global war on terror’ has generated rightlessness but not lawlessness. Rule by law threatens to produce a constitutive undoing of the post World War II international legal architecture, or ‘law’s empire’. The current threat to human rights and the future of legality may be understood as ‘empire’s law,’ a development that arms neoliberal globalization with a neoconservative political order of global rule by an American empire. To analyze these developments a critical analysis of international law that can conceptualize the universalist core of legitimate legality which authors like Franz Neumann and, above all, Jürgen Habermas provide is necessary. Both ‘egalitarian universalism’ as key to legality’s internal legitimacy and democratic legitimation as a necessary but still far off condition for external legitimacy are important ideas to further develop in our political theory of legitimate legality and to defend in our struggles to resist empire’s law, a form of rule that threatens humanity’s future.
David Schlosberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256419
- eISBN:
- 9780191600203
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256411.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political ...
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The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political and social theory, a range of authors has finally begun to respond to a lament broached by Mary Parker Follett in 1918: pluralists early in the century had acknowledged difference, she noted, but they had not arrived at the heart of the question – what is to be done with this diversity? This chapter examines some of the contemporary responses to Follett’s question and constructs a list of practices necessary to build political relations across difference. These get at issues of justice beyond the material, concerning both recognition and participatory process, and it is argued that agonistic respect (William Connolly 1991), attempts at intersubjective understanding (Seyla Benhabib 1992; Jurgen Habermas 1970; Axel Honneth 1992), inclusive, open discourse free from domination and the possibility of reprisals (John Dryzek 1990; John Forester 1989; Habermas 1984, 1987), and the development of a particular form of solidarity are all crucial to the practices suggested by a new generation of pluralist theory. Solidarity (unity without uniformity) is complex in that it centres on the process of reconciling difference with the need for concerted political action. The author focuses on how the notion of unity suggested by Follett was discarded by the second generation of pluralism, but is now mirrored by numerous contemporary theorists, including Richard Rorty (1989), Donna Haraway (1991), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987).Less
The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political and social theory, a range of authors has finally begun to respond to a lament broached by Mary Parker Follett in 1918: pluralists early in the century had acknowledged difference, she noted, but they had not arrived at the heart of the question – what is to be done with this diversity? This chapter examines some of the contemporary responses to Follett’s question and constructs a list of practices necessary to build political relations across difference. These get at issues of justice beyond the material, concerning both recognition and participatory process, and it is argued that agonistic respect (William Connolly 1991), attempts at intersubjective understanding (Seyla Benhabib 1992; Jurgen Habermas 1970; Axel Honneth 1992), inclusive, open discourse free from domination and the possibility of reprisals (John Dryzek 1990; John Forester 1989; Habermas 1984, 1987), and the development of a particular form of solidarity are all crucial to the practices suggested by a new generation of pluralist theory. Solidarity (unity without uniformity) is complex in that it centres on the process of reconciling difference with the need for concerted political action. The author focuses on how the notion of unity suggested by Follett was discarded by the second generation of pluralism, but is now mirrored by numerous contemporary theorists, including Richard Rorty (1989), Donna Haraway (1991), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987).
Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199566624
- eISBN:
- 9780191722042
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199566624.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Religion and Society
Must religious voices keep quiet in public places? Does fairness in a plural society require it? Must the expression of religious belief be so authoritarian as to threaten civil peace? Do we need ...
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Must religious voices keep quiet in public places? Does fairness in a plural society require it? Must the expression of religious belief be so authoritarian as to threaten civil peace? Do we need translation into ‘secular’ language, or should we try to manage polyglot conversation? How neutral is ‘secular’ language? Is a religious argument necessarily unreasonable? What issues are specific to Islam within this exchange? These are just some of the pressing questions addressed by this book. This book comprehends both political philosophy and theology, and moves adeptly between political theory and practice. Whether offering critical analyses of key theorists such as John Rawls, Jeffrey Stout, and Jürgen Habermas, or pursuing the issue of the public expression of religion into the debate about religious education in the USA, the legalisation of euthanasia in the UK, and human rights worldwide, this book looks directly into crucial areas of religious and political complexity.Less
Must religious voices keep quiet in public places? Does fairness in a plural society require it? Must the expression of religious belief be so authoritarian as to threaten civil peace? Do we need translation into ‘secular’ language, or should we try to manage polyglot conversation? How neutral is ‘secular’ language? Is a religious argument necessarily unreasonable? What issues are specific to Islam within this exchange? These are just some of the pressing questions addressed by this book. This book comprehends both political philosophy and theology, and moves adeptly between political theory and practice. Whether offering critical analyses of key theorists such as John Rawls, Jeffrey Stout, and Jürgen Habermas, or pursuing the issue of the public expression of religion into the debate about religious education in the USA, the legalisation of euthanasia in the UK, and human rights worldwide, this book looks directly into crucial areas of religious and political complexity.
Patricia Owens
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199299362
- eISBN:
- 9780191715051
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299362.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter contrasts Arendt's writing with Jürgen Habermas who has argued that humanitarian intervention is justified, in part, because it places international relations on the path toward ...
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This chapter contrasts Arendt's writing with Jürgen Habermas who has argued that humanitarian intervention is justified, in part, because it places international relations on the path toward cosmopolitan society, a global public realm. Habermas has unwittingly — and perhaps surprisingly — endorsed a model of global political founding that has something in common with Machiavelli's notion of politics and violence being two sides of the same coin. Habermas envisages a political end, a global public; ‘humanitarian’ war is endorsed as a means to make it. Arendt's judgement is more sobering. Her account of founding and political freedom foregoes the temptation to reduce politics to a relationship between ends and means. She held a deeply ambivalent view of the concept of and justifications for political action based on ‘humanity’. Her thought was rarely couched in what she took to be the rather abstract and even dangerous language of humanitarianism.Less
This chapter contrasts Arendt's writing with Jürgen Habermas who has argued that humanitarian intervention is justified, in part, because it places international relations on the path toward cosmopolitan society, a global public realm. Habermas has unwittingly — and perhaps surprisingly — endorsed a model of global political founding that has something in common with Machiavelli's notion of politics and violence being two sides of the same coin. Habermas envisages a political end, a global public; ‘humanitarian’ war is endorsed as a means to make it. Arendt's judgement is more sobering. Her account of founding and political freedom foregoes the temptation to reduce politics to a relationship between ends and means. She held a deeply ambivalent view of the concept of and justifications for political action based on ‘humanity’. Her thought was rarely couched in what she took to be the rather abstract and even dangerous language of humanitarianism.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
If politics is a process whereby collective decisions are reached from an initial position of disagreement, there are two conceptions of how this should happen. Politics as interest‐aggregation looks ...
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If politics is a process whereby collective decisions are reached from an initial position of disagreement, there are two conceptions of how this should happen. Politics as interest‐aggregation looks for a procedure whereby pre‐existing preferences can be fairly aggregated (e.g. majority voting). In contrast, politics as dialogue emphasizes the giving of reasons by participants, which allows even those who disagree with the final outcome to regard it as legitimate. Arendt and Habermas present sharply opposed, but unacceptable, versions of the latter view. A more realistic alternative would involve narrowing the scope of political debate, and focusing on the conditions under which citizens are willing to set aside their personal interests in order to represent the public as a whole.Less
If politics is a process whereby collective decisions are reached from an initial position of disagreement, there are two conceptions of how this should happen. Politics as interest‐aggregation looks for a procedure whereby pre‐existing preferences can be fairly aggregated (e.g. majority voting). In contrast, politics as dialogue emphasizes the giving of reasons by participants, which allows even those who disagree with the final outcome to regard it as legitimate. Arendt and Habermas present sharply opposed, but unacceptable, versions of the latter view. A more realistic alternative would involve narrowing the scope of political debate, and focusing on the conditions under which citizens are willing to set aside their personal interests in order to represent the public as a whole.
Kirk Wetters
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823229888
- eISBN:
- 9780823235766
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823229888.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book revises the concept of the public sphere by examining opinion as a foundational concept of modernity. Indispensable to ideas like “public opinion” and “freedom of opinion,” opinion, though ...
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This book revises the concept of the public sphere by examining opinion as a foundational concept of modernity. Indispensable to ideas like “public opinion” and “freedom of opinion,” opinion, though sometimes held in dubious repute, here assumes a central position in modern philosophy, literature, sociology, and political theory, while being the object of extremely contradictory valuations. The book focuses on interpretative shifts begun in the Enlightenment and cemented by the French Revolution to restore the concept of “opinion” to a central role in our understanding of the political public sphere. Locke's “law of opinion,” underwritten by the ancient conceptions of nomos and fama, proved to be inconsistent with the modern ideal of a rational political order. The contemporary dynamics of this problem have been worked out by Jürgen Habermas and Reinhart Koselleck: for Habermas the private law of opinion can be brought under the rational control of public discourse and procedural form, whereas Koselleck views modernity as the period in which irrational potentials were unleashed by a political-conceptual language that only intensified and accelerated the upheavals of history. Modernity risked making opinions into the idols of collective representations, sacrificing opinion to ideology and individualism to totalitarianism. Drawing on an intriguing range of thinkers, some not widely known today, the book argues that this transformation, though irreversible, is resisted by literary language, which opposes the rigid formalism that compels individuals to identify with their opinions. Rather than forcing thought to bind itself to stable opinions, modern literary forms seek to suspend this moment of closure and representation, so that held opinions do not bring all deliberative processes to a standstill.Less
This book revises the concept of the public sphere by examining opinion as a foundational concept of modernity. Indispensable to ideas like “public opinion” and “freedom of opinion,” opinion, though sometimes held in dubious repute, here assumes a central position in modern philosophy, literature, sociology, and political theory, while being the object of extremely contradictory valuations. The book focuses on interpretative shifts begun in the Enlightenment and cemented by the French Revolution to restore the concept of “opinion” to a central role in our understanding of the political public sphere. Locke's “law of opinion,” underwritten by the ancient conceptions of nomos and fama, proved to be inconsistent with the modern ideal of a rational political order. The contemporary dynamics of this problem have been worked out by Jürgen Habermas and Reinhart Koselleck: for Habermas the private law of opinion can be brought under the rational control of public discourse and procedural form, whereas Koselleck views modernity as the period in which irrational potentials were unleashed by a political-conceptual language that only intensified and accelerated the upheavals of history. Modernity risked making opinions into the idols of collective representations, sacrificing opinion to ideology and individualism to totalitarianism. Drawing on an intriguing range of thinkers, some not widely known today, the book argues that this transformation, though irreversible, is resisted by literary language, which opposes the rigid formalism that compels individuals to identify with their opinions. Rather than forcing thought to bind itself to stable opinions, modern literary forms seek to suspend this moment of closure and representation, so that held opinions do not bring all deliberative processes to a standstill.
Francis Cheneval
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594627
- eISBN:
- 9780191595738
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594627.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union, Political Theory
This chapter analyses the ambiguous status of the European intellectual in an integration process understood as the attempt to overcome self‐centred patriotism in the name of universal principles. ...
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This chapter analyses the ambiguous status of the European intellectual in an integration process understood as the attempt to overcome self‐centred patriotism in the name of universal principles. Francis Cheneval shows that European intellectuals adhering to universal principles find themselves caught between the rationale of political particularity and closure on the one hand, and that of cosmopolitan integration on the other. The question is thus how intellectuals can defend European institution‐building and political consolidation when the process is in strong tension with cosmopolitan ideals. Such a conceptual incertitude between Euro‐patriotism and cosmopolitan tendencies is evident in the recent evolution of Jürgen Habermas, whose discrepancy between an initial plea for critical and rational identities and a more recent glorification of the European model might well illustrate a structural problem of integration theory faced by many European intellectuals over time.Less
This chapter analyses the ambiguous status of the European intellectual in an integration process understood as the attempt to overcome self‐centred patriotism in the name of universal principles. Francis Cheneval shows that European intellectuals adhering to universal principles find themselves caught between the rationale of political particularity and closure on the one hand, and that of cosmopolitan integration on the other. The question is thus how intellectuals can defend European institution‐building and political consolidation when the process is in strong tension with cosmopolitan ideals. Such a conceptual incertitude between Euro‐patriotism and cosmopolitan tendencies is evident in the recent evolution of Jürgen Habermas, whose discrepancy between an initial plea for critical and rational identities and a more recent glorification of the European model might well illustrate a structural problem of integration theory faced by many European intellectuals over time.
Michele Dillon
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814738726
- eISBN:
- 9780814738733
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814738726.003.0010
- Subject:
- Sociology, Politics, Social Movements and Social Change
This chapter explores the intellectual significance of Jürgen Habermas's gesture toward religion and offers a sociological critique of his view of religion as well as its implications for ...
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This chapter explores the intellectual significance of Jürgen Habermas's gesture toward religion and offers a sociological critique of his view of religion as well as its implications for post-secular society. It first considers Habermas's theory of communicative action before discussing his post-secular–religious turn as it relates to the contested nature of religious ideas. It argues that his religious turn marginalizes the centrality of spirituality, emotion, and tradition to religion, and fails to recognize the link between religion and the secular. It then notes Habermas's inattentiveness to how religion manifests and matters in everyday life, an indication that he doesn't take religion seriously. It suggests that Habermas's post-secular–religious turn is a reflection of the lingering persistence of his highly cognitive and rational approach to social life and undermines the conceptual promise of a post-secular society for which religion may offer a means of emancipation. The chapter concludes by commenting on Habermas's use of the terms “secular citizens” and “religious citizens.”Less
This chapter explores the intellectual significance of Jürgen Habermas's gesture toward religion and offers a sociological critique of his view of religion as well as its implications for post-secular society. It first considers Habermas's theory of communicative action before discussing his post-secular–religious turn as it relates to the contested nature of religious ideas. It argues that his religious turn marginalizes the centrality of spirituality, emotion, and tradition to religion, and fails to recognize the link between religion and the secular. It then notes Habermas's inattentiveness to how religion manifests and matters in everyday life, an indication that he doesn't take religion seriously. It suggests that Habermas's post-secular–religious turn is a reflection of the lingering persistence of his highly cognitive and rational approach to social life and undermines the conceptual promise of a post-secular society for which religion may offer a means of emancipation. The chapter concludes by commenting on Habermas's use of the terms “secular citizens” and “religious citizens.”
Jürgen Habermas
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823228416
- eISBN:
- 9780823235544
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823228416.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter examines German philosopher Jürgen Habermas' view on the characterization of the role of scientific technology as a type of human activity from the ...
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This chapter examines German philosopher Jürgen Habermas' view on the characterization of the role of scientific technology as a type of human activity from the perspective of American Pragmatism. Habermas contends that scientific technology can never be concerned with questions of practical reasons, and in order for scientific technology to do its work it must dismiss such concerns as subjective. This chapter also analyzes Habermas' attempt to construct a middle position between the disparate visions of scientific technology advanced by the positivist right and the Marcusean left.Less
This chapter examines German philosopher Jürgen Habermas' view on the characterization of the role of scientific technology as a type of human activity from the perspective of American Pragmatism. Habermas contends that scientific technology can never be concerned with questions of practical reasons, and in order for scientific technology to do its work it must dismiss such concerns as subjective. This chapter also analyzes Habermas' attempt to construct a middle position between the disparate visions of scientific technology advanced by the positivist right and the Marcusean left.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236016
- eISBN:
- 9780191679162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, General
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the relation between consensus and pluralism. This book criticises the consensualism of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas ...
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This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the relation between consensus and pluralism. This book criticises the consensualism of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and suggests that it is fraught with negative potential and deserves a forceful contradiction. It examines the relation between consensus, rationality, and epistemic morality, and evaluates whether consensus is required in the pursuit of truth. It also identifies the problems of a consensus theory of truth and discusses the experiential basis of cognitive diversity and the unavoidability of pluralism.Less
This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the relation between consensus and pluralism. This book criticises the consensualism of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and suggests that it is fraught with negative potential and deserves a forceful contradiction. It examines the relation between consensus, rationality, and epistemic morality, and evaluates whether consensus is required in the pursuit of truth. It also identifies the problems of a consensus theory of truth and discusses the experiential basis of cognitive diversity and the unavoidability of pluralism.
Anja J. Karnein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199782475
- eISBN:
- 9780199933297
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782475.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
In light of new biomedical technologies, such as artificial reproduction, stem cell research, genetic selection and design, the question of what we owe to future persons and unborn life more ...
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In light of new biomedical technologies, such as artificial reproduction, stem cell research, genetic selection and design, the question of what we owe to future persons and unborn life more generally, is as contested as ever. This book offers a new theory by showing how our commitments to persons can help us make sense of our obligations to unborn life. These commitments give us reasons to treat embryos that will develop into persons in anticipation of these persons. By contrast, embryos, which women want to abort or refuse to implant, can be discarded or used for research purposes. How viable is this theory? The book explores its attractiveness for Germany and the U.S.—two countries with very different approaches to valuing unborn life. However, another question raised by modern biomedical technologies concerns the legitimacy of genetically selecting and manipulating embryos. Parents might want to create persons with particular genetic properties. The book maintains that only some uses of these technologies do not violate what respect for persons, including those of the future, requires. Genetic interventions can only be legitimate if used to insure future persons’ independence. With this claim the book’s theory runs counter to liberal eugenic approaches that give parents wide-ranging entitlements to interfere with their future child’s genome, in the names of reproductive freedom, enhancing the species or social justice.Less
In light of new biomedical technologies, such as artificial reproduction, stem cell research, genetic selection and design, the question of what we owe to future persons and unborn life more generally, is as contested as ever. This book offers a new theory by showing how our commitments to persons can help us make sense of our obligations to unborn life. These commitments give us reasons to treat embryos that will develop into persons in anticipation of these persons. By contrast, embryos, which women want to abort or refuse to implant, can be discarded or used for research purposes. How viable is this theory? The book explores its attractiveness for Germany and the U.S.—two countries with very different approaches to valuing unborn life. However, another question raised by modern biomedical technologies concerns the legitimacy of genetically selecting and manipulating embryos. Parents might want to create persons with particular genetic properties. The book maintains that only some uses of these technologies do not violate what respect for persons, including those of the future, requires. Genetic interventions can only be legitimate if used to insure future persons’ independence. With this claim the book’s theory runs counter to liberal eugenic approaches that give parents wide-ranging entitlements to interfere with their future child’s genome, in the names of reproductive freedom, enhancing the species or social justice.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236016
- eISBN:
- 9780191679162
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses the flaws and problems related to a consensus theory of truth. It suggests that consensus has to be construed in terms of addressing common issues in a common way, but this ...
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This chapter discusses the flaws and problems related to a consensus theory of truth. It suggests that consensus has to be construed in terms of addressing common issues in a common way, but this notion produces a question of how consilience bears on the issue of truth. It evaluates Jürgen Habermas' philosophy concerning consensus and truth and suggests that his rationality via consensus approach is predicated upon very unrealistic expectations of consensus because it fails to provide a means toward achieving something akin to rationality as traditionally conceived.Less
This chapter discusses the flaws and problems related to a consensus theory of truth. It suggests that consensus has to be construed in terms of addressing common issues in a common way, but this notion produces a question of how consilience bears on the issue of truth. It evaluates Jürgen Habermas' philosophy concerning consensus and truth and suggests that his rationality via consensus approach is predicated upon very unrealistic expectations of consensus because it fails to provide a means toward achieving something akin to rationality as traditionally conceived.
T. C. W. BLANNING
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198227458
- eISBN:
- 9780191678707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198227458.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Early Modern History, Cultural History
This chapter provides an outline of what is to be found in the main text. It reveals the conceptual foundations on which the book is based. It also presents a comparative study of the development of ...
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This chapter provides an outline of what is to be found in the main text. It reveals the conceptual foundations on which the book is based. It also presents a comparative study of the development of political culture in Europe from the late 17th century to the late 19th century, focusing on Great Britain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. It discusses the emergence of the ‘public sphere’, in which private individuals came and were able to create a cultural actor — the public — which has dominated the European culture ever since. It examines the influence of Jürgen Habermas’s early work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first published in German in 1962, on the conceptual framework of the analysis of the representational culture. This chapter also analyzes the terms culture and nation, and examines their significance in the public sphere.Less
This chapter provides an outline of what is to be found in the main text. It reveals the conceptual foundations on which the book is based. It also presents a comparative study of the development of political culture in Europe from the late 17th century to the late 19th century, focusing on Great Britain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. It discusses the emergence of the ‘public sphere’, in which private individuals came and were able to create a cultural actor — the public — which has dominated the European culture ever since. It examines the influence of Jürgen Habermas’s early work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first published in German in 1962, on the conceptual framework of the analysis of the representational culture. This chapter also analyzes the terms culture and nation, and examines their significance in the public sphere.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804769129
- eISBN:
- 9780804777810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804769129.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative ...
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In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative Action and later in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas describes the “lifeworld” as the basic conception of society, to be amended or supplemented only for cause. In addition, Habermas argues that in the course of social evolution, systems of economic and political action arise whereby action is coordinated by the consequences of self-interested action, rather than consensual understanding. This chapter explores Habermas's idea of such “systems” based on his reading of Talcott Parsons. It also examines how Habermas integrates the lifeworld and system concepts into his model of system/lifeworld interchange. It argues that the critical model developed by Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action is more functionalist than straightforwardly normative.Less
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Jürgen Habermas proposes a theory of “communicative action” and sets it within a concept of society he calls “lifeworld.” In both his Theory of Communicative Action and later in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas describes the “lifeworld” as the basic conception of society, to be amended or supplemented only for cause. In addition, Habermas argues that in the course of social evolution, systems of economic and political action arise whereby action is coordinated by the consequences of self-interested action, rather than consensual understanding. This chapter explores Habermas's idea of such “systems” based on his reading of Talcott Parsons. It also examines how Habermas integrates the lifeworld and system concepts into his model of system/lifeworld interchange. It argues that the critical model developed by Habermas in Theory of Communicative Action is more functionalist than straightforwardly normative.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804769129
- eISBN:
- 9780804777810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804769129.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Jürgen Habermas's analysis of modern law is based on the social condition that he calls the “rationalization of the lifeworld.” He argues that through this process of rationalization, the cultural ...
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Jürgen Habermas's analysis of modern law is based on the social condition that he calls the “rationalization of the lifeworld.” He argues that through this process of rationalization, the cultural tradition has been largely secularized and has lost much of its power to prescribe in advance the division of labor and social roles. While he views communicative action as a means to coordinate action and integrate society, he insists that it is not the only mechanism. These difficulties are addressed by modern law, which Habermas argues has the power to steer actors' choices through sanctions and has claim to legitimacy. The idea that a legal order's legitimacy buttresses its long-run stability is a key assumption of social theory and features prominently in Max Weber's sociology of law. This chapter explores Habermas's reconstruction of modern law, as well as the tensions between ideal and empirical validity and the tensions between legitimacy and enforcement. It also considers Habermas's argument about the tension between facticity and validity, his account of the system of rights, and his notion of the constitutional state.Less
Jürgen Habermas's analysis of modern law is based on the social condition that he calls the “rationalization of the lifeworld.” He argues that through this process of rationalization, the cultural tradition has been largely secularized and has lost much of its power to prescribe in advance the division of labor and social roles. While he views communicative action as a means to coordinate action and integrate society, he insists that it is not the only mechanism. These difficulties are addressed by modern law, which Habermas argues has the power to steer actors' choices through sanctions and has claim to legitimacy. The idea that a legal order's legitimacy buttresses its long-run stability is a key assumption of social theory and features prominently in Max Weber's sociology of law. This chapter explores Habermas's reconstruction of modern law, as well as the tensions between ideal and empirical validity and the tensions between legitimacy and enforcement. It also considers Habermas's argument about the tension between facticity and validity, his account of the system of rights, and his notion of the constitutional state.
