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On the Distinction between Intellectual and Moral Virtues

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199604074
eISBN:
9780191729300
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The Appendix examines the relationship between intellectual virtues, conceived as character traits, and what are typically thought of as moral virtues. Three possible accounts of this relation are ... More


The Personal Worth Conception and its Rivals

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199604074
eISBN:
9780191729300
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of ... More


Reply to Driver and Darwall

Joshua D. Greene

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter responds to the arguments made by Julia Driver and Stephen Darwall. Driver argues that more robust moral theories, including robust kinds of consequentialism and deontology, are not ... More


Character and Consequences

Ben Bradley

in Questions of Character

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780199357703
eISBN:
9780199357734
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in ... More


Forgetting Christian Humility

Kent Dunnington

in Humility, Pride, and Christian Virtue Theory

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
February 2019
ISBN:
9780198818397
eISBN:
9780191859533
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198818397.003.0001
Subject:
Religion, Philosophy of Religion

Recent scholarship on humility can be grouped into five major accounts of humility. This chapter canvasses those accounts before suggesting that two accounts—“low concern” and ... More


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