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Ron Mallon and Shaun Nichols

in The Moral Psychology Handbook

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199582143
eISBN:
9780191594496
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Recent work on the emotions and moral judgment by Jonathan Haidt, James Blair, and Joshua Greene has done much to revive a sentimentalist tradition of thinking about moral psychology. This chapter ... More


Neuroscience and Legal Theory: Jurisprudence, Morality, and Economics

Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson

in Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199812134
eISBN:
9780199368594
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812134.003.0003
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law, Medical Law

This chapter discusses several issues at the intersection of neuroscience and legal theory. It first considers claims about how neuroscience may illuminate issues in general jurisprudence. It then ... More


Morality and Neuroscience: Past and Future

S. Matthew Liao

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter identifies some of the central topics in the field of moral neuroscience, takes stock of some of the key discussions, and recommends ways of taking these discussions further. It first ... More


Moral Psychology Meets Reliabilism

Erik J. Wielenberg

in Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780198714323
eISBN:
9780191782725
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714323.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter draws on contemporary empirical moral psychology to develop an account of how we can have knowledge of non-natural causally inert ethical features of things. The chapter connects the ... More


Empathy and the Limits of Utilitarianism (II)

Samuel Fleischacker

in Being Me Being You: Adam Smith and Empathy

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2020
ISBN:
9780226661759
eISBN:
9780226661926
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:
10.7208/chicago/9780226661926.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, General

Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt have proposed that utilitarianism provides us with the common moral currency that every pluralistic society needs for public discourse. This chapter argues that ... More


Emotion versus Cognition in Moral Decision-Making: A Dubious Dichotomy

James Woodward

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses and criticizes the widely accepted idea that there is a sharp distinction between “cognitive” and “emotional” processing in the brain. It also criticizes the accompanying claim ... More


Cognitive Science and Moral Philosophy: Challenging Scientistic Overreach

William FitzPatrick

in Scientism: Prospects and Problems

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190462758
eISBN:
9780190462772
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General

Can empirical work in cognitive science and moral psychology impact issues of general theoretical relevance to moral philosophy? Some think it can. They take it to underwrite debunking arguments ... More


Reply to Driver and Darwall

Joshua D. Greene

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter responds to the arguments made by Julia Driver and Stephen Darwall. Driver argues that more robust moral theories, including robust kinds of consequentialism and deontology, are not ... More


The Limits of the Dual-Process View

Julia Driver

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that empirical moral psychology supports consequentialism. On his view, our making of moral judgments conforms to a dual-process model, analogous to a digital ... More


Getting Moral Wrongness into the Picture

Stephen Darwall

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Joshua Greene argues that science can advance ethics and that, in particular, empirical evidence tends to support characteristically consequentialist over deontological judgments, because ... More


Are Intuitions Heuristics?

S. Matthew Liao

in Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
September 2016
ISBN:
9780199357666
eISBN:
9780199357697
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions as evidence for the truth of philosophical claims. However, what, if anything, gives intuitions their evidentiary status? In recent years, it has become ... More


The Trolley Cases

Torbjörn Tännsjö

in Taking Life: Three Theories on the Ethics of Killing

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780190225575
eISBN:
9780190225605
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190225575.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter goes in search of thought experiments that elicit a consistent pattern of responses, irrespective of one’s traditions or cultural background. Since it is believed that the three standard ... More


Reason, Emotion, and Morality: Some Cautions for the Enhancement Project

C. A. J. Coady

in The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780198754855
eISBN:
9780191816352
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754855.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In the debate about the pros and cons of human enhancement, proponents of enhancement (so-called ‘liberals’) often accuse their opponents (so-called ‘conservatives’) of substituting emotion for ... More


Hume’s Moral Pluralism

Michael B. Gill

in Humean Moral Pluralism

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780198714033
eISBN:
9780191782480
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and ... More


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