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This book is a collection of important exchanges between Jorge J. E. Gracia and other prominent philosophers who have engaged him in dialogue on issues relating to race, ethnicity, nationality, and Hispanic/Latino identity in the United States. These philosophers include Lucius T. Outlaw Jr., Linda M. Alcoff, K. Anthony Appiah, Robert Gooding-Williams, Richard J. Bernstein, Gregory Pappas, Eduardo Mendieta, Susana Nuccetelli, and Lawrence Blum. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with race, ethnicity, nationality, and the meta-philosophical question of the value of a philosophical inquiry of these topics. Part II addresses Hispanic/Latino identity and related questions. Part III focuses on Hispanic/Latino philosophy and philosophers in Latin America and the United States.

In this chapter, Jorge J. E. Gracia responds to criticisms of his views about the question of Hispanic/Latino identity and its impact in the United States. In his book Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000), Gracia offers the first systematic philosophical attempt at coming up with a theory that is not descriptive of the views of Latin Americans on topics under the rubric “Hispanic/Latino identity,” in the process eliciting a considerable number of criticisms and comments. Gracia defends his position against these criticisms, some of which relate to the very legitimacy of the notion of ethnic identity and its application to Hispanics; his historiographical claim concerning the importance of 1492 for Hispanic identity; his alleged neglect of certain factors that are deemed essential to ethnicity, such as race, history, language, and culture; and his thesis that the perception of being foreign explains to a great extent the marginalization of Hispanics in American philosophy today.

This chapter explores questions of ethics and racism, with particular emphasis on Jorge J. E. Gracia's perspectives. It begins by discussing the idea of ethnic identity before expressing some concerns about Gracia's account of it. It then offers reasons to doubt the very idea of ethnic identity in general and Gracia's account of Hispanic/Latino identity, arguing that his conception of a Hispanic/Latino identity makes no sense insofar as talking about what a person is should be sufficient for purposes of dealing effectively with racial discrimination and similar phenomena. It contends that Gracia does not need to have recourse to the notion of an ethnic identity, which is problematic and dubious, and that identity always needs two points of comparison because it is always relational. The chapter stresses the need to speak of and identify Hispanics for purposes of affirmative action, but it rejects the need for the notion of a Hispanic identity.

In this chapter, Jorge J. E. Gracia responds to various criticisms of his notion of ethnic philosophy, the use of the label “Latino philosophy” to refer to the philosophy produced both in Latin America and in the United States, the understanding of this philosophy as an ethnic philosophy, and linguistic rights and affirmative action for Latinos. Gracia refers to his two books, Latinos in America (2008) and Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000), to defend his position regarding these issues, including the controversy surrounding the use of the labels “Hispanics” versus “Latinos.” He comments on the distinction between ethnos and ethnicity, the political advantages of the use of “Latino,” the difference between Latin American philosophy and Latino philosophy, and the nativism and nationalism that seem to be behind much of the discussion of linguistic rights.

This chapter challenges Jorge J. E. Gracia's views about the nature of identity, the meaning of ethnic labels, the sociology of American philosophy, individuation, and linguistic rights. It focuses on four aspects of Gracia's book Latinos in America (2008) that it deems problematic in one way or another: Gracia's treatment of the relationship between Latino and Hispanic; his defense of “Latino,” as opposed to “Hispanic,” as a group label; his conception of Latino philosophy; and his treatment of the debate over language rights. Given that Gracia changes the terminology from “Hispanics” that he favored in Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000) to “Latinos” in Latinos in America, the chapter argues that Gracia's position with respect to the use of these labels in the two books is inconsistent. It also claims that Gracia does not provide sufficient evidence for the political connotations of “Latino,” thus undermining its usefulness, nor for the introduction of the label “Latino philosophy” to refer to a philosophy that combines Latin American philosophy and the philosophy of Latinos in the United States.

This chapter critiques Jorge J. E. Gracia's philosophy of race, ethnicity, and nationality. Gracia develops his metaphysical accounts of race and ethnicity against a background in which both notions have been challenged on several distinct grounds—conceptual, metaphysical, epistemic, moral, and political. He takes up these challenges systematically and argues that race and ethnicity are coherent and consistent concepts that apply to the world and reveal features of the world that would be invisible without these concepts. Gracia articulates his philosophical account in his book Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century (2005). This chapter expounds on Gracia's philosophy by discussing his argument that certain general but false views of both race and ethnicity are obstructing the possibility of a coherent account of them, including what he calls essentialism and the assumption that racial and ethnic groups are internally homogeneous; his Familial-Historical View of ethnicity; his account of Hispanic/Latino ethnicity in relation to subnationality; and his Common-Bundle View of race.

In this chapter, Jorge J. E. Gracia responds to criticisms about his philosophy of race, ethnicity, and nationality. In his book Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century (2005), Gracia has claimed that philosophy's role not only contributes substantially to the understanding of race and ethnicity but also is in many ways essential to it. This chapter contains Gracia's reflections on what philosophy provides that other disciplines do not, the very understanding of race and ethnicity, and the boundaries between them, and the boundaries between them and other closely related phenomena, such as nationality. Gracia discusses the objectivity of philosophical theories in general and how that affects the notions of race and ethnicity, as well as the related notion of nationality; the argument that philosophy is limited and cannot carry out a constructive task that goes beyond that of other disciplines of learning; and whether a metaphysics of race and ethnicity in particular is a descriptive or prescriptive enterprise. Finally, he considers an effective set of conditions for race, ethnicity, and nationality.

This chapter explores issues related to Hispanic identity, with particular emphasis on the positive case that Jorge J. E. Gracia makes for Hispanic identity and his reflections on the possibility of a Hispanic-American philosophy. It rejects Gracia's preference for talking about what people are, and instead underscores the importance of what people think they are. It disputes Gracia's position, claiming that he does not take into account what really matters for identity, which is the view people have about themselves. Although it agrees with Gracia that history is important for identity, the chapter argues that history needs to be individuated in order to function effectively in the formation and identification of an ethnic group. The factor that is missing in Gracia's position is the self-identification and awareness of one's history; the chapter asserts that self-identification and self-awareness are the only effective ways to establish clear boundaries with regard to the identity of Hispanics.

This book has explored issues of race, ethnicity, and Hispanic/Latino identity by focusing on the debate between Jorge J. E. Gracia and fifteen prominent scholars. In conclusion, Gracia reflects on the importance of dialogue in philosophy, citing as an example the dialogues of Plato, where a teacher, Socrates, engages young minds in the pursuit of a solution to a problem. A dialogue is a way of opening us to others, to engage perspectives new to us, and to encounter previously unsuspected challenges. As philosophers we need to be confronted by other perspectives; we need to face sharp criticisms; and we need to consider tough objections to the views that we value deeply in order to eliminate as many of those biases and prejudices as possible. Gracia says he is grateful for the opportunity to have his work subjected to serious criticism by other philosophers who have given careful thought to it and who have in many ways helped shape current discussions of the topics examined in this book.

This chapter challenges Jorge J. E. Gracia's particular defense of affirmative action for Latinos. In his book Latinos in America (2008), Gracia evaluates the labels “Hispanic identity” and “Latino identity,” pointing to the difficulties associated with lumping Latinos together under one label. He also explores the justness of the marketplace for Latinos, the policy of affirmative action, and linguistic rights, and situates Latino understandings of who they are within the boundaries of Latino philosophy understood in the context of American and world philosophies. The chapter describes two forward-looking strategies for affirmative action, one based on utility and one based on justice, and one backward-looking strategy, the rectification of past wrongs. It questions Gracia's proposal for dismissing the backward-looking strategy in favor of the two forward-looking ones, arguing that the forward-looking strategies do not provide proper justification for favoring one social group over another—something that is necessary in affirmative action.

This chapter critiques Jorge J. E. Gracia's views about the meaning and political implications of race, ethnicity, and nationality. In his book Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century (2005), Gracia believes that many if not most of the problems, the political violence, enmity, and so on that are related to race, ethnicity, and nationality are actually based on confusions about what they truly are, such as ethnic conflict mistakenly taken as national conflict, or race taken as the sign of innate biological traits. Thus, he hopes, a slim work of metaphysics might make some positive difference. Gracia also attempts to carve out a middle ground between essentialism and eliminativism. This chapter examines Gracia's Familial-Historical View, Common-Bundle View, and Political View in regard to ethnicity, race, and nationality, respectively. Finally, it considers Gracia's position against the overlap between ethnicity and nationality based on his belief that ethnic conflicts would be more contained if carried out against a backdrop of shared nationality.

This chapter explores issues related to the politics and social dimensions of race, with particular emphasis on Jorge J. E. Gracia's position. In his book Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000), Gracia makes a valuable contribution to contemporary philosophical discussions of racial and ethnic identities by reviewing some arguments against using the expressions “Hispanics” and “Latinos/Latinas” “to name us,” as Gracia puts it, and the relation of names to ethnicity and identity. The chapter probes Gracia's arguments in support of his positive account of Hispanic identity and raises some questions regarding his conclusions. In particular, it considers Gracia's description of the origins of Hispanic identity, his discussion of political justifications for the use of a common name, and his treatment of the status of Hispanics in American philosophy. It questions Gracia's choice of 1492 as the starting point from which—and in time—it makes sense to speak of a Hispanic identity and instead favors 1441.

This chapter explores the role of culture in Hispanic identity, with particular emphasis on Jorge J. E. Gracia's position that there are no essential properties common to Hispanics/Latinos. In his book Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000), Gracia declares that “there is a way to understand the concept of Hispanic that allows us to speak meaningfully of, and refer effectively to, Hispanics, even when the people named by it do not share any property in common at all times and places,” and that there is no need to find properties common to all Hispanics in order to classify them as Hispanics. The chapter argues that Gracia does not grant culture its due place in the constitution of Hispanic identity, citing his opposition to essentialism as a possible reason. It discusses culture as the most important factor in ethnic identity in general and in Hispanic identity in particular.

This chapter discusses the controversy concerning the proper label to use to refer to Hispanics/Latinos. It argues that adopting a term such as “Hispanics” globally to refer to what are, in fact, different groups of people is not only inaccurate but “disastrous.” It considers the groups of people that Jorge J. E. Gracia refers to as Hispanics in his book Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000), claiming that they are so different from one another that the use of any term globally to label them homogenizes them in ways that fail to do justice to their struggles and reality. The chapter critiques Gracia's views about the relationship between naming and cultural and ethnic identity; what the foundation for a cultural identity could or should be; the history of the emergence of the Hispanic people out of intercontinental encounters, mythical inventions, and mestizaje; the question of whether there is something called Hispanic philosophy and Latin American philosophy; and the status of Hispanics/Latinos within the discipline of philosophy in the United States.

This chapter discusses philosophy and race within the context of a pragmatic approach in which social and political concerns are of the essence. It critiques Jorge J. E. Gracia's views because of what it perceives to be an unwarranted and excessive emphasis on philosophy and an insufficient attention to social and political considerations. In particular, it examines Gracia's Familial-Historical View, Common-Bundle View, and Political View in regard to ethnicity, race, and nationality, respectively. In exploring the role of philosophy in the understanding of race, ethnicity, and nationality, the chapter argues that there is no such thing as philosophy conceived in the way Gracia does, nor has there ever been. While acknowledging Gracia's arguments in favor of keeping the terminology and notions of race, ethnicity, and nationality alive, the chapter rejects his claims concerning philosophy's role in the inquiry. It also calls for greater attention to social and political matters.

This chapter challenges Jorge J. E. Gracia's notion of ethnic philosophy, arguing that it does not do justice to both philosophy and Latin American philosophy on two fronts: it does not present an effective criterion of inclusion and fails to apply the criterion it uses. In his book Latinos in America (2008), Gracia offers a novel proposal for categorizing Latin American philosophy, according to which it should be classified as a form of “ethnic philosophy.” The chapter examines this proposal in relation to the scope of Latin American philosophy. In particular, it asks which works are to count as belonging to the discipline and whose works we should include. It also discusses Latin American philosophy in relation to universalism and distinctivism. It describes Gracia's ethnic Latin American philosophy as a middle-way position that has the advantage of committing to neither denying the existence of a distinctive Latin American philosophy nor taking it to consist merely of philosophy in Latin America.

This chapter examines the role of metaphysics in the understanding of race and ethnicity and disputes Jorge J. E. Gracia's conceptions of race and ethnicity. It first considers Gracia's contribution to the philosophy of race and ethnicity before discussing his Familial-Historical View and Common-Bundle View of ethnicity and race, respectively. It critiques both views, claiming that they would require the addition of certain conditions for them to do what Gracia wants them to do; when those conditions are added, race and ethnicity cease to be what Gracia first thought they were. The two most important issues in question are the need to add the notion of an ancestral people to conditions of both ethnicity and race, and the fact that Gracia's formulation about race does not account for the difference between “Aborigines” and “Negroes.” The chapter argues that the notion of an ancestral people would help in the resolution of these two issues, although it would collapse the notions of race and ethnicity, contrary to Gracia's attempts to keep them separate.

This chapter discusses Jorge J. E. Gracia's failure to look at language as a prism through which to analyze human experience, arguing that language is one of the most significant elements shaping the identity of Latinos in the United States. It considers Gracia's reflections on Hispanic identity, which are contained in his books Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000) and Latinos in America (2008). Hispanic/Latino Identity explores how Hispanics in general call themselves and the way the link between identity and ethnicity plays out in them, whereas Latinos in America is an outgrowth of the first but focuses exclusively on Latinos north of the border. In order to prove that the Latin American philosophical tradition does exist, Gracia proposes three approaches: Universalism, Culturalism, and the notion that Latin Americans could engage in Universalism and Culturalism but they can't because the conditions to achieve an autochthonous philosophy are unavailable. This chapter also examines Gracia's philosophical account of ethnos and minority in regard to Latinos in the United States.

This chapter challenges Jorge J. E. Gracia's notion of a Latino philosophy as well as of Latino philosophers. In his book Latinos in America (2008), Gracia addresses three questions that constitute the core of the so-called Latino challenge: What is it to be Latino? What is the place of Latinos in America? And how do Latinos think about themselves and their identity? In his response, Gracia develops and uses a theoretical tool to identify Latinos that he dubs the Familial-Historical View. He examines various conspicuously controversial issues related to Latino identity such as their linguistic rights, the advantages and disadvantages of affirmative action for Latinos, and the place of Latinos in the marketplace within the field of professional philosophy. Finally, he performs an in-depth examination of Latino philosophy. This chapter argues that Gracia fails to take into account the important differences between Latin American philosophy and the philosophers who work in Latin America and in the United States.