Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, Jay A. Jacobson, and Charles B. Smith
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335842
- eISBN:
- 9780199868926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335842.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, ...
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This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.Less
This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the ...
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This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.Less
This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.
T. M. Scanlon
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, ...
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This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.Less
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of ...
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This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of their identities. This chapter examines problems relating to the derivation of principles from the original position, the conception of the original position itself, and the relation of self‐interest to the capacity of justice.Less
This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of their identities. This chapter examines problems relating to the derivation of principles from the original position, the conception of the original position itself, and the relation of self‐interest to the capacity of justice.
Eamonn Callan
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292586
- eISBN:
- 9780191598913
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292589.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that ...
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The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this problem. The book identifies both the principal aims of political education—liberal patriotism and the sense of justice—and the rights that limit their public pursuit. The public pursuit of these educational aims is properly constrained by deference to the rights of parents, and these are shown to have some independent moral weight underived from the rights of children. The liberal state's possible role in the sponsorship and the control of denominational school is discussed, as are the benefits and hazards of moral dialogue in morally diverse educational environments. The book draws heavily on John Rawls's theory of justice.Less
The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this problem. The book identifies both the principal aims of political education—liberal patriotism and the sense of justice—and the rights that limit their public pursuit. The public pursuit of these educational aims is properly constrained by deference to the rights of parents, and these are shown to have some independent moral weight underived from the rights of children. The liberal state's possible role in the sponsorship and the control of denominational school is discussed, as are the benefits and hazards of moral dialogue in morally diverse educational environments. The book draws heavily on John Rawls's theory of justice.
H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr.
David E. Guinn (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195178739
- eISBN:
- 9780199784943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195178734.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores the view that religious claims have no legitimate place in the public forum. This exploration involves a critical re-examination of the public versus private distinction that ...
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This chapter explores the view that religious claims have no legitimate place in the public forum. This exploration involves a critical re-examination of the public versus private distinction that would place religious commitments and grounds for action in a sphere isolated from that of public discourse and public choice. In the process, this chapter brings into question John Rawls's defense of a public discourse that seeks to marginalize religious commitments.Less
This chapter explores the view that religious claims have no legitimate place in the public forum. This exploration involves a critical re-examination of the public versus private distinction that would place religious commitments and grounds for action in a sphere isolated from that of public discourse and public choice. In the process, this chapter brings into question John Rawls's defense of a public discourse that seeks to marginalize religious commitments.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter puts contextualism to work in analyzing Rawlsian liberalism. Political Liberalism marked a shift in focus in Rawls’s project from the presentation of a conception of justice and its ...
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This chapter puts contextualism to work in analyzing Rawlsian liberalism. Political Liberalism marked a shift in focus in Rawls’s project from the presentation of a conception of justice and its stability to the wider question of what constituted a legitimate conception of justice for a modern society marked by a certain kind of moral pluralism. Some commentators have erroneously taken this shift to represent a revision in Rawls’s initial presentation of his conception of justice. Others have accepted that this part of the view remains unchanged while nevertheless expressing reservations as to whether the issue of legitimacy needed to be raised in the way in which Rawls raised it. It is argued that focusing on the contextualist model of justification underpinning Rawls’s view can alleviate both sources of concern.Less
This chapter puts contextualism to work in analyzing Rawlsian liberalism. Political Liberalism marked a shift in focus in Rawls’s project from the presentation of a conception of justice and its stability to the wider question of what constituted a legitimate conception of justice for a modern society marked by a certain kind of moral pluralism. Some commentators have erroneously taken this shift to represent a revision in Rawls’s initial presentation of his conception of justice. Others have accepted that this part of the view remains unchanged while nevertheless expressing reservations as to whether the issue of legitimacy needed to be raised in the way in which Rawls raised it. It is argued that focusing on the contextualist model of justification underpinning Rawls’s view can alleviate both sources of concern.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Contextual Arguments for Liberalism This chapter examines Rawls's essays published since A Theory of Justice and Charles Larmore's argument in Patterns of Moral Complexity, both of which reject the ...
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Contextual Arguments for Liberalism This chapter examines Rawls's essays published since A Theory of Justice and Charles Larmore's argument in Patterns of Moral Complexity, both of which reject the derivation of liberal principles from a neutral starting point and claim that their liberal principles are justified because they are the most appropriate response to the circumstances that obtain in modern society, and particularly the circumstance of moral pluralism.Less
Contextual Arguments for Liberalism This chapter examines Rawls's essays published since A Theory of Justice and Charles Larmore's argument in Patterns of Moral Complexity, both of which reject the derivation of liberal principles from a neutral starting point and claim that their liberal principles are justified because they are the most appropriate response to the circumstances that obtain in modern society, and particularly the circumstance of moral pluralism.
Matt Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295730
- eISBN:
- 9780191599828
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could ...
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This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.Less
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.
Simon Caney
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198293507
- eISBN:
- 9780191602337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829350X.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider ...
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Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines what universal principles of distributive justice (if any) should be adopted. It is arranged in 14 sections: Section I presents a conceptual analysis of the nature of distributive justice; Section II makes some preliminary points about the nature of cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice and the general nature of the reasoning underlying these; Sections III–V then analyse three types of arguments for cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice, and Section VI reflects on these, and suggests and defends four principles of cosmopolitan distributive justice; Sections VII–VIII consider objections (counter-arguments) to cosmopolitan concepts of distributive justice, some of them outlined by John Rawls in his account of international justice and others by nationalist political thinkers such as David Miller; Sections IX–XI examine three nationalist claims about the nature of distributive justice, all of which emphasize the moral relevance of persons’ membership in nations, while Sections XII–XIII investigate two realist claims (XII–XIII). Section XIV sums up the findings of the chapter.Less
Having argued, in Ch. 2, that there are universal moral values, the next logical step is to ask what these universal moral values are; this question is pursued in Chs 3 and 4, which consider arguments for two different types of universal value and link together to provide an analysis of what universal principles of justice should apply at the global level. This chapter examines what universal principles of distributive justice (if any) should be adopted. It is arranged in 14 sections: Section I presents a conceptual analysis of the nature of distributive justice; Section II makes some preliminary points about the nature of cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice and the general nature of the reasoning underlying these; Sections III–V then analyse three types of arguments for cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice, and Section VI reflects on these, and suggests and defends four principles of cosmopolitan distributive justice; Sections VII–VIII consider objections (counter-arguments) to cosmopolitan concepts of distributive justice, some of them outlined by John Rawls in his account of international justice and others by nationalist political thinkers such as David Miller; Sections IX–XI examine three nationalist claims about the nature of distributive justice, all of which emphasize the moral relevance of persons’ membership in nations, while Sections XII–XIII investigate two realist claims (XII–XIII). Section XIV sums up the findings of the chapter.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter addresses the unresolved problem for Rawls described at the end of the previous chapter. The problem is that given the demanding nature of the duty of mutual restraint invoked when ...
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This chapter addresses the unresolved problem for Rawls described at the end of the previous chapter. The problem is that given the demanding nature of the duty of mutual restraint invoked when citizens deliberate about constitutional and legislative fundamentals, some account is necessary of how people are actually motivated to act in accordance with such a demanding ideal of citizenship. It is argued that the problem can be solved by extending political liberalism to cover a specific set of claims drawn from the republican tradition.Less
This chapter addresses the unresolved problem for Rawls described at the end of the previous chapter. The problem is that given the demanding nature of the duty of mutual restraint invoked when citizens deliberate about constitutional and legislative fundamentals, some account is necessary of how people are actually motivated to act in accordance with such a demanding ideal of citizenship. It is argued that the problem can be solved by extending political liberalism to cover a specific set of claims drawn from the republican tradition.
Rex Martin
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292937
- eISBN:
- 9780191599811
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292937.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The internal coherence of any system of political institutions and ideas is only one of the considerations we must have in mind in an account of ultimate justification; there is also the idea of a ...
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The internal coherence of any system of political institutions and ideas is only one of the considerations we must have in mind in an account of ultimate justification; there is also the idea of a critical moral justification for it. Thus, the book turns, last of all, to the subject of the possibility and character of such vindication for a system of rights.Two principal theories are canvassed in this regard: the indirect utilitarianism of J. S. Mill and more recent utilitarian thinkers and the contractarian moral justification elaborated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (and for several years thereafter). The utilitarian theory is set aside first; it is fundamentally unable to provide a principled justification for the priority of basic rights over policies justified by considerations of aggregate benefit or general well being. And Rawls's contractarianism is set aside as failing in one of its own self‐appointed tasks: it cannot provide an objective basis for assessing competing political or moral theoriesThese two failures to provide, from among leading contemporary moral theories, a critical moral grounding for a democratic system of rights do not serve to establish the creditability of philosophical anarchism; but it is clear, nonetheless, that more than was initially thought to be involved will be required in order to do the job effectively.The chapter and the book, conclude with a brief survey of the tasks of political theory and of what has been accomplished to date. The idea of a system of rights is one of the great ideas of political philosophy and, unlike many of these ideas, it is still a living one; so, some suggestions are made about the way forward.Less
The internal coherence of any system of political institutions and ideas is only one of the considerations we must have in mind in an account of ultimate justification; there is also the idea of a critical moral justification for it. Thus, the book turns, last of all, to the subject of the possibility and character of such vindication for a system of rights.
Two principal theories are canvassed in this regard: the indirect utilitarianism of J. S. Mill and more recent utilitarian thinkers and the contractarian moral justification elaborated by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (and for several years thereafter). The utilitarian theory is set aside first; it is fundamentally unable to provide a principled justification for the priority of basic rights over policies justified by considerations of aggregate benefit or general well being. And Rawls's contractarianism is set aside as failing in one of its own self‐appointed tasks: it cannot provide an objective basis for assessing competing political or moral theories
These two failures to provide, from among leading contemporary moral theories, a critical moral grounding for a democratic system of rights do not serve to establish the creditability of philosophical anarchism; but it is clear, nonetheless, that more than was initially thought to be involved will be required in order to do the job effectively.
The chapter and the book, conclude with a brief survey of the tasks of political theory and of what has been accomplished to date. The idea of a system of rights is one of the great ideas of political philosophy and, unlike many of these ideas, it is still a living one; so, some suggestions are made about the way forward.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Attempts to ground liberal toleration in pluralism about value, in scepticism about value, or in the simple need for a modus vivendi are all subject to various difficulties. John Rawls, in his book ...
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Attempts to ground liberal toleration in pluralism about value, in scepticism about value, or in the simple need for a modus vivendi are all subject to various difficulties. John Rawls, in his book Political Liberalism, develops a fourth proposal, one that aims to give toleration and other liberal institutions a basis in moral reasons without presupposing any controversial moral outlook. In this essay, Scheffler critically examines Rawls's argument that the principles of justice can rest on an overlapping consensus of comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. Among the issues Scheffler discusses are the possibility of including classical utilitarianism in an overlapping consensus, the relationship between such a consensus and the ideal of public reason, and the relevance of political liberalism for societies that lack liberal, democratic traditions.Less
Attempts to ground liberal toleration in pluralism about value, in scepticism about value, or in the simple need for a modus vivendi are all subject to various difficulties. John Rawls, in his book Political Liberalism, develops a fourth proposal, one that aims to give toleration and other liberal institutions a basis in moral reasons without presupposing any controversial moral outlook. In this essay, Scheffler critically examines Rawls's argument that the principles of justice can rest on an overlapping consensus of comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. Among the issues Scheffler discusses are the possibility of including classical utilitarianism in an overlapping consensus, the relationship between such a consensus and the ideal of public reason, and the relevance of political liberalism for societies that lack liberal, democratic traditions.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It ...
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This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.Less
This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.
Eamonn Callan
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292586
- eISBN:
- 9780191598913
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292589.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The cardinal idea in Rawls's political liberalism is that a better conception of liberal justice is available to us once we ground principles of justice in an ‘overlapping consensus’ among the many ...
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The cardinal idea in Rawls's political liberalism is that a better conception of liberal justice is available to us once we ground principles of justice in an ‘overlapping consensus’ among the many reasonable doctrines that abound in a free society instead of any of the comprehensive liberal doctrines that liberal philosophers have traditionally championed. Rawls's contrast between the political and comprehensive liberalism is specious, though his political conception of the person and his related conception of ‘reasonable pluralism’ are shown to provide a compelling perspective on the proper scope of diversity and the conduct of political education in a liberal society.Less
The cardinal idea in Rawls's political liberalism is that a better conception of liberal justice is available to us once we ground principles of justice in an ‘overlapping consensus’ among the many reasonable doctrines that abound in a free society instead of any of the comprehensive liberal doctrines that liberal philosophers have traditionally championed. Rawls's contrast between the political and comprehensive liberalism is specious, though his political conception of the person and his related conception of ‘reasonable pluralism’ are shown to provide a compelling perspective on the proper scope of diversity and the conduct of political education in a liberal society.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, ...
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Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, denies that the principles of distributive justice make reference to a ‘prejusticial’ notion of desert but allows a place for prejusticial desert in our thinking about retributive justice and the criminal law. Scheffler investigates this asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, noting that desert is an individualistic notion that may not fit into a holistic theory of distributive justice. But retributive justice, concerned with the imposition of punishment on particular human beings, can perhaps accommodate such an individualistic notion.Less
Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, denies that the principles of distributive justice make reference to a ‘prejusticial’ notion of desert but allows a place for prejusticial desert in our thinking about retributive justice and the criminal law. Scheffler investigates this asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, noting that desert is an individualistic notion that may not fit into a holistic theory of distributive justice. But retributive justice, concerned with the imposition of punishment on particular human beings, can perhaps accommodate such an individualistic notion.
M. L. J. Wissenburg
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294894
- eISBN:
- 9780191599064
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294891.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Marcel Wissenburg makes a close analysis of John Rawls's ‘savings principle’ as articulated in Political Liberalism, and argues that, properly understood, it is a necessary condition for the survival ...
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Marcel Wissenburg makes a close analysis of John Rawls's ‘savings principle’ as articulated in Political Liberalism, and argues that, properly understood, it is a necessary condition for the survival of liberal democracy. If so, then liberalism and sustainability are more compatible than is often claimed. Much depends on what savings the present generation is obliged to make, and Wissenburg generates a ‘restraint principle’ that enjoins any given generation not to destroy goods unless unavoidable, to replace with identical ones if not, to replace with equivalent ones if identical ones are not available, and to offer compensation as a last resort. Much depends on what ‘unless unavoidable’ means, and this will be a normative as well as a technical issue.Less
Marcel Wissenburg makes a close analysis of John Rawls's ‘savings principle’ as articulated in Political Liberalism, and argues that, properly understood, it is a necessary condition for the survival of liberal democracy. If so, then liberalism and sustainability are more compatible than is often claimed. Much depends on what savings the present generation is obliged to make, and Wissenburg generates a ‘restraint principle’ that enjoins any given generation not to destroy goods unless unavoidable, to replace with identical ones if not, to replace with equivalent ones if identical ones are not available, and to offer compensation as a last resort. Much depends on what ‘unless unavoidable’ means, and this will be a normative as well as a technical issue.
Susan Mendus
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198297819
- eISBN:
- 9780191599880
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297815.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Argues that a form of impartialism that is grounded in the partial concerns we have for others can be shown to be congruent with the good of the agent, and that such congruence does not imply ...
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Argues that a form of impartialism that is grounded in the partial concerns we have for others can be shown to be congruent with the good of the agent, and that such congruence does not imply commitment to a specific comprehensive conception of the good. If correct, this argument has important consequences for liberalism at the political level. It suggests that the defence of stability, which Rawls advocates in A Theory of Justice need not depend upon commitment to a comprehensive, and Kantian, conception of the good. Justice can be shown to have moral priority, while at the same time acknowledging the permanence of pluralism about the good.Less
Argues that a form of impartialism that is grounded in the partial concerns we have for others can be shown to be congruent with the good of the agent, and that such congruence does not imply commitment to a specific comprehensive conception of the good. If correct, this argument has important consequences for liberalism at the political level. It suggests that the defence of stability, which Rawls advocates in A Theory of Justice need not depend upon commitment to a comprehensive, and Kantian, conception of the good. Justice can be shown to have moral priority, while at the same time acknowledging the permanence of pluralism about the good.
Kok-Chor Tan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199588855
- eISBN:
- 9780191738586
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588855.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These ...
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This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.Less
This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.
Laura Valentini
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593859
- eISBN:
- 9780191731457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter discusses the complaint that the statist ideal is excessively biased in favour of the status quo and argues that this critique is only partly successful. While the statists’ (especially ...
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This chapter discusses the complaint that the statist ideal is excessively biased in favour of the status quo and argues that this critique is only partly successful. While the statists’ (especially Rawls’s) refusal to extend egalitarian justice to the global realm does not in itself indicate subservience to the status quo, statist principles have unduly conservative implications because they are insufficiently sensitive to morally relevant phenomena characterizing the global realm. Although statists rightly identify peoples (states) as important subjects of international justice in virtue of the particular forms of coercive power they exercise by directly interfering in one another’s affairs, they fail to appreciate that these are not the only forms of international coercion in need of justification. Because the normative outlook underpinning Rawlsian statism is blind to these other potential sources of injustice, its principles may very well turn out to be status-quo biased and, therefore, rightly criticized on guidance grounds.Less
This chapter discusses the complaint that the statist ideal is excessively biased in favour of the status quo and argues that this critique is only partly successful. While the statists’ (especially Rawls’s) refusal to extend egalitarian justice to the global realm does not in itself indicate subservience to the status quo, statist principles have unduly conservative implications because they are insufficiently sensitive to morally relevant phenomena characterizing the global realm. Although statists rightly identify peoples (states) as important subjects of international justice in virtue of the particular forms of coercive power they exercise by directly interfering in one another’s affairs, they fail to appreciate that these are not the only forms of international coercion in need of justification. Because the normative outlook underpinning Rawlsian statism is blind to these other potential sources of injustice, its principles may very well turn out to be status-quo biased and, therefore, rightly criticized on guidance grounds.
