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This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's discussions about the usefulness of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as part of the U.S. national security policy. The chapter first looks at the appointment of John Mark Deutch as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with his agenda for the agency. It then considers Deutch's friendship with Aspin that goes back to their student days at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It also discusses the functions of NIEs as well as the subjects they cover and the frequency of their production; the question of how to represent dissenting views in an NIE; and the importance for national intelligence officers to maintain good liaison relationships with consumers and among themselves. The chapter concludes by comparing “current intelligence” with “research intelligence” such as the NIE.

This chapter focuses on President Bill Clinton's appointment of John Mark Deutch as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It begins with an overview of Deutch's credentials, followed by a discussion of the debate surrounding his nomination as director of central intelligence. It then considers Deutch's Senate confirmation hearings and the commission's meeting with consultants from the RAND think tank to discuss issues related to intelligence, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's espionage priorities. It also looks at the intelligence flap caused by two murders in Guatemala and the Oklahoma City bombing before concluding with an assessment of Navy Admiral William Oliver Studeman's proposals about the goals of the Aspin-Brown Commission.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's work following Harold Brown's appointment as chairman to replace Les Aspin. The chapter first considers the commission's session with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, who served as director of naval intelligence, vice director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It then looks at Inman's views on a range of intelligence-related issues, such as human intelligence, the director of central (or national) intelligence, the CIA's paramilitary capabilities, and high-frequency NSA coverage. It also discusses CIA director John Mark Deutch's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, along with the commission's meeting with a visiting delegation of British parliamentarians from the House of Commons. The chapter concludes by reflecting on Clinton's appointment of Brown and the latter's management style compared to Aspin.

This chapter examines the impact of the Aspin-Brown Commission of 1995–1996. The chapter first considers the events that occurred in the aftermath of the forming of the commission, including allegations that officers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headed by John Mark Deutch had been involved in peddling cocaine from Nicaragua in the back streets of Los Angeles. It then looks at Deutch's attempt to defend the CIA and his decision to leave his post in December 1996. It also discusses the commission's reform proposals that became policy, as well as the lessons learned about the intricacies of espionage, intelligence budgets, and organizations. The chapter concludes by analyzing the intelligence community's major shortcomings prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's busy schedule as part of its bipartisan inquiry into the status of the nation's intelligence agencies. The chapter first looks at the Commission's interviews and “roundtables” featuring intelligence experts and critics to discuss some very specific questions/issues. It then considers the views of Mark Lowenthal, staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, about the quality of intelligence analysis and the plan of Central Intelligence Agency director John Mark Deutch to create a new imagery agency. It also examines the issue of human intelligence and the “Aspin Papers” that assessed the effectiveness of the intelligence community's collection and analysis against the Soviet Union's military targets during the Cold War. Finally, it reflects on Aspin's death in 1995 due to a massive stroke and its impact on the commission which he chaired.

This chapter focuses on the Aspin-Brown Commission's retreat in Leesburg, its second after a similar retreat at Camp Peary near Williamsburg; both venues are in Virginia. The chapter first considers the commission's preparation of its options papers, including “The Consumer-Producer Relationship,” before turning to a discussion of its sessions with expert witnesses. It then looks at the topics tackled by the commission during the retreat, from economic intelligence to covert action and National Intelligence Estimates. It also discusses the reform agenda of Central Intelligence Agency director John Mark Deutch before concluding with an assessment of the approaches proposed by lawmakers with regards to intelligence oversight.