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The Problem of Moral Knowledge

Alan Thomas

in Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780198250173
eISBN:
9780191604072
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198250177.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses the philosophies of Harman and Mackie with a view to highlighting six claims of central concern: (1) whether issues of objectivity should be raised ‘reflexively’ at the ... More


Commonsense Objectivism and the Persistence of Moral Judgment

Shaun Nichols

in Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780195169348
eISBN:
9780199835041
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195169344.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Many philosophers maintain that common sense is committed to a kind of moral objectivism. This chapter exploits recent empirical work to defend this claim. The chapter also maintains that the account ... More


The Logical Problem of Evil Redux

Michael J. Almeida

in Freedom, God, and Worlds

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199640027
eISBN:
9780191741937
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640027.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology

John Mackie argued that God's perfect goodness is incompatible with his failing to actualize the best world that he can actualize. And God's omnipotence is incompatible with his being unable to ... More


The Accidental Error Theorist

Richard Joyce

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199606375
eISBN:
9780191729478
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The moral error theorist faces many kinds of opposition. One kind of opponent offers an identity claim between moral properties and certain naturalistic properties (e.g., of the format “Goodness = ... More


Preference Noncognitivism

Joseph Heath

in Following the Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
January 2009
ISBN:
9780195370294
eISBN:
9780199871230
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370294.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

There is often thought to be an asymmetry between belief and desire, such that belief is more rational than desire, or possessed of cognitive content that desire lacks. In this chapter, it is argued ... More


Metaphysics of Morals: Intrinsic Value, Reasons, and Obligations

Erik J. Wielenberg

in Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
November 2014
ISBN:
9780198714323
eISBN:
9780191782725
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714323.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter lays out the central elements of non-theistic robust normative realism. It pays particular attention to the supervenience of moral properties upon non-moral properties, addressing ... More


Conclusion

Torbjörn Tännsjö

in Setting Health-Care Priorities: What Ethical Theories Tell Us

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
July 2019
ISBN:
9780190946883
eISBN:
9780190946913
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190946883.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Even if according to all plausible theories of distributive justice, spending more on the care and cure of patients suffering from mental illness should be a priority rather than on marginal life ... More


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