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This chapter explores the British philosopher John Hick’s early and late views on religious pluralism in the light of Sri Ramakrishna. Between 1970 and 1974, the early Hick espoused a Vedāntic theory of religious pluralism—based explicitly on Sri Aurobindo’s “logic of the infinite”—that comes remarkably close to Sri Ramakrishna’s pluralist model. According to the early Hick, each religion captures at least one true aspect of the impersonal-personal Infinite Reality. By 1976, though, Hick abandoned this Vedāntic line of thought in favor of his now well-known quasi-Kantian theory of religious pluralism, according to which the personal and nonpersonal ultimates of the various world religions are different phenomenal manifestations of the same unknowable “Real an sich.” Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s model of religious pluralism is more robust and philosophically coherent than Hick’s quasi-Kantian model.

The main focus in this chapter is on the claim that a number of religions do equally well in terms of truth, though there is also some attention to pluralism about salvation, or salvific pluralism, which is roughly the view that a number of religious traditions provide equally viable means to salvation. Topics discussed include pluralism that is limited to a particular area of inquiry, such as a “religious ultimate” or a “supreme religious reality”; various interpretations of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis; various objections to Hick; and some additional forms of religious pluralism.

This chapter surveys and assesses major contemporary versions of pluralist and particularist theologies of religious diversity including those of John Hick, David Ray Griffin, and Mark Heim. While finding commendable elements in each, the chapter argues for a relational pluralism derived from the work of Roland Faber and Catherine Keller. Central to the work of this chapter is the challenge to accounts of “religion” which tend to homogenize out difference and accounts of “religions” which tend to reify traditions over against each other. Even positive pluralist accounts that seek to speak of the different religions as valid paths up the same or even different mountains often fail to recognize just how deeply intertwined religious traditions are. Relational pluralism, by contrast, rightly recognizes that religious traditions have always emerged in relation and that their ongoing flourishing will continue to require relational encounter.

This chapter adopts a cross-cultural approach to the problem of evil by bringing Sri Ramakrishna into conversation with recent analytic philosophers. Maharaj begins by exploring the philosophical resonances between Sri Ramakrishna’s skeptical theism and William Alston’s skeptical theist refutation of William Rowe’s argument from evil. On the one hand, Maharaj draws on Alston’s skeptical theist response to Rowe as a means of developing and defending Sri Ramakrishna’s own skeptical theist position. On the other, Maharaj argues that Alston’s failure to consider Indian karma-based theodicies significantly weakens his argument. Maharaj then brings Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy into dialogue with Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy. Hick’s convincing arguments for the necessity of evil in a soul-making environment lend support to Sri Ramakrishna’s saint-making theodicy. However, Maharaj also identifies major weaknesses in Hick’s soul-making theodicy, which stem from Hick’s assumption of a one-life-only paradigm and his neglect of mystical experience. On this basis, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna’s mystically grounded saint-making theodicy, which presupposes the doctrines of karma and rebirth, has significant advantages over Hick’s theodicy.

This chapter focuses on William James' relationship to Blaise Pascal. One of the fiercest critics of James' contentions has gotten considerable mileage out of viewing his lecture through the lens provided by the famous Wager argument from Pascal's Pensées. The chapter shows that the view John Hick takes of Pascal, and the attitude he assumes James had to Pascal's Wager, color his entire criticism. It also aims to point out that a more careful study of the Pensées, combined with a wider and more sensitive appreciation of James' attitude toward that work, warrants scholars' drawing conclusions quite the reverse of those which Hick would urge upon them.

Drawing on the Bible, Christians traditionally have insisted that salvation is found only in Jesus Christ and that all people, including sincere followers of other religious ways, must repent of sin and acknowledge Jesus as Lord and Savior. Many contend that this exclusivism, with insistence on the need for conversion, provokes mistreatment of others and religious violence. This chapter looks at two figures who call for basic unity among the religions rather than competition over human souls: the Dalai Lama and John Hick. When such unity comes at the expense of minimizing or distorting the distinctive teachings that have characterized the religions over centuries, then there is failure to take the religions seriously on their own terms. The chapter looks at Christian teaching on salvation and Jesus as the only Savior, with brief observations about conversion and culture. It concludes with a response to the growing popularity of soteriological universalism.

This chapter considers the concept of ineffability. Has this concept been monopolized by pluralists who use it to provide an object that is sufficiently mystical and unfathomable to accommodate religious differences? Does the ineffable do any work in their systems other than provide a formal category of ultimacy? The chapter seeks to investigate this by evaluating the use of ineffability, or the transcategorial, by advocates of the pluralist view of religions. In the second part, the chapter seeks to bring the analytic tradition into dialogue with the phenomenological tradition and particularly with the work of Jean-Luc Marion. Marion highlights the given-ness or excess of experiences that do not rely on metaphysical grounds. The chapter suggests an alternative account of ‘the Real’ as an experience of excess (the ‘transcategorial phenomenal’) that takes place in the midst of the event of interreligious encounter. ‘The Real’ from the ground-up.

This chapter looks at how William James seemingly provided mankind with neither more nor less than a reckless license for “wishful thinking.” It examines both the grounds that have been offered for that objection and the varied strategies that a number of James' defenders have adopted in answering it. The chapter also demonstrates how John Hick's criticism has succeeded in provoking reams of impassioned discussion. For the moment, though, it should be noted that he arrives at his remarkably economical distillation of James' argument, first, by ignoring a number of refinements that James considered important to making his case, and, secondly, by lifting his proof-quotations out of the refining contexts that lend them their exact point and bearing on the argument.

Jeffery Long, a Hindu theologian, explores the problem of evil as it is raised and addressed by thinkers in the Ramakrishna Vedanta tradition of Hinduism and by two separate schools of thought from contemporary Christianity. The textual sources used from the Ramakrishna tradition consist of the teachings of Sri Ramakrishna as found in the primary sources on his life, as well as the Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda. From Christianity, Long employs works of John Hick and David Ray Griffin on the topic of theodicy. Despite the fact that the latter two authors hail from the same religious tradition, Long shows that Hick and Ramakrishna are in closer agreement on this topic than either is with Griffin’s process theology. The essay offers a revised version of the Ramakrishna-Hick theodicy that takes Griffin’s objections into account.

African American prophetic thinkers shared ideas that God providentially intended freedom and guided history toward justice. These beliefs raise the issue of suffering’s place in God’s purposes (theodicy). Contrary to views emphasizing acceptance of “redemptive suffering,” prophetic thinkers embraced a less theodical idea of withstanding suffering and ultimate compensatory benefit.

This chapter argues that if the philosophy of religion is to take religion seriously, it must expand its focus and incorporate a wide range of religious perspectives. The chapter develops a ‘global philosophy of religion’ by critically assessing two earlier attempts to transform the philosophy of religion: Ninian Smart’s ‘philosophy of worldviews’ and John Hick’s ‘global theology’. The global philosophy of religion is more constructive than these two approaches because it emphasizes common issues that philosophers in distinct traditions can tackle together. Moreover, the global philosophy of religion moves beyond interreligious dialogue without demanding commitment to any controversial meta-theory, such as religious pluralism or religious inclusivism.

This chapter draws upon Sri Ramakrishna’s teachings and mystical testimony in order to develop a new conceptual framework for understanding the nature of mystical experience. In recent analytic philosophy of religion, two approaches to mystical experience have been especially influential: perennialism and constructivism. While perennialists maintain that there is a common core of all mystical experiences across various cultures, constructivists claim that a mystic’s cultural conditioning plays a major role in shaping his or her mystical experiences. After identifying the strengths and limitations of these two positions, Maharaj argues that Sri Ramakrishna champions a “manifestationist” approach to mystical experience that provides a powerful dialectical alternative to both perennialism and constructivism. According to Sri Ramakrishna, mystics in various traditions experience different real manifestations of one and the same impersonal-personal Infinite Reality. Sri Ramakrishna’s manifestationist paradigm shares the advantages of both perennialism and constructivism but avoids their respective weaknesses and limitations.

This chapter launches a new investigation of the question of God’s existence, examining it against the reality of human suffering and bringing to the fore contentious presuppositions concerning agency and value at the core of the debate. When we survey the world, we observe an enormous amount of pain, including virtually unspeakable kinds of maltreatment and agony, many instances of which seem patently unfair, unearned, and pointless. This chapter initiates the book’s argument that, in light of these observations, it is reasonable to conclude that God does not exist. The chapter critically examines and extends the work of William Rowe, John Hick, and Alvin Plantinga, taking up apparently pointless instances of suffering and the proposed justifying goods of character-building and free will.

Chapter 2 offers a structured synopsis of the history of natural theology from Xenophanes to Richard Swinburne. It is argued, for example, that the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are outdated, and that the decline of natural theology in the nineteenth century was due largely to Kant’s and Hume’s philosophies of science. However, since these philosophies of science have turned out to be problematic, there is no reason for religious believers to stick to some blend of religious irrationalism à la Kierkegaard or William James, or to hold that natural theology must be meaningless. In principle, natural theology can be a perfectly decent intellectual enterprise.

This chapter introduces, reformulates, and defends the old Indian allegory of the blind men and the elephant to argue that, despite critiques, it remains a valuable tool for thinking about religious diversity. Appealing to John Hull, theologian of blindness, the book reformulates the ancient tale as one about blindfolded men and the elephant. After reformulating the tale, the author puts it to new uses. He argues that theology of religious diversity is the work of accounting for why there are so many different accounts of the elephant, comparative theology is the work of actually walking over to another side of the elephant, and constructive theology is the venture of actually redescribing the elephant in light of the other two tasks. This chapter argues that all three tasks must be done together.

This chapter reconstructs from Sri Ramakrishna’s teachings a unique and philosophically sophisticated model of religious pluralism. For Sri Ramakrishna, God is infinite, so there are correspondingly infinite ways of approaching and realizing God. Therefore, all religions and spiritual philosophies—both theistic and nontheistic—are salvifically effective paths to one common goal: God-realization, or the direct spiritual experience of God in any of His innumerable aspects or forms. Maharaj then examines Sri Ramakrishna’s response to the thorny problem of conflicting religious truth-claims. Sri Ramakrishna reconciles religious claims about the nature of the ultimate reality by claiming that every religion captures a uniquely real aspect of the impersonal-personal Infinite Reality. Regarding other types of religious truth-claims, Sri Ramakrishna maintains that while every religion errs on some points of doctrine, these errors do not substantially diminish the salvific efficacy of religions. Finally, Maharaj defends Sri Ramakrishna’s doctrine of religious pluralism against numerous objections.