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This chapter brings together the three phases of a rolling debate with John Harris about the justifiability of euthanasia. The senses of ‘euthanasia’ are carefully distinguished; the defining importance of intention is underlined and illustrated, and intention's moral significance is explored. The moral wrongness of choosing to terminate life is argued for as an implication of the reality of personhood and good of life even in the very young, very ill, or very old. The individuality of the early conceptus and the significance of radical capacity are explained against Harris's misunderstandings. The idea of the person in Harris and in Dworkin is discussed, as well as Dworkin's concept of critical interests. The final phases of the debate concern voluntary verses involuntary euthanasia, responsibility for side effects, the idea that some people ‘should die’, the dualism involved in denying radical capacity's significance, and the unfair implications of autonomous choices to be killed.

This chapter introduces the general themes of and rationale for the book. It explains the importance and scope of the field of bioethics, and of the scholarship of Professor John Harris within that field. It explains how the book’s focus is both on theoretical questions in moral philosophy, and practical questions in policy, health, and science. The chapter also offers an overview of the contents of the book.

This chapter reflects on the role of reason in law and bioethics. The aspiring lawyer makes the acquaintance of the ‘reasonable man’ early in her or his student days. The chapter then addresses the work in bioethics of that most ‘reasonable person ’, Professor John Harris. It contends that in terms of law and policy, the reasonable Professor Harris is not always right but argues that Harris’s uncompromising and consistent ethical arguments make an invaluable contribution to debate on policy and legal regulation. Laws in most modern multi-cultural and democratic societies are of necessity based on compromise. Harris would classify some of those compromises as ‘fudge’. Lawmakers need to be acutely aware when they are ‘fudging’ the issue, even when ‘fudge’ is inevitable.

I use the deconstruction of the nature-culture dichotomy, with its attendant opposition between grown and made, to challenge debates in bioethics over cloning. Indeed, deconstructing the central terms assumed in these debates can change the very framework of them. These debates are currently dominated by the liberal notion of an autonomous individual with free choice, precisely the notion of the sovereign subject that comes under scrutiny in Derrida's later work. Taking John Harris and Jürgen Habermas as representatives of two sides in debates over genetic engineering and cloning, I show how deconstruction unsettles both. In addition, I consider Derrida's own views on cloning and how they might help us navigate complex ethical issues raised by new technologies of reproduction.

Part I considered how to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die per se, but in the two chapters of Part II, the consideration is when it is and when it is not permissible to kill some to save others. Ch. 6 first examines in some detail the arguments John Harris has made for a survival lottery (where we may select from among healthy people the one who will die to save another or who will share a fair risk of death with another), and considers a very limited context in which a curtailed survival lottery might be installed. The rest of the chapter is devoted to consideration of the many attempts to solve the problem of why we may not ordinarily kill one to save more (as in the Transplant Case, where a non‐consequentialist would believe that we may not chop up one innocent non‐threatening person, who would not otherwise die, to transplant his organs into a greater number of people in order to save their lives) but may kill via redirection of threats (as in the Trolley Case, where there is a choice between killing one or killing a greater number by turning/redirecting, or failing to turn/redirect, a runaway trolley). These attempts include the views of Philippa Foot, proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect (e.g. Michael Costa), Warren Quinn, James Montmarquet, Judith Thomson, and Bruce Russell. A detailed examination is also made of whether the notion of ‘being already involved’ is a moral notion or can be given a non‐moral description.

This chapter examines Clarence Samuel Stein's interrelated community design, with particular emphasis on his Radburn Idea. It first takes a look at Stein's early large-scale unbuilt projects that demonstrate his emerging talent in site design, such as Sunnyside Park in Shelton, Connecticut, with Kohn in 1920; Fort Sheridan Gardens with Ernest Gruensfeldt; and the Spuyten Duyvil Housing Development in the northwest Bronx in 1923. It then considers Stein's development of Radburn to illustrate the benefits of communitarian regionalism: Radburn was conceived as a “complete town” for twenty-five thousand that would include “all the other facilities and conveniences which go to make for comfortable, pleasant living.” The chapter also discusses Stein's innovations in site design at Chatham Village in Pennsylvania; his design of Phipps Garden Apartments in New York City and the Wichita Art Institute; and his partnership with John W. Harris for the new town of Maplewood near Lake Charles, Louisiana.

In 1950, issues of science fiction magazines outnumbered science fiction paperbacks in the United States. The opposite was true in Britain, as paper rationing during World War II meant an insufficient supply of paper, and starting any new serial publication was restricted. This situation led to the demise of fiction magazines, including the grandfather of them all, The Strand Magazine, which folded in March 1950. Britain's two premier science fiction magazines, New Worlds and Science-Fantasy, became the bedrock of high-quality science fiction in the country. Arthur C. Clarke, Eric Frank Russell, John Beynon Harris, John Christopher, and Charles Eric Maine represented a higher proportion of the rank and file of British science fiction writers than their American counterparts. British writers were especially fascinated with computers and automation.

Survival lotteries play a considerable role in philosophers’ thinking on the ethics of killing. They have also entered popular culture. The lotteries are not widely accepted, yet they seem to be reasonable, if only we can set some of our taboos to one side. In this chapter, deontology, the moral rights theory, and utilitarianism are confronted with famous ‘survival lotteries’. Here this chapter examines cases such as John Harris’s organ lottery, John Taurek’s rescue lottery, and Gilbert Harman’s ‘organ’ thought experiments. In the final analysis, it is argued that utilitarianism can best explain our considered intuitions in relation to these lotteries. It is possible to debunk intuitions commonly held to the opposite effect, once they are submitted to cognitive psychotherapy.