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Dealing with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s February 1961 visit to the White House and President John F. Kennedy’s reciprocal visit to Ottawa that May, this chapter also examines Canadian–American relations against the backdrop of the Cold War’s twilight struggle in the Third World. Although disagreeing over how to contain communism in Asia and Latin America, Ottawa and Washington shared a common interest in defending the interests of the West, and so they sought to avoid mutual conflict and even aided one another. As this chapter shows—in contradistinction to previous works—the two leaders established a working relationship, which, while not close, proved useful for Ottawa in terms of keeping the United States out of areas of Canadian jurisdiction and for Washington in terms of gaining Canadian assistance in waging the Cold War.

This chapter analyses the nuclear crisis in Canada–US relations. As a result of the Cuban missile crisis, Canada finally agreed to begin final negotiations with the United States toward the acceptance of nuclear weapons. However, the talks bogged down, leading to a rupture in the bilateral relationship. Indeed the situation was worsened when the nuclear issue sparked a domestic political crisis in Canada. The result was the collapse of John Diefenbaker’s government, for which the United States bears some blame. In a resulting election Canada–US relations proved to be a divisive campaign issue, with Diefenbaker appealing to nationalist rhetoric. However, ultimately, he was defeated at the polls, the result of his mismanagement of a host of issues, relations with the United States among them.

John Kennedy was not the first American president with whom John Diefenbaker dealt, and so for the sake of comparison, this chapter reviews the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the relationship with Canada from 1957 to 1961. This period saw the revival of Canadian nationalism, a force that contributed to back-to-back electoral victories by Diefenbaker’s Tories as well as to increasing bilateral tensions. Yet there were also genuine policy differences stemming both from the Cold War as well as growing economic, military, and cultural ties between Canada and the United States. While Eisenhower was deft in his handling of his personal relationship with Diefenbaker, he was unable both to overcome policy differences and to blunt nationalist sentiments.

In response to revelations in October 1962 that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, President John F. Kennedy blockaded the island, sparking the most significant crisis of the Cold War if not human history. With the world on the brink of nuclear war, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker refused to back his American counterpart. Yet as is pointed out in this chapter, throughout this standoff, and in terms of Cuba more generally, Canada offered quiet assistance to the United States, a point overlooked by historians. Throughout the Cuban missile crisis Canada supported the US militarily and diplomatically, as well as through intelligence-sharing activities, all of which was much appreciated by US officials. However, the crisis brought to the fore the simmering issue of whether or not Canada would acquire nuclear warheads for its military.

Common Cold War interests united Canada and the United States in the summer of 1961 as a crisis with the Soviet Union over the status of Berlin had the potential to devolve into war. As this chapter makes clear, Berlin and the related fear of a nuclear conflict led Canada to closely align itself with the United States, but also led many Canadians to champion disarmament and oppose the Canada–US military alliance. These competing forces had a profound impact on Diefenbaker’s handling of defense policy, toward which the Kennedy administration displayed patience and understanding—though frustration began to grow over Canadian hesitancy about accepting nuclear weapons.

Mutual frustration and recrimination marked Canadian–American relations over a host of economic questions during the Kennedy period, especially on the important issues stemming from Britain’s 1961 decision to join the European Common Market. For John Diefenbaker and other Canadian nationalists, this move threatened Canadian ties with Britain—a traditional counterweight to the United States—and raised concerns about Canada’s position in North America. This issue, and the emotionalism surrounding it, poisoned the personal relationship between John F. Kennedy and Diefenbaker and strained relations at the diplomatic and ministerial levels, strains reflective of a wider divergence between Canada and the United States. Yet despite these tensions, the special relationship continued to function as Ottawa faced a major economic crisis in the summer of 1962.

The Canadian position on Cuba since 1959 has proved advantageous for both countries economically, educationally, and culturally. Canadian engagement with Cuba, which has always been constructive, owes much to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. His policy, still in effect today, was to construct “a normal relationship . . . one in which both sides politely agree to disagree on certain policy questions.” Although Canada’s current government, led by Conservative Stephen Harper, initially signaled that it would adopt a new strategy towards Cuba, like its predecessors it has instead chosen engagement over isolation. It is unclear whether this approach will result in the constructive changes that have long been championed by Canadian policymakers, but since 1959 Canada’s approach to Cuba has been remarkably consistent.

The epilogue deals with Canada–US relations during the eight-month overlap between President Kennedy and Lester Pearson—a period that indicated that bilateral tension would continue, as would rising Canadian nationalism. Pearson and Kennedy rekindled a friendly relationship, yet it was one that could not mask wider underlying tensions. So, in the face of nationalist discontent, and in response to a variety of policy differences with their northern neighbors, the Kennedy administration and the Canadian specialists in the State Department displayed considerable forbearance, a reflection of the good feeling underscoring the special relationship between the two countries in the era of quiet diplomacy.