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The Myth of Instrumental Rationality 1

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693818
eISBN:
9780191731907
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Facilitative reasons are explained. They are, it is claimed, what are often referred to as instrumental reasons. However, they are both wider and narrower than common accounts of instrumental reasons ... More


Reasons: Explanatory and Normative

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693818
eISBN:
9780191731907
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

‘A reason’ has two meanings: explanatory reasons are facts that contribute to an explanation (of anything explained); normative reasons are facts that favour and guide responses, in one’s emotions, ... More


Keeping Things Simple

Roger Crisp

in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199684908
eISBN:
9780191765223
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter defends the view that the most important normative notion is that of a reason, against John Broome’s claim that ought plays this role. The weight Broome places on the idea of explanation ... More


Scope for Rational Autonomy

Mark Schroeder

in Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780198713807
eISBN:
9780191782190
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter continues to develop the autonomous conception of rationality by responding to two challenges to narrow-scope theories of rationality offered by John Broome in his paper, ’Requirements’. ... More


Early Death and Later Suffering

Jeff McMahan

in Saving People from the Harm of Death

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
March 2019
ISBN:
9780190921415
eISBN:
9780190921446
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In this chapter I sketch an account of the misfortune of death for which I have previously argued (the Time-Relative Interest Account) and defend it against objections advanced by John Broome in his ... More


Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason

Kieran Setiya

in Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
October 2016
ISBN:
9780190462925
eISBN:
9780190462949
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190462925.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

This chapter argues for a cognitivist account of the instrumental principle, according to which we must will the necessary means to our ends. This principle turns on the application of theoretical ... More


Practical Reasoning

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199693818
eISBN:
9780191731907
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Part One of the book argued, by implication, for the unity of reason. This conclusion is reinforced by the argument of this chapter for the unity of reasoning, that is that so-called practical ... More


The Coherent and the Rational

Errol Lord

in The Importance of Being Rational

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
July 2018
ISBN:
9780198815099
eISBN:
9780191852916
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198815099.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter motivates Reasons Responsiveness by situating it within the metaethical literature on rationality. The first task is to show how Reasons Responsiveness can overcome prominent arguments ... More


Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality

Michael E. Bratman

in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190867850
eISBN:
9780190867898
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It ... More


Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance

Michael E. Bratman

in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190867850
eISBN:
9780190867898
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Is there a diachronic rationality constraint on an agent’s intentions over time, one that favors stability of intention? I argue that there is reason to think that there is some such diachronic ... More


Eliminations and Reductions II

Alex Worsnip

in Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
November 2021
ISBN:
9780197608142
eISBN:
9780197608173
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197608142.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of substantive rationality or reduce it to structural rationality. Together with the previous chapter—which argues against ... More


Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance

Michael E. Bratman

in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780190867850
eISBN:
9780190867898
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190867850.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Planning agency involves characteristic norms of practical rationality—in particular, norms of consistency and of means-end coherence of intentions. This essay defends the idea that there is normally ... More


Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents

Lara Buchak and Philip Pettit

in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199684908
eISBN:
9780191765223
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.003.0015
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

John Broome has argued that there are distinct requirements of rationality and reason. Niko Kolodny has defended an error theory about requirements of rationality, arguing that requirements of ... More


Working It Out together: Joint Moral Reasoning

Henry Richardson

in Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780190247744
eISBN:
9780190247768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190247744.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

Resisting some of the leading conceptions of joint moral reasoning prominent in the philosophical tradition, such as Kant’s kingdom of ends and Habermas’s discourse ethics, because they are too ... More


Defence of an Inclusive View of Benefiting and Reasons of Beneficence

Ingmar Persson

in Inclusive Ethics

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780198792178
eISBN:
9780191840470
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198792178.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The main objective of this chapter is to defend a view of benefiting which is inclusive to the extent that it entails that we can benefit beings by bringing them into existence and so—since there are ... More


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