Peter Kivy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198746782
- eISBN:
- 9780191809064
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746782.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Chapter 3 introduces a theme that pervades the discussion of the aesthetic, from the eighteenth century to the present. The contrast between moral and aesthetic judgments. To put it bluntly, it is ...
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Chapter 3 introduces a theme that pervades the discussion of the aesthetic, from the eighteenth century to the present. The contrast between moral and aesthetic judgments. To put it bluntly, it is either claimed that they are radically different or in principle the same. In this chapter eighteenth-century sources are again cited: namely, Francis Hutcheson and John Balguy. In the event, Hutcheson and Balguy ended up agreeing that moral and aesthetic judgments are alike, disagreeing, however, about their character.Less
Chapter 3 introduces a theme that pervades the discussion of the aesthetic, from the eighteenth century to the present. The contrast between moral and aesthetic judgments. To put it bluntly, it is either claimed that they are radically different or in principle the same. In this chapter eighteenth-century sources are again cited: namely, Francis Hutcheson and John Balguy. In the event, Hutcheson and Balguy ended up agreeing that moral and aesthetic judgments are alike, disagreeing, however, about their character.
Michael B. Gill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714033
- eISBN:
- 9780191782480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Many have claimed that sentimentalists in general and Hume in particular cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. This criticism can be found in thinkers such as ...
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Many have claimed that sentimentalists in general and Hume in particular cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. This criticism can be found in thinkers such as John Balguy, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Stephen Darwall. This chapter argues that the criticism is unfounded. An examination of Hume’s account of the motivational influences of pride, love, and approval reveals that Humean sentimentalism implies a moral pluralism that includes not only consequentialist moral ends but non-consequentialist ones as well. For on Hume’s account, self-oriented passions (such as pride and approval of self) have an agent-relative character that distinguishes their motivational influence from other-oriented passions (such as love and approval of others), and that agent-relative character explains well our non-consequentialist concerns.Less
Many have claimed that sentimentalists in general and Hume in particular cannot accommodate the non-consequentialist aspects of our moral thinking. This criticism can be found in thinkers such as John Balguy, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Stephen Darwall. This chapter argues that the criticism is unfounded. An examination of Hume’s account of the motivational influences of pride, love, and approval reveals that Humean sentimentalism implies a moral pluralism that includes not only consequentialist moral ends but non-consequentialist ones as well. For on Hume’s account, self-oriented passions (such as pride and approval of self) have an agent-relative character that distinguishes their motivational influence from other-oriented passions (such as love and approval of others), and that agent-relative character explains well our non-consequentialist concerns.
