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This book seeks to further the debate between ‘cognitivists’ and ‘non-cognitivists’ about the possibility and the nature of moral knowledge. The book is divided into four parts. Part I presents the theoretical framework for the revision of cognitivism. Part II examines the challenge to the revised form of cognitivism developed from two sophisticated forms of non-cognitivist strategy: expressive/projective strategy and non-objectivism. Part III develops proposals for the solution of the problems described in Parts I and II. Part IV focuses on the work of John Rawls.

Contributors to this edited book consider the normative issues at stake in the relationship between environmental sustainability and social justice. If future generations are owed justice, what should we bequeath them? Is ‘sustainability’ an appropriate medium for environmentalists to express their demands? Is environmental protection compatible with justice within generations? Is environmental sustainability a luxury when social peace has broken down? The contested nature of sustainable development is considered––is it a useful concept at all any longer? Is it reconcilable with capital accumulation? Liberal––particularly Rawlsian––and socialist notions of justice are tested against the demands of sustainability, and policy instruments for sustainability––such as environmental taxation––are examined for their distributive effects.

This book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. Part One argues that traditional realism can be explicated as a doctrine about truth — that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent, and epistemically independent. Part Two argues that a form of Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument demonstrates that no such notion of truth can be founded on the idea of correspondence, as explained in model-theoretic terms. Part Three argues that non-correspondence accounts of truth-truth as superassertibility or idealized rational acceptability, formal conceptions of truth, and Tarskian truth also fail to meet the criteria for objectivity. Along the way, it also dismisses the claims of the latter-day views of Putnam, and of similar views articulated by John McDowell, to constitute a new, less traditional, form of realism. The Coda bolsters some of the considerations advanced in Part Three in evaluating formal conceptions of truth, by assessing and rejecting the claims of Robert Brandom to have combined such an account of truth with a satisfactory account of semantic structure. The book concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth that preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. So the only question remaining is which form of antirealism to adopt.

The problem of education in liberal democracies is to ensure the intergenerational continuity of their constitutive political ideals while remaining open to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this problem. The book identifies both the principal aims of political education—liberal patriotism and the sense of justice—and the rights that limit their public pursuit. The public pursuit of these educational aims is properly constrained by deference to the rights of parents, and these are shown to have some independent moral weight underived from the rights of children. The liberal state's possible role in the sponsorship and the control of denominational school is discussed, as are the benefits and hazards of moral dialogue in morally diverse educational environments. The book draws heavily on John Rawls's theory of justice.

This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.

Hilary of Poitiers (c300–368), who was instrumental in shaping the development of pro-Nicene theology in the West, combined two separate works, a treatise on faith (De Fide) and a treatise against the “Arians” (Adversus Arianos), to create De Trinitate; his chief theological contribution to the 4th-century Trinitarian debates. Scholars have long recognized the presence of these two treatises in Hilary's De Trinitate but have been unable to settle the questions of when and why Hilary did this. This book addresses these questions concerning the structure and chronology of De Trinitate by situating Hilary's treatise in its historical and theological context and offering a close reading of the text. It is argued that De Fide was written in 356 following Hilary's condemnation at the synod of Béziers and prior to receiving a decision on his exile from the Emperor. When Hilary arrived in exile, he wrote a second work, Adversus Arianos. Following the synod of Sirmium in 357 and his collaboration with Basil of Ancyra in early 358, Hilary recast his efforts and began to write De Trinitate. He decided to incorporate his two earlier works, De Fide and Adversus Arianos, into this project. Toward that end, he returned to his earlier works and drastically revised their content by adding new prefaces and new theological and exegetical material to reflect his mature pro-Nicene theology. These revisions and textual alterations have never before been acknowledged in the scholarship on De Trinitate.

This book comprises three main chapters on Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, with extensive responses. It explores the common ground of the great early-modern rationalist theories, and provides an examination of the ways in which the mainstream Platonic tradition permeates these theories. One chapter identifies characteristically Platonic themes in Descartes’s cosmology and metaphysics, finding them associated with two distinct, even opposed attitudes to nature and the human condition, one ancient and ‘contemplative’, the other modern and ‘controlling’. It finds the same tension in Descartes’s moral theory, and believes that it remains unresolved in present-day ethics. Was Spinoza a Neoplatonist theist, critical Cartesian, or naturalistic materialist? The second chapter argues that he was all of these. Analysis of his system reveals how Spinoza employed Neoplatonist monism against Descartes’s Platonist pluralism. Yet the terminology — like the physics — is Cartesian. And within this Platonic-Cartesian shell Spinoza developed a rigorously naturalistic metaphysics and even, Ayers claims, an effectually empiricist epistemology. The final chapter focuses on the Rationalists’ arguments for the Platonist, anti-Empiricist principle of ‘the priority of the perfect’, i.e. the principle that finite attributes are to be understood through corresponding perfections of God, rather than the reverse. It finds the given arguments unsatisfactory but stimulating, and offers a development of one of Leibniz’s for consideration. These chapters receive informed and constructive criticism and development at the hands of, respectively, Douglas Hedley, Sarah Hutton and Maria Rosa Antognazza.

Radon showed how to write arbitrary functions in Rⁿ in terms of the characteristic functions (delta functions) of hyperplanes. This idea leads to various generalizations. For example, R can be replaced by a more general group and “plane” can be replaced by other types of geometric objects. All this is for the “nonparametric” Radon transform. For the parametric Radon transform, this book parametrizes the points of the geometric objects, leading to differential equations in the parameters because the Radon transform is overdetermined. Such equations were first studied by F. John. This book elaborates on them and puts them in a general framework.

This volume of the Proceedings of the British Academy looks at the lives and works of some of Britain's foremost scholars. The scholars featured in this volume are: John Lloyd Ackrill, Maurice Warwick Beresford, Malcolm MacNaughtan Bowie, Peter Astbury Brunt, Norman Rufus Colin Cohn, John Anthony Crook, Robert Rees Davies, David Fairweather Foxon, Terence Wilmot Hutchison, Philip James Jones, Michael Vincent Levey, John Macquarrie, Charles Francis Digby Moule, Anthony David Nuttall, Alan William Raitt, Joseph Burney Trapp, William Watson, and Bryan Ronald Wilson.

This volume offers a series of fresh explorations of the life, writing, and reputation of John Milton. The ten papers take us inside Milton's verse and prose, into the context of the events and the intellectual debates within which they were written, and into the later worlds within which his reputation evolved and fluctuated. Key topics discussed include: his political beliefs and career; the characteristics of his poetry – especially Paradise Lost; the literary influences upon his verse; his perception of women; and the ways he has been seen since his death.

Best known today as one of the earliest critics of John Locke, John Norris (1657-1711) incorporated ideas of Augustine, Malebranche, Plato, the Cambridge Platonists, and the scholastics into an original synthesis that was highly influential on the philosophy and theology of his day. This book presents a study of this unjustly neglected thinker, and the different perspectives he offers on this seminal period in philosophical history.

This book presents an account of the provenance of De Doctrina Christiana, with a history of the manuscript, a reconstruction of the way it was assembled and revised, and an assessment of its place in the interpretation of other works by John Milton. It resolves issues relating to its place in Milton's canon, thus concluding a controversy that has recently been central to Milton studies.

Cicero has long been seen to embody the values of the Roman Republic. This study of Cicero's use of history reveals that rather than promoting his own values, Cicero uses historical representation to explore the difficulties of finding any ideological coherence in Rome's political or cultural traditions. The book looks to the scepticism of Cicero's philosophical education for an understanding of his perspective on Rome's history, and argues that neglect of the sceptical tradition has transformed the doubting, ambiguous Cicero into the confident proponent of a form of Roman identity formed in his own image. The close reading of a range of his theoretical works make up much of the book: De republica, De oratore, Brutus, and De divinatione are treated in detail, and a range of other works are also discussed. The book explores Cicero's ironic attitude towards Roman history, and connects it to the use of irony in mainstream Latin historians, in particular Sallust and Tacitus. It also examines Cicero's approach to the history of rhetoric at Rome. The book concludes with a study of a little-read treatise on Cicero from the early 18th century, by the radical thinker John Toland, which sheds new light on the history of Cicero's reception. Cicero's use of history shows the flexibility of his understanding of Roman identity. The book argues against the image of Cicero as a writer hoping to coerce his readers into identifying himself and his own achievements with the dominant ideologies of Rome.

The Victorians were preoccupied by the 18th century. It was central to many 19th-century debates, particularly those concerning the place of history and religion in national life. This book explores the diverse responses of key Victorian writers and thinkers — Thomas Carlyle, John Henry Newman, Leslie Stephen, Vernon Lee, and M. R. James — to a period which commanded their interest throughout the Victorian era, from the accession of Queen Victoria to the opening decades of the 20th century. They were, on the one hand, appalled by the apparent frivolity of the 18th century, which was denounced by Carlyle as a dispiriting successor to the culture of Puritan England, and, on the other they were concerned to continue its secularizing influence on English culture, as is seen in the pioneering work of Leslie Stephen, who was passionately keen to transform the legacy of 18th-century scepticism into Victorian agnosticism. The Victorian interest in the 18th century was never a purely insular matter, and the history of 18th-century France, Germany, and Italy played a dominant role in the 19th-century historical understanding. A debate between generations was enacted, in which Romanticism melded into Victorianism. The Victorians were haunted by the 18th century, both metaphorically and literally, and the book closes with consideration of the culturally resonant 18th-century ghosts encountered in the fiction of Vernon Lee and M. R. James.

Early modern theologians such as William Perkins, William Ames, Jeremy Taylor, and Richard Baxter see the rectified conscience as a syllogism worked out in partnership with God, which compares actions to the law, and comes to a conclusion. It is thus a linguistic act. John Donne, George Herbert, and Henry Vaughan focus on the points where the conversation breaks down. In their poems, hearts refuse to confess, laws are forgotten or mixed up, and judgements are omitted. Between them, God and the poets take decisive action, torturing, inscribing, fragmenting, and writhing the heart in a set of tropes (turnings of meaning) which get the right response: subjectio (answering your own question), enigma, aposiopesis (breaking off speech), antanaclasis (altering the meanings of words), and chiasmus (redoubling meaning).

This book is a critical survey of the following three questions of egalitarian distributive justice. where does distributive equality matter? Why does it matter? And among whom does it matter? These questions may be referred to, respectively, as the questions of the site, ground, and scope of distributive equality. The book defends an institutional site for egalitarian justice, a luck eglitarian ideal of why equality matters, and the idea that the scope of distributive justice is global. The account of equality proposed in this work may be described as “institutional luck egalitarianism” that is global in scope.