Jay Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251339
- eISBN:
- 9780191598326
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251339.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers an unorthodox, systematic view of the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, truth, and justification. It articulates and defends a conception of knowledge as adequately ...
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This book offers an unorthodox, systematic view of the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, truth, and justification. It articulates and defends a conception of knowledge as adequately justified belief. We correctly judge that S knows that p, whenever, from our de facto epistemic perspective, we judge S able adequately to justify his belief that p. A further ‘truth requirement’ is arguably vacuous and idle, since truth can function neither as the goal of enquiry nor as a constraining condition on any determinate epistemic policy or practice. The corresponding conception of justification is both proceduralist—what are fundamentally justified or unjustified are epistemic conducts and practices—and internalist—a person's belief is justified only to the extent that she is in a position to justify it. Enquiry is correlatively understood as always addressed to determinate questions, properly raised only within a context of defeasible, but settled background beliefs that guide and constrain the procedures and norms of epistemic activity. The theses that matter‐of‐factual knowledge both needs and has available incorrigible foundations are consequently rejected in favour of a resolute anti‐scepticism coupled with a thoroughgoing fallibilism.Less
This book offers an unorthodox, systematic view of the relationships among the concepts of knowledge, truth, and justification. It articulates and defends a conception of knowledge as adequately justified belief. We correctly judge that S knows that p, whenever, from our de facto epistemic perspective, we judge S able adequately to justify his belief that p. A further ‘truth requirement’ is arguably vacuous and idle, since truth can function neither as the goal of enquiry nor as a constraining condition on any determinate epistemic policy or practice. The corresponding conception of justification is both proceduralist—what are fundamentally justified or unjustified are epistemic conducts and practices—and internalist—a person's belief is justified only to the extent that she is in a position to justify it. Enquiry is correlatively understood as always addressed to determinate questions, properly raised only within a context of defeasible, but settled background beliefs that guide and constrain the procedures and norms of epistemic activity. The theses that matter‐of‐factual knowledge both needs and has available incorrigible foundations are consequently rejected in favour of a resolute anti‐scepticism coupled with a thoroughgoing fallibilism.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252138
- eISBN:
- 9780191598500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252130.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Stroud discusses Jay Rosenberg's Peirce‐inspired epistemological naturalism in relation to the requirements of a Kantian epistemological project that answers scepticism. Stroud explores the question ...
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Stroud discusses Jay Rosenberg's Peirce‐inspired epistemological naturalism in relation to the requirements of a Kantian epistemological project that answers scepticism. Stroud explores the question of the possibility of conclusions of a special metaphysical status required for the success of such a project and sketches answers that vary with the status and strength of the conclusions in questions.Less
Stroud discusses Jay Rosenberg's Peirce‐inspired epistemological naturalism in relation to the requirements of a Kantian epistemological project that answers scepticism. Stroud explores the question of the possibility of conclusions of a special metaphysical status required for the success of such a project and sketches answers that vary with the status and strength of the conclusions in questions.
