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Chapter 7 describes the history and contemporary standing of a political ritual practiced in most Japanese Zen monasteries and temples today. This hour long ritual—Shukushin (Invoking the Sage)—is performed at least twenty‐six times each year throughout Japan. The concept of the sage can be traced back from classical Daoism and the practice of rituals on behalf of the well‐being and long life of the emperor through early Chinese Buddhist sources up through the Sung dynasty Ch'an school. Describing the ritual as it is performed today in Japan, the essay shows how continuity of ritual tradition is maintained in Zen even into the postwar era in which the emperor's role in maintaining the prosperity and well‐being of the nation is minimal.

Chapter 4 explains the Imjin War of 1592-98, which marks a major international war in pre-nineteenth century Asia. Japan directly challenged the Ming empire and invaded Korea in an attempt to conquer the Ming. The chapter demonstrates that in addition to Japan’s growing military power vis-à-vis the Ming, Hideyoshi’s post-unification efforts for building a new domestic political order against his rivals explain why Japan challenged the Ming empire in the way that he did at that particular timing. Similarly, one must consider the internal crisis the Korean king found himself in after his failures in the war. Korea’s unusually high compliance with Ming hegemony should be understood in the context of the Korean king’s manipulation of the moral authority of the Ming emperor in an attempt to compensate for his lack of domestic legitimacy vis-à-vis his own domestic constituencies.

Wu Sufeng demonstrates that the policy of the Nationalists toward post-war Japan was based on the principle of ‘repaying aggression with kindness’, in stark contrast to US and British approaches. Wu argues that in pursuit of this policy, Chiang Kaishek encountered many setbacks and had to put up with dismissive attitudes of his two major Allies which resulted in China’s exclusion from major Allied conferences in the last year of WWII. Chiang Kaishek even had to plead for the inclusion of China as one of the three countries demanding Japan’s unconditional surrender in the Potsdam declaration. However, on such key issues as the position of the Japanese emperor and wartime reparations, Chiang’s views were nonetheless influential. His careful manouevering also ensured that China did emerge out of WWII as one of the victorious Allies.

The final chapter looks at the aftermath of Japanese surrender. The initial post-surrender policy of the U.S. government put forward a whole host of reforms in Japan. The first year and a half of occupation was known as the “liberal phase.” General MacArthur implemented many of the first reforms. The chapter looks at how these reforms were devised, put in place, received, and implemented and how the nature and extent of reforms changed in time. The chapter also considers the consequences for Japan of the demotion and humanization of the emperor that came with surrender. Did sparing the emperor from prosecution grant the Japanese public general immunity? How could individual Japanese citizens be held responsible for the war if the emperor, in whose name they had acted, was not? The chapter looks at the ramifications for the events covered in this book for the time between then and now, as we are at the point of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the surrender of Japan. Finally, the chapter looks to the future and lesson learned.

In the third chapter I address Kōtoku’s diagnosis of the causes of imperialism. In contrast with Hobson and Lenin, Kōtoku focuses on the political, ideological, and psychological causes of imperialism and deemphasizes the economic causes. He famously claims that patriotism and militarism “are the woof and the warp from which imperialism is woven.” Governments “stir up” and exploit “love of country,” or patriotism, to justify territorial aggrandizement and to divert the attention of citizens from domestic problems. The benefits of imperialism flow to a small elite, which uses imperialism to carry out a takeover of national politics. I also address weaknesses and inconsistencies in his critical analysis and look at critiques that have been leveled against it.

This chapter discusses the rise of a new political order in Japan during the period 1868–1873. In order to legitimize their rule, the leaders of the interdomainal alliance chose to “hide” their power behind the prestigious institution of the emperor, without giving him real power. When the interdomainal alliance collapsed in autumn 1873, it left in its wake formidable waves of military insurgency. The chapter first describes the reign of the Japanese emperor, who was compared to a “jewel” held by the leaders of the government—well respected, but devoid of real power. It then considers the Meiji regime, which was established through a series of decisive reforms, as well as the rifts and rivalries of the interdomainal alliance, particularly between the Chōshū and Satsuma domains. Finally, it examines Japan's conflict with Korea and the collapse of the interdomainal alliance.