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The 1942 Burma Campaign was an extension of the Malaya–Singapore Campaign. During the conquest of Burma in the first half of 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) displayed the same tactical skill which it had displayed in the Malayan jungles and in Singapore. And also during the ‘long retreat’ from Burma, the BURCORPS displayed the same weaknesses which A.E. Percival’s composite army exhibited during their retreat from north Malaya to Singapore. The demands of Japanese grand strategy prevented the IJA from launching a full-scale invasion of India in either late 1942 or during 1943. Japanese inactivity allowed India Command the respite which the latter desperately needed to build up the air assets and for training British and Indian infantry. This chapter shows how India Command and general headquarters from 1943 onwards, through creative rigorous training and propaganda, were able to instil combat professionalism among the Indian soldiery. And they along with the nascent Royal Indian Navy and miniscule Royal Indian Air Force led Field-Marshal Bill Slim’s 14th Army to victory in Mandalay–Meiktila and Rangoon during 1944–5.

This chapter details events that occurred from February to May 1942. The first Bataan offensive, which started on January 9, 1942, inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese 65th Brigade and on February 8, Homma Masaharu, commander of the 14th Army, ordered a ceasefire. The Japanese had clearly underestimated the U.S. and Filipino forces. Following the ceasefire, operational conflicts emerged among the 14th Army Headquarters, the Southern Army, and the Imperial General Headquarters. Meanwhile, in Bataan, the U.S. and Filipino force responded to the retreat of Japanese frontline troops by having each unit advance separately. In particular, they worked to strengthen their main camps at the foot of Mt. Smat and in the eastern district and to reorganize weak units. When the Japanese Army pursued its second offensive in Bataan, it also made intermittent air strikes on Corregidor from March 24 onward. The remainder of the chapter discusses the fall of Bataan on April 9 and the Bataan Death March, which as has become a symbol of the inhumane behavior of the Japanese military in World War II.

This chapter asks how the military valorizes a past that is marked by defeat. Looking at base museums against the backdrop of more prominent war and military museums, it traces numerous instances of the historization and dehistorization within and around the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). It argues that the SDF tries to forge a communal memory to increase service members' morale and enable them to reposition themselves in Japanese society and the international security landscape. Base museums as the main sites of these efforts employ three strategies of representation—locality, historicity, and symbolism—that help humanize Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) members and reconcile the relationship between the IJA and the SDF.

Chapter 1 traces the historical development of Japan’s interest in Sino-Muslims and is framed within the broader intellectual interest in both Islam and religion that began in the late Meiji period (1868-1912). This discussion provides a sense of the methods and logic behind Japan’s increasingly coherent Islamic policy throughout the Taishō Era (1912–26) and the early years of Hirohito’s reign until the founding of Manchukuo in March 1932. During this time, the Japanese Empire strengthened its foothold in China and increased its outreach to Muslim communities. All the while, the interests of the Japanese Imperial Army and Japanese scholars of Islam became more closely aligned. The outbreak of war between China and Japan in July 1937 was pivotal for Japanese imperial policy toward Sino-Muslims.

This chapter focuses on the supreme prerogative system (tōsui-ken) and how it secured the independence of the Japanese armed forces from any civilian institution apart from the imperial throne. In the postwar years, the “prerogative of supreme command” became a bogeyman to be blamed for all disasters from early Meiji to the end of the Pacific War. The novelist Shiba Ryōtarō claimed that the Imperial Japanese Army, entrenched within their own “supreme prerogative country,” became as wild and murderous as the Pixiu, a gold-eating monster from Chinese mythology. The chapter first considers the Japanese military reforms of 1878 and the motives behind them before discussing the flaws of the supreme prerogative system, arguing that it created a rich background for the future development of military insubordination.

This chapter focuses on the testimony of Tanaka Ryūkichi, an officer in Japan's Kwantung Army in China and Kawashima Yoshiko's lover, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trial after World War II. There was much speculation about why Tanaka decided to appear at the trial. A major general in the Imperial Japanese Army, he cooperated with U.S. Occupation authorities and testified against his military colleagues. Accused of turning against his fellow officers in retaliation for being denied a wartime post or to escape indictment himself, Tanaka rejected any suggestions of base intent. Tanaka appeared before the tribunal a number of times, sometimes for the defense and sometimes for the prosecution. He admitted that he was entirely responsible for the Shanghai Incident of 1932, claiming that it had been hatched as a distraction from bigger doings in Manchuria, and talked about Yoshiko's involvement in it. Yoshiko was a cross-dressing Manchu princess who turned into a Japanese spy and commanded her own army during the Japanese occupation of China in 1931.

During the Japanese occupation, the widespread and almost daily commission of war crimes by members of the Tokkeitai and Kempeitai resulted in a unique post-World War II approach to the prosecution of war crimes: If a war crime was committed within the framework of the activities of a group of persons in such a way that the crime could be ascribed to the group as a whole, then the crime was considered to have been committed by the group, and criminal proceedings could be taken against and sentences passed on all members of the group. This was a unique approach to the prosecution of war crimes; no other nation has ever used such a group criminal liability theory. This chapter examines the concept by looking at prosecutions involving the Japanese naval police (Tokkeitai) and military police (Kempeitai) and the 25th Army.

This chapter examines the Taishō political crisis of 1912–1913. It first considers Home Minister Hara Kei's “positive policy” and the military budget dispute of autumn 1912 involving the army and navy before discussing the imperial ordinance known as the “rule of active duty ministry.” It then turns to Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi's conflict with the army and his successor Katsura Tarō's dispute with the navy. It also explains how the “active duty rule” and the political tools it had generated turned the budgetary dispute of autumn 1912 into a government crisis, and finally, into a military coup d'état. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the ramifications of the Taishō political crisis for the future.

This book examines the culture of rebellion and resistance in the Imperial Japanese Army. Drawing on fifteen archives in four different countries, along with other sources such as letter collections, testimonies, police transcripts, court documents, diplomatic cables, historical newspapers, memoirs, and interviews, the book refutes the notion that Imperial Japanese soldiers were blindly and unconditionally obedient to authority. It presents evidence showing that the Imperial Japanese Army was arguably one of the most disobedient armed forces in modern history. Indeed, it was normal for Imperial Japanese soldiers to rebel, resist, assassinate, and conspire. The book traces Japan's history of military insubordination to bolster its argument that rebelliousness was an integral part of Japanese military life from the 1860s to the 1930s.

The chapter describes the experience of the Hong Kong servicemen during the battle of Hong Kong in detail, highlighting the diversity of such experience among the servicemen from different branches. For many of the Hong Kong service, especially those who only received partial training, the battle was a harrowing and confusing experience. Some had traumatising escapes, and their stories were not known until now, as narratives about the battle usually focus on the experience of the British personnel. The chapter also offers a statistical study of the Hongkongers’ participation of the battle.

This book has shown how a culture of insubordination, an ideological pattern of rebellion and resistance, developed as a constant feature of Japanese military life from the Meiji Restoration onward. Tracing its roots in the shishi culture of the late Tokugawa period, military insubordination persisted into the 1870s and reached new heights during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. It broke into two independent components: elite resistance to state policy and the shishi tradition of the mixed gangs. The book concludes with a discussion of three “bugs” that allowed the Imperial Japanese Army's rebellious culture to grow, prosper, and radicalize with the passing years: the first bug was the hazy political legitimacy of the Meiji regime; the second was the one-way nature of territorial expansion; and the third was the endless nature of territorial expansion.