Michael Freeden
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294146
- eISBN:
- 9780191599323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829414X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, the author has selected four case‐studies of clusters of thought claiming to be liberal, in order to perform the twofold task of assembling ...
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From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, the author has selected four case‐studies of clusters of thought claiming to be liberal, in order to perform the twofold task of assembling the units of liberalism into an identifiable structure, and of testing concrete instances against whatever dominant morphological configuration may emerge. First, there is what is misleadingly known as classical liberalism, an early‐ to mid‐nineteenth‐century creed associated in Britain with J. S. Mill; some of its tenets are examined while being careful not to fall into the trap of assigning lexical correctness to its conceptual definitions and merely secondary or derivative status to its successors. Second, there are versions of reformist (or new) liberalism, such as those associated with T. H. Green, the British new liberalism, and their German and French counterparts; here, an assessment is made of both the question of family continuity and the boundary problems these permutations have, particularly with socialism; the analysis of new liberalism is taken further in the next chapter. Third, there is a recent genre of philosophical liberalism, much in fashion in the American academic world but achieving success abroad through the prominence of American political philosophy; an inquiry is made into whether this school produces a possibly innovative but stipulative model and whether it is reconcilable with mainstream American liberal traditions; the ideological elements in this philosophical position are also examined; the analysis of philosophical liberalism is taken further in Ch. 6. Finally, there is a variant broadly known as libertarianism, with both nineteenth‐century and contemporary instances; an exploration is made of its claim to be representative of a (or the) legitimate strand of liberalism, and of the extent to which it is situated within or outside the accepted boundaries of liberalism; the analysis of libertarianism is taken further in Ch. 7.Less
From the vantage point of the end of the twentieth century, the author has selected four case‐studies of clusters of thought claiming to be liberal, in order to perform the twofold task of assembling the units of liberalism into an identifiable structure, and of testing concrete instances against whatever dominant morphological configuration may emerge. First, there is what is misleadingly known as classical liberalism, an early‐ to mid‐nineteenth‐century creed associated in Britain with J. S. Mill; some of its tenets are examined while being careful not to fall into the trap of assigning lexical correctness to its conceptual definitions and merely secondary or derivative status to its successors. Second, there are versions of reformist (or new) liberalism, such as those associated with T. H. Green, the British new liberalism, and their German and French counterparts; here, an assessment is made of both the question of family continuity and the boundary problems these permutations have, particularly with socialism; the analysis of new liberalism is taken further in the next chapter. Third, there is a recent genre of philosophical liberalism, much in fashion in the American academic world but achieving success abroad through the prominence of American political philosophy; an inquiry is made into whether this school produces a possibly innovative but stipulative model and whether it is reconcilable with mainstream American liberal traditions; the ideological elements in this philosophical position are also examined; the analysis of philosophical liberalism is taken further in Ch. 6. Finally, there is a variant broadly known as libertarianism, with both nineteenth‐century and contemporary instances; an exploration is made of its claim to be representative of a (or the) legitimate strand of liberalism, and of the extent to which it is situated within or outside the accepted boundaries of liberalism; the analysis of libertarianism is taken further in Ch. 7.
Michael Freeden
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294146
- eISBN:
- 9780191599323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829414X.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
An examination of J. S. Mill's ideational legatees offers a useful insight into ideological variation, since later liberals constantly alluded to Mill as a yardstick by which to measure their own ...
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An examination of J. S. Mill's ideational legatees offers a useful insight into ideological variation, since later liberals constantly alluded to Mill as a yardstick by which to measure their own attainments; we thus face a tradition consciously absorbed and recreated by a new generation of ideological consumers, employing common points of reference to forge a sense of ideological community through expanding horizons. The Millite paradigm of the previous chapter becomes pivotal not merely as a preference of the analyst of ideologies, but because so many shapers of liberalism believed Mill to be pivotal; assessment of their contributions on the basis of that perception is methodologically justified, and moreover, from the historical perspective, a period offering instances of both ideological continuity and change is optimally suited to studying ideological diversity and conceptual mutability. In answer to the question of how the core concepts of liberty, individualism, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability, limited, and responsible power fared in the hands of the Millite succession, it is contended in this chapter that they all remained constituents of the liberal core, but that some underwent redecontesting owing to changing scientific fashion, new sets of ethico‐cultural beliefs, and specific events that made their mark on ideological assumptions. The final feature of liberalism—structural tolerance—was a key facilitator in that process, allowing critical distancing from the modernist project with which liberalism was associated. The eight sections of the chapter are: (a) The idealist liberalism of T. H. Green; (b) Perimeter practices and adjacent aftermaths; (c) The new liberalism: the evolution of an ideology (d) The changing adjacencies of liberty; (e) The organic analogy; (f) Fleshing out the new liberal morphology; (g) State, group, and society: the German case; and (h) state, group, and society: the French case.Less
An examination of J. S. Mill's ideational legatees offers a useful insight into ideological variation, since later liberals constantly alluded to Mill as a yardstick by which to measure their own attainments; we thus face a tradition consciously absorbed and recreated by a new generation of ideological consumers, employing common points of reference to forge a sense of ideological community through expanding horizons. The Millite paradigm of the previous chapter becomes pivotal not merely as a preference of the analyst of ideologies, but because so many shapers of liberalism believed Mill to be pivotal; assessment of their contributions on the basis of that perception is methodologically justified, and moreover, from the historical perspective, a period offering instances of both ideological continuity and change is optimally suited to studying ideological diversity and conceptual mutability. In answer to the question of how the core concepts of liberty, individualism, progress, rationality, the general interest, sociability, limited, and responsible power fared in the hands of the Millite succession, it is contended in this chapter that they all remained constituents of the liberal core, but that some underwent redecontesting owing to changing scientific fashion, new sets of ethico‐cultural beliefs, and specific events that made their mark on ideological assumptions. The final feature of liberalism—structural tolerance—was a key facilitator in that process, allowing critical distancing from the modernist project with which liberalism was associated. The eight sections of the chapter are: (a) The idealist liberalism of T. H. Green; (b) Perimeter practices and adjacent aftermaths; (c) The new liberalism: the evolution of an ideology (d) The changing adjacencies of liberty; (e) The organic analogy; (f) Fleshing out the new liberal morphology; (g) State, group, and society: the German case; and (h) state, group, and society: the French case.
Chandran Kukathas
- Published in print:
- 1989
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198273264
- eISBN:
- 9780191684029
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198273264.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In the history of modern liberal political thought the work of F. A. Hayek stands out as one of the most significant contributions to liberal theory since J. S. Mill. This book critically examines ...
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In the history of modern liberal political thought the work of F. A. Hayek stands out as one of the most significant contributions to liberal theory since J. S. Mill. This book critically examines the nature and coherence of Hayek's defence of liberal principles, and tries both to identify its weaknesses and to show why it makes such an important contribution to contemporary political theory. The book argues that Hayek's defence of liberalism is unsuccessful because it rests on presuppositions, which are philosophically incompatible. The unresolved dilemma of Hayek's political philosophy is how to mount a systematic defence of liberalism if one emphasizes the limited capacity of reason. However, this book states that Hayek's social philosophy offers us a significant theory of the nature of social processes, and is therefore an important account of how this must constrain our choice of political principles. For this reason, Hayek's work is worthy of attention both by supporters and critics of liberalism.Less
In the history of modern liberal political thought the work of F. A. Hayek stands out as one of the most significant contributions to liberal theory since J. S. Mill. This book critically examines the nature and coherence of Hayek's defence of liberal principles, and tries both to identify its weaknesses and to show why it makes such an important contribution to contemporary political theory. The book argues that Hayek's defence of liberalism is unsuccessful because it rests on presuppositions, which are philosophically incompatible. The unresolved dilemma of Hayek's political philosophy is how to mount a systematic defence of liberalism if one emphasizes the limited capacity of reason. However, this book states that Hayek's social philosophy offers us a significant theory of the nature of social processes, and is therefore an important account of how this must constrain our choice of political principles. For this reason, Hayek's work is worthy of attention both by supporters and critics of liberalism.
Jeff Jordan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199291328
- eISBN:
- 9780191710698
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291328.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
There are pragmatic theistic arguments different from Pascal's Wager. Some of these pragmatic arguments are found in James Beattie, J. S. Mill, William James, and Jules Lachelier. Some of these ...
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There are pragmatic theistic arguments different from Pascal's Wager. Some of these pragmatic arguments are found in James Beattie, J. S. Mill, William James, and Jules Lachelier. Some of these arguments support the propriety of hoping that theism is true, while others are arguments in support of theistic belief being rational. The permissibility conditions of hope differ from those of belief, and that is a topic of this chapter.Less
There are pragmatic theistic arguments different from Pascal's Wager. Some of these pragmatic arguments are found in James Beattie, J. S. Mill, William James, and Jules Lachelier. Some of these arguments support the propriety of hoping that theism is true, while others are arguments in support of theistic belief being rational. The permissibility conditions of hope differ from those of belief, and that is a topic of this chapter.
Karen Zivi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199826414
- eISBN:
- 9780199919437
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199826414.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Democratization
This chapter suggests that we need to think of rights claims as claims of persuasion rather than as trumping claims, a shift that involves more fully appreciating them as perlocutionary utterances ...
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This chapter suggests that we need to think of rights claims as claims of persuasion rather than as trumping claims, a shift that involves more fully appreciating them as perlocutionary utterances that have uncertain effects. It draws on the work of Arendt to develop an understanding of persuasion as a performative political practice that recognizes the plurality of individual perspectives and the impossibility of definitive political outcomes. It then explore J.S. Mill’s rights theory and politics to illustrate what a persuasive politics of rights looks like and to reveal its democratic potential. It thus challenges those traditional readings of Mill that interpret him as advancing a liberal individualism at odds with democratic values and practices.Less
This chapter suggests that we need to think of rights claims as claims of persuasion rather than as trumping claims, a shift that involves more fully appreciating them as perlocutionary utterances that have uncertain effects. It draws on the work of Arendt to develop an understanding of persuasion as a performative political practice that recognizes the plurality of individual perspectives and the impossibility of definitive political outcomes. It then explore J.S. Mill’s rights theory and politics to illustrate what a persuasive politics of rights looks like and to reveal its democratic potential. It thus challenges those traditional readings of Mill that interpret him as advancing a liberal individualism at odds with democratic values and practices.
Michael Freeden
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294146
- eISBN:
- 9780191599323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829414X.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The ideas of liberation and emancipation were integral to the Continentalist socialist tradition, while within the British socialist tradition, as well as in non‐Marxist Continental socialism, both ...
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The ideas of liberation and emancipation were integral to the Continentalist socialist tradition, while within the British socialist tradition, as well as in non‐Marxist Continental socialism, both liberty and individuality were desirable values. The impact of British liberal ideas on socialism was also greatly amplified by J. S. Mill in remarks where he welcomed a cautious move to collective ownership, although he also cast doubt on the compatibility of socialism with the free and spontaneous development of individuals. This chapter looks at socialism in relation to liberty and choice in six sections: (a) The pursuit of liberalism by other means; (b) Equality and liberty: a partnership of equals?; (c) The fundamental nature of revisionism; (d) Continental comparisons; (e) The perimeter problem of market socialism; and (f) A note on other socialisms.Less
The ideas of liberation and emancipation were integral to the Continentalist socialist tradition, while within the British socialist tradition, as well as in non‐Marxist Continental socialism, both liberty and individuality were desirable values. The impact of British liberal ideas on socialism was also greatly amplified by J. S. Mill in remarks where he welcomed a cautious move to collective ownership, although he also cast doubt on the compatibility of socialism with the free and spontaneous development of individuals. This chapter looks at socialism in relation to liberty and choice in six sections: (a) The pursuit of liberalism by other means; (b) Equality and liberty: a partnership of equals?; (c) The fundamental nature of revisionism; (d) Continental comparisons; (e) The perimeter problem of market socialism; and (f) A note on other socialisms.
Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
It is important for liberals to make sense of claims about degrees of overall freedom because freedom is a fundamental value for liberals. Freedom is a fundamental value for liberals because liberals ...
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It is important for liberals to make sense of claims about degrees of overall freedom because freedom is a fundamental value for liberals. Freedom is a fundamental value for liberals because liberals (at least implicitly) assume freedom to have non-specific value, or value as such. Freedom has non-specific value (value as such) not only if it has intrinsic value but also if it has non-specific instrumental value (e.g. as a means to social or economic progress) or non-specific constitutive value (e.g. as a part of the value of autonomy). Assertions or assumptions of freedom’s non-specific instrumental or constitutive value are made by many representatives of the liberal tradition, including J. S. Mill, Hobhouse and Hayek.Less
It is important for liberals to make sense of claims about degrees of overall freedom because freedom is a fundamental value for liberals. Freedom is a fundamental value for liberals because liberals (at least implicitly) assume freedom to have non-specific value, or value as such. Freedom has non-specific value (value as such) not only if it has intrinsic value but also if it has non-specific instrumental value (e.g. as a means to social or economic progress) or non-specific constitutive value (e.g. as a part of the value of autonomy). Assertions or assumptions of freedom’s non-specific instrumental or constitutive value are made by many representatives of the liberal tradition, including J. S. Mill, Hobhouse and Hayek.
Joseph V. Femia
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198280637
- eISBN:
- 9780191599231
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198280637.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
According to the jeopardy thesis, democracy will endanger or even destroy values that we hold dear: cultural excellence, freedom, and economic prosperity. The proponents of the jeopardy thesis are ...
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According to the jeopardy thesis, democracy will endanger or even destroy values that we hold dear: cultural excellence, freedom, and economic prosperity. The proponents of the jeopardy thesis are many and various, ranging from proto‐fascists (Nietzsche, Maurras) and conservatives (T.S. Eliot, Ortega y Gasset) through to progressive liberals (J.S. Mill) and laissez‐faire liberals (Hayek). It is concluded that they were unduly alarmist and underestimated democracy's ability to adapt to other values.Less
According to the jeopardy thesis, democracy will endanger or even destroy values that we hold dear: cultural excellence, freedom, and economic prosperity. The proponents of the jeopardy thesis are many and various, ranging from proto‐fascists (Nietzsche, Maurras) and conservatives (T.S. Eliot, Ortega y Gasset) through to progressive liberals (J.S. Mill) and laissez‐faire liberals (Hayek). It is concluded that they were unduly alarmist and underestimated democracy's ability to adapt to other values.
Peter de Marneffe
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195383249
- eISBN:
- 9780199870554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195383249.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Although some paternalistic government policies are morally wrong, not all are. Even some “hard” paternalistic policies are morally justifiable. This position is consistent with a due respect for ...
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Although some paternalistic government policies are morally wrong, not all are. Even some “hard” paternalistic policies are morally justifiable. This position is consistent with a due respect for individual autonomy. J. S. Mill's arguments in On Liberty fail to provide good reasons to think that all paternalistic prostitution laws are unjustifiable. Recent academic critics of prostitution laws, Lars Ericsson, Martha Nussbaum, and David Richards, fail to give convincing grounds to oppose all paternalistic prostitution laws. The contractualist views of John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon provide no reason to believe that paternalism is always wrong. The cliché that “it is not the government's business to protect us against ourselves” is considered and rejected as a basis for opposing paternalistic prostitution laws.Less
Although some paternalistic government policies are morally wrong, not all are. Even some “hard” paternalistic policies are morally justifiable. This position is consistent with a due respect for individual autonomy. J. S. Mill's arguments in On Liberty fail to provide good reasons to think that all paternalistic prostitution laws are unjustifiable. Recent academic critics of prostitution laws, Lars Ericsson, Martha Nussbaum, and David Richards, fail to give convincing grounds to oppose all paternalistic prostitution laws. The contractualist views of John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon provide no reason to believe that paternalism is always wrong. The cliché that “it is not the government's business to protect us against ourselves” is considered and rejected as a basis for opposing paternalistic prostitution laws.
Lynn Zastoupil
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781526105646
- eISBN:
- 9781526128140
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781526105646.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay re-examines the fact that J. S. Mill’s published work registers surprisingly few direct examples of influence from India, despite his lengthy East India Company career. Situating Mill’s ...
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This essay re-examines the fact that J. S. Mill’s published work registers surprisingly few direct examples of influence from India, despite his lengthy East India Company career. Situating Mill’s contact with South Asia in the rich history of Anglo-Indian intellectual exchange that colonialism engendered, it argues that this missed opportunity to connect is striking because of the confluence of extraordinary motives and opportunity in Mill’s early life. During the 1830s, European intellectual influences and colonial imperatives combined to lead Mill to advocate a form of Einfühlung—sympathetic understanding of others—at the very moment when the visiting Indian reformer Rammohun Roy was being celebrated across Britain by many individuals close to Mill, such as Jeremy Bentham. Yet Mill never met Rammohun and he virtually ignored the celebrated Bengali in his correspondence and published work. This neglect, the chapter argues, is astounding: not only did Mill and Rammohun campaign alike for freedom of the press in the 1820s, but numerous people that Mill knew used Rammohun’s example to argue that social progress depends on such liberties, a view of progress that Mill shared at the time. The essay concludes that Mill’s rejection of this foundational idea of liberty in favour of the famously restrictive one espoused in On Liberty awaits proper investigation, as does the abandonment of Einfühlung in his later publications.Less
This essay re-examines the fact that J. S. Mill’s published work registers surprisingly few direct examples of influence from India, despite his lengthy East India Company career. Situating Mill’s contact with South Asia in the rich history of Anglo-Indian intellectual exchange that colonialism engendered, it argues that this missed opportunity to connect is striking because of the confluence of extraordinary motives and opportunity in Mill’s early life. During the 1830s, European intellectual influences and colonial imperatives combined to lead Mill to advocate a form of Einfühlung—sympathetic understanding of others—at the very moment when the visiting Indian reformer Rammohun Roy was being celebrated across Britain by many individuals close to Mill, such as Jeremy Bentham. Yet Mill never met Rammohun and he virtually ignored the celebrated Bengali in his correspondence and published work. This neglect, the chapter argues, is astounding: not only did Mill and Rammohun campaign alike for freedom of the press in the 1820s, but numerous people that Mill knew used Rammohun’s example to argue that social progress depends on such liberties, a view of progress that Mill shared at the time. The essay concludes that Mill’s rejection of this foundational idea of liberty in favour of the famously restrictive one espoused in On Liberty awaits proper investigation, as does the abandonment of Einfühlung in his later publications.
Edwin G. Boring
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195385540
- eISBN:
- 9780199869824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385540.003.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter examines the concept of artifact in the context of J. S. Mill's logic of causal inquiry and four conventional uses of the term control in experimental research with human subjects.
This chapter examines the concept of artifact in the context of J. S. Mill's logic of causal inquiry and four conventional uses of the term control in experimental research with human subjects.
David Weinstein
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199600670
- eISBN:
- 9780191738203
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199600670.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter builds on Michael Freeden’s reservations about what he refers to as ‘American philosophical liberalism’. It argues that the analytical preoccupations of this practice of philosophizing ...
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This chapter builds on Michael Freeden’s reservations about what he refers to as ‘American philosophical liberalism’. It argues that the analytical preoccupations of this practice of philosophizing have caused contemporary liberals to narrate the liberal tradition too simplistically. It explores, in particular, how political theorists have misinterpreted J. S. Mill, and as a consequence forgotten Henry Sidgwick.Less
This chapter builds on Michael Freeden’s reservations about what he refers to as ‘American philosophical liberalism’. It argues that the analytical preoccupations of this practice of philosophizing have caused contemporary liberals to narrate the liberal tradition too simplistically. It explores, in particular, how political theorists have misinterpreted J. S. Mill, and as a consequence forgotten Henry Sidgwick.
Nancy Rosenblum
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195337396
- eISBN:
- 9780199868681
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337396.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This chapter discusses the radical implications of Susan Okin's liberal political philosophy. Most of the world's societies subject women to unequal lives, whether through laws or conventions or a ...
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This chapter discusses the radical implications of Susan Okin's liberal political philosophy. Most of the world's societies subject women to unequal lives, whether through laws or conventions or a combination of the two. Rosenblum argues that this subjection of women is the touchstone of Okin's liberal humanism. Drawing out the similarities between Okin and John Stuart Mill, Rosenblum shows how his touchstone issues result in some radical theoretical and practical commitments.Less
This chapter discusses the radical implications of Susan Okin's liberal political philosophy. Most of the world's societies subject women to unequal lives, whether through laws or conventions or a combination of the two. Rosenblum argues that this subjection of women is the touchstone of Okin's liberal humanism. Drawing out the similarities between Okin and John Stuart Mill, Rosenblum shows how his touchstone issues result in some radical theoretical and practical commitments.
William J. Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195173482
- eISBN:
- 9780199872176
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195173482.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter provides an historical explanation of the epistemological basis for autonomy rights. The history begins with Mill’s revolutionary social process epistemology in On Liberty. On Mill’s ...
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This chapter provides an historical explanation of the epistemological basis for autonomy rights. The history begins with Mill’s revolutionary social process epistemology in On Liberty. On Mill’s account, to attain rational beliefs and to approach true beliefs, we depend on being part of a process of free give-and-take of opinion. The chapter contrasts Mill’s account based on this real-world process with Habermas’s account of normative validity based on an ideal process of rational discourse. The chapter criticizes Rawls’s move from metaphysical to political liberalism, which led Rawls to dispense with truth and to replace it with a relativized version of reasonableness. The chapter endorses Habermas’s insistence that engaging in normative inquiry commits us to standards of validity that transcend our particular life world. However, the chapter criticizes Habermas for a move that parallels Rawls’s: Habermas’s decision to understand our normative commitments as factual rather than metaphysical. Finally, the chapter reverses the order of explanation in Habermas’s theory of normative validity. It is not by reference to an ideal process of rational discourse that the results of our real-world process of free give-and-take of opinion attain whatever validity they might have; it is the real-world process that provides the grounding for our beliefs about what an ideal process would be like.Less
This chapter provides an historical explanation of the epistemological basis for autonomy rights. The history begins with Mill’s revolutionary social process epistemology in On Liberty. On Mill’s account, to attain rational beliefs and to approach true beliefs, we depend on being part of a process of free give-and-take of opinion. The chapter contrasts Mill’s account based on this real-world process with Habermas’s account of normative validity based on an ideal process of rational discourse. The chapter criticizes Rawls’s move from metaphysical to political liberalism, which led Rawls to dispense with truth and to replace it with a relativized version of reasonableness. The chapter endorses Habermas’s insistence that engaging in normative inquiry commits us to standards of validity that transcend our particular life world. However, the chapter criticizes Habermas for a move that parallels Rawls’s: Habermas’s decision to understand our normative commitments as factual rather than metaphysical. Finally, the chapter reverses the order of explanation in Habermas’s theory of normative validity. It is not by reference to an ideal process of rational discourse that the results of our real-world process of free give-and-take of opinion attain whatever validity they might have; it is the real-world process that provides the grounding for our beliefs about what an ideal process would be like.
Gary Browning
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199682287
- eISBN:
- 9780191833311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682287.003.0016
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Mill’s thought is standardly presented as an eclectic reading of modern conditions that allows for a view of liberty that is clear and also a view of representative democracy. A standard view of Mill ...
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Mill’s thought is standardly presented as an eclectic reading of modern conditions that allows for a view of liberty that is clear and also a view of representative democracy. A standard view of Mill is challenged by the interpretation of Collini, who emphasizes how Mill is a representative public figure of his age rather than ours. In a series of writings on Mill, Collini relates Mill to his Victorian context and shows him to be a moralistic and energetic proponent of causes that at the time were dissident and challenging. He emphasizes Mill’s moralism and public engagement. In contrast, Skorupski’s express attempt to read Mill in the light of present view is also discussed, in that Mill remains a figure who has something to say to our age as well as his own.Less
Mill’s thought is standardly presented as an eclectic reading of modern conditions that allows for a view of liberty that is clear and also a view of representative democracy. A standard view of Mill is challenged by the interpretation of Collini, who emphasizes how Mill is a representative public figure of his age rather than ours. In a series of writings on Mill, Collini relates Mill to his Victorian context and shows him to be a moralistic and energetic proponent of causes that at the time were dissident and challenging. He emphasizes Mill’s moralism and public engagement. In contrast, Skorupski’s express attempt to read Mill in the light of present view is also discussed, in that Mill remains a figure who has something to say to our age as well as his own.
William Talbott
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195173475
- eISBN:
- 9780199835331
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195173473.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of autonomy rights as a response to the failure of paternalistic defenses of autocracy (e.g., Plato’s Republic and the Marxist dictatorships of the ...
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In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of autonomy rights as a response to the failure of paternalistic defenses of autocracy (e.g., Plato’s Republic and the Marxist dictatorships of the 20th century). Talbott discusses two alternative ways of explaining the importance of autonomy rights, one consequentialist and one nonconsequentialist. Talbott focuses on the consequentialist account. Talbott proposes a non-metaphysical conception of autonomy as involving good judgment (making generally reliable judgments about one's own good) and self-determination (making choices on the basis of one's judgments). Talbott claims that one of the most important discoveries in the development of human rights is the discovery that the claim of first person authority is true—that is, the discovery, first announced by J.S. Mill, that, given the necessary education and training, all normal human beings are capable of becoming generally reliable judges of what is good for them. Talbott defines two categories of autonomy rights—development-of-judgment rights and exercise-of-judgment rights— that are necessary for the judgments of normal adults to be generally reliable. He argues that for a government to reliably promote the well-being of its citizens, the government must obtain and be appropriately responsive to reliable feedback from its citizens about the effects of its policies. This is the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem. Talbott argues that guarantees of autonomy rights are essential parts of any solution to the reliable feedback problem. The chapter concludes with a list of eight autonomy rights.Less
In this chapter, Talbott explains the development of autonomy rights as a response to the failure of paternalistic defenses of autocracy (e.g., Plato’s Republic and the Marxist dictatorships of the 20th century). Talbott discusses two alternative ways of explaining the importance of autonomy rights, one consequentialist and one nonconsequentialist. Talbott focuses on the consequentialist account. Talbott proposes a non-metaphysical conception of autonomy as involving good judgment (making generally reliable judgments about one's own good) and self-determination (making choices on the basis of one's judgments). Talbott claims that one of the most important discoveries in the development of human rights is the discovery that the claim of first person authority is true—that is, the discovery, first announced by J.S. Mill, that, given the necessary education and training, all normal human beings are capable of becoming generally reliable judges of what is good for them. Talbott defines two categories of autonomy rights—development-of-judgment rights and exercise-of-judgment rights— that are necessary for the judgments of normal adults to be generally reliable. He argues that for a government to reliably promote the well-being of its citizens, the government must obtain and be appropriately responsive to reliable feedback from its citizens about the effects of its policies. This is the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem. Talbott argues that guarantees of autonomy rights are essential parts of any solution to the reliable feedback problem. The chapter concludes with a list of eight autonomy rights.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199265169
- eISBN:
- 9780191601385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926516X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible ...
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Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.Less
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.
Matt Qvortrup
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719076589
- eISBN:
- 9781781701560
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719076589.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
We live in an age of democracy. Very few people challenge the virtues of ‘government by the people’, yet, politicians and commentators are fond of decrying the ‘crisis of democracy’. How do these ...
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We live in an age of democracy. Very few people challenge the virtues of ‘government by the people’, yet, politicians and commentators are fond of decrying the ‘crisis of democracy’. How do these views square up? This book provides the answer by surveying the philosophical history of democracy and its critics and by analysing empirical data about citizen participation in Britain and other developed democracies. In addition to analysis of major political thinkers such as Plato, Machiavelli and J.S. Mill, it analyses how modern technology has influenced democracy. Among the issues discussed in the book are why people vote and what determines their decisions. When do citizens get involved in riots and demonstrations? Are spin doctors and designer politics a threat to democracy? Do the mass-media influence our political behaviour?Less
We live in an age of democracy. Very few people challenge the virtues of ‘government by the people’, yet, politicians and commentators are fond of decrying the ‘crisis of democracy’. How do these views square up? This book provides the answer by surveying the philosophical history of democracy and its critics and by analysing empirical data about citizen participation in Britain and other developed democracies. In addition to analysis of major political thinkers such as Plato, Machiavelli and J.S. Mill, it analyses how modern technology has influenced democracy. Among the issues discussed in the book are why people vote and what determines their decisions. When do citizens get involved in riots and demonstrations? Are spin doctors and designer politics a threat to democracy? Do the mass-media influence our political behaviour?
Peter van Inwagen
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199245604
- eISBN:
- 9780191715310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The global argument from evil proceeds from a premise about the vast amount of suffering that actually exists. The popular contention that there is something morally objectionable about treating this ...
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The global argument from evil proceeds from a premise about the vast amount of suffering that actually exists. The popular contention that there is something morally objectionable about treating this argument as ‘just one more philosophical argument’ is examined and rejected. Atheist — an idealized proponent of the argument — presents the argument to an audience of idealized agnostics in an attempt to convert them to atheism. Theist — an idealized critic of the argument — tries to block this attempt at conversion. The idea of a ‘defence’ is introduced: the idea of a story that contains both God and all the evils that actually exist, a story that is put forward not as true but as ‘true for all anyone knows’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the ‘free-will defence’, a story according to which the evils of the world result from the abuse of free will by created beings.Less
The global argument from evil proceeds from a premise about the vast amount of suffering that actually exists. The popular contention that there is something morally objectionable about treating this argument as ‘just one more philosophical argument’ is examined and rejected. Atheist — an idealized proponent of the argument — presents the argument to an audience of idealized agnostics in an attempt to convert them to atheism. Theist — an idealized critic of the argument — tries to block this attempt at conversion. The idea of a ‘defence’ is introduced: the idea of a story that contains both God and all the evils that actually exist, a story that is put forward not as true but as ‘true for all anyone knows’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the ‘free-will defence’, a story according to which the evils of the world result from the abuse of free will by created beings.
Mary Anne Perkins
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240754
- eISBN:
- 9780191680250
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240754.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Coleridge's status as a philosopher has often been questioned. ‘I am a poor poet in England’, he admitted, ‘but in America, I am a great philosopher’. J. S. Mill's assertion that ‘the time is yet far ...
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Coleridge's status as a philosopher has often been questioned. ‘I am a poor poet in England’, he admitted, ‘but in America, I am a great philosopher’. J. S. Mill's assertion that ‘the time is yet far distant when, in the estimation of Coleridge, and of his influence upon the intellect of our time, anything like unanimity can be looked for’ seems to have been justified. This book re-examines Coleridge's claim to have developed a ‘logosophic’ system which attempted ‘to reduce all knowledge into harmony’. The book pays particular attention to his later writings, some of which are still unpublished. It suggests that the accusations of plagiarism and of muddled, abstruse metaphysics which have been levelled at him may be challenged by a thorough reading of his work in which his unifying principle is revealed. The book explores the various meanings for the term ‘Logos’, a recurrent theme in every area of Coleridge's thought — philosophy, religion, natural science, history, political and social criticism, literary theory, and psychology. Coleridge was responding to the concerns of his own time, a revolutionary age in which increasing intellectual and moral fragmentation and confusion seemed to him to threaten both individuals and society. Drawing on the whole of Western intellectual history, he offered a ground for philosophy which was relational rather than mechanistic. He is one of those few thinkers whose work appears to become more interesting, his perceptions more acute, as the historical gulf widens.Less
Coleridge's status as a philosopher has often been questioned. ‘I am a poor poet in England’, he admitted, ‘but in America, I am a great philosopher’. J. S. Mill's assertion that ‘the time is yet far distant when, in the estimation of Coleridge, and of his influence upon the intellect of our time, anything like unanimity can be looked for’ seems to have been justified. This book re-examines Coleridge's claim to have developed a ‘logosophic’ system which attempted ‘to reduce all knowledge into harmony’. The book pays particular attention to his later writings, some of which are still unpublished. It suggests that the accusations of plagiarism and of muddled, abstruse metaphysics which have been levelled at him may be challenged by a thorough reading of his work in which his unifying principle is revealed. The book explores the various meanings for the term ‘Logos’, a recurrent theme in every area of Coleridge's thought — philosophy, religion, natural science, history, political and social criticism, literary theory, and psychology. Coleridge was responding to the concerns of his own time, a revolutionary age in which increasing intellectual and moral fragmentation and confusion seemed to him to threaten both individuals and society. Drawing on the whole of Western intellectual history, he offered a ground for philosophy which was relational rather than mechanistic. He is one of those few thinkers whose work appears to become more interesting, his perceptions more acute, as the historical gulf widens.