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Most studies of Islamism have focused on the role of oppositional forces. Increasingly, states are also important Islamist actors. States pursue Islamization not only in reaction to Islamist challenges but also because in Islamism they see the opportunity to address the inherent weaknesses of the postcolonial state structure, and to significantly increase the power and capacity of the state. This trend is most evident in Pakistan and Malaysia where both the weakness of the postcolonial state and the opportunity inherent in Islamization have been greatest. These cases deviate from other models of state formation in the Muslim world, and provide new insights not only into state formation in the Muslim world but also into the study of the role of religion in state expansion in comparative politics.

In the 1980s, Malaysia adopted the policy of state‐led Islamization. The ruling UMNO party co‐opted ABIM, fashioned itself as an Islamically oriented party, and adopted many Islamist ideas. The state created Islamic institutions, and supported Islamic cultural, political, and economic activities. It used Islamization to expand its power and to penetrate the Malay society. The state also embarked on rapid economic growth to address racial tensions. It used its control of Islam to manage Islamic politics and define Islamic values with a view of economic growth and accommodating globalization.

The Zia ul‐Haq regime adopted state‐led Islamization to shore up waning state power. It adopted aspects of Islamist ideology to reshape the country's judicial and political structures. This strategy expanded state power after years of domestic strife and at a time when Pakistan was involved in the Afghan War. The policy was also used to legitimate military rule, providing a justification for its continuation as demands for democratization grew. The Islamization strategy firmly entrenched the postcolonial state in Islamic ideology and allowed the military to ally itself with Islamist forces to achieve its goals.

Why did only Malaysia and Pakistan adopt state‐led Islamization as a strategy for expansion of state power? How did this strategy serve their interests? What was the impact of this strategy on these countries and their societies? In the end, Islamization did serve state interests, but at the cost of laws and procedures that were neither viable in the long run nor were they socially beneficial. Furthermore, Islamization strategy ultimately proved untenable as interests of the state and those of Islamist actors began to diverge, especially with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis, and implementation of IMF reforms.

Analysis of German immigration policy shows the limits to which immigrants can be assimilated without granting them citizenship. Non‐citizen status becomes especially problematic for second‐ and third‐generation immigrants. This chapter examines the problems of integrating Turkish guest workers, whose situation and status is becoming increasingly relevant as European integration proceeds. The widely held assumption, that Islamization was mostly a phenomenon limited to the first‐generation immigrants, has proved to be mistaken, and the outcome of a clear trend towards nationalist and religious retrenchment among the third‐generation immigrants remains worryingly problematic.

The conclusion provides reflections on the idea of pietization and politics after the transition from the Mahathir administration to the Abdullah administration in the government, as well as from the reformist leadership of Fadzil Noor in PAS to the fundamentalist leadership of Abdul Hadi Awang. It discusses the intensification of contested authenticities between UMNO and PAS that these changes heralded. In addition to a careful critical deconstruction of the Islamic discourse and praxis of the main political protagonists, the conclusion draws further attention to the cultural context, meanings, and practices of contemporary Islam in Malaysia, and particularly how these factors interplay with mainstream elite politics encapsulated in the UMNO-PAS “Islamization race.” By listening to the voices of those outside the elite who have responded to the effects of UMNO’s and PAS’s mutually reinforcing Islamist politics, the conclusion further assesses the contributions of society (in contradistinction to the state and the political apparatus, as represented by these dominant political parties) either as an alternative vehicle for or as a buffer against Islamization.

This chapter examines how conversion affects religious geography and sacred space. It discusses the great fire of the summer of 1660 and the meaning given to it by contemporary writers, Hatice Turhan's converting of Jewish places in the wake of the fire, the construction and dedication of the Valide Sultan Mosque in the heart of the former main Jewish neighborhood, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's Islamization of Christian places, and how Muslim commoners followed the rulers' example in articulating the call to enjoin good and forbid wrong by removing perceived obstacles to Muslim piety. These processes transformed the religious geography of the imperial capital, shaping a more Islamic landscape.

This chapter explores several of the major themes of the book, including why people attempt to bring others of the same religion to their understanding of that religion (the motivation of Vani Mehmed Efendi), the link between piety and proselytization, and the significance of the advocate or mediator of conversion. It focuses on the changed religious scene in the 1660s following the fire and Islamization in Istanbul and the appointment of Fazıl Ahmed Pasha as grand vizier. The crucial individual is Vani Mehmed Efendi, a preacher who became closer to the dynasty and administration and more influential than the previous Kadızadeli leaders Kadızade Mehmed Efendi and Üstüvani Mehmed Efendi. This advocate of a reformed Islam free of innovations and Sufi accretions — who compelled the enjoining of good and forbidding of wrong in Istanbul by attacking Sufis and dissenters, ending the trade in wine and spirits, and razing taverns — mediated the conversion of the valide sultan, grand vizier, and sultan to his way of Islam through charismatic preaching.

This chapter discusses Islamic rulers and the process of conversion. It argues that the conversion of self, conversion of others of the same religion, conversion of others of different religions and their sacred spaces within society, and the waging of ghaza in part to convert others and their religious geography abroad were all linked during Mehmed IV's epoch. Most notable about the ideology of Mehmed IV's court was its marked religious piety: the sultan and his inner circle openly proclaimed their own piety in their writings and through their personal behavior and the policies they implemented. After experiencing their own conversion, Mehmed IV, Hatice Turhan, Fazil Ahmed Pasha, and Vani Mehmed Efendi considered themselves devoted Muslims returning society to the right path, from which it had deviated. Mehmed IV's time in power also invites comparisons with those of modern rulers, particularly the reign of the last important Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamid II.

Since the early 1990s, the issue of the booming young generation has been placed at the top of the public agenda of the Iranian state. During this same period, young people have played a major role in the resistance against official attempts to reshape the cultural and even the physical space of urban areas along monolithic moral guidelines. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the successive Islamization policies of the Iranian state, with a focus on the successive attempts to police moral behavior of young people in public places in the cities. For the past 28 years, the moral police have been in charge of enforcing Islamic codes in urban public space. Their performance is an indication of the effectiveness of officially sanctioned Islamization policies of the Islamic Republic, the Republic of piety.

This chapter looks at the genesis of the Islamist agenda in Malaysia from the perspective of both Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Using the history of the Islamist opposition PAS and UMNO’s concomitant early responses to its rise as a lens through which to perceive the early tenor of Islamism in the Malaysian context, the chapter demonstrates how the party underwent several metamorphoses as it evolved to locate Islamism at the heart of its social-political agenda.

This chapter investigates at closer analytical quarters the phenomenon of Islamization in Malaysia and the creation of institutions of Islamic governance by the UMNO-led Malaysian government in a process that can aptly be described as the “bureaucratization” of Islam. This process is important, for it effectively put in place the levers of Islamist governance in Malaysia, eventually facilitating the “Islamic state” proclamations by some of UMNO’s senior leaders. The chapter also identifies and discusses in greater detail two prevailing contradictions that arose out of this move to bureaucratize Islam, the first between federal and state administrations, and the second between civil and religious law.

This introductory chapter documents what is known of the process of Islamization across Indonesia and argues that the present knowledge is informed in large part by the acceptance of the retrospective framings and validations of seventeenth-century Sufi teachings that emphasized a mystical connection between the Prophet and a learned elite patronized by regal authorities. Numerous difficulties beset any attempt at plotting a straightforward history of the conversion and Islamization of Indonesia's many diverse peoples up to the middle of the eighteenth century. What does emerge is a sense that certain key courts took on the mantle of defenders of Islam and regularly sought validation from beyond their shores, most preferably from the person of the Prophet's lineal descendants in Mecca and the scholars associated with them. Regardless of how it was achieved or subsequently justified, Islamization brought the power of international connections that linked the Indian Ocean and China Sea ever more closely together.

This chapter examines Islamization in Classical Arabic Central Asia. The Arab Empire founded by the prophet Muhammad expanded rapidly, defeating the Byzantine Empire and capturing Syria (637) and Egypt (640). At the same time, the Arabs defeated the Sasanid Persian Empire (637) and raced across Persia into Central Asia. Within a very short time, early Arab Islamic culture came into direct, intimate contact with several major civilized areas, including the Graeco-Roman-influenced cultures of the Levant and North Africa, Persian culture, and the Buddhist cultures of Central Asia. From them the Muslims adopted various cultural elements. This chapter considers when, where, and how the Muslims acquired the recursive argument method and the Islamic college or madrasa. It shows that the recursive argument method is used in Arabic works by the Central Asian scientist and philosopher Avicenna.

The conclusion summarizes necessary future directions for research in medieval Nubia, including the publication of remaining documents, and a closer look at the process of Islamization in Nubia. The conclusion also includes a discussion of gender in medieval Nubia, noting the prominent role of women in Nubian land ownership and the parallel importance of women in Nubian royal succession. An historical synthesis summarizes the activities of the main Nubian officials we see in office from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. The conclusion ends with a summary of the book’s arguments and an attempt to demonstrate that what we can prove true for Qasr Ibrim was probably true in the Nubian heartland as well. The Nubian capital at Dongola has revealed art portraying a feast accompanying a financial exchange. Medieval graffiti written not far from Dongola have revealed travelers from western Europe. Various documents show networks of land ownership connecting Dongola to Qasr Ibrim and elsewhere. In short, Qasr Ibrim is not exceptional but serves as a proxy for both Lower and Upper Nubia, where we consistently see a civilization blending indigenous festive practices with late antique patterns of land ownership and legal practice.

This chapter discusses the July 2007 Pakistan military operation against the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It begins by briefly describing the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistan, focusing on the rise of Islamist militant groups, especially those affiliated with the Deobandi school of thought and the nexus between the Establishment and the Islamists in Pakistan. The chapter then discusses the growing Islamization of the Pakistani state and society, within which the occupation of the Red Mosque by armed insurgents took place; and the conduct of Operation Sunrise and the recapture of the mosque complex by Pakistani security forces. It is argued that while Operation Sunrise was a success in military terms, its political consequences have contributed to Pakistan's ever-deepening instability and to Islamist militancy in the tribal belt and beyond. Prospects are slim that Islamabad has the will or capability to address the structural context within which the events at the Red Mosque transpired.