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This chapter systematically explores the notion of invariance, which is the key feature that a generalization must possess if it is to figure in causal explanations. A generalization is invariant if it is stable in the right way under interventions. A generalization may be invariant even if it fails to satisfy such traditional criteria for lawfulness as exceptionlessness, expressability in ter m s of purely qualitative predicates, and wide scope. Laws are one kind of invariant relationship but not the only kind. Invariance is also different from Skyrms’ notion of resiliency, and satisfaction of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis criteria for lawfulness is neither necessary nor sufficient for invariance.

Do the properties of a compound or aggregate supervene on the properties of its parts? Theories that imply a negative answer (or the states they attribute) are called ’holistic’. Besides the EPR paradox, Pauli's Exclusion Principle and quantum statistics (for aggregates of identical bosons or fermions) are all generally cited as establishing the holism of quantum theory. It has been conjectured both that the principle of Permutation Invariance accounts for the departures from classical statistics, and that if ’identical’ in ’aggregate of identical particles’ is properly understood, then it entails Permutation Invariance tautologically. It has also been thought that there can be a proof within elementary (non‐relativistic) quantum mechanics of the principle of Dichotomy, i.e. that only Bose and Fermi statistics, and not intermediate non‐classical ’para‐statistics’ can apply. All three conjectures are contested in this chapter and the next. This chapter is devoted to an exposition of the quantum theoretical foundations for this subject, with implications for limits to interpretation of the theory.

This chapter summarizes some of the work examining visual cognition through recordings of single neurons in the human medial temporal lobe (MTL). These recordings were performed in patients with pharmacologically intractable epilepsy as part of the procedure to determine the seizure focus for surgical resection. Neurons respond to complex stimuli, sometimes associating seemingly distinct stimuli, typically with sparse responses and long latencies. These recordings have opened the doors to interrogate the human brain at unprecedented resolution and are beginning to reveal a bewildering complexity in the representation of the inner cognitive world.

This chapter explores how accounts of phenomenal unity can not only satisfy the phenomenality constraint, but also a version of globality. Global phenomenal unity could then be called phenomenal holism. First, different relevant versions of globality are discussed, as well as notions of holism that can be applied to consciousness. According to accounts of strong phenomenal holism, every phenomenal part of a phenomenal field depends for its existence on all other phenomenal parts of the same phenomenal field. It is argued that accounts which defend such a strong phenomenal holism are ultimately not tenable. Hence, the globality constraint can only be used in its weaker, relaxed versions. It is suggested that a substantial version of phenomenal holism should combine relaxed versions of globality with the assumption that experienced wholes are hierarchically ordered. Furthermore, three features that make this idea more specific are identified: Multiplicity, Graduality, and Invariance. Finally, the ideas presented in this chapter are wrapped up by presenting the regularity account of phenomenal unity (RPU).