Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199281701
- eISBN:
- 9780191713088
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281701.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In this chapter the relationship between non‐discursive and discursive thought is addressed. It is argued that non‐discursive thought has a multiple object and is nevertheless not propositional. The ...
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In this chapter the relationship between non‐discursive and discursive thought is addressed. It is argued that non‐discursive thought has a multiple object and is nevertheless not propositional. The holism of Intellect is explained. Finally, some explanation is given of the fact that according to Plotinus non‐discursive thought is the primary kind of thought on which discursive thought necessarily depends.Less
In this chapter the relationship between non‐discursive and discursive thought is addressed. It is argued that non‐discursive thought has a multiple object and is nevertheless not propositional. The holism of Intellect is explained. Finally, some explanation is given of the fact that according to Plotinus non‐discursive thought is the primary kind of thought on which discursive thought necessarily depends.
William A. Richards and G. William Barnard
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231174060
- eISBN:
- 9780231540919
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231174060.003.0004
- Subject:
- Psychology, Psychopharmacology
Insights into God, Immortality, Interrelationships, Love, Beauty and Emerging Wisdom.
Insights into God, Immortality, Interrelationships, Love, Beauty and Emerging Wisdom.
Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780748691838
- eISBN:
- 9781474465304
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748691838.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Why is intelligence so hard to define? Why is there no systematic or adequate theory of intelligence? This book argues that classic intelligence production has been premised on an ill-founded belief ...
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Why is intelligence so hard to define? Why is there no systematic or adequate theory of intelligence? This book argues that classic intelligence production has been premised on an ill-founded belief in an automatic inference between history and the future, and that the lack of a working theory has exacerbated this problem. The book uses classic cases of intelligence failure to demonstrate how this problem creates a restricted language in intelligence communities that undermines threat perception. From these cases it concludes that intelligence needs to be re-thought, and argues that good intelligence is the art of threat perception beyond the limits of our habitual thinking and shared experience. This book therefore argues that intelligence can never be truths, only uncertain theories about the future. Qualified intelligence work is, accordingly, ideas that lead to theories about the future. These theories should always seek to explain a comprehension of the wholeness of threats. The hypothesis derived from these theories must thereafter be tested, as tests that make the theories less uncertain. This implies that intelligence never can be anything but uncertain theories about the future that are made less uncertain through scientific, critical tests of hypotheses derived from these theories. High quality intelligence institutions conduct these tests in what is known as the intelligence cycle. This cycle works well if it mirrors good thinking.Less
Why is intelligence so hard to define? Why is there no systematic or adequate theory of intelligence? This book argues that classic intelligence production has been premised on an ill-founded belief in an automatic inference between history and the future, and that the lack of a working theory has exacerbated this problem. The book uses classic cases of intelligence failure to demonstrate how this problem creates a restricted language in intelligence communities that undermines threat perception. From these cases it concludes that intelligence needs to be re-thought, and argues that good intelligence is the art of threat perception beyond the limits of our habitual thinking and shared experience. This book therefore argues that intelligence can never be truths, only uncertain theories about the future. Qualified intelligence work is, accordingly, ideas that lead to theories about the future. These theories should always seek to explain a comprehension of the wholeness of threats. The hypothesis derived from these theories must thereafter be tested, as tests that make the theories less uncertain. This implies that intelligence never can be anything but uncertain theories about the future that are made less uncertain through scientific, critical tests of hypotheses derived from these theories. High quality intelligence institutions conduct these tests in what is known as the intelligence cycle. This cycle works well if it mirrors good thinking.
Max Deutsch
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262028950
- eISBN:
- 9780262327374
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental ...
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This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” (xphi) and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking.Less
This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” (xphi) and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking.
Georges Dicker
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195153064
- eISBN:
- 9780199835027
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195153065.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail ...
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This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail the principles that do not depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought–and introduces those that do depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Analogies of Experience.Less
This chapter introduces Kant’s theory of categories and corresponding principles. It explains and evaluates Kant’s attempt to derive his categories from forms of judgment. It also discusses in detail the principles that do not depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Postulates of Empirical Thought–and introduces those that do depend on the Transcendental Deduction–namely, the Analogies of Experience.
David Papineau
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199243822
- eISBN:
- 9780191598166
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199243824.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist ...
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Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist arguments, like Jackson's knowledge argument or Kripke's modal argument. Papineau shows that this cannot be right, since these arguments apply equally in cases in which we feel no intuition of distinctness. Instead, he draws on remarks of Thomas Nagel to argue that the intuition of distinctness is due to an “antipathetic fallacy”: we move from the true premise that phenomenal concepts don’t involve conscious feelings to the false conclusion that they don’t refer to them.Less
Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist arguments, like Jackson's knowledge argument or Kripke's modal argument. Papineau shows that this cannot be right, since these arguments apply equally in cases in which we feel no intuition of distinctness. Instead, he draws on remarks of Thomas Nagel to argue that the intuition of distinctness is due to an “antipathetic fallacy”: we move from the true premise that phenomenal concepts don’t involve conscious feelings to the false conclusion that they don’t refer to them.
Victor Tadros
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199554423
- eISBN:
- 9780191731341
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199554423.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Philosophy of Law
This introduction sets up the problem of punishment, indicating why it requires serious philosophical investigation. It outlines the philosophical method of the book. Finally, it provides an overview ...
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This introduction sets up the problem of punishment, indicating why it requires serious philosophical investigation. It outlines the philosophical method of the book. Finally, it provides an overview of the argument.Less
This introduction sets up the problem of punishment, indicating why it requires serious philosophical investigation. It outlines the philosophical method of the book. Finally, it provides an overview of the argument.
Paul Humphreys
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696499
- eISBN:
- 9780191744983
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides six arguments in favor of scientifically based ontology and against speculative ontology, a branch of analytic metaphysics. Parts of contemporary speculative ontology are ...
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This chapter provides six arguments in favor of scientifically based ontology and against speculative ontology, a branch of analytic metaphysics. Parts of contemporary speculative ontology are untenable because they are factually false; intuitions are not domain-invariant; conceptual analysis is too closely tied to everyday experience; what counts as an acceptable philosophical idealization is left unarticulated; the world is not scale-invariant; and anthropocentric epistemology does not always minimize epistemic risk. Nevertheless, specifically philosophical arguments are necessary when making ontological claims and complete deference to scientific consensus is unreasonable. The overall strategy is to recognize that different domains of reality require different methods of discovery and justification, and that a significant part of contemporary metaphysics is employing methods that are inappropriate to its goals.Less
This chapter provides six arguments in favor of scientifically based ontology and against speculative ontology, a branch of analytic metaphysics. Parts of contemporary speculative ontology are untenable because they are factually false; intuitions are not domain-invariant; conceptual analysis is too closely tied to everyday experience; what counts as an acceptable philosophical idealization is left unarticulated; the world is not scale-invariant; and anthropocentric epistemology does not always minimize epistemic risk. Nevertheless, specifically philosophical arguments are necessary when making ontological claims and complete deference to scientific consensus is unreasonable. The overall strategy is to recognize that different domains of reality require different methods of discovery and justification, and that a significant part of contemporary metaphysics is employing methods that are inappropriate to its goals.
Bryan G. Norton
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780195093971
- eISBN:
- 9780197560723
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195093971.003.0010
- Subject:
- Environmental Science, Environmentalist Thought and Ideology
Languages are more like searchlights than floodlights; they do not illuminate equally across the full range of the perceptual field. This generalization is ...
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Languages are more like searchlights than floodlights; they do not illuminate equally across the full range of the perceptual field. This generalization is especially true of technical vocabularies that characterize specialized professions such as economics and ecology, and to a lesser extent of systems of favored expressions used by groups that share a special interest, such as nature preservation. Because of this selectivity of focus, languages and special vocabularies can disclose the world differently. If various environmentalists’ descriptions of the same events often sound as though they are perceiving something quite different, it is because environmentalists, who have not adopted a shared worldview, express themselves in a variety of unsystematized languages and vocabularies. It will therefore be useful to examine the systems of concepts that important environmentalists have used to describe what they have perceived. It is important not to think of concepts as abstractions, however. A language and the forms of expression it embodies are the glue that hold worldviews together; our vocabularies therefore carry our perceptions, playing an active role in shaping the world we see. The very meaning attributed to events is affected by the interplay of perceptions, actions, and the linguistic behaviors that express the meaning of events. Perceptions, we assume, directly affect the theoretical hypotheses and conjectures we develop to make sense of our world as we act within it. But theoretical assumptions likewise affect perception; and since perception is the only basis we have for discriminating among theories of reality, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that to some degree at least, the constellation of conceptual, theoretical, and value precepts we operate with, and the vocabulary we use to express them, will determine the shape of the world we encounter. This, loosely put, is the idea behind worldview analysis, as introduced in Chapter 2 and used occasionally throughout this book. Because most people are not accustomed to question their linguistic forms and the philosophical commitments embodied in them, it is often useful to discuss these issues informally in metaphorical terms. For example, the language of atomism as applied to nature is often associated with a mechanistic metaphor, while more holistic approaches are associated with an organicist metaphor.
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Languages are more like searchlights than floodlights; they do not illuminate equally across the full range of the perceptual field. This generalization is especially true of technical vocabularies that characterize specialized professions such as economics and ecology, and to a lesser extent of systems of favored expressions used by groups that share a special interest, such as nature preservation. Because of this selectivity of focus, languages and special vocabularies can disclose the world differently. If various environmentalists’ descriptions of the same events often sound as though they are perceiving something quite different, it is because environmentalists, who have not adopted a shared worldview, express themselves in a variety of unsystematized languages and vocabularies. It will therefore be useful to examine the systems of concepts that important environmentalists have used to describe what they have perceived. It is important not to think of concepts as abstractions, however. A language and the forms of expression it embodies are the glue that hold worldviews together; our vocabularies therefore carry our perceptions, playing an active role in shaping the world we see. The very meaning attributed to events is affected by the interplay of perceptions, actions, and the linguistic behaviors that express the meaning of events. Perceptions, we assume, directly affect the theoretical hypotheses and conjectures we develop to make sense of our world as we act within it. But theoretical assumptions likewise affect perception; and since perception is the only basis we have for discriminating among theories of reality, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that to some degree at least, the constellation of conceptual, theoretical, and value precepts we operate with, and the vocabulary we use to express them, will determine the shape of the world we encounter. This, loosely put, is the idea behind worldview analysis, as introduced in Chapter 2 and used occasionally throughout this book. Because most people are not accustomed to question their linguistic forms and the philosophical commitments embodied in them, it is often useful to discuss these issues informally in metaphorical terms. For example, the language of atomism as applied to nature is often associated with a mechanistic metaphor, while more holistic approaches are associated with an organicist metaphor.
Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780748691838
- eISBN:
- 9781474465304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748691838.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Intelligence as an activity and practice is an extremely complex process. It is this complexity that needs to be understood if intelligence institutions are to hope to diminish the force of discourse ...
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Intelligence as an activity and practice is an extremely complex process. It is this complexity that needs to be understood if intelligence institutions are to hope to diminish the force of discourse failure. The essence of intelligence needs to be acknowledged, and intelligence operatives need proper education and training. Intelligence is a highly demanding profession that is identified by the twelve images that will be described in this chapter. These images also serve as reminders of the challenges of intelligence. Intelligence is method, it is a phenomenon and it is science and knowledge. It constantly deals with uncertainty, and its ultimate objective is to make uncertainty less uncertain through its estimation about the future. It is arguably tempting for many to close cognition, overlook the challenging and displace those factors that do not fit with orthodox beliefs and political assumptions.Less
Intelligence as an activity and practice is an extremely complex process. It is this complexity that needs to be understood if intelligence institutions are to hope to diminish the force of discourse failure. The essence of intelligence needs to be acknowledged, and intelligence operatives need proper education and training. Intelligence is a highly demanding profession that is identified by the twelve images that will be described in this chapter. These images also serve as reminders of the challenges of intelligence. Intelligence is method, it is a phenomenon and it is science and knowledge. It constantly deals with uncertainty, and its ultimate objective is to make uncertainty less uncertain through its estimation about the future. It is arguably tempting for many to close cognition, overlook the challenging and displace those factors that do not fit with orthodox beliefs and political assumptions.
M. Chirimuuta
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029087
- eISBN:
- 9780262327435
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029087.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Numerous authors have claimed that color relationism is simply not compatible with the deliverances of introspectible experience. But is the non-relationality of color as easily recovered from ...
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Numerous authors have claimed that color relationism is simply not compatible with the deliverances of introspectible experience. But is the non-relationality of color as easily recovered from experience as has been claimed? This chapter addresses this major objection to relationism, and tackles the implications for color adverbialism in particular. It is argued that the objectors to relationism have yet to demonstrate that experiences of color per se—and not experiences of objects with color, shape, size, and numerous other properties—are the source of their intuition that colors are out there in the world, and perceiver independent. Phenomenology, it is argued, is uncommitted about the ontological issues. Moreover, the objectors have yet to show that their supposed phenomenological facts are independent of theoretical views about the nature of color. Color adverbialism is no more vulnerable to phenomenological objections than other versions of relationism. Finally, the material presented suggests new ways to think about the phenomena of color constancy.Less
Numerous authors have claimed that color relationism is simply not compatible with the deliverances of introspectible experience. But is the non-relationality of color as easily recovered from experience as has been claimed? This chapter addresses this major objection to relationism, and tackles the implications for color adverbialism in particular. It is argued that the objectors to relationism have yet to demonstrate that experiences of color per se—and not experiences of objects with color, shape, size, and numerous other properties—are the source of their intuition that colors are out there in the world, and perceiver independent. Phenomenology, it is argued, is uncommitted about the ontological issues. Moreover, the objectors have yet to show that their supposed phenomenological facts are independent of theoretical views about the nature of color. Color adverbialism is no more vulnerable to phenomenological objections than other versions of relationism. Finally, the material presented suggests new ways to think about the phenomena of color constancy.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199696680
- eISBN:
- 9780191744266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696680.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion, Theology
This chapter argues that moral obligations are experienced as having a number of distinguishing characteristics, which collectively are described as the “Anscombe intuition,” since they are ...
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This chapter argues that moral obligations are experienced as having a number of distinguishing characteristics, which collectively are described as the “Anscombe intuition,” since they are highlighted in a famous article by Elizabeth Anscombe, in which she argues that moral obligations require a law-giver. Moral obligations appear to have the following characteristics: (1) They are objective. (2) They are binary (verdict-like) in character. (3) They bring deliberation to closure. (4) They are overriding reasons. (5) They have motivational power. (6) They are universal, both in the sense that they apply to all humans, and that some of them involve obligations that extend to all humans. One does not have to be an adherent of a revealed religion to understand morality in this way, since Socrates clearly recognized these characteristics of morality. Anscombe intuitionLess
This chapter argues that moral obligations are experienced as having a number of distinguishing characteristics, which collectively are described as the “Anscombe intuition,” since they are highlighted in a famous article by Elizabeth Anscombe, in which she argues that moral obligations require a law-giver. Moral obligations appear to have the following characteristics: (1) They are objective. (2) They are binary (verdict-like) in character. (3) They bring deliberation to closure. (4) They are overriding reasons. (5) They have motivational power. (6) They are universal, both in the sense that they apply to all humans, and that some of them involve obligations that extend to all humans. One does not have to be an adherent of a revealed religion to understand morality in this way, since Socrates clearly recognized these characteristics of morality. Anscombe intuition
Max Deutsch
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262028950
- eISBN:
- 9780262327374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter identifies an important ambiguity in the claim that many philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence and a corresponding ambiguity in the term “intuition” itself. On one reading ...
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This chapter identifies an important ambiguity in the claim that many philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence and a corresponding ambiguity in the term “intuition” itself. On one reading of “intuition”—the “content” reading—it might be accurate to describe philosophers as relying on intuitions as evidence. This fact is cited as one of the main reasons for the appeal of the idea that philosophy trades heavily in intuitions. However, the chapter argues that the negative xphi critique depends taking “intuition” is the “state” sense in attributing a flawed method to analytic philosophers, but goes on to argue that analytic philosophers do not appeal to intuitions in the “state” sense as evidence. The chapter also includes case studies of famous arguments from Gettier and Kripke (demonstrating that these philosophers appeal to arguments, not intuitions) and a discussion of the crucial difference between a counterexample and an intuitive counterexample.Less
This chapter identifies an important ambiguity in the claim that many philosophical arguments treat intuitions as evidence and a corresponding ambiguity in the term “intuition” itself. On one reading of “intuition”—the “content” reading—it might be accurate to describe philosophers as relying on intuitions as evidence. This fact is cited as one of the main reasons for the appeal of the idea that philosophy trades heavily in intuitions. However, the chapter argues that the negative xphi critique depends taking “intuition” is the “state” sense in attributing a flawed method to analytic philosophers, but goes on to argue that analytic philosophers do not appeal to intuitions in the “state” sense as evidence. The chapter also includes case studies of famous arguments from Gettier and Kripke (demonstrating that these philosophers appeal to arguments, not intuitions) and a discussion of the crucial difference between a counterexample and an intuitive counterexample.
Barbara Maria Stafford
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780226630489
- eISBN:
- 9780226630656
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226630656.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Archaeology, before the birth of psychiatry, was the preeminent nineteenth-century science to embody both the act and the concept of delving. Strikingly, those two major interpreters of Western ...
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Archaeology, before the birth of psychiatry, was the preeminent nineteenth-century science to embody both the act and the concept of delving. Strikingly, those two major interpreters of Western humanistic and scientific traditions, Hans Blumenberg and Alfred North Whitehead, similarly invoke a sublime archaeology of unearthing. Making the submerged emerge permits that which is excessive, or mentally beyond reach, to loom into view. This essay argues that what makes this version of the multifaceted non-conscious, or involuntary, Sublime still relevant across current disciplinary divides is that it integrates what otherwise remains, in Whitehead’s apt word, “bifurcated.” It does this by bringing to the surface separated, buried “causes,” thus allowing them to become attached in the process of entering our unifying awareness. By the Sublime, I refer specifically to that overwhelming psychophysiological intrusion, which—like love’s fury—transiently manages to merge the personal awareness of our affective and cognitive states with the otherwise concealed and impersonal neurophysiological mechanisms underlying them. With our resistance undone, we begin to understand how this raw subjective experience is actually conjoined with objective nature, that is, bound up with the tumultuous environment to which it intuitively corresponds.Less
Archaeology, before the birth of psychiatry, was the preeminent nineteenth-century science to embody both the act and the concept of delving. Strikingly, those two major interpreters of Western humanistic and scientific traditions, Hans Blumenberg and Alfred North Whitehead, similarly invoke a sublime archaeology of unearthing. Making the submerged emerge permits that which is excessive, or mentally beyond reach, to loom into view. This essay argues that what makes this version of the multifaceted non-conscious, or involuntary, Sublime still relevant across current disciplinary divides is that it integrates what otherwise remains, in Whitehead’s apt word, “bifurcated.” It does this by bringing to the surface separated, buried “causes,” thus allowing them to become attached in the process of entering our unifying awareness. By the Sublime, I refer specifically to that overwhelming psychophysiological intrusion, which—like love’s fury—transiently manages to merge the personal awareness of our affective and cognitive states with the otherwise concealed and impersonal neurophysiological mechanisms underlying them. With our resistance undone, we begin to understand how this raw subjective experience is actually conjoined with objective nature, that is, bound up with the tumultuous environment to which it intuitively corresponds.
Aaron T. Looney
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780823262960
- eISBN:
- 9780823266654
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823262960.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter clarifies several of Jankélévitch's core conceptions, including the instant and the interval, intuition, almost-nothing, and the I-know-not-what (je-ne-sais-quoi). Inspired by both the ...
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This chapter clarifies several of Jankélévitch's core conceptions, including the instant and the interval, intuition, almost-nothing, and the I-know-not-what (je-ne-sais-quoi). Inspired by both the dynamism of Bergson’s philosophy of life and the biblical creation narrative, Jankélévitch conceives acts of creation as a third category between being and nothingness. For Jankélévitch, transcendence—the wholly other—is beyond being, essence, truth, and value. This chapter explores what Jankélévitch sees as the limits of understanding and explicates his priority of the deed over knowledge. It demonstrates that for Jankélévitch, as for Levinas, first philosophy is ethics and that he unifies the message of the Gospels with the moral-philosophical insights of Kant by showing the good will to be one and the same as the loving will.Less
This chapter clarifies several of Jankélévitch's core conceptions, including the instant and the interval, intuition, almost-nothing, and the I-know-not-what (je-ne-sais-quoi). Inspired by both the dynamism of Bergson’s philosophy of life and the biblical creation narrative, Jankélévitch conceives acts of creation as a third category between being and nothingness. For Jankélévitch, transcendence—the wholly other—is beyond being, essence, truth, and value. This chapter explores what Jankélévitch sees as the limits of understanding and explicates his priority of the deed over knowledge. It demonstrates that for Jankélévitch, as for Levinas, first philosophy is ethics and that he unifies the message of the Gospels with the moral-philosophical insights of Kant by showing the good will to be one and the same as the loving will.
N. G. Laskowski
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198859512
- eISBN:
- 9780191891861
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198859512.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. Influential proponents of reductive views themselves admit as much. Ethicists also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. ...
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Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. Influential proponents of reductive views themselves admit as much. Ethicists also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why ethicists resist reductive views and why ethicists have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures shores up new evidence for various theses about the distinctiveness of our use of normative concepts. This chapter builds on previous work to make a cumulative case for the view that what it is to use a normative concept is to use an unanalyzable natural-cognitive concept that is related to noncognitive elements of our psychology.Less
Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. Influential proponents of reductive views themselves admit as much. Ethicists also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why ethicists resist reductive views and why ethicists have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures shores up new evidence for various theses about the distinctiveness of our use of normative concepts. This chapter builds on previous work to make a cumulative case for the view that what it is to use a normative concept is to use an unanalyzable natural-cognitive concept that is related to noncognitive elements of our psychology.
Peter Nicholls
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199678464
- eISBN:
- 9780191803727
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199678464.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry
This chapter affirms that George Oppen's last few years in Mexico were difficult ones and his return to poetry is simply not attributed to the ‘rust and copper dream’, which in its partly humorous ...
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This chapter affirms that George Oppen's last few years in Mexico were difficult ones and his return to poetry is simply not attributed to the ‘rust and copper dream’, which in its partly humorous retellings never quite conveys the sudden focusing of his energies. It is also clear that Oppen's reading during the Mexico years had an important part to play in his return to writing, indicating that philosophical works came high on his agenda. This chapter also considers that Oppen's collection of poems in ‘The Materials’ discern traces of his engagement with Jacques Maritain's aesthetics, which finds ‘ontological simplicity’ of a very different kind from that evoked in ‘Creative Intuition’.Less
This chapter affirms that George Oppen's last few years in Mexico were difficult ones and his return to poetry is simply not attributed to the ‘rust and copper dream’, which in its partly humorous retellings never quite conveys the sudden focusing of his energies. It is also clear that Oppen's reading during the Mexico years had an important part to play in his return to writing, indicating that philosophical works came high on his agenda. This chapter also considers that Oppen's collection of poems in ‘The Materials’ discern traces of his engagement with Jacques Maritain's aesthetics, which finds ‘ontological simplicity’ of a very different kind from that evoked in ‘Creative Intuition’.
Daniel Sutherland
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- December 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198809647
- eISBN:
- 9780191846915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198809647.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers the status of geometrical and kinematic representations in the foundations of 18th century analysis and in Kant’s understanding of those foundations. It has two aims. First, ...
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This chapter considers the status of geometrical and kinematic representations in the foundations of 18th century analysis and in Kant’s understanding of those foundations. It has two aims. First, relying on relatively recent reassessments of the history of analysis, it will attempt to bring forward a more accurate account of intuitive representation in 18th century analysis and the relation between British and Continental mathematics. Second, it will give a better account of Kant’s place in that history. The result shows that although Kant did no better at navigating the labyrinth of the continuum than his contemporaries, he had a more interesting and reasonable account of the foundations of analysis than an easy reading of either Kant or that history provides. It also permits a more accurate and interesting account of how and when a conception of foundations of analysis without intuitive representations emerged, and how that paved the way for Bolzano and Cauchy.Less
This chapter considers the status of geometrical and kinematic representations in the foundations of 18th century analysis and in Kant’s understanding of those foundations. It has two aims. First, relying on relatively recent reassessments of the history of analysis, it will attempt to bring forward a more accurate account of intuitive representation in 18th century analysis and the relation between British and Continental mathematics. Second, it will give a better account of Kant’s place in that history. The result shows that although Kant did no better at navigating the labyrinth of the continuum than his contemporaries, he had a more interesting and reasonable account of the foundations of analysis than an easy reading of either Kant or that history provides. It also permits a more accurate and interesting account of how and when a conception of foundations of analysis without intuitive representations emerged, and how that paved the way for Bolzano and Cauchy.
Paul L. Gavrilyuk
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198701583
- eISBN:
- 9780191771392
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701583.003.0014
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter addresses Florovsky’s interpretation of the sources and norms of neopatristic theology, more specifically, scripture, tradition, divine revelation, and ecclesial experience. Florovsky ...
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This chapter addresses Florovsky’s interpretation of the sources and norms of neopatristic theology, more specifically, scripture, tradition, divine revelation, and ecclesial experience. Florovsky draws on the insights of Aleksei Khomiakov’s epistemology of sobornost’, in which knowledge acquisition depends on the community of knowers bounded by love. Florovsky developed a version of social epistemology of the catholic transformation by ecclesial and Eucharistic participation. Florovsky’s use of different modalities of theological reasoning, especially his appeal to intuition and the antinomic character of religious knowledge, is discussed.Less
This chapter addresses Florovsky’s interpretation of the sources and norms of neopatristic theology, more specifically, scripture, tradition, divine revelation, and ecclesial experience. Florovsky draws on the insights of Aleksei Khomiakov’s epistemology of sobornost’, in which knowledge acquisition depends on the community of knowers bounded by love. Florovsky developed a version of social epistemology of the catholic transformation by ecclesial and Eucharistic participation. Florovsky’s use of different modalities of theological reasoning, especially his appeal to intuition and the antinomic character of religious knowledge, is discussed.