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This chapter examines two business unions, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) and the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). Business unions differ from each other as well as from activist unions. Some, like the Teamsters, are legitimate unions whose leaders, while far less constrained and far better compensated than those in the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), are nonetheless subject to regulation and re-election. Others, such as the ILA, are little more than a protection racket, whose leaders prey upon members and collaborate with employers and the mob. Unlike the leadership of activist unions, business union leaders believe that expanding the scope of the union's activities is costly, with few, if any, downstream benefits. If leaders provide sufficient selective incentives in services, patronage, or coercion, then the members are likely to comply.

This chapter introduces the major players in the case US v. IBT, filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its investigative arm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its top officers in June 1988. The lawsuit was jointly prepared by US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's office in the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Washington, DC. This lawsuit launched a major battle in DOJ's decades-long war against the Cosa Nostra organized-crime families. This chapter provides a background on the plaintiff, the amici curiae (Teamsters for a Democratic Union and Association for Union Democracy), the defendants, and the judge who presided over the case for its first twelve years, David Edelstein.

This chapter introduces the major players in the case US v. IBT, filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its investigative arm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its top officers in June 1988. The lawsuit was jointly prepared by US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's office in the Southern District of New York, the FBI, and DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Washington, DC. This lawsuit launched a major battle in DOJ's decades-long war against the Cosa Nostra organized-crime families. This chapter provides a background on the plaintiff, the amici curiae (Teamsters for a Democratic Union and Association for Union Democracy), the defendants, and the judge who presided over the case for its first twelve years, David Edelstein.

This chapter examines how the national-level organizations manage internal heterogeneity across individual members, as well as specific geographically defined subunits. By observing internal opposition to the dominant national leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), and Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF), the chapter compares specific locals within each union. Consequently, it shows the robustness of the larger organizational governance institutions to perturbation once in equilibrium and that, at the local level, workers did not sort in to unions for political or social reasons; rather, they joined where the economic opportunities first appeared. The ILWU and WWF, whose leaders ask member contributions to political projects, pursued active persuasion combined with tolerance. The IBT, on the other hand, invested less in persuasion and employed screening and repression.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

This chapter focuses on the disciplinary cases prosecuted by the court-appointed investigations officer and adjudicated by the independent administrator against International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) officials from 1989 to 1992. It begins with an overview of sources of IBT disciplinary law and the steps involved in a disciplinary case before turning to a discussion of how officers involved in US v. IBT laid down a comprehensive administrative law of IBT's disciplinary violations. It then considers how the consent decree made administrative prosecution of violations of the IBT's constitution, IBT locals' bylaws, federal criminal and labor laws, and the consent decree itself the primary means of ridding the union of organized crime's influence.

This chapter focuses on James P. Hoffa's victory in the 1998 rerun election as general president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It first considers the argument between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the IBT over the issue of who should finance the 1998 rerun election before looking at the candidates and their campaigns. In particular, it examines Hoffa's election promise that he will persuade the DOJ and the district court judge that the US v. IBT consent decree was no longer necessary. The chapter then discusses the election results, which saw Hoffa emerge victorious, and his creation of an internal IBT anticorruption unit called Project RISE (respect, integrity, strength, and ethics). It also explores Project RISE's investigation of Cosa Nostra's influence over IBT locals and joint councils and concludes with an assessment of the independent review board's investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of individual disciplinary cases and systemic corruption at the IBT during its second five-year term (July 1996–July 2001).

This chapter focuses on the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) 2006 election for general president, the independent review board's (IRB) ongoing disciplinary work during its fourth term (July 2006–July 2011), and the run-up to the 2011 IBT election. It first considers the election campaigns of James P. Hoffa and Tom Leedham and the IBT's Las Vegas convention in June 2006 before moving to a discussion of the presidential debate pitting Tom Keegel and Leedham. It then examines the preballoting election protests and the election results, which saw Hoffa defeat Leedham again. It also looks at the IRB's continued investigations of disciplinary cases and systemic corruption at the IBT, including membership in and association with Cosa Nostra.

This chapter examines how the Department of Justice's (DOJ) lawyers adapted the civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) law for use against entrenched corruption and racketeering in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It begins with an overview of RICO and its provisions that are relevant to the US v. IBT civil RICO complaint. It then looks at the defendants in US v. IBT, which include Cosa Nostra in addition to IBT and goes on to discuss various reactions to the case. It also considers the pretrial motions, discovery, and depositions related to the case and concludes with an assessment of settlement signed by the IBT with the DOJ providing for three court-appointed officers to enforce a consent decree imposing strong disciplinary and election remedies.

This chapter focuses on the disciplinary cases prosecuted by the court-appointed investigations officer and adjudicated by the independent administrator against International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) officials from 1989 to 1992. It begins with an overview of sources of IBT disciplinary law and the steps involved in a disciplinary case before turning to a discussion of how officers involved in US v. IBT laid down a comprehensive administrative law of IBT's disciplinary violations. It then considers how the consent decree made administrative prosecution of violations of the IBT's constitution, IBT locals' bylaws, federal criminal and labor laws, and the consent decree itself the primary means of ridding the union of organized crime's influence.

This chapter focuses on the scandal that marred the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) 1996 election for general president. It first provides an overview of the three candidates for the 1996 election, namely: Ron Carey, Sam Theodus, and James P. Hoffa. It then considers the election rules and the IBT's Philadelphia convention held on July 15–19, 1996 before moving to a discussion of the election campaigns by the candidates. It also examines Carey's victory and the post-election discovery that IBT funds were used to finance his reelection campaign, along with the court-appointed officers' decision to declare the 1996 election null and void, the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the invalidated 1996 election and the upcoming 1998 rerun election, the disqualification of Carey from the rerun election, and his expulsion from the IBT. Finally, it analyzes reactions to the election scandal and suggests that the US v. IBT consent decree had a role in Carey's rise and fall.

This chapter focuses on the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) 2006 election for general president, the independent review board's (IRB) ongoing disciplinary work during its fourth term (July 2006–July 2011), and the run-up to the 2011 IBT election. It first considers the election campaigns of James P. Hoffa and Tom Leedham and the IBT's Las Vegas convention in June 2006 before moving to a discussion of the presidential debate pitting Tom Keegel and Leedham. It then examines the preballoting election protests and the election results, which saw Hoffa defeat Leedham again. It also looks at the IRB's continued investigations of disciplinary cases and systemic corruption at the IBT, including membership in and association with Cosa Nostra.

This chapter focuses on James P. Hoffa's victory in the 1998 rerun election as general president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). It first considers the argument between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the IBT over the issue of who should finance the 1998 rerun election before looking at the candidates and their campaigns. In particular, it examines Hoffa's election promise that he will persuade the DOJ and the district court judge that the US v. IBT consent decree was no longer necessary. The chapter then discusses the election results, which saw Hoffa emerge victorious, and his creation of an internal IBT anticorruption unit called Project RISE (respect, integrity, strength, and ethics). It also explores Project RISE's investigation of Cosa Nostra's influence over IBT locals and joint councils and concludes with an assessment of the independent review board's investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of individual disciplinary cases and systemic corruption at the IBT during its second five-year term (July 1996–July 2001).

This chapter focuses on the enforcement of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) administrative discipline during Ron Carey's tenure as general president from 1992 to 1997. It describes how, soon after Carey took office, disciplinary authority under the US v. IBT consent decree shifted from the investigations officer and independent administrator to an independent review board (IRB). It also considers the IRB phase of the remediation that gives the IBT a role in charging, adjudicating, and punishing disciplinary offenses, along with Carey's resistance to the IRB. Finally, it examines Carey's initiatives aimed at eradicating corruption at IBT, including the creation of the Ethical Practices Committee and his imposition of trusteeships.

This chapter focuses on the enforcement of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) administrative discipline during Ron Carey's tenure as general president from 1992 to 1997. It describes how, soon after Carey took office, disciplinary authority under the US v. IBT consent decree shifted from the investigations officer and independent administrator to an independent review board (IRB). It also considers the IRB phase of the remediation that gives the IBT a role in charging, adjudicating, and punishing disciplinary offenses, along with Carey's resistance to the IRB. Finally, it examines Carey's initiatives aimed at eradicating corruption at IBT, including the creation of the Ethical Practices Committee and his imposition of trusteeships.

This chapter focuses on the scandal that marred the International Brotherhood of Teamsters's (IBT) 1996 election for general president. It first provides an overview of the three candidates for the 1996 election, namely: Ron Carey, Sam Theodus, and James P. Hoffa. It then considers the election rules and the IBT's Philadelphia convention held on July 15–19, 1996 before moving to a discussion of the election campaigns by the candidates. It also examines Carey's victory and the post-election discovery that IBT funds were used to finance his reelection campaign, along with the court-appointed officers' decision to declare the 1996 election null and void, the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the invalidated 1996 election and the upcoming 1998 rerun election, the disqualification of Carey from the rerun election, and his expulsion from the IBT. Finally, it analyzes reactions to the election scandal and suggests that the US v. IBT consent decree had a role in Carey's rise and fall.

This chapter examines the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) leadership's change of heart after signing a settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its resistance to the consent decree that formalized the settlement. The settlement in US v. IBT did not guarantee eradication of Cosa Nostra's influence in the IBT. From August 1989 to September 1992, the IBT placed Judge David Edelstein and the court-appointed officers under legal siege. In the months following issuance of the consent decree, the international union and a number of IBT locals repeatedly challenged or refused to comply with the court officers' decisions, prompting the court officers to seek judicial orders. This chapter considers the IBT's counterattacks after signing the consent decree as well as Edelstein's opinion on the All Writs Act injunction requested by US Attorney Otto Obermaier prohibiting anyone from filing any lawsuit pertaining to the consent decree in any forum other than Edelstein's courtroom.

This chapter focuses on the watershed 1991 election of International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) international officers, the first election supervised by the court-appointed election officer. In negotiating the US v. IBT consent decree, US Attorney Rudolph Giuliani accepted the suggestion that, given free and fair elections, the IBT would elect candidates who opposed corruption and racketeering. The consent decree thus mandated election procedures that were more democratic than those of any other labor union in the United States. This chapter first provides an overview of the 1991 election rules before looking at the candidates for general president and their slates. It then considers the election campaigns, the preballoting election protests, and balloting and results, which saw insurgent candidate Ron Carey winning in the one-man-one-vote, secret mail-ballot election.

This chapter examines the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) leadership's change of heart after signing a settlement with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and its resistance to the consent decree that formalized the settlement. The settlement in US v. IBT did not guarantee eradication of Cosa Nostra's influence in the IBT. From August 1989 to September 1992, the IBT placed Judge David Edelstein and the court-appointed officers under legal siege. In the months following issuance of the consent decree, the international union and a number of IBT locals repeatedly challenged or refused to comply with the court officers' decisions, prompting the court officers to seek judicial orders. This chapter considers the IBT's counterattacks after signing the consent decree as well as Edelstein's opinion on the All Writs Act injunction requested by US Attorney Otto Obermaier prohibiting anyone from filing any lawsuit pertaining to the consent decree in any forum other than Edelstein's courtroom.