Michael Moore
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199599493
- eISBN:
- 9780191594649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599493.003.0015
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
Once one sees that criminal law presuppose that those subject to it must at least be rational agents, the subject of the previous chapter, the question arises as to what other fundamental attributes ...
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Once one sees that criminal law presuppose that those subject to it must at least be rational agents, the subject of the previous chapter, the question arises as to what other fundamental attributes the law might suppose persons to have. The chapter explores a number of such features: autonomy (in four different senses), emotionality, unified character, unified consciousness, and Intentionality. Some further features are often assumed to be presupposed about persons by the law, namely freedom of the will, mind-stuff existing outside the natural world, souls, and the like; but these are rejected as legal presuppositions about persons and moral agency.Less
Once one sees that criminal law presuppose that those subject to it must at least be rational agents, the subject of the previous chapter, the question arises as to what other fundamental attributes the law might suppose persons to have. The chapter explores a number of such features: autonomy (in four different senses), emotionality, unified character, unified consciousness, and Intentionality. Some further features are often assumed to be presupposed about persons by the law, namely freedom of the will, mind-stuff existing outside the natural world, souls, and the like; but these are rejected as legal presuppositions about persons and moral agency.
Zed Adams and Jacob Browning (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262035248
- eISBN:
- 9780262335850
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy’s conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, ...
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In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy’s conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, and how they relate. Haugeland argued that “giving a damn” is essential for having a mind, and suggested that traditional approaches to cognitive science mistakenly overlook the relevance of caring to the understanding of mindedness. Haugeland’s determination to expand philosophy’s array of concepts led him to write on a wide variety of subjects that may seem unrelated—from topics in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to examinations of such figures as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Thomas Kuhn. Haugeland’s two books with the MIT Press, Artificial Intelligence and Mind Design, show the range of his interests.
This book offers a collection of essays in conversation with Haugeland’s work. The essays, by prominent scholars, extend Haugeland’s work on a range of contemporary topics in philosophy of mind—from questions about intentionality to issues concerning objectivity and truth to the work of Heidegger. Giving a Damn also includes a previously unpublished paper by Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” as well as critical responses to it. Finally, an appendix offers Haugeland’s outline of Kant’s "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.”Less
In his work, the philosopher John Haugeland (1945–2010) proposed a radical expansion of philosophy’s conceptual toolkit, calling for a wider range of resources for understanding the mind, the world, and how they relate. Haugeland argued that “giving a damn” is essential for having a mind, and suggested that traditional approaches to cognitive science mistakenly overlook the relevance of caring to the understanding of mindedness. Haugeland’s determination to expand philosophy’s array of concepts led him to write on a wide variety of subjects that may seem unrelated—from topics in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to examinations of such figures as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Thomas Kuhn. Haugeland’s two books with the MIT Press, Artificial Intelligence and Mind Design, show the range of his interests.
This book offers a collection of essays in conversation with Haugeland’s work. The essays, by prominent scholars, extend Haugeland’s work on a range of contemporary topics in philosophy of mind—from questions about intentionality to issues concerning objectivity and truth to the work of Heidegger. Giving a Damn also includes a previously unpublished paper by Haugeland, “Two Dogmas of Rationalism,” as well as critical responses to it. Finally, an appendix offers Haugeland’s outline of Kant’s "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.”
Tim Crane
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199682744
- eISBN:
- 9780191762970
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682744.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. It is argued that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about ...
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This book addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. It is argued that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought’s representational power (‘intentionality’) unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist.Less
This book addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. It is argued that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought’s representational power (‘intentionality’) unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist.
Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198732570
- eISBN:
- 9780191796807
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and ...
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This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and large, it is understood in propositional terms. Typically, the examples of intentionality deemed fundamental and the explanations of their natures rely on the idea of propositional content. But these commitments cannot go unquestioned and the (often implicit) acceptance of “propositionalism” has impeded philosophical discussion about the nature of intentionality in at least three noteworthy ways: (i) a precise statement of propositionalism has been left undeveloped; (ii) the motivations for propositionalism are rarely articulated; and (iii) apparent counterexamples and challenges to propositionalism, along with non-propositional theories of intentionality, are underexplored. The contributors to this volume explore and correct these impediments by discussing in detail what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; by shedding light on why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and by exploring the ways in which one might depart from propositionalism.Less
This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and large, it is understood in propositional terms. Typically, the examples of intentionality deemed fundamental and the explanations of their natures rely on the idea of propositional content. But these commitments cannot go unquestioned and the (often implicit) acceptance of “propositionalism” has impeded philosophical discussion about the nature of intentionality in at least three noteworthy ways: (i) a precise statement of propositionalism has been left undeveloped; (ii) the motivations for propositionalism are rarely articulated; and (iii) apparent counterexamples and challenges to propositionalism, along with non-propositional theories of intentionality, are underexplored. The contributors to this volume explore and correct these impediments by discussing in detail what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; by shedding light on why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and by exploring the ways in which one might depart from propositionalism.
Vlad Strukov
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474407649
- eISBN:
- 9781474422024
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474407649.003.0001
- Subject:
- Film, Television and Radio, Film
Taurus poses questions about the nature of death and life whereby the two are indistinguishable from one another. One of the main technical features and optical tropes in the film is that of the ...
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Taurus poses questions about the nature of death and life whereby the two are indistinguishable from one another. One of the main technical features and optical tropes in the film is that of the dissolve shot which emphasises the blurring of boundaries between all states and which codes subjectivity in terms of transience and transcendence. I demonstrate how film as a form of art constructs particular forms of subjectivity and relates them to the discourse of intelligence—cinema as a metaphor for thought. Sokurov is interested in a type of ontology which is invisible and is a matter of transcendental evocation, guessing and anticipation, and one which is visible but only to the subject itself in the ultimate act of internalising knowledge and experiencing it as a knowledge-world. Sokurov never reduces one to another and instead engages in the retroactive act of re-assembling knowledge-worlds as matters of relation and intentionality. His worlds are infinite in the composition and limited by duration and change. The worlds of Sokurov are always political in that they contradict the laws of being, and particularly the ontology of spectatorship. This chapter sets the agenda for my further investigation.Less
Taurus poses questions about the nature of death and life whereby the two are indistinguishable from one another. One of the main technical features and optical tropes in the film is that of the dissolve shot which emphasises the blurring of boundaries between all states and which codes subjectivity in terms of transience and transcendence. I demonstrate how film as a form of art constructs particular forms of subjectivity and relates them to the discourse of intelligence—cinema as a metaphor for thought. Sokurov is interested in a type of ontology which is invisible and is a matter of transcendental evocation, guessing and anticipation, and one which is visible but only to the subject itself in the ultimate act of internalising knowledge and experiencing it as a knowledge-world. Sokurov never reduces one to another and instead engages in the retroactive act of re-assembling knowledge-worlds as matters of relation and intentionality. His worlds are infinite in the composition and limited by duration and change. The worlds of Sokurov are always political in that they contradict the laws of being, and particularly the ontology of spectatorship. This chapter sets the agenda for my further investigation.
M.D. Rutherford and Valerie A. Kuhlmeier (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
As adults, we can quickly interpret minimal visual information as a cue that something is animate, as when we briefly catch sight of a mouse darting from hiding place to hiding place. With a mere ...
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As adults, we can quickly interpret minimal visual information as a cue that something is animate, as when we briefly catch sight of a mouse darting from hiding place to hiding place. With a mere glance, we can often infer that someone has agency, is moving towards a goal, or is feeling a particular emotion. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the attribution of agency and the understanding of goal-directed behavior, following a rapid increase in empirical discoveries leading to the conclusion that an intuitive understanding of social others is an early-developing part of our human nature, and may be compromised in certain clinical populations, namely autism. This book presents current research in the interdisciplinary field of social perception, including the perception of biological motion, the perception of animacy, attributions of intentionality, and the development of these psychological processes. Authors include researchers who mainly see themselves as vision scientists, those who are developmental psychologists, those who are known for their research in autism, and those who take neuroscientific approaches. The theoretical frameworks and methodological paradigms presented cut across four areas: Developmental Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Neuroscience, and Clinical Approaches.Less
As adults, we can quickly interpret minimal visual information as a cue that something is animate, as when we briefly catch sight of a mouse darting from hiding place to hiding place. With a mere glance, we can often infer that someone has agency, is moving towards a goal, or is feeling a particular emotion. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the attribution of agency and the understanding of goal-directed behavior, following a rapid increase in empirical discoveries leading to the conclusion that an intuitive understanding of social others is an early-developing part of our human nature, and may be compromised in certain clinical populations, namely autism. This book presents current research in the interdisciplinary field of social perception, including the perception of biological motion, the perception of animacy, attributions of intentionality, and the development of these psychological processes. Authors include researchers who mainly see themselves as vision scientists, those who are developmental psychologists, those who are known for their research in autism, and those who take neuroscientific approaches. The theoretical frameworks and methodological paradigms presented cut across four areas: Developmental Science, Evolutionary Psychology, Neuroscience, and Clinical Approaches.
Matthew Ratcliffe
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262035552
- eISBN:
- 9780262337120
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035552.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This paper addresses the view that schizophrenia involves disturbance of the minimal self, and that this distinguishes it from other psychiatric conditions. I challenge the distinction between a ...
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This paper addresses the view that schizophrenia involves disturbance of the minimal self, and that this distinguishes it from other psychiatric conditions. I challenge the distinction between a minimal and an interpersonally constituted sense of self, through a consideration of the relationship between psychosis and interpersonally induced trauma. First of all, I suggest that even minimal self-experience must include a pre-reflective sense of what kind of intentional state one is in. Then I address the extent to which human experience and thought are interpersonally regulated. I propose that traumatic events, in childhood and/or in adulthood, can erode a primitive form of “trust” in other people that the integrity of intentionality depends upon, thus disrupting the phenomenological boundaries between intentional state types. I conclude that a distinction between minimal and interpersonal self is untenable, and that schizophrenia should be thought of in relational terms rather than simply as a disorder of the individual.Less
This paper addresses the view that schizophrenia involves disturbance of the minimal self, and that this distinguishes it from other psychiatric conditions. I challenge the distinction between a minimal and an interpersonally constituted sense of self, through a consideration of the relationship between psychosis and interpersonally induced trauma. First of all, I suggest that even minimal self-experience must include a pre-reflective sense of what kind of intentional state one is in. Then I address the extent to which human experience and thought are interpersonally regulated. I propose that traumatic events, in childhood and/or in adulthood, can erode a primitive form of “trust” in other people that the integrity of intentionality depends upon, thus disrupting the phenomenological boundaries between intentional state types. I conclude that a distinction between minimal and interpersonal self is untenable, and that schizophrenia should be thought of in relational terms rather than simply as a disorder of the individual.
Frank Chouraqui
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780823254118
- eISBN:
- 9780823261116
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823254118.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book seeks to elucidate Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the question of truth by using each of their philosophies to shed light on the other. For both philosophers, the question of ...
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This book seeks to elucidate Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the question of truth by using each of their philosophies to shed light on the other. For both philosophers, the question of truth arises from the fact that even though truth is an illusion, it remains a meaningful concept. What authentic experience is truth an inauthentic expression of? By following the trajectory of this question in both authors’ works, this book demonstrates how this question structures both their philosophies and how its answer constitutes the systematic and intrinsic link between them: the concept of truth arises from the authentic experience of Being as an endless movement of falsification. For Being must be defined as the very movement whereby the world transforms itself into truths.Less
This book seeks to elucidate Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the question of truth by using each of their philosophies to shed light on the other. For both philosophers, the question of truth arises from the fact that even though truth is an illusion, it remains a meaningful concept. What authentic experience is truth an inauthentic expression of? By following the trajectory of this question in both authors’ works, this book demonstrates how this question structures both their philosophies and how its answer constitutes the systematic and intrinsic link between them: the concept of truth arises from the authentic experience of Being as an endless movement of falsification. For Being must be defined as the very movement whereby the world transforms itself into truths.
Antonia F. de C. Hamilton and Richard Ramsey
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
Comprehension of actions is a core social skill. Here we provide a critical review of the dominant mirror neuron theory of action comprehension. Recent data demonstrate that parts of the mirror ...
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Comprehension of actions is a core social skill. Here we provide a critical review of the dominant mirror neuron theory of action comprehension. Recent data demonstrate that parts of the mirror system respond to actions performed by nonhuman shapes and are insensitive to actor identity. Regions beyond the mirror system are also important for action comprehension. We suggest this data is not compatible with a strong mirror system hypothesis, and we outline alternative theories.Less
Comprehension of actions is a core social skill. Here we provide a critical review of the dominant mirror neuron theory of action comprehension. Recent data demonstrate that parts of the mirror system respond to actions performed by nonhuman shapes and are insensitive to actor identity. Regions beyond the mirror system are also important for action comprehension. We suggest this data is not compatible with a strong mirror system hypothesis, and we outline alternative theories.
Yuyan Luo and You-jung Choi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
Recent research shows that from an early age, infants appear to attribute mental states such as goals, dispositions, perceptions, and beliefs to agents—whether human or nonhuman. Agents are entities ...
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Recent research shows that from an early age, infants appear to attribute mental states such as goals, dispositions, perceptions, and beliefs to agents—whether human or nonhuman. Agents are entities that can detect their environment and exert control over their actions. In the present chapter, we review evidence on infants’ understanding about nonhuman agents. We describe results highlighting certain featural information and behavioral cues infants may use to identify agents. In light of the empirical results, we discuss our theoretical account and speculate on the learning mechanisms involved in early psychological understanding.Less
Recent research shows that from an early age, infants appear to attribute mental states such as goals, dispositions, perceptions, and beliefs to agents—whether human or nonhuman. Agents are entities that can detect their environment and exert control over their actions. In the present chapter, we review evidence on infants’ understanding about nonhuman agents. We describe results highlighting certain featural information and behavioral cues infants may use to identify agents. In light of the empirical results, we discuss our theoretical account and speculate on the learning mechanisms involved in early psychological understanding.
Valerie A. Kuhlmeier
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter presents a series of studies describing the social perception of helping and hindering—an ability that likely is integral to the maintenance of cooperative interactions. Two aspects of ...
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This chapter presents a series of studies describing the social perception of helping and hindering—an ability that likely is integral to the maintenance of cooperative interactions. Two aspects of this perception are considered both in infants and adults: the detection of the actions (e.g., the interaction of motion patterns and goal attribution systems that ultimately provides the percept of helping or hindering) and the interpretation of the action (e.g., as positive or negative, as justifiable or praiseworthy, or as indicative of the actors’ underlying dispositions). It will be suggested that the human brain appears to be ready, at an early age, to create a meaningful understanding of even sparse, stylized representations of helping and hindering.Less
This chapter presents a series of studies describing the social perception of helping and hindering—an ability that likely is integral to the maintenance of cooperative interactions. Two aspects of this perception are considered both in infants and adults: the detection of the actions (e.g., the interaction of motion patterns and goal attribution systems that ultimately provides the percept of helping or hindering) and the interpretation of the action (e.g., as positive or negative, as justifiable or praiseworthy, or as indicative of the actors’ underlying dispositions). It will be suggested that the human brain appears to be ready, at an early age, to create a meaningful understanding of even sparse, stylized representations of helping and hindering.
Dare Baldwin and Kara D. Sage
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
We present a series of studies using a new methodology—the dwell-time paradigm—to investigate observers’ sensitivity to structure within unfolding action sequences. Viewers advance at their own pace ...
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We present a series of studies using a new methodology—the dwell-time paradigm—to investigate observers’ sensitivity to structure within unfolding action sequences. Viewers advance at their own pace through slides extracted from digitized videos; dwell times for each slide are recorded. Findings reveal that adults, preschoolers, and even infants display sensitivity to both segmental and hierarchical structure within events. Other work hints that dwell times may also reflect infants’ and adults’ sensitivity to violations of causal structure. In addition, social context (e.g., pedagogy) appears to influence both infants’ dwell-time patterns and their later successful enactment of a sequence. Although questions remain about the precise way to characterize dwell-time effects, the paradigm shows promise for providing altogether new information about action processing and how it changes with development.Less
We present a series of studies using a new methodology—the dwell-time paradigm—to investigate observers’ sensitivity to structure within unfolding action sequences. Viewers advance at their own pace through slides extracted from digitized videos; dwell times for each slide are recorded. Findings reveal that adults, preschoolers, and even infants display sensitivity to both segmental and hierarchical structure within events. Other work hints that dwell times may also reflect infants’ and adults’ sensitivity to violations of causal structure. In addition, social context (e.g., pedagogy) appears to influence both infants’ dwell-time patterns and their later successful enactment of a sequence. Although questions remain about the precise way to characterize dwell-time effects, the paradigm shows promise for providing altogether new information about action processing and how it changes with development.
Amanda Woodward and Erin N. Cannon
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0016
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
The ability to understand others’ actions as intentional is a critical foundation for human social functioning. Equally critical is the ability to recruit this knowledge rapidly in the course of ...
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The ability to understand others’ actions as intentional is a critical foundation for human social functioning. Equally critical is the ability to recruit this knowledge rapidly in the course of social interactions to generate online predictions about others’ actions. Recent experiments have recruited eye-tracking methods to investigate infants’ visual anticipation of others’ actions. In this chapter, we consider this newly emerging literature in the context of the larger existing body of work that has principally used visual habituation methods to investigate infants’ offline action understanding. This older body of work has shown that infants have relatively rich and generative knowledge about others’ intentional actions and that this knowledge is structured, at least in part, by infants’ own action experience. We consider whether infants’ online anticipation of others’ actions recruits this body of knowledge and conclude that although there is initial evidence to indicate that it does, many questions are yet to be answered.Less
The ability to understand others’ actions as intentional is a critical foundation for human social functioning. Equally critical is the ability to recruit this knowledge rapidly in the course of social interactions to generate online predictions about others’ actions. Recent experiments have recruited eye-tracking methods to investigate infants’ visual anticipation of others’ actions. In this chapter, we consider this newly emerging literature in the context of the larger existing body of work that has principally used visual habituation methods to investigate infants’ offline action understanding. This older body of work has shown that infants have relatively rich and generative knowledge about others’ intentional actions and that this knowledge is structured, at least in part, by infants’ own action experience. We consider whether infants’ online anticipation of others’ actions recruits this body of knowledge and conclude that although there is initial evidence to indicate that it does, many questions are yet to be answered.
Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262036115
- eISBN:
- 9780262339773
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 5 does two things: it clarifies the features of world-involving but contentless Ur-intentionality and how this fundamental form of intentionality can be understood naturalistically. It ...
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Chapter 5 does two things: it clarifies the features of world-involving but contentless Ur-intentionality and how this fundamental form of intentionality can be understood naturalistically. It explains how it is possible to make sense of REC’s proposal that basic minds are contentless while nonetheless holding on to the claim that such minds exhibit a kind of basic intentionality. It does so by situating REC’s notion of Ur-intentionality within the larger history of attempts to explicate the notion of intentionality simpliciter, showing that there is conceptual space for and reason to believe in a nonrepresentational form of intentionality.
The second part of the chapter provides a fresh analysis of how and why this most basic kind of intentionality can be best accounted for in naturalistic terms by means of a RECtified teleosemantics—one stripped of problematic semantic ambitions and put to different theoretical use, namely, that of explicating the most basic, nonsemantic forms of world-involving cognition.Less
Chapter 5 does two things: it clarifies the features of world-involving but contentless Ur-intentionality and how this fundamental form of intentionality can be understood naturalistically. It explains how it is possible to make sense of REC’s proposal that basic minds are contentless while nonetheless holding on to the claim that such minds exhibit a kind of basic intentionality. It does so by situating REC’s notion of Ur-intentionality within the larger history of attempts to explicate the notion of intentionality simpliciter, showing that there is conceptual space for and reason to believe in a nonrepresentational form of intentionality.
The second part of the chapter provides a fresh analysis of how and why this most basic kind of intentionality can be best accounted for in naturalistic terms by means of a RECtified teleosemantics—one stripped of problematic semantic ambitions and put to different theoretical use, namely, that of explicating the most basic, nonsemantic forms of world-involving cognition.
Phil McAleer and Scott A. Love
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
Typically, the actions of agents in classical animacy displays are synthetically created, thus forming artificial displays of biological movement. Therefore, the link between the motion in animacy ...
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Typically, the actions of agents in classical animacy displays are synthetically created, thus forming artificial displays of biological movement. Therefore, the link between the motion in animacy displays and that of actual biological motion is unclear. In this chapter we will look at work being done to clarify this relationship. We will first discuss a modern approach to the creation of animacy displays whereby full-video displays of human interactions are reduced into simple animacy displays; this results in animate shapes whose motions are directly derived from human actions. Second, we will review what is known about the ability of typically developed adults and people with autism spectrum disorders to perceive the intentionality within these displays. Finally, we will explore the effects that motion parameters such as speed and acceleration, measured directly from original human actions, have on the perception of intent; fMRI studies that connect neural networks to motion parameters, and the resultant perception of animacy and intention, will also be examined.Less
Typically, the actions of agents in classical animacy displays are synthetically created, thus forming artificial displays of biological movement. Therefore, the link between the motion in animacy displays and that of actual biological motion is unclear. In this chapter we will look at work being done to clarify this relationship. We will first discuss a modern approach to the creation of animacy displays whereby full-video displays of human interactions are reduced into simple animacy displays; this results in animate shapes whose motions are directly derived from human actions. Second, we will review what is known about the ability of typically developed adults and people with autism spectrum disorders to perceive the intentionality within these displays. Finally, we will explore the effects that motion parameters such as speed and acceleration, measured directly from original human actions, have on the perception of intent; fMRI studies that connect neural networks to motion parameters, and the resultant perception of animacy and intention, will also be examined.
Brian J. Scholl and Tao Gao
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262019279
- eISBN:
- 9780262315029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019279.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
We can identify social agents in our environment not only on the basis of how they look, but also on the basis of how they move—and even simple geometric shapes can give rise to rich percepts of ...
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We can identify social agents in our environment not only on the basis of how they look, but also on the basis of how they move—and even simple geometric shapes can give rise to rich percepts of animacy and intentionality based on their motion patterns. But why should we think that such phenomena truly reflect visual processing, as opposed to higher-level judgment and categorization based on visual input? This chapter explores five lines of evidence: (1) The phenomenology of visual experience, (2) dramatic dependence on subtle visual display details, (3) implicit influences on visual performance, (4) activation of visual brain areas, and (5) interactions with other visual processes. Collectively, this evidence provides compelling support for the idea that visual processing itself traffics in animacy and intentionality.Less
We can identify social agents in our environment not only on the basis of how they look, but also on the basis of how they move—and even simple geometric shapes can give rise to rich percepts of animacy and intentionality based on their motion patterns. But why should we think that such phenomena truly reflect visual processing, as opposed to higher-level judgment and categorization based on visual input? This chapter explores five lines of evidence: (1) The phenomenology of visual experience, (2) dramatic dependence on subtle visual display details, (3) implicit influences on visual performance, (4) activation of visual brain areas, and (5) interactions with other visual processes. Collectively, this evidence provides compelling support for the idea that visual processing itself traffics in animacy and intentionality.
Steven Crowell
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262035248
- eISBN:
- 9780262335850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The paper explains why Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger is indispensable for understanding Heidegger’s work; why his Heideggerian account of commitment is indispensible for understanding what ...
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The paper explains why Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger is indispensable for understanding Heidegger’s work; why his Heideggerian account of commitment is indispensible for understanding what it is to be a self; and why this account of selfhood is indispensible to philosophy generally. The first indispensability concerns Haugeland’s insight that Heidegger advances beyond traditional metaphysics by showing how not just “essence” (essentia) but also “existence” (existentia) is meaningful. The second indispensability lies in Haugeland’s grasp of the methodological connection between Division I and Division II of Being and Time, which shows that what it is to be “I myself” is a function neither of consciousness nor self-consciousness, but depends on my taking responsibility for the normative force of the norms that enable entities to show up as they in truth are. Finally, this insight is indispensible to philosophy generally. Drawing on Joseph Rouse’s charge that Haugeland’s concept of “objectivity” involves a residual scientism and voluntarism, I offer a defense that brings Haugeland’s his account of existential death together with Heiedegger’s claim, in Being and Time, that science tries to grasp the occurrent in its basic unintelligibility, and his claim, in “What is Metaphysics?,” that science aims to give entities “the first and last word.”Less
The paper explains why Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger is indispensable for understanding Heidegger’s work; why his Heideggerian account of commitment is indispensible for understanding what it is to be a self; and why this account of selfhood is indispensible to philosophy generally. The first indispensability concerns Haugeland’s insight that Heidegger advances beyond traditional metaphysics by showing how not just “essence” (essentia) but also “existence” (existentia) is meaningful. The second indispensability lies in Haugeland’s grasp of the methodological connection between Division I and Division II of Being and Time, which shows that what it is to be “I myself” is a function neither of consciousness nor self-consciousness, but depends on my taking responsibility for the normative force of the norms that enable entities to show up as they in truth are. Finally, this insight is indispensible to philosophy generally. Drawing on Joseph Rouse’s charge that Haugeland’s concept of “objectivity” involves a residual scientism and voluntarism, I offer a defense that brings Haugeland’s his account of existential death together with Heiedegger’s claim, in Being and Time, that science tries to grasp the occurrent in its basic unintelligibility, and his claim, in “What is Metaphysics?,” that science aims to give entities “the first and last word.”
Joseph Rouse
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780262035248
- eISBN:
- 9780262335850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262035248.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This paper explicates and connects two of Haugeland’s most controversial philosophical claims: his puzzling claim that the characteristic form of intentionality and human understanding is love, and ...
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This paper explicates and connects two of Haugeland’s most controversial philosophical claims: his puzzling claim that the characteristic form of intentionality and human understanding is love, and his revisionist interpretation of Heidegger’s account of “existential death” in Being and Time. The former claim responds to Haugeland’s implicit classification and telling criticisms of the predominant alternative conceptions of intentionality. Haugeland argues that these alternatives actually fit different phenomena (“ersatz” or “lapsed” intentionality) that fall short of even the most ordinary human comportments. The latter claim treats “death” as concerned not with human mortality, but with the objective accountability of entire domains of human activity and understanding. Heidegger thereby has a deeper, more adequate account of intentionality and understanding directly complementing Haugeland’s re-conception of intentionality as a form of love. This reading also brings Being and Time into closer critical engagement with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This juxtaposition further illuminates Heidegger’s Kantian emphasis upon the finitude of human understanding, and brings out the political significance of Being and Time in constructively revealing ways despite Heidegger’s own later disastrous political involvement.Less
This paper explicates and connects two of Haugeland’s most controversial philosophical claims: his puzzling claim that the characteristic form of intentionality and human understanding is love, and his revisionist interpretation of Heidegger’s account of “existential death” in Being and Time. The former claim responds to Haugeland’s implicit classification and telling criticisms of the predominant alternative conceptions of intentionality. Haugeland argues that these alternatives actually fit different phenomena (“ersatz” or “lapsed” intentionality) that fall short of even the most ordinary human comportments. The latter claim treats “death” as concerned not with human mortality, but with the objective accountability of entire domains of human activity and understanding. Heidegger thereby has a deeper, more adequate account of intentionality and understanding directly complementing Haugeland’s re-conception of intentionality as a form of love. This reading also brings Being and Time into closer critical engagement with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This juxtaposition further illuminates Heidegger’s Kantian emphasis upon the finitude of human understanding, and brings out the political significance of Being and Time in constructively revealing ways despite Heidegger’s own later disastrous political involvement.
Neal Deroo
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780823244645
- eISBN:
- 9780823252749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823244645.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explores the implications of the book’s attempt to understand the role that futurity plays in the phenomenological method. These implications are both within the book (for example, why ...
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This chapter explores the implications of the book’s attempt to understand the role that futurity plays in the phenomenological method. These implications are both within the book (for example, why the discussion of Husserl, Levinas and Derrida but not of Heidegger; why the focus on methodological issues) and beyond the book (for example, how futurity can help us see the continuity between Husserl and the ‘theological turn’ in phenomenology). It then provides an overview of the argument of the entire book, leading to the conclusions that: a) an understanding of futurity is essential to any understanding of phenomenology; b) phenomenology has an essentially non-epistemological focus; and c) phenomenology is best understood as the promissory discipline.Less
This chapter explores the implications of the book’s attempt to understand the role that futurity plays in the phenomenological method. These implications are both within the book (for example, why the discussion of Husserl, Levinas and Derrida but not of Heidegger; why the focus on methodological issues) and beyond the book (for example, how futurity can help us see the continuity between Husserl and the ‘theological turn’ in phenomenology). It then provides an overview of the argument of the entire book, leading to the conclusions that: a) an understanding of futurity is essential to any understanding of phenomenology; b) phenomenology has an essentially non-epistemological focus; and c) phenomenology is best understood as the promissory discipline.
Elliot R. Wolfson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780823255702
- eISBN:
- 9780823260911
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823255702.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This chapter explores the intricacies of Levinas's reflections on transcendence in the various stages of his intellectual biography, particularly as they relate to the tropes of the infinite and ...
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This chapter explores the intricacies of Levinas's reflections on transcendence in the various stages of his intellectual biography, particularly as they relate to the tropes of the infinite and illeity that are essential to his conception of alterity. Deviating from Husserl's reflections on the intentional structure of consciousness, Levinas argues that infinity and transcendence, the wholly other, are to be excluded from the domain of phenomenology and the criterion of truth as the showing of what comes to light. The determination of the transcendence of the subject from the standpoint of the practical intentionality of affective life set Levinas on a course of thinking from which he never diverged, culminating in his more advanced articulations of ethics as first philosophy and the emphasis he placed on the radical transcendence necessary to establish the ground for genuine alterity. The phenomenological fascination with the nonphenomenalizable can be pinpointed as the essential thought that informed Levinas's critique of ontological realism—the narcissistic reduction of the other to the same—throughout his life, the philosophical venture toward a transcendence that is not to be relocated absolutely in the domain of immanence. The rhetoric of his texts indicate, however, that he could not avoid characterizing transcendence in personal terms that efface the clear distinction between human and divine and thus jeopardize the concept of an irreducible alterity of the transcendent that is truly other.Less
This chapter explores the intricacies of Levinas's reflections on transcendence in the various stages of his intellectual biography, particularly as they relate to the tropes of the infinite and illeity that are essential to his conception of alterity. Deviating from Husserl's reflections on the intentional structure of consciousness, Levinas argues that infinity and transcendence, the wholly other, are to be excluded from the domain of phenomenology and the criterion of truth as the showing of what comes to light. The determination of the transcendence of the subject from the standpoint of the practical intentionality of affective life set Levinas on a course of thinking from which he never diverged, culminating in his more advanced articulations of ethics as first philosophy and the emphasis he placed on the radical transcendence necessary to establish the ground for genuine alterity. The phenomenological fascination with the nonphenomenalizable can be pinpointed as the essential thought that informed Levinas's critique of ontological realism—the narcissistic reduction of the other to the same—throughout his life, the philosophical venture toward a transcendence that is not to be relocated absolutely in the domain of immanence. The rhetoric of his texts indicate, however, that he could not avoid characterizing transcendence in personal terms that efface the clear distinction between human and divine and thus jeopardize the concept of an irreducible alterity of the transcendent that is truly other.