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The Theory of Spirits

Phillip Wiebe

in God and Other Spirits: Intimations of Transcendence in Christian Experience

This chapter, central to this book, elaborates on the theory of spirits that has been advanced to explain numerous kinds of phenomena, a few of which were sampled in the first two chapters. The ... More

This chapter, central to this book, elaborates on the theory of spirits that has been advanced to explain numerous kinds of phenomena, a few of which were sampled in the first two chapters. The importance of abductive argument in advancing the existence of unobservable beings or objects, as opposed to deductive and probabilistic reasoning, is defended. The theory of spirits is construed as empiricist in character, whose descriptions are sometimes theory-laden and whose postulated beings are contextually defined primarily by the causal roles these postulated beings play in the theory. The view of physical objects advanced by phenomenalism, such as that found in many logical positivists, is examined, with a view to explaining how it illuminates challenges that beset an empirical approach to religion. The boundary of naturalism is discussed, especially inasmuch as the spirits postulated to exist in religion are definable by their causal links to phenomena or objects that are unquestionable naturalistic.Less

Induction

Christopher Peacocke

in The Realm of Reason

Argues that the same principles of complexity reduction that he used to explain principles of perceptual entitlement in the preceding chapter can be used to explain the principles of inductive ... More

Argues that the same principles of complexity reduction that he used to explain principles of perceptual entitlement in the preceding chapter can be used to explain the principles of inductive inference. When we have a sound, non‐conclusive inductive inference from a variety of Fs being G to the conclusion that all Fs are G, this holds because the easiest way for the evidence to hold is one that also makes it the case that all Fs are G. Clarifies and elaborates this thesis and traces out its consequences.Less

The Future of Sympathy II:: Hume and the Afterlife of Shaftesburianism

Seth Lobis

in Virtue of Sympathy: Magic, Philosophy, and Literature in Seventeenth-Century England

This chapter focuses on David Hume’s critique of a sympathetic worldview, as represented by Shaftesbury and by the Peripatetic philosophers, as well as on Hume’s elevation of human sympathy as a ... More

This chapter focuses on David Hume’s critique of a sympathetic worldview, as represented by Shaftesbury and by the Peripatetic philosophers, as well as on Hume’s elevation of human sympathy as a fundamental organizing principle of society. The two worked in tandem, the chapter argues, to establish the order of things on the level of the moral and the social. For Hume, universal sympathy was not an ontological fact but a psychological fiction. The whole was unavailable to the mind except though the unscientific processes of induction and imagination. Hume affirmed and reinforced Shaftesbury’s claim for the power of sympathy in society, but he rejected the universalist aspiration of Shaftesbury’s system. In making it the cornerstone of a rigorous moral science, Hume effectively disenchanted sympathy. The chapter traces the progress of this rationalizing trend in the philosophy of Adam Smith. In spite of the development of a modern science of sympathy, however, its long-standing association with magic and mystery did not disappear. The chapter concludes with a reading of Samuel Jackson Pratt’s late eighteenth-century poem Sympathy, which reveals a longing for magical presence in the world outside the mind.Less

On Analysis

Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke

in The Problem of Secret Intelligence

The understanding and acknowledgement of the problem of induction and its negative force on discourse failure bring intelligence studies towards a new theory of intelligence. The understanding of ... More

The understanding and acknowledgement of the problem of induction and its negative force on discourse failure bring intelligence studies towards a new theory of intelligence. The understanding of discourse failure opens a window to intelligence failure as a circular problem that intensifies itself by the human tendency to displace and redirect new knowledge that threatens orthodoxies, political assumptions and a uniform belief in nature. The result is that threats appearing in new variations will not easily be acknowledged or accepted, since they exist outside the normative threat paradigms and outside the existing language available to communicate threats that exist outside the possibilities of induction. The acknowledgement of this phenomenon discloses the problems that arise because intelligence has lacked a proper intelligence theory. It illustrates that if intelligence institutions want to reduce the damaging effect of the problem of induction and discourse fail- ure, and produce qualitative intelligence, they must probe beyond the limits of induction. A deep acknowledgement of the discourse failure theory therefore explains the reciprocal nature of intelli- gence, as well as capturing and identifying the circular dynamic between threats, threat perception and intelligence failure. This chapter examines how this phenomenon shapes intelligence analysis.Less

Abduction: Inference and Instinct

John Kaag

in Thinking Through the Imagination: Aesthetics in Human Cognition

This chapter focuses the relationship between Peircean abduction and the concepts of the imagination and genius in German idealism. It asks the following questions: What is abduction? Can abduction ... More

This chapter focuses the relationship between Peircean abduction and the concepts of the imagination and genius in German idealism. It asks the following questions: What is abduction? Can abduction be formalized? How has abduction been described in the secondary literature? In light of this formalization and these more recent descriptions, what standards might be used to judge the verity and value of particular abductive processes? Most importantly for the purposes of the current project, to what extent does abductive logic coincide with the process of the imagination as described by Kant and Schiller? This last question is addressed in detail in the next chapter on musement and genius. But all these considerations shed light on Peirce's corpus and more generally on the nature of human cognition. In this respect, Jaakko Hintikka suggests that the questions concerning abduction stand as “the fundamental problem of contemporary epistemology.”Less

Greek Enlightenment: What the Buddha, Pyrrho, and Hume Argue Against

Christopher I. Beckwith

in Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia

The argument known in Antiquity as the Problem of the Criterion was introduced to Western thought by Pyrrho of Elis, who learned it in Central Asia and India from Early Buddhism. The problem ... More

The argument known in Antiquity as the Problem of the Criterion was introduced to Western thought by Pyrrho of Elis, who learned it in Central Asia and India from Early Buddhism. The problem revolutionized ancient European thought, such that from Pyrrho's time onward ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy was focused on the epistemological question, “Can we really know anything?” With the ascendancy of Christianity and its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic apologetics, the problem was sidelined and practically forgotten during the Middle Ages. When Pyrrhonism was reintroduced to Western Europe in the late Renaissance, the problem once again revolutionized Western thought and shifted the central focus of philosophy to epistemology. Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) is responsible for what may be called the problem's modern incarnation, known today as the “Problem of Induction.” This chapter analyzes the issues fundamental to understanding not only Hume but also Pyrrho, and in turn the Buddha.Less

The Stage is Set

in Stanford in Turmoil: Campus Unrest, 1966–1972

In the late 1960s, a series of events set the stage for the unrest that would later erupt at Stanford University. It began on February 20, 1967, three days before David Harris resigned as president ... More

In the late 1960s, a series of events set the stage for the unrest that would later erupt at Stanford University. It began on February 20, 1967, three days before David Harris resigned as president of the Associated Students of Stanford University (ASSU). U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey came to campus to hold private talks with members of the Food Research Institute and to deliver a speech to the Memorial Auditorium. The crowd made noise during Humphrey's speech, but the real trouble arose when the vice president departed. Chaos ensued when an angry crowd pounded on his car. The “violence” was exaggerated, but it left an impression to the public that there had been a near-riot at Stanford, and that the personal safety of Humphrey had been compromised. The incident drew fierce reactions. Protests erupted in different parts of the country, including the Pentagon in Washington and the Oakland Induction Center in the Bay Area.Less

Scientific Method: The Engine of Knowledge

Vered Maimon

in "Singular Images, Failed Copies": William Henry Fox Talbot and the Early Photograph

This chapter thus focuses on Talbot’s first 1839 discovery account, “Some Account of the Art of Photogenic Drawing.” It argues that by evoking the inductive method Talbot didn’t assign a privileged ... More

This chapter thus focuses on Talbot’s first 1839 discovery account, “Some Account of the Art of Photogenic Drawing.” It argues that by evoking the inductive method Talbot didn’t assign a privileged epistemological status to photography because during this time the validity of induction as a scientific method was challenged. Talbot conceptualized photography as a copying method that is based on theories of industrial labor and on deskilling.Less

Radical Interpretation and Reference Magnetism

J. Robert G. Williams

in The Metaphysics of Representation

This chapter is one of three that draws out the consequences of Radical Interpretation for how concepts represent the world. A claim associated with David Lewis is that metaphysically fundamental ... More

This chapter is one of three that draws out the consequences of Radical Interpretation for how concepts represent the world. A claim associated with David Lewis is that metaphysically fundamental properties are ‘reference magnets’—that if usage is equipoised between two candidate referents, the one that is ‘closer to the metaphysical fundamentals’ is the one that gets to be the referent. This chapter examines how such a thesis might arise as a prediction of Radical Interpretation. It looks to epistemology of inference to the best explanation to make a connection between concepts used in explanations and naturalness. The connection to concepts used in induction is discussed.Less