Christopher A. Shrock
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474417846
- eISBN:
- 9781474438650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474417846.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
As the common sense view of perception, Direct Realism rightly stands in a privileged position in relation to rival perceptual theories, Idealism and Indirect Realism. For most thinkers, rejecting ...
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As the common sense view of perception, Direct Realism rightly stands in a privileged position in relation to rival perceptual theories, Idealism and Indirect Realism. For most thinkers, rejecting Direct Realism would require extensive and unwelcome revisions to many other views. Furthermore, Indirect Realism and Idealism fall short of accomplishing their oft-assigned task of solving the Problem of Illusion.Less
As the common sense view of perception, Direct Realism rightly stands in a privileged position in relation to rival perceptual theories, Idealism and Indirect Realism. For most thinkers, rejecting Direct Realism would require extensive and unwelcome revisions to many other views. Furthermore, Indirect Realism and Idealism fall short of accomplishing their oft-assigned task of solving the Problem of Illusion.
Edmond Wright (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262232661
- eISBN:
- 9780262286497
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical ...
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Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical position that has qualia as a central tenet) include Michael Tye, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and even Frank Jackson, a former supporter. Qualiaphiles apparently face the difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when their access to it is seen by qualiaphobes to be secondhand and, worse, hidden behind a “veil of sensation”—a position that would slide easily into relativism and solipsism, presenting an ethical dilemma. In this book, chapters defending qualia look at the Indirect Realist position and mount detailed counterarguments against opposing views. The book first presents philosophical defenses, with arguments propounding, variously, a new argument from illusion, a sense-datum theory, dualism, “qualia realism,” qualia as the “cement” of the experiential world, and “subjective physicalism.” Three scientific defenses follow, discussing color, heat, and the link between the external object and the internal representation. Finally, specific criticisms of opposing views include discussions of the Churchlands’ “neurophilosophy,” answers to Frank Jackson’s abandonment of qualia (one of which is titled, in a reference to Jackson’s famous thought experiment, “Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary”), and refutations of Transparency Theory.Less
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists dismiss the notion of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. Leading opponents of qualia (and of Indirect Realism, the philosophical position that has qualia as a central tenet) include Michael Tye, Daniel Dennett, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and even Frank Jackson, a former supporter. Qualiaphiles apparently face the difficulty of establishing philosophical contact with the real when their access to it is seen by qualiaphobes to be secondhand and, worse, hidden behind a “veil of sensation”—a position that would slide easily into relativism and solipsism, presenting an ethical dilemma. In this book, chapters defending qualia look at the Indirect Realist position and mount detailed counterarguments against opposing views. The book first presents philosophical defenses, with arguments propounding, variously, a new argument from illusion, a sense-datum theory, dualism, “qualia realism,” qualia as the “cement” of the experiential world, and “subjective physicalism.” Three scientific defenses follow, discussing color, heat, and the link between the external object and the internal representation. Finally, specific criticisms of opposing views include discussions of the Churchlands’ “neurophilosophy,” answers to Frank Jackson’s abandonment of qualia (one of which is titled, in a reference to Jackson’s famous thought experiment, “Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary”), and refutations of Transparency Theory.
Christopher A. Shrock
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474417846
- eISBN:
- 9781474438650
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474417846.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the ...
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A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the perceiver. This approach assumes Indirect Realism (and therefore the falsity of Direct Realism), but it was ubiquitous in Reid’s day. This chapter traces Reid’s rejection of the Way of Ideas as it bears on his defense of Direct Realism and theory of secondary qualities. Although this objection would not be likely to get traction among contemporary philosophers, this chapter presents Reid’s case for historical interest and consistency.Less
A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the perceiver. This approach assumes Indirect Realism (and therefore the falsity of Direct Realism), but it was ubiquitous in Reid’s day. This chapter traces Reid’s rejection of the Way of Ideas as it bears on his defense of Direct Realism and theory of secondary qualities. Although this objection would not be likely to get traction among contemporary philosophers, this chapter presents Reid’s case for historical interest and consistency.
