Rahul Singh
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780804785716
- eISBN:
- 9780804787925
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804785716.003.0016
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
This chapter analyzes the emerging jurisprudence of Indian merger control regime in terms its nascent antitrust/competition law. Drawing upon the interdisciplinary methodology of law-and-economics, ...
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This chapter analyzes the emerging jurisprudence of Indian merger control regime in terms its nascent antitrust/competition law. Drawing upon the interdisciplinary methodology of law-and-economics, it explores the historical evolution of the merger control regime and the politics of corporate lobbying and its impact upon the Indian merger control regime. In this context, it also analyzes the underlying economics of the Indian merger control regime and the inherent contradictions emanating from the politics of corporate lobbying and the inchoate philosophy manifest through the precedents. The chapter indicates that the implementation of the merger control regime in India is a mess and currently exhibits kamikaze tendencies. India will take some time to work out the poor design of the merger control regime.Less
This chapter analyzes the emerging jurisprudence of Indian merger control regime in terms its nascent antitrust/competition law. Drawing upon the interdisciplinary methodology of law-and-economics, it explores the historical evolution of the merger control regime and the politics of corporate lobbying and its impact upon the Indian merger control regime. In this context, it also analyzes the underlying economics of the Indian merger control regime and the inherent contradictions emanating from the politics of corporate lobbying and the inchoate philosophy manifest through the precedents. The chapter indicates that the implementation of the merger control regime in India is a mess and currently exhibits kamikaze tendencies. India will take some time to work out the poor design of the merger control regime.
