Daniel S. Markey
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- March 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190680190
- eISBN:
- 9780190087883
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190680190.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter describes the intersection of Chinese, Pakistani, and Indian economic, political, and security interests in South Asia. It introduces a brief history of China’s interaction with South ...
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This chapter describes the intersection of Chinese, Pakistani, and Indian economic, political, and security interests in South Asia. It introduces a brief history of China’s interaction with South Asia and explains how China now perceives its economic, security, and diplomatic goals in the region. It shows how Pakistanis are divided in their perceptions of China and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and explains how the military and other establishment figures are likely to gain from closer ties, while liberals and other opposition groups stand to lose. It details how Pakistan benefits from its military ties to China, especially in the areas of nuclear weapons, missiles, and drone technologies, and how China’s diplomatic support shields Pakistan from international pressure. It evaluates that on balance, China’s deepened regional presence and economic, military, and diplomatic assistance to Pakistan will tend to raise tensions with India.Less
This chapter describes the intersection of Chinese, Pakistani, and Indian economic, political, and security interests in South Asia. It introduces a brief history of China’s interaction with South Asia and explains how China now perceives its economic, security, and diplomatic goals in the region. It shows how Pakistanis are divided in their perceptions of China and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and explains how the military and other establishment figures are likely to gain from closer ties, while liberals and other opposition groups stand to lose. It details how Pakistan benefits from its military ties to China, especially in the areas of nuclear weapons, missiles, and drone technologies, and how China’s diplomatic support shields Pakistan from international pressure. It evaluates that on balance, China’s deepened regional presence and economic, military, and diplomatic assistance to Pakistan will tend to raise tensions with India.
Avinash Paliwal
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190685829
- eISBN:
- 9780190872564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190685829.003.0005
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter shows how India’s Afghanistan policy witnessed an 180-degree shift in April 1991. Far from cutting contact, Indian policymakers — dominated by conciliators — officially recognised the ...
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This chapter shows how India’s Afghanistan policy witnessed an 180-degree shift in April 1991. Far from cutting contact, Indian policymakers — dominated by conciliators — officially recognised the Mujahideen government despite the latter being dependent on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This shift was momentous given India’s traditional mistrust of the Afghan Islamists. The fall of Kabul to the Taliban complicated this conciliatory approach. Contrary to the arguments of existing literature, there was an undercurrent in New Delhi to engage with the Taliban. Having dealt with the Mujahideen, the conciliators were confident of finding a sympathetic audience among senior Taliban leadership, which, they argued, would protect Indian interests in Afghanistan and were not being remote-controlled by Pakistan. The partisans, however, with support from Iran and Russia, marginalized the conciliators and successfully pushed India towards backing the anti-Taliban United Front.Less
This chapter shows how India’s Afghanistan policy witnessed an 180-degree shift in April 1991. Far from cutting contact, Indian policymakers — dominated by conciliators — officially recognised the Mujahideen government despite the latter being dependent on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This shift was momentous given India’s traditional mistrust of the Afghan Islamists. The fall of Kabul to the Taliban complicated this conciliatory approach. Contrary to the arguments of existing literature, there was an undercurrent in New Delhi to engage with the Taliban. Having dealt with the Mujahideen, the conciliators were confident of finding a sympathetic audience among senior Taliban leadership, which, they argued, would protect Indian interests in Afghanistan and were not being remote-controlled by Pakistan. The partisans, however, with support from Iran and Russia, marginalized the conciliators and successfully pushed India towards backing the anti-Taliban United Front.
Rajesh Basrur
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- April 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199458325
- eISBN:
- 9780199086498
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199458325.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Tracing the evolution of the India-Pakistan relationship, this chapter shows how an ‘intractable’ rivalry has begun to change in substantive ways. It argues that the advent of nuclear weapons and the ...
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Tracing the evolution of the India-Pakistan relationship, this chapter shows how an ‘intractable’ rivalry has begun to change in substantive ways. It argues that the advent of nuclear weapons and the pressures of globalization have circumscribed conflict at the system level; perceptible shifts in national identity and domestic politics have introduced fundamental rethinking at the state level; and unprecedented initiatives have been taken by individual policy makers who have tried to alter the trajectory of the relationship. The combination of factors has gradually attenuated the intensity of the conflict. Though a positive outcome is not assured as yet, the trend is sufficiently encouraging to evoke expectations of better times. But the process is likely to remain a relatively uneven one.Less
Tracing the evolution of the India-Pakistan relationship, this chapter shows how an ‘intractable’ rivalry has begun to change in substantive ways. It argues that the advent of nuclear weapons and the pressures of globalization have circumscribed conflict at the system level; perceptible shifts in national identity and domestic politics have introduced fundamental rethinking at the state level; and unprecedented initiatives have been taken by individual policy makers who have tried to alter the trajectory of the relationship. The combination of factors has gradually attenuated the intensity of the conflict. Though a positive outcome is not assured as yet, the trend is sufficiently encouraging to evoke expectations of better times. But the process is likely to remain a relatively uneven one.
Avinash Paliwal
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190685829
- eISBN:
- 9780190872564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190685829.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
Moscow’s decision to militarily invade Afghanistan in December 1979, without consulting with New Delhi, shocked India. But even more worrisome was the impact of a haphazard Soviet withdrawal. This ...
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Moscow’s decision to militarily invade Afghanistan in December 1979, without consulting with New Delhi, shocked India. But even more worrisome was the impact of a haphazard Soviet withdrawal. This chapter explains how India managed these events at global, regional, and domestic levels. Ranging from Indira Gandhi’s strategic balancing act between Pakistan and US on one hand and Moscow on the other, this chapter also throws light on Rajiv Gandhi’s diplomacy on the Afghan question with US president Ronald Reagan and USSR premier Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985-89. India had begun to open up — covertly — to various Mujahideen factions behind the back of its stalwart Afghan ally, president Najibullah.Less
Moscow’s decision to militarily invade Afghanistan in December 1979, without consulting with New Delhi, shocked India. But even more worrisome was the impact of a haphazard Soviet withdrawal. This chapter explains how India managed these events at global, regional, and domestic levels. Ranging from Indira Gandhi’s strategic balancing act between Pakistan and US on one hand and Moscow on the other, this chapter also throws light on Rajiv Gandhi’s diplomacy on the Afghan question with US president Ronald Reagan and USSR premier Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985-89. India had begun to open up — covertly — to various Mujahideen factions behind the back of its stalwart Afghan ally, president Najibullah.
Avinash Paliwal
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190685829
- eISBN:
- 9780190872564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190685829.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
Better understanding about the Afghan Taliban allowed India to advocate political reconciliation, but also made it wary about the way NATO members — especially the UK — were going about it. This ...
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Better understanding about the Afghan Taliban allowed India to advocate political reconciliation, but also made it wary about the way NATO members — especially the UK — were going about it. This chapter explains why, despite accepting the merits of a political solution, India stiffly opposed the idea of reconciling with the Taliban at the 2010 London Conference. It explains how the partisans and conciliators debated providing lethal military equipment to Afghanistan, why they could not reach a timely decision, and how they viewed the 2014 Afghan elections and the rise of Ashraf Ghani as president of Afghanistan. Critically, the chapter shows the influence that the conciliators exerted on India’s policy in 2015, (despite having a Hindu nationalist government that is staunchly opposed to holding unconditional talks with Pakistan) confidently (but not happily) accepting Ghani’s diplomatic outreach to Pakistan.Less
Better understanding about the Afghan Taliban allowed India to advocate political reconciliation, but also made it wary about the way NATO members — especially the UK — were going about it. This chapter explains why, despite accepting the merits of a political solution, India stiffly opposed the idea of reconciling with the Taliban at the 2010 London Conference. It explains how the partisans and conciliators debated providing lethal military equipment to Afghanistan, why they could not reach a timely decision, and how they viewed the 2014 Afghan elections and the rise of Ashraf Ghani as president of Afghanistan. Critically, the chapter shows the influence that the conciliators exerted on India’s policy in 2015, (despite having a Hindu nationalist government that is staunchly opposed to holding unconditional talks with Pakistan) confidently (but not happily) accepting Ghani’s diplomatic outreach to Pakistan.
Avinash Paliwal
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190685829
- eISBN:
- 9780190872564
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190685829.003.0011
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
The epilogue brings together all key points highlighted in the book, and delves into the latest developments between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan between late-2015 and in 2016.
The epilogue brings together all key points highlighted in the book, and delves into the latest developments between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan between late-2015 and in 2016.
Happymon Jacob
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780199489893
- eISBN:
- 9780199095483
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199489893.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Indian Politics
The India–Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed repeated ceasefire violations (CFVs) over the past decade. Indeed, with relations between India and Pakistan degrading, CFVs have ...
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The India–Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed repeated ceasefire violations (CFVs) over the past decade. Indeed, with relations between India and Pakistan degrading, CFVs have gone up exponentially. These CFVs have the potential to not only begin a crisis but also escalate an ongoing one. To make things worse, in the event of major violations, political leadership on either side often engage in high-pitched rhetoric some of which even have nuclear undertones. Using fresh empirical data and oral history evidence, this book explains the causes of CFVs on the J&K border and establishes a relationship between CFVs and crisis escalation between India and Pakistan. In doing so, the book further nuances the existing arguments about the escalatory dynamics between the two South Asian nuclear rivals. Furthermore, the book explains ceasefire violations using the concept of ‘autonomous military factors’.Less
The India–Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has witnessed repeated ceasefire violations (CFVs) over the past decade. Indeed, with relations between India and Pakistan degrading, CFVs have gone up exponentially. These CFVs have the potential to not only begin a crisis but also escalate an ongoing one. To make things worse, in the event of major violations, political leadership on either side often engage in high-pitched rhetoric some of which even have nuclear undertones. Using fresh empirical data and oral history evidence, this book explains the causes of CFVs on the J&K border and establishes a relationship between CFVs and crisis escalation between India and Pakistan. In doing so, the book further nuances the existing arguments about the escalatory dynamics between the two South Asian nuclear rivals. Furthermore, the book explains ceasefire violations using the concept of ‘autonomous military factors’.
Avinash Paliwal
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- December 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190685829
- eISBN:
- 9780190872564
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190685829.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
The archetype of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, India’s political and economic presence in Afghanistan is often viewed as a Machiavellian ploy aimed against Pakistan. Challenging deeply held ...
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The archetype of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, India’s political and economic presence in Afghanistan is often viewed as a Machiavellian ploy aimed against Pakistan. Challenging deeply held beliefs about an India-Pakistan proxy war, the book offers a nuanced explanation of India’s strategic intent and actions, which is critical to resolving the seemingly unending war in Afghanistan, as well as wider bilateral disputes between the two South Asian rivals. Divided into three parts — ‘debating neutrality’, ‘debating containment’, and ‘debating engagement’ — the book offers a detailed examination of the nature of and reasons for New Delhi’s foreign policy conduct. It demonstrates that Indian presence in Afghanistan has been guided primarily by an enduring vision for the region that requires a stable balance of power across the Durand Line.Less
The archetype of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, India’s political and economic presence in Afghanistan is often viewed as a Machiavellian ploy aimed against Pakistan. Challenging deeply held beliefs about an India-Pakistan proxy war, the book offers a nuanced explanation of India’s strategic intent and actions, which is critical to resolving the seemingly unending war in Afghanistan, as well as wider bilateral disputes between the two South Asian rivals. Divided into three parts — ‘debating neutrality’, ‘debating containment’, and ‘debating engagement’ — the book offers a detailed examination of the nature of and reasons for New Delhi’s foreign policy conduct. It demonstrates that Indian presence in Afghanistan has been guided primarily by an enduring vision for the region that requires a stable balance of power across the Durand Line.