Search Results

This chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the (statutory and non-statutory) reviews that are possible in respect of two key parts of counter-terrorism: Prevent, and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). In addition to describing the counter-terrorism review assemblage that attaches to Prevent and TPIMs, the chapter also identifies the reviews that have been undertaken over the five-year period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2018. For each of these, it includes a consideration of the standards against which these reviews evaluated the law or programme, identified by close textual analysis of the reviews themselves. This analysis shows that, in spite of the persistent reliance on review as a safeguard in counter-terrorism legislation, Parliament’s historical tendency not robustly to challenge security narratives from Government is remarkably resilient. While these mandated reviews do take place (and non-mandated or discretionary reviews seem to be less frequent), their success in evaluating the measures, engaging in reality, and showing capacity for action is questionable.

This chapter presents a thematic analysis of 24 interviews with actors we identified as undertaking, participating in, or interacting with counter-terrorism review, including former Home Secretaries, former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, high-level political actors, representatives of regulators and complaints bodies, civil servants, lawyers, and representatives from a range of civil society organisations. The chapter considers this data across five themes: (i) the purposes of review, (ii) how those purposes are pursued in practice, (iii) the values that underpin review, (iv) how the different elements of the counter-terrorism review assemblage relate to one another, and (v) the impact of review.

The United Kingdom’s intelligence accountability system reviews and oversees the Five Eyes’ oldest intelligence and security community. Her Majesty’s intelligence community illustrates the challenge of managing the tension between state security with human security: a cycle of reform driven in an attempt to (re)gain the trust of a sceptical UK public and in response to technological progression. Over the course of the last century, the UK and its intelligence and security agencies assisted other Five Eyes members in establishing their own ISAs, while its cycle of reform has had equally important ramifications for driving innovation in intelligence accountability across the Five Eyes community. Controversies have undermined the prospect for public trust on which the legitimacy of the UK’s intelligence community ultimately depends. Changes from the initial focus on general administrative and executive review and oversight were driven by domestic and transnational legal challenges. The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have had a notable impact on security and intelligence in the United Kingdom. The chapter reviews the member organizations of the UK’s intelligence community, the strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in the UK, national security threats from the vantage point of the UK, and the UK’s intelligence accountability architecture: the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Judicial Commissioners Office, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the Intelligence and Security Committee composed of members of both Houses of Parliament, and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.