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Assesses the success of the two humanitarian interventions in the Balkans – Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – from the perspective of humanitarian organizations. It argues how, ironically, the effectiveness of organizations such as UNHCR can dissuade powerful states from taking the necessary steps to address the root causes of massive human rights violations. Slow and ambiguous action from the international community can raise false expectations on the part of suffering civilians, and embolden those who commit atrocities. The author argues that the political, military, and humanitarian strands of interventions are always closely interwoven, and draws a series of lessons from the Balkans experience: the need for the international community to act early, credibly, and consistently; the importance of preserving the identity of a humanitarian operation; the imperative to end the impunity of those who orchestrate and commit massive violations of human rights; and the importance of engaging the United Nations.

This chapter looks to the law of international human rights, which provides further rules regarding the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-international armed conflict. The protections of international human rights law act to supplement the IHL rules, so that it is possible to speak of a substantial body of rules applicable in non-international armed conflict that effectively duplicate nearly all the protections afforded to combatants and POWs.

This chapter explores the extent to which international human rights law requires peacekeepers to protect civilians from serious violations of the rights they protect. The jurisprudence of the ICJ and of regional human rights courts, the observations and comments of UN human rights committee bodies, and the statements of the ICRC all support the view that human rights law is applicable during armed conflict, and that jurisdiction may apply extra-territorially where a contracting party is in de facto control of an area and in certain recognized exceptions to the territorial principle of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may also extend to situations where a State brings an individual under their control, typically by detaining them. However, the ECtHR has made it clear that forces deployed pursuant to a Chapter VII resolution are immune from its scrutiny. The chapter concludes with suggestions for minimizing differences in the degrees of accountability for human rights law violations between different contingents.

This chapter explores the notion of progress in weapons law. It gives an account of how new weapons treaties are initiated, and the roles of states, non-governmental organiZations, and the ICRC are explained. Emphasis is again placed on the centrality of states in the development of new treaties and in the evolution of customary rules. The position that arises when states are not able to agree new treaties to address established humanitarian concern is considered, and ‘soft law’, and its possible role in such circumstances, are discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of an alternative, ‘gradualist’ approach are outlined and a possible path to progress is charted. Conclusions as to the overall status and health of the law of weaponry are then put forward.

This chapter analyses the sources of the law of weaponry. It begins by explaining the notion of customary law. It discusses how the existence of a rule of custom can be determined. The rules as to the conversion of treaty rules into custom are explained, and the effect of the emergence of a customary rule is related. State practice, an essential element of custom, is considered. The second component of international law, namely treaty law, is the focus of the second part of the chapter. The sometimes mixed legal status of weapons treaty texts, the notion of weapons declarations other than treaties, the negotiation of treaties, the formalities associated with their conclusion, and other significant elements of treaty law are all addressed in sufficient detail to inform the analysis in later chapters. The status of the ICRC Customary Law Study and of the UN Secretary-General's Bulletin, and the methodology of the former, are considered in so far as relevant to the law of weaponry.

This chapter is concerned with the human rights situation in Kosovo during the period immediately preceding NATO intervention in 1999, when Serbian/FRY policy shifted from a programme of legislative discrimination to one of military assault. Although purportedly directed against an increasingly militant KLA, FRY/Serbian ‘counter-insurgency’ operations had devastating consequences for the civilian population and led to massive displacements. The chapter assesses the response of international agencies to the humanitarian crisis and suggests that, unlike previous large-scale humanitarian operations, the lead role assumed by the UNHCR meant that coordination and planning was well effected, at least in the early phases. The important role of the ICRC is also noted. The chapter then examines the role played by sanctions in the Kosovo crisis, tracing their recent usage, their impact on the Yugoslav conflict more generally and, finally, the reasons behind the relative ineffectiveness of Resolution 1160 (1998).

International law governing international armed conflict has grown since 1945 to include many crimes for which individuals may be held criminally liable. The ICTY and its supporters claim that much of this law has been extended to non-international armed conflict. This chapter argues that the rapid growth of internal-armed-conflict law at the ICTY has been accomplished by an ICTY moral philosophy masquerading as method. The tribunal's judges were well aware that the majority of states were, as late as 1977, opposed to, or had doubts about, such expansionism. Under a veneer of legality, a humanitarian sentiment that had been blocked by states at the diplomatic conferences convened by the ICRC found an opening with the establishment of the ICTY. Can the ICTY's law survive in the long term against the power of sovereign interest? The chapter considers this question in the light of the United States' critique of the ICRC's 2005 customary-law study.

This chapter offers the analytical framework to discuss the status of the private military and security companies' (PMSCs') employees under the law of international armed conflict: it determines the rights and the privileges afforded by the law and the legal consequences deriving from the conduct of those persons. It argues that they can fall within the category of legitimate combatants, once the hiring State establishes a certain qualified factual link between them and its regular armed forces. If not, they are civilians: therefore, PMSC's employees enjoy immunity from attack, unless they take a direct part in the hostilities. Much attention is paid to the Interpretive Guidance on the notion, released by the ICRC in 2009. The chapter seeks to test the approach taken by the ICRC in light of the tasks entrusted to the PMSCs.

This chapter discusses how technology has transformed the ways news is circulated around the world. As stated by Yves Daccord, director general of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), firsthand documentation is increasingly accomplished by anyone with a smartphone, including average citizens, bloggers, and activists. However, journalists are still greatly needed; citizen-reporters can be overwhelmed with information, and may struggle to understand its implications and formulate responses. The most important figures in the global information ecosystem are local journalists—they are the ones informing global citizens, in addition to being jailed and killed as a result of their increased importance in the absence of international correspondents. The chapter emphasizes how new systems of control are suppressing the global conversation and disrupting the advancement of policies and solutions based on an informed understanding of the local realities.

This chapter traces the development of the 1949 Geneva Conventions from their origins in pre-1949 treaty law through the 1977 Additional Protocols and to the present. It argues that international humanitarian law (IHL) has historically emerged from a contentious mix of military interest, moral values, and emotions grounded in the traumatic episodes leading to its revision. It focuses specifically on the evolution of three general areas of IHL: the protection of combatants and prisoners of war (POWs) and captured fighters, the protection of noncombatants (or civilians), and the mechanisms for implementation and enforcement of the law. The chapter draws on novel archival research as well as key primary and secondary sources.

The Korean War demonstrated the serious problems that the United States had adhering to the new 1949 Geneva Conventions and the severely limited protections that these new treaties provided. The protections for war victims were undermined both by serious gaps in the treaties that failed to provide much safety from bombing to civilians and by US deviations from the agreements in the handling of refugees and prisoners of war. However, Americans did not discard the agreements in the wake of their troubled Korean War experiences. Instead, the war helped to legitimize and lay the foundation for the further internalization of the new laws through their formal implementation, the public controversy they generated, and a boomerang effect of atrocity accusations. Despite failing to provide much protection for Korean War victims, the treaties were part of a broader international consensus-building process that helped to spread humanitarian norms.

This chapter dissects the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s current relationship with the Department of Defense, a relationship which centers on the adherence by the United States to its law of armed conflict obligations. This analysis begins with an overview of the ICRC’s history, institutional structure, and operating modalities, highlighting the roles given to it by both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. This chapter then outlines both the formal and informal interactions between the ICRC and the DoD, both on the civilian side of the house in the Pentagon and on the uniformed military side, with an emphasis on the operational components. It exposes the ICRC’s extra-legal agenda, and places it within the larger evolution of the modern law of armed conflict itself.

Nasser’s “long-breath strategy” from 1966 through the end of 1967 was focused on maintaining the security of the strategic triangle while using fewer troops. Instead, an intensive bombing campaign that included poison gas was used to target the vast royalist cave network in North Yemen. Despite Egypt’s violation of the Geneva Protocols of 1925, the international community failed to condemn the use of chemical weapons, demonstrating the tenacity of the poison gas taboo. Saudi Ambassador Jamil Baroody’s fierce campaign against UN Secretary General U Thant’s inaction failed to persuade the UN to act. The ICRC, NATO, United States, and UK refused to openly criticize Egypt, as they did not want to fall out of favor with Nasser and suffer economic or political repercussions.

No single foreign or domestic power was able to exercise control over events in Yemen, which created an opportunity for many to have a lasting presence in South Arabia. Three individuals, in particular, made inroads in Yemen that impacted the course of the civil war and the future of the country: Bruce Condé, an eclectic American philatelist, became postmaster general of Imam al-Badr’s tribal areas and singlehandedly brought tribal nonstate actors a level of international legitimacy. André Rochat brought the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to Yemen for the first time and played an important role in royalist healthcare and the adoption of Geneva Conventions in Yemen. Dr. James Young led a group of Southern Baptist missionaries in founding a modern Western hospital in the rural village of Jibla, amidst one of the most religiously conservative societies in the world.

The war in Yemen that began in 2014 between northern tribes and the exiled republic is the bookend to six decades of conflict that began in 1962. The Houthi northern tribal alliance is a modern reincarnation of the royalists who had supported Imam al-Badr during the 1960s. The Houthis see themselves as rectifying the unjust political settlements left over from the Yemen Civil War. The current conflict reached a turning point with a tribal conquest of Sana’a, reminiscent of 1968, aimed at overthrowing the post-revolutionary generation of urban leadership and its republican government in decline. In a demonstration of history repeating itself, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the ICRC, the UN, and large groups of mercenaries returned to Yemen for another round of unwinnable interventions that closely resemble the original conflict.

Chapter 3 examines in detail the concept of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). This chapter looks at the history and development of the concept of DPH as an exception to non-combatant immunity. It also analyses the attempts to determine the parameters of DPH, from before its first explicit iterations in the Additional Protocols, to the Israeli Supreme Court Case on targeted killings. The chapter will culminate with an analysis of the most recent attempt to define DPH, the International Committee of the Red Cross Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, and examines the international legal and political reception to the Interpretive Guidance.