PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical ...
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This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical defects of most of this tradition, and suggests why, where, and how it should be put right. The standardly accepted formal theory of part-whole is classical extensional mereology, which is known in two logical guises, the Calculus of Individuals of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman, and the Mereology of Stanislaw Leśniewski. Despite the discrepancies between the underlying logics of these two approaches, there is a precise sense in which both say the same things about parts and wholes. The book also considers the mereology of continuants and brings modality and mereology together as they are found in the work of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the century and later in that of Roderick Chisholm.Less
This book provides a connected account of the various kinds of mereology, or formal theory of part, whole, and related concepts, which exist in the literature. It also exposes the philosophical defects of most of this tradition, and suggests why, where, and how it should be put right. The standardly accepted formal theory of part-whole is classical extensional mereology, which is known in two logical guises, the Calculus of Individuals of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman, and the Mereology of Stanislaw Leśniewski. Despite the discrepancies between the underlying logics of these two approaches, there is a precise sense in which both say the same things about parts and wholes. The book also considers the mereology of continuants and brings modality and mereology together as they are found in the work of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the century and later in that of Roderick Chisholm.
Robert C. Solomon
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195181579
- eISBN:
- 9780199786602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195181573.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Sartre’s first novel, Nausea, is quite clearly a working out of the phenomenological insights he was developing at the time in such works as “Transcendence of the Ego” and “The Emotions”. This ...
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Sartre’s first novel, Nausea, is quite clearly a working out of the phenomenological insights he was developing at the time in such works as “Transcendence of the Ego” and “The Emotions”. This chapter explores the basic tenets of Sartre’s phenomenology, focusing in particular on his rejection of certain themes in his mentor, Edmund Husserl. It also spends considerable time looking at the perversity of Sartre’s central character, Roquentin, who quite clearly resembles Sartre himself at that time in his situation and his provincial circumstances.Less
Sartre’s first novel, Nausea, is quite clearly a working out of the phenomenological insights he was developing at the time in such works as “Transcendence of the Ego” and “The Emotions”. This chapter explores the basic tenets of Sartre’s phenomenology, focusing in particular on his rejection of certain themes in his mentor, Edmund Husserl. It also spends considerable time looking at the perversity of Sartre’s central character, Roquentin, who quite clearly resembles Sartre himself at that time in his situation and his provincial circumstances.
Claudio Ciborra
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199275267
- eISBN:
- 9780191714399
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275267.003.0002
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Information Technology
This chapter discusses the ‘crisis’ in the information and communication technology (ICT) discipline. It argues that crisis is due to the separation between people and science, and the neglect of ...
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This chapter discusses the ‘crisis’ in the information and communication technology (ICT) discipline. It argues that crisis is due to the separation between people and science, and the neglect of issues such as the subjective origin of science, the foundational role of everyday life in the creation and development of a methodology, and, ultimately, the obliteration of authentic human existence in the management of organizations and technologies.Less
This chapter discusses the ‘crisis’ in the information and communication technology (ICT) discipline. It argues that crisis is due to the separation between people and science, and the neglect of issues such as the subjective origin of science, the foundational role of everyday life in the creation and development of a methodology, and, ultimately, the obliteration of authentic human existence in the management of organizations and technologies.
Constantin V. Boundas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748624799
- eISBN:
- 9780748652396
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624799.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book provides an exploration of the continuing philosophical relevance of Gilles Deleuze. This collection of chapters uses Deleuze to move between thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Husserl, ...
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This book provides an exploration of the continuing philosophical relevance of Gilles Deleuze. This collection of chapters uses Deleuze to move between thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Husserl, Hume, Locke, Kant, Foucault, Badiou and Agamben. As such the reader is left with a comprehensive understanding not just of the philosophy of Deleuze but how he can be situated within a much broader philosophical trajectory. The book includes recent scholarship on Deleuze's philosophy by an acclaimed line-up of international contributors, all of whom seek to provide new and previously unexplored theoretical terrains. Three of the chapters are by key French Deleuzians whose work is not widely available in translation.Less
This book provides an exploration of the continuing philosophical relevance of Gilles Deleuze. This collection of chapters uses Deleuze to move between thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Husserl, Hume, Locke, Kant, Foucault, Badiou and Agamben. As such the reader is left with a comprehensive understanding not just of the philosophy of Deleuze but how he can be situated within a much broader philosophical trajectory. The book includes recent scholarship on Deleuze's philosophy by an acclaimed line-up of international contributors, all of whom seek to provide new and previously unexplored theoretical terrains. Three of the chapters are by key French Deleuzians whose work is not widely available in translation.
David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such ...
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Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specifically written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. This book demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but are mutually illuminating.Less
Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specifically written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. This book demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but are mutually illuminating.
Peter Simons and David Bell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199890576
- eISBN:
- 9780199980031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199890576.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Meinong’s theory of objects and Husserl’s formal ontology are divergent but cognate responses to Brentano’s flawed theory of intentional inexistence. While Meinong emphasized objects and their ...
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Meinong’s theory of objects and Husserl’s formal ontology are divergent but cognate responses to Brentano’s flawed theory of intentional inexistence. While Meinong emphasized objects and their variety, Husserl emphasized contents and their variety. Their theories agree on many salient issues both of phenomenology and ontology. Meinong, like Twardowski, upheld the objectuality of all intentional acts, and was therefore constrained to seek objects for acts lacking standard objects. Husserl by contrast rejects non-existents and explains the same phenomena by saying such lack objects but are phenomenologically indistinguishable from acts that have objects. This is modified by Husserl’s later theory of noemata on the one hand and Meinong’s recognition of the semantic role of incomplete auxiliary objects on the other. As a result, their theories materially converged. This chapter charts their principal convergences and disagreements and portrays them both as independent continuers of Brentano’s messianic drive to establish a scientific philosophy.Less
Meinong’s theory of objects and Husserl’s formal ontology are divergent but cognate responses to Brentano’s flawed theory of intentional inexistence. While Meinong emphasized objects and their variety, Husserl emphasized contents and their variety. Their theories agree on many salient issues both of phenomenology and ontology. Meinong, like Twardowski, upheld the objectuality of all intentional acts, and was therefore constrained to seek objects for acts lacking standard objects. Husserl by contrast rejects non-existents and explains the same phenomena by saying such lack objects but are phenomenologically indistinguishable from acts that have objects. This is modified by Husserl’s later theory of noemata on the one hand and Meinong’s recognition of the semantic role of incomplete auxiliary objects on the other. As a result, their theories materially converged. This chapter charts their principal convergences and disagreements and portrays them both as independent continuers of Brentano’s messianic drive to establish a scientific philosophy.
Kas Saghafi
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823231621
- eISBN:
- 9780823235094
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823231621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The chapters of this book revolve around the notion of the other in Jacques Derrida's work. How does Derrida write of and on the other? Arguing that Derrida offers the most attentive ...
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The chapters of this book revolve around the notion of the other in Jacques Derrida's work. How does Derrida write of and on the other? Arguing that Derrida offers the most attentive and responsible thinking about “the undeniable experience of the alterity of the other”, this book examines exemplary instances of the relation to the other, e.g. the relation of Moses to God, Derrida's friendship with Jean-Luc Nancy, and Derrida's relation to a recently departed actress caught on video, to demonstrate how Derrida forces us to reconceive who or what the other may be. For Derrida, the singularity of the other, always written in the lower case, includes not only the formal or logical sense of alterity, the otherness of the human other, but also the otherness of the nonliving, the no longer living, or the not yet alive. The book explores welcoming and hospitality, salutation and greeting, “approaching”, and mourning as constitutive facets of the relation to these others. Addressing Derrida's readings of Husserl, Levinas, Barthes, Blanchot, and Nancy, among other thinkers, and ranging across a number of disciplines, including art, literature, philosophy, and religion, this book explores the apparitions of the other by attending to the mode of appearing or coming on the scene, the phenomenality and visibility of the other. Analyzing some of Derrida's essays on the visual arts, the book also demonstrates that video and photography display an intimate relation to “spectrality”, as well as a structural relation to the absolute singularity of the other.Less
The chapters of this book revolve around the notion of the other in Jacques Derrida's work. How does Derrida write of and on the other? Arguing that Derrida offers the most attentive and responsible thinking about “the undeniable experience of the alterity of the other”, this book examines exemplary instances of the relation to the other, e.g. the relation of Moses to God, Derrida's friendship with Jean-Luc Nancy, and Derrida's relation to a recently departed actress caught on video, to demonstrate how Derrida forces us to reconceive who or what the other may be. For Derrida, the singularity of the other, always written in the lower case, includes not only the formal or logical sense of alterity, the otherness of the human other, but also the otherness of the nonliving, the no longer living, or the not yet alive. The book explores welcoming and hospitality, salutation and greeting, “approaching”, and mourning as constitutive facets of the relation to these others. Addressing Derrida's readings of Husserl, Levinas, Barthes, Blanchot, and Nancy, among other thinkers, and ranging across a number of disciplines, including art, literature, philosophy, and religion, this book explores the apparitions of the other by attending to the mode of appearing or coming on the scene, the phenomenality and visibility of the other. Analyzing some of Derrida's essays on the visual arts, the book also demonstrates that video and photography display an intimate relation to “spectrality”, as well as a structural relation to the absolute singularity of the other.
David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing ...
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This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing assumption that — for historical, methodological, or doctrinal reasons — analytic philosophy of mind has little in common with the tradition of phenomenology that began with Brentano, and which was developed by Husserl and continued through such figures as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty. This volume overturns that assumption by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to progress on problems central to both classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, the essays gathered here (all written for the volume) bring ideas from classical phenomenology into the recent debates in philosophy of mind, and vice versa, in discussions of consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, holism about mental state contents, and the prospects for ‘explaining’ consciousness.Less
This volume involves both disciplinary and historical issues, and aims to integrate results and methods of the two disciplines in the interest of philosophy as a whole. There has been a long-standing assumption that — for historical, methodological, or doctrinal reasons — analytic philosophy of mind has little in common with the tradition of phenomenology that began with Brentano, and which was developed by Husserl and continued through such figures as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau–Ponty. This volume overturns that assumption by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to progress on problems central to both classical phenomenology and contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, the essays gathered here (all written for the volume) bring ideas from classical phenomenology into the recent debates in philosophy of mind, and vice versa, in discussions of consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, holism about mental state contents, and the prospects for ‘explaining’ consciousness.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
We each at least seem to have a distinctive first-person knowledge of our own experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner ...
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We each at least seem to have a distinctive first-person knowledge of our own experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. But Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction was designed precisely to find a route to knowledge of the structures of consciousness that was independent of any appeal to observation of one's own mental states. This chapter explicates Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction in contemporary terms that (1) show its distance from all inner-observation accounts; (2) exhibit its kinship to and historical influence on outer-observation accounts of self-knowledge popularized by Sellars; and (3) demonstrate that a contemporary ‘cognitive transformation’ view based on Husserl's method may provide a viable contribution to contemporary debates about the source of self-knowledge.Less
We each at least seem to have a distinctive first-person knowledge of our own experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. But Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction was designed precisely to find a route to knowledge of the structures of consciousness that was independent of any appeal to observation of one's own mental states. This chapter explicates Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction in contemporary terms that (1) show its distance from all inner-observation accounts; (2) exhibit its kinship to and historical influence on outer-observation accounts of self-knowledge popularized by Sellars; and (3) demonstrate that a contemporary ‘cognitive transformation’ view based on Husserl's method may provide a viable contribution to contemporary debates about the source of self-knowledge.
John Bickle and Ralph Ellis
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Many believe that phenomenology is an uneasy fit with the notion that consciousness is simply produced by physical manipulations. This chapter takes one of the most provocative examples of this type ...
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Many believe that phenomenology is an uneasy fit with the notion that consciousness is simply produced by physical manipulations. This chapter takes one of the most provocative examples of this type of manipulation — cortical microstimulation leading to seemingly random conscious states such as the image of one's grandmother or a musical melody — and shows that such phenomena are not only consistent with Husserlian phenomenology, but actually underscore the importance of Husserl's careful distinctions. It guards against conflating ‘physical’ with ‘empirically observable’ by falling into the natural attitude and unwarrantedly equating the ‘perceived object’ with the corresponding ‘physical object’ that supposedly causes the perception, and then equating both of those with the ‘intentional’ object. There can be an intentional object with no physical object, and subserved only by a physical brain event. But this does not detract from the intentional meaning of the object-as-experienced. In this kind of example, it shows more clearly than ever Husserl's distinction between the noesis and the noema within each intentional experience.Less
Many believe that phenomenology is an uneasy fit with the notion that consciousness is simply produced by physical manipulations. This chapter takes one of the most provocative examples of this type of manipulation — cortical microstimulation leading to seemingly random conscious states such as the image of one's grandmother or a musical melody — and shows that such phenomena are not only consistent with Husserlian phenomenology, but actually underscore the importance of Husserl's careful distinctions. It guards against conflating ‘physical’ with ‘empirically observable’ by falling into the natural attitude and unwarrantedly equating the ‘perceived object’ with the corresponding ‘physical object’ that supposedly causes the perception, and then equating both of those with the ‘intentional’ object. There can be an intentional object with no physical object, and subserved only by a physical brain event. But this does not detract from the intentional meaning of the object-as-experienced. In this kind of example, it shows more clearly than ever Husserl's distinction between the noesis and the noema within each intentional experience.
Richard Tieszen
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Edmund Husserl is one of only a few major philosophers in the last one hundred years or so who holds that it is possible to develop a philosophy of mind in which one can account for the consciousness ...
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Edmund Husserl is one of only a few major philosophers in the last one hundred years or so who holds that it is possible to develop a philosophy of mind in which one can account for the consciousness of abstract objects or ideal objects. This chapter discusses Husserl's ideas in connection with the views of Kurt Gödel and Roger Penrose. It presents an argument that leads from Gödel's incompleteness theorems to recognition of the awareness of abstract or ideal objects. Husserl's view, based on his ideas about intentionality and the phenomenological reduction, shows us how to open up a space for a phenomenology of the consciousness of abstract mathematical objects.Less
Edmund Husserl is one of only a few major philosophers in the last one hundred years or so who holds that it is possible to develop a philosophy of mind in which one can account for the consciousness of abstract objects or ideal objects. This chapter discusses Husserl's ideas in connection with the views of Kurt Gödel and Roger Penrose. It presents an argument that leads from Gödel's incompleteness theorems to recognition of the awareness of abstract or ideal objects. Husserl's view, based on his ideas about intentionality and the phenomenological reduction, shows us how to open up a space for a phenomenology of the consciousness of abstract mathematical objects.
Hans Kelsen
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198252177
- eISBN:
- 9780191681363
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198252177.003.0052
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
What Jorgensen calls the ‘indicative factor’ contained in a command, Edmund Husserl calls the ‘theoretical content’ of a norm. He says of every practical discipline that ‘its rules [i.e. norms] must ...
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What Jorgensen calls the ‘indicative factor’ contained in a command, Edmund Husserl calls the ‘theoretical content’ of a norm. He says of every practical discipline that ‘its rules [i.e. norms] must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity (of the “shall” or “should”).’ The norm ‘An A should be B’ is ‘identical’ with, or ‘at least’ equivalent to, the sentence ‘Only an A which is a B is a good A’. He calls this a purely ‘theoretical’ sentence and claims that the norm ‘implies’ this theoretical sentence. Thus, according to Husserl, the ‘normative’ sentence ‘An A should be B’ expresses ‘normativity’; in other words, this sollen-sentence is a norm.Less
What Jorgensen calls the ‘indicative factor’ contained in a command, Edmund Husserl calls the ‘theoretical content’ of a norm. He says of every practical discipline that ‘its rules [i.e. norms] must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of normativity (of the “shall” or “should”).’ The norm ‘An A should be B’ is ‘identical’ with, or ‘at least’ equivalent to, the sentence ‘Only an A which is a B is a good A’. He calls this a purely ‘theoretical’ sentence and claims that the norm ‘implies’ this theoretical sentence. Thus, according to Husserl, the ‘normative’ sentence ‘An A should be B’ expresses ‘normativity’; in other words, this sollen-sentence is a norm.
Wayne M. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl ...
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This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl is committed to this idea and why it is so out of step with contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind. It then tries to render the idea intelligible along two paths. First, to take the idea of a logic of consciousness seriously, we must challenge our entrenched atomistic assumptions about conscious states. Second, to recognize the sense in which a science of consciousness might be logical, we must come to terms with Husserl's conception of an ideal science. For on a Husserlian conception, apophantic logic and phenomenology must be seen as two varieties of ideal science: systematic articulations of the content and structure of an ideal that is constitutive for conscious experience of a world.Less
This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomeno-logic. It shows why Husserl is committed to this idea and why it is so out of step with contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind. It then tries to render the idea intelligible along two paths. First, to take the idea of a logic of consciousness seriously, we must challenge our entrenched atomistic assumptions about conscious states. Second, to recognize the sense in which a science of consciousness might be logical, we must come to terms with Husserl's conception of an ideal science. For on a Husserlian conception, apophantic logic and phenomenology must be seen as two varieties of ideal science: systematic articulations of the content and structure of an ideal that is constitutive for conscious experience of a world.
Sean Dorrance Kelly
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199272457
- eISBN:
- 9780191709951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The problem of temporal awareness manifests itself in many ways: in our experience of the passage of time, in our experience of the movement of objects across space, in our experience of temporally ...
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The problem of temporal awareness manifests itself in many ways: in our experience of the passage of time, in our experience of the movement of objects across space, in our experience of temporally separated objects as belonging together (as in the case of the notes in a melody), and so on. Each of these cases makes it clear that our experience, in some sense, extends beyond what's happening now. But what model of experience accounts for this phenomenon? This chapter argues that two classical models — the specious present theory and the retention theory — are both unsatisfactory. It concludes by suggesting some of the richer phenomenological features that ought to play a central role in any more satisfactory account.Less
The problem of temporal awareness manifests itself in many ways: in our experience of the passage of time, in our experience of the movement of objects across space, in our experience of temporally separated objects as belonging together (as in the case of the notes in a melody), and so on. Each of these cases makes it clear that our experience, in some sense, extends beyond what's happening now. But what model of experience accounts for this phenomenon? This chapter argues that two classical models — the specious present theory and the retention theory — are both unsatisfactory. It concludes by suggesting some of the richer phenomenological features that ought to play a central role in any more satisfactory account.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780198250067
- eISBN:
- 9780191712593
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250067.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins with a discussion of the thin conception, according to which a subject of experience is something that exists only if experience exists of which it is the subject. It explores ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the thin conception, according to which a subject of experience is something that exists only if experience exists of which it is the subject. It explores Descartes' endorsement of the thin conception of the subject, which is fundamental to his conception of the I or mind or soul or self or subject in that it doesn't and can't exist in the absence of experience or consciousness — in his terminology — ‘thinking’ or ‘thought’ (cogitatio). The chapter then considers Fichte, Husserl, Nozick, James, and Hume.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the thin conception, according to which a subject of experience is something that exists only if experience exists of which it is the subject. It explores Descartes' endorsement of the thin conception of the subject, which is fundamental to his conception of the I or mind or soul or self or subject in that it doesn't and can't exist in the absence of experience or consciousness — in his terminology — ‘thinking’ or ‘thought’ (cogitatio). The chapter then considers Fichte, Husserl, Nozick, James, and Hume.
David Hyder and Hans-Jorg Rheinberger (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756044
- eISBN:
- 9780804772945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756044.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last ...
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This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the “life-world” of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naïve science, and the fact–value distinction. The chapters included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this “crisis” and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and “worlds,” the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.Less
This book is a collection of chapters on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the “life-world” of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naïve science, and the fact–value distinction. The chapters included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this “crisis” and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and “worlds,” the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.
Thomas Ryckman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195177176
- eISBN:
- 9780199835324
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195177177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The general theory of relativity (1915) was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory’s existence, two main tendencies dominated ...
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The general theory of relativity (1915) was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory’s existence, two main tendencies dominated its philosophical reception. It is argued that the path actually taken, which became logical empiricist philosophy of science, greatly contributed to the current impasse over scientific realism. On the other hand, new possibilities are opened in revisiting and reviving the spirit of a more sophisticated tendency, here broadly termed ‘transcendental idealism,’ a cluster of viewpoints principally associated with Ernst Cassirer, Hermann Weyl, and Arthur Eddington. In particular, Weyl’s reformulation of gravitational and electromagnetic theory within the framework of a “pure infinitesimal geometry” under the explicit inspiration of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism is traced in detail and further articulated. It is further argued that Einstein, though initially paying lip service to the emerging philosophy of logical empiricism, ended up siding de facto with the broad contours of the transcendental idealist tendency, which is also a significant progenitor of the contemporary point of view misleadingly designated “structural realism”.Less
The general theory of relativity (1915) was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory’s existence, two main tendencies dominated its philosophical reception. It is argued that the path actually taken, which became logical empiricist philosophy of science, greatly contributed to the current impasse over scientific realism. On the other hand, new possibilities are opened in revisiting and reviving the spirit of a more sophisticated tendency, here broadly termed ‘transcendental idealism,’ a cluster of viewpoints principally associated with Ernst Cassirer, Hermann Weyl, and Arthur Eddington. In particular, Weyl’s reformulation of gravitational and electromagnetic theory within the framework of a “pure infinitesimal geometry” under the explicit inspiration of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism is traced in detail and further articulated. It is further argued that Einstein, though initially paying lip service to the emerging philosophy of logical empiricism, ended up siding de facto with the broad contours of the transcendental idealist tendency, which is also a significant progenitor of the contemporary point of view misleadingly designated “structural realism”.
John W. M. Krummel
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199841172
- eISBN:
- 9780199919543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841172.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This substantial introduction to Nishida discusses the significance of Nishida as a thinker and the key components of his philosophy as a whole, and contextualizes the two essays of this volume ...
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This substantial introduction to Nishida discusses the significance of Nishida as a thinker and the key components of his philosophy as a whole, and contextualizes the two essays of this volume within the unfolding of his oeuvre. The essay examines the various influences on Nishida’s thought, including neo-Kantianism, Hegel, and Husserl, as well as Buddhism, that led to his philosophy of place (basho) and to the prelogical origin of logic in his attempts to recapture the nondualistic implacement of our concrete lived experience. In explicating the complexity of Nishida’s theory the introduction underscores its unique position within contemporary world philosophy as more than simply Japanese or Western, or just Buddhist or Kantian or Hegelian.Less
This substantial introduction to Nishida discusses the significance of Nishida as a thinker and the key components of his philosophy as a whole, and contextualizes the two essays of this volume within the unfolding of his oeuvre. The essay examines the various influences on Nishida’s thought, including neo-Kantianism, Hegel, and Husserl, as well as Buddhism, that led to his philosophy of place (basho) and to the prelogical origin of logic in his attempts to recapture the nondualistic implacement of our concrete lived experience. In explicating the complexity of Nishida’s theory the introduction underscores its unique position within contemporary world philosophy as more than simply Japanese or Western, or just Buddhist or Kantian or Hegelian.
Nishida Kitarō
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199841172
- eISBN:
- 9780199919543
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841172.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This essay from 1926/27 provides the first systematic articulation of Nishida’s philosophy of “place” (basho). This is the essay that initiated the philosophical system of basho that eventually came ...
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This essay from 1926/27 provides the first systematic articulation of Nishida’s philosophy of “place” (basho). This is the essay that initiated the philosophical system of basho that eventually came to be known as “Nishida philosophy” (Nishida tetsugaku). Hence it is indispensable to understanding not only Nishida’s philosophy but the entire Kyoto school of thought that took off from Nishida’s thoughts on basho. In formulating his theory of basho Nishida aims to overcome the dualism assumed by traditional Western epistemology, especially neo-Kantianism, e.g., the dichotomies of subject–object, idealism–realism, experience–reality. The essay seeks to articulate an alternative to the solutions to dualism offered by Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, G. W. F. Hegel, as well as William James, with the concept of basho as designating one’s concrete lived situation, in the whole of its dynamic structure, wherein one finds oneself implaced “always already” before any bifurcation between subject and object arises.Less
This essay from 1926/27 provides the first systematic articulation of Nishida’s philosophy of “place” (basho). This is the essay that initiated the philosophical system of basho that eventually came to be known as “Nishida philosophy” (Nishida tetsugaku). Hence it is indispensable to understanding not only Nishida’s philosophy but the entire Kyoto school of thought that took off from Nishida’s thoughts on basho. In formulating his theory of basho Nishida aims to overcome the dualism assumed by traditional Western epistemology, especially neo-Kantianism, e.g., the dichotomies of subject–object, idealism–realism, experience–reality. The essay seeks to articulate an alternative to the solutions to dualism offered by Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, G. W. F. Hegel, as well as William James, with the concept of basho as designating one’s concrete lived situation, in the whole of its dynamic structure, wherein one finds oneself implaced “always already” before any bifurcation between subject and object arises.
Thomas Ryckman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195177176
- eISBN:
- 9780199835324
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195177177.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Weyl’s major contributions in the spring of 1918 to the general theory of relativity and to constructive analysis reveal the influence of Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism. The known ...
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Weyl’s major contributions in the spring of 1918 to the general theory of relativity and to constructive analysis reveal the influence of Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism. The known personal contacts of Weyl and Husserl are summarized, and Husserl’s development of a distinctively transcendental approach to phenomenology is traced. A synopsis is given of the salient methodological aspects of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in evidence in Weyl’s “pure infinitesimal geometry”, and in its use as a framework “world geometry” for gravitation and electromagnetism.Less
Weyl’s major contributions in the spring of 1918 to the general theory of relativity and to constructive analysis reveal the influence of Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism. The known personal contacts of Weyl and Husserl are summarized, and Husserl’s development of a distinctively transcendental approach to phenomenology is traced. A synopsis is given of the salient methodological aspects of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in evidence in Weyl’s “pure infinitesimal geometry”, and in its use as a framework “world geometry” for gravitation and electromagnetism.
