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On Virtue Ethics

Rosalind Hursthouse

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199247998
eISBN:
9780191597756
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199247994.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

On Virtue Ethics is an exposition and defence of neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics. The first part discusses the ways in which it can provide action guidance and action assessment, which ... More


Virtue Egoism

Alison Hills

in The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199213306
eISBN:
9780191594212
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199213306.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One response to the challenge of Egoism is to deny that there is a distinction between reasons of self-interest and moral reasons. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that the good life, the life of ... More


Against Virtue Ethics

Thomas Hurka

in Virtue, Vice, and Value

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780195137163
eISBN:
9780199833283
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0195137167.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Having spent its bulk elaborating its own account of virtue, the book closes by arguing for this account's superiority over those defended under the heading of “virtue ethics.” It critically assesses ... More


The Idiot

Mark Rowlands

in Can Animals Be Moral?

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199842001
eISBN:
9780199979844
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General

The concept of control, identified in the arguments of Aristotle and Kant, is rendered more precise in this chapter. The central dialectical figure of Myshkin is introduced. Myshkin is an individual ... More


Doing the Right Thing from Malice

Steven Sverdlik

in Motive and Rightness

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199594948
eISBN:
9780191725401
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594948.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The deontic relevance of motives in virtue ethics is examined. Various types of virtue ethics are distinguished. Only some of them endorse the usage of the deontic concepts of obligation, wrongness, ... More


The Personal Worth Conception and its Rivals

Jason Baehr

in The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199604074
eISBN:
9780191729300
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The personal worth conception of intellectual virtue introduced and defended in Chapter 6 is contrasted with five other accounts of intellectual or moral virtue in the literature. The accounts of ... More


Indirect Duties, Virtue Ethics, and Animals

Robert Garner

in A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a Nonideal World

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199936311
eISBN:
9780199345816
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936311.003.0004
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

This chapter asks whether an indirect duty view and, in particular, one based on virtue ethics, can provide an acceptable degree of protection for animals. It is argued that there is some scope for ... More


Hume’s Moral Pluralism

Michael B. Gill

in Humean Moral Pluralism

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780198714033
eISBN:
9780191782480
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

David Hume argues for a pluralist view of morality. According to his pluralist view, there are different ultimate moral ends, those different moral ends can come into conflict with each other, and ... More


Virtue Theories: of Michael Slote, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Timothy Jackson

Nick Fotion

in Theory vs. Anti-Theory in Ethics: A Misconceived Conflict

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
June 2014
ISBN:
9780199373529
eISBN:
9780199373543
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199373529.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

Although Slote and Hursthouse differ, as virtue theorists, in that the former is not a consequentialist while the latter is, they are both grand theorists. Jackson introduces religious commitments ... More


Morality and Virtue: Co-authored with David Copp

David Sobel

in From Valuing to Value: Towards a Defense of Subjectivism

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
December 2016
ISBN:
9780198712640
eISBN:
9780191780998
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712640.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

In this chapter David Copp and I canvass some literature on “virtue ethics” including some distinctively virtue-based conceptions of practical reason. After pointing out that the literature on virtue ... More


Can We Deduce Morality from Human Nature?

John E. Hare

in God’s Command

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
November 2015
ISBN:
9780199602018
eISBN:
9780191808463
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602018.003.0004
Subject:
Religion, Theology

The chapter starts from the position of Scotus that the second table of the Ten Commandments, though it fits our nature extremely well, is not deducible from that nature. It discusses the social ... More


Character and Consequences

Ben Bradley

in Questions of Character

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
November 2016
ISBN:
9780199357703
eISBN:
9780199357734
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter defends the provocative claim that if a certain popular view of virtue is true, then virtue has no intrinsic value, and so it can play no useful role in moral theory. The view in ... More


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