John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular ...
More
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.Less
This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253050
- eISBN:
- 9780191597282
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253056.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Practical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon ...
More
Practical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act—our motivating reasons, as they are commonly called—as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or even purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the normative and the motivational. Instead, we have to understand a motivating reason as the sort of thing that could be a good reason, for instance, that the train is about to leave. This, rather than my belief that the train is about to leave, must be my reason for running. Motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent, but states of affairs.Less
Practical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act—our motivating reasons, as they are commonly called—as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or even purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the normative and the motivational. Instead, we have to understand a motivating reason as the sort of thing that could be a good reason, for instance, that the train is about to leave. This, rather than my belief that the train is about to leave, must be my reason for running. Motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent, but states of affairs.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian ...
More
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian cognitivists’ position by Bernard Williams. Williams’s arguments are presented in a different light from the way in which they are usually understood. The mention of Humeanism in his initial presentation of his ideas led to Williams being viewed as a representative of someone committed to the Humean theory of motivation, or to a Humean view of the self or of the psychological. Williams’s position is seen as a set of relatively neutral constraints on the very idea of a practical reason.Less
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian cognitivists’ position by Bernard Williams. Williams’s arguments are presented in a different light from the way in which they are usually understood. The mention of Humeanism in his initial presentation of his ideas led to Williams being viewed as a representative of someone committed to the Humean theory of motivation, or to a Humean view of the self or of the psychological. Williams’s position is seen as a set of relatively neutral constraints on the very idea of a practical reason.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically ...
More
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.Less
Much of the recent literature on laws of nature is about the dispute between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of laws. The MAL does not fit easily in either camp. Like Humean views, it is ontologically parsimonious and consistent with Humean Supervenience; like Non‐Humean views, it denies that the laws are simply economical summaries of the universe, it provides a robust sense in which laws govern the universe, and it does not make the relation between laws and counterfactuals depend on what we choose to ‘hold constant’ in our counterfactual reasoning. The chapter concludes with an examination of the MAL's implications for various metaphysical issues, including natural theology, the relation between God and the universe, freedom and responsibility, and what the law‐governedness of the world consists in.
John T. Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557707
- eISBN:
- 9780191721052
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The idea that science has discovered that our universe is governed by laws of nature is arguably an important part of the modern scientific world‐view. The distinction between laws and other truths ...
More
The idea that science has discovered that our universe is governed by laws of nature is arguably an important part of the modern scientific world‐view. The distinction between laws and other truths discovered by science is essential in at least some scientific reasoning, for example in statistical mechanics. The idea that laws of nature really govern the universe—and that they are not merely regularities that form an elegant system, as they are according to proponents of Humeanism (e.g. David Lewis)—turns out to play a crucial role in much scientific reasoning having to do with so‐called fine‐tuning. This chapter offers a formulation of the law‐governed world‐picture and outlines an argument for a new account of lawhood that vindicates that picture.Less
The idea that science has discovered that our universe is governed by laws of nature is arguably an important part of the modern scientific world‐view. The distinction between laws and other truths discovered by science is essential in at least some scientific reasoning, for example in statistical mechanics. The idea that laws of nature really govern the universe—and that they are not merely regularities that form an elegant system, as they are according to proponents of Humeanism (e.g. David Lewis)—turns out to play a crucial role in much scientific reasoning having to do with so‐called fine‐tuning. This chapter offers a formulation of the law‐governed world‐picture and outlines an argument for a new account of lawhood that vindicates that picture.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199652365
- eISBN:
- 9780191740718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
This chapter develops an analytical framework within which conceptions of self can be identified and classified. A conception about self supplies an answer to the question “What am I?” Until very ...
More
This chapter develops an analytical framework within which conceptions of self can be identified and classified. A conception about self supplies an answer to the question “What am I?” Until very recently, virtually all western discussion about the self explored three conceptions: the Cartesian, the Humean or Reductionist, and the Strawsonian or Materialist views. This chapter demonstrates that these three are far from exhaustive, and indeed identify eleven broad conceptions of self, grounding the classification in an orthogonal pair of distinctions: between adjectival and collective modes of exemplification, and between considerations about individuation and considerations about ownership. Thus, as well as the three views just mentioned, Indian theory discusses Ownership, Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal views, three types of (Buddhist) No Place view, the Tornado view and the Flame view.Less
This chapter develops an analytical framework within which conceptions of self can be identified and classified. A conception about self supplies an answer to the question “What am I?” Until very recently, virtually all western discussion about the self explored three conceptions: the Cartesian, the Humean or Reductionist, and the Strawsonian or Materialist views. This chapter demonstrates that these three are far from exhaustive, and indeed identify eleven broad conceptions of self, grounding the classification in an orthogonal pair of distinctions: between adjectival and collective modes of exemplification, and between considerations about individuation and considerations about ownership. Thus, as well as the three views just mentioned, Indian theory discusses Ownership, Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal views, three types of (Buddhist) No Place view, the Tornado view and the Flame view.
John Hawthorne
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199291236
- eISBN:
- 9780191710612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291236.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to Humeanism, the causal facts pertaining to any subregion of the world are extrinsic to that region, supervening on the global distribution of freely recombinable fundamental properties. ...
More
According to Humeanism, the causal facts pertaining to any subregion of the world are extrinsic to that region, supervening on the global distribution of freely recombinable fundamental properties. For example, according to the Humean, a spatiotemporal region in which a certain intrusion of a bullet into a body is followed by death is only extrinsically a region in which the intrusion causes the death. The latter causal fact will, if it obtains, be underwritten by certain global regularities (most obviously, those connecting death to certain bodily disturbances) that are extrinsic to the region in question. Embed an intrinsic duplicate of that region in a global setting where very different regularities are in play and it may be false of that duplicate region that its intrusion and its death are causally connected. Similarly a spatiotemporal region that contains a substance that has a certain causal power — say of poisoning human beings — is only extrinsically a region where that causal power is present. Embed an intrinsic duplicate of a region in very different global settings and the relevant power may be absent. Humeanism thus delivers the thesis that the causal facts pertaining to a region are extrinsic to it. But that thesis, no matter how it is embellished, is incompatible with a pair of very obvious facts about a person7#x0027;s own nature. Accordingly, Humeanism is untenable. This chapter argues that (1) an intrinsic duplicate of any region wholly containing a person will contain a being with that person's conscious life; and (2) there are causal requirements on that person's conscious life. Therefore, Humeanism is false.Less
According to Humeanism, the causal facts pertaining to any subregion of the world are extrinsic to that region, supervening on the global distribution of freely recombinable fundamental properties. For example, according to the Humean, a spatiotemporal region in which a certain intrusion of a bullet into a body is followed by death is only extrinsically a region in which the intrusion causes the death. The latter causal fact will, if it obtains, be underwritten by certain global regularities (most obviously, those connecting death to certain bodily disturbances) that are extrinsic to the region in question. Embed an intrinsic duplicate of that region in a global setting where very different regularities are in play and it may be false of that duplicate region that its intrusion and its death are causally connected. Similarly a spatiotemporal region that contains a substance that has a certain causal power — say of poisoning human beings — is only extrinsically a region where that causal power is present. Embed an intrinsic duplicate of a region in very different global settings and the relevant power may be absent. Humeanism thus delivers the thesis that the causal facts pertaining to a region are extrinsic to it. But that thesis, no matter how it is embellished, is incompatible with a pair of very obvious facts about a person7#x0027;s own nature. Accordingly, Humeanism is untenable. This chapter argues that (1) an intrinsic duplicate of any region wholly containing a person will contain a being with that person's conscious life; and (2) there are causal requirements on that person's conscious life. Therefore, Humeanism is false.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents an outline of Socrates' view of moral psychology as presented in Plato's Protagoras. The chapter concerns with the critical examination of some classical and modern views of ...
More
This chapter presents an outline of Socrates' view of moral psychology as presented in Plato's Protagoras. The chapter concerns with the critical examination of some classical and modern views of reasons for action and motivation for action which tend, sometimes themselves to assimilate weakness to recklessness or compulsion. It focuses on Socratic account of knowledge and pleasure in the production of action, and his explanation of weakness of will. It then examines John McDowell's analysis of moral knowledge and moral motivation. A close evaluation of the shortcomings of the Socratic accounts, which equate virtue with knowledge, tends to push towards Humean account of the explanation of action. The chapter concludes that a search for a looser connection at a lower cost to common sense.Less
This chapter presents an outline of Socrates' view of moral psychology as presented in Plato's Protagoras. The chapter concerns with the critical examination of some classical and modern views of reasons for action and motivation for action which tend, sometimes themselves to assimilate weakness to recklessness or compulsion. It focuses on Socratic account of knowledge and pleasure in the production of action, and his explanation of weakness of will. It then examines John McDowell's analysis of moral knowledge and moral motivation. A close evaluation of the shortcomings of the Socratic accounts, which equate virtue with knowledge, tends to push towards Humean account of the explanation of action. The chapter concludes that a search for a looser connection at a lower cost to common sense.
Jeanette Kennett
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199266302
- eISBN:
- 9780191699146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266302.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter focuses on Humean accounts. It first examines Donald Davidson's distinctly Humean account of reasons for action in his paper ‘How is the Weakness of the Will Possible?’, and looks into ...
More
This chapter focuses on Humean accounts. It first examines Donald Davidson's distinctly Humean account of reasons for action in his paper ‘How is the Weakness of the Will Possible?’, and looks into his characterization of practical reasoning and weakness of will. It then investigates the possibility argued for by Jackson, Biglow, Dods, and Pargeter, that the akratic conflict is not what the folk theorists thought it was, and that the problem does not arise. However, the chapter argues that these alternative constructions of akrasia, with their explicitly reductive view of evaluation, do not succeed in capturing the phenomenon they set out to explain. The chapter concludes that the conceptual resources available to Humeans are too thin to enable them to sufficiently address the issue of justification to explain and distinguish the various failures of agency that are of main concern.Less
This chapter focuses on Humean accounts. It first examines Donald Davidson's distinctly Humean account of reasons for action in his paper ‘How is the Weakness of the Will Possible?’, and looks into his characterization of practical reasoning and weakness of will. It then investigates the possibility argued for by Jackson, Biglow, Dods, and Pargeter, that the akratic conflict is not what the folk theorists thought it was, and that the problem does not arise. However, the chapter argues that these alternative constructions of akrasia, with their explicitly reductive view of evaluation, do not succeed in capturing the phenomenon they set out to explain. The chapter concludes that the conceptual resources available to Humeans are too thin to enable them to sufficiently address the issue of justification to explain and distinguish the various failures of agency that are of main concern.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253050
- eISBN:
- 9780191597282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253056.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Introduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act (normative reasons), those for which we act (motivating reasons), and (more generally) the reasons why we act. It also ...
More
Introduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act (normative reasons), those for which we act (motivating reasons), and (more generally) the reasons why we act. It also distinguishes between Humeanism and anti‐Humeanism in the theory of motivation, psychologism, and anti‐psychologism in the theory of motivation, internalism, and externalism (Williams‐style) and desire‐based and value‐based theories of normative reasons.Less
Introduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act (normative reasons), those for which we act (motivating reasons), and (more generally) the reasons why we act. It also distinguishes between Humeanism and anti‐Humeanism in the theory of motivation, psychologism, and anti‐psychologism in the theory of motivation, internalism, and externalism (Williams‐style) and desire‐based and value‐based theories of normative reasons.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253050
- eISBN:
- 9780191597282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253056.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues that normative reasons are value‐based rather than desire‐based, following and hopefully improving on the work of Raz, Quinn, and Scanlon.
Argues that normative reasons are value‐based rather than desire‐based, following and hopefully improving on the work of Raz, Quinn, and Scanlon.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199253050
- eISBN:
- 9780191597282
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199253056.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take ...
More
Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.Less
Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.
John Heil
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199259748
- eISBN:
- 9780191597657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259747.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
One popular view of dispositions turns them into ‘higher‐level’ properties with categorical ‘realizers’. The position is motivated in part by the belief that the same disposition can have different ...
More
One popular view of dispositions turns them into ‘higher‐level’ properties with categorical ‘realizers’. The position is motivated in part by the belief that the same disposition can have different bases, and in part by a conviction that powers are contingent features of the world. I argue that the belief and conviction are misguided.Less
One popular view of dispositions turns them into ‘higher‐level’ properties with categorical ‘realizers’. The position is motivated in part by the belief that the same disposition can have different bases, and in part by a conviction that powers are contingent features of the world. I argue that the belief and conviction are misguided.
Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259455.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Discusses the role of motivational Humeanism is a classic anti‐realist argument. Provides some reasons to reject this theory of action, and then offers criticisms of the most powerful arguments ...
More
Discusses the role of motivational Humeanism is a classic anti‐realist argument. Provides some reasons to reject this theory of action, and then offers criticisms of the most powerful arguments favouring motivational Humeanism.Less
Discusses the role of motivational Humeanism is a classic anti‐realist argument. Provides some reasons to reject this theory of action, and then offers criticisms of the most powerful arguments favouring motivational Humeanism.
Ruth Groff
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199574131
- eISBN:
- 9780191728921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574131.003.0014
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
A realist, powers‐based metaphysics is very much on the table in contemporary metaphysics, and is beginning to take hold in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. On this picture, causality is ...
More
A realist, powers‐based metaphysics is very much on the table in contemporary metaphysics, and is beginning to take hold in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. On this picture, causality is (roughly) a matter of the powers that things have to effect change(s) in other things. The realist view is at odds with every version of Humeanism, according to all of which causation is not, in the end, about the exercise of powers, but rather, in one way or another, about regular sequences. The chapter has two parts. In the first part the chapter considers how it is that analytic philosophers of social science have been able thus far to side‐step the critique of Humeanism. In the second part, the chapter considers how analytic philosophy of social science might look different, were Humeanism no longer to be its tacit metaphysics. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.–HumeLess
A realist, powers‐based metaphysics is very much on the table in contemporary metaphysics, and is beginning to take hold in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. On this picture, causality is (roughly) a matter of the powers that things have to effect change(s) in other things. The realist view is at odds with every version of Humeanism, according to all of which causation is not, in the end, about the exercise of powers, but rather, in one way or another, about regular sequences. The chapter has two parts. In the first part the chapter considers how it is that analytic philosophers of social science have been able thus far to side‐step the critique of Humeanism. In the second part, the chapter considers how analytic philosophy of social science might look different, were Humeanism no longer to be its tacit metaphysics. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.–Hume
Tim Maudlin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577439
- eISBN:
- 9780191730603
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers three ways in which probabilities may be derived from a physical theory without adverting to subjective considerations. The first derives from a fundamentally stochastic ...
More
This chapter considers three ways in which probabilities may be derived from a physical theory without adverting to subjective considerations. The first derives from a fundamentally stochastic dynamics that implies transition chances at the level of natural law. The second is a Humean approach, in which probabilities are deployed as part of a compact system for conveying information about the structure of the Humean mosaic, i.e. the distribution of local physical quantities in space-time. The last employs either deterministic or stochastic dynamics together with a measure of typicality, i.e. a measure of sets of initial conditions that count as extremely large. Probabilities emerge in this setting as typical frequencies, that is, frequencies exhibited by most initial conditions.Less
This chapter considers three ways in which probabilities may be derived from a physical theory without adverting to subjective considerations. The first derives from a fundamentally stochastic dynamics that implies transition chances at the level of natural law. The second is a Humean approach, in which probabilities are deployed as part of a compact system for conveying information about the structure of the Humean mosaic, i.e. the distribution of local physical quantities in space-time. The last employs either deterministic or stochastic dynamics together with a measure of typicality, i.e. a measure of sets of initial conditions that count as extremely large. Probabilities emerge in this setting as typical frequencies, that is, frequencies exhibited by most initial conditions.
Carl Hoefer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577439
- eISBN:
- 9780191730603
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends a Humean approach to objective probabilities in physics. Two motivations for a Humean account of probabilities are distinguished: One derives from a general commitment to a ...
More
This chapter defends a Humean approach to objective probabilities in physics. Two motivations for a Humean account of probabilities are distinguished: One derives from a general commitment to a Humean account of natural laws. The other, which is articulated in more detail in the chapter, starts from worries that irreducibly probabilistic physical laws are problematic. Such worries are avoided if probabilities are tied to a best system of the world, as D. Lewis has suggested. Lewis’ own account of objective chance is contrasted with a more pragmatic Humean account, in which objective probabilities are divorced from the best system and tied to systems of less simple probability rules instead. The chapter compares the abilities of both Humean accounts to capture the probabilities appearing in our best physical theories.Less
This chapter defends a Humean approach to objective probabilities in physics. Two motivations for a Humean account of probabilities are distinguished: One derives from a general commitment to a Humean account of natural laws. The other, which is articulated in more detail in the chapter, starts from worries that irreducibly probabilistic physical laws are problematic. Such worries are avoided if probabilities are tied to a best system of the world, as D. Lewis has suggested. Lewis’ own account of objective chance is contrasted with a more pragmatic Humean account, in which objective probabilities are divorced from the best system and tied to systems of less simple probability rules instead. The chapter compares the abilities of both Humean accounts to capture the probabilities appearing in our best physical theories.
Neil E. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198833574
- eISBN:
- 9780191872006
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198833574.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of a single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of ...
More
Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of a single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers and develops a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as ‘powers’, a metaphysic is developed that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is developed that understands this internal nature in terms of a blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, it is put to work in offering solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as it casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.Less
Systematic metaphysics is defined by its task of solving metaphysical problems through the repeated application of a single, fundamental ontology. The dominant contemporary metaphysic is that of neo-Humeanism, built on a static ontology typified by its rejection of basic causal and modal features. This book offers and develops a radically distinct metaphysic, one that turns the status quo on its head. Starting with a foundational ontology of inherently causal properties known as ‘powers’, a metaphysic is developed that appeals to powers in explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality. Powers are properties that have their causal natures internal to them: they are responsible for the effects in the world. A unique account of powers is developed that understands this internal nature in terms of a blueprint of potential interaction types. After the presentation of the powers ontology, it is put to work in offering solutions to broad metaphysical puzzles, some of which take on different forms in light of the new tools that are available. The defence of the ontology comes from the virtues of metaphysic it can be used to develop. Particular attention is paid to the problems of causation and persistence, simultaneously solving them as it casts them in a new light. The resultant powers metaphysic is offered as a systematic alternative to neo-Humeanism.
Barbara Vetter
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- March 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198714316
- eISBN:
- 9780191782718
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714316.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book develops and defends dispositionalism about modality: the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions that objects have. Dispositionalism is an attractive view for ...
More
This book develops and defends dispositionalism about modality: the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions that objects have. Dispositionalism is an attractive view for actualists about modality, and for anyone who embraces an anti-Humean metaphysics of powers. This book shows in detail how such a view is to be formulated, which challenges it faces, and how they may be met. The book begins by arguing that a realist account of dispositions is committed to more than just the ordinary dispositions that are typically appealed to: fragility, solubility, irascibility, and so forth. Rather, realists must embrace a more general notion, which is labelled ‘potentiality’. With that more general notion, a straightforward definition of metaphysical possibility can be given: it is possible that p if and only if something has (or had, or will have) an iterated potentiality for p (that is, a potentiality to be such that p, or a potentiality to be such that something has a potentiality to be such that p, or …). The metaphysics of potentiality is examined in detail to show that the view meets the three main challenges for a metaphysics of modality: (1) Extensional correctness: providing the right truth-values for statements of possibility and necessity; (2) formal adequacy: providing the right logic for metaphysical modality; and (3) semantic utility: providing a semantics that links ordinary modal language to the metaphysics of modality.Less
This book develops and defends dispositionalism about modality: the view that metaphysical modality is a matter of the dispositions that objects have. Dispositionalism is an attractive view for actualists about modality, and for anyone who embraces an anti-Humean metaphysics of powers. This book shows in detail how such a view is to be formulated, which challenges it faces, and how they may be met. The book begins by arguing that a realist account of dispositions is committed to more than just the ordinary dispositions that are typically appealed to: fragility, solubility, irascibility, and so forth. Rather, realists must embrace a more general notion, which is labelled ‘potentiality’. With that more general notion, a straightforward definition of metaphysical possibility can be given: it is possible that p if and only if something has (or had, or will have) an iterated potentiality for p (that is, a potentiality to be such that p, or a potentiality to be such that something has a potentiality to be such that p, or …). The metaphysics of potentiality is examined in detail to show that the view meets the three main challenges for a metaphysics of modality: (1) Extensional correctness: providing the right truth-values for statements of possibility and necessity; (2) formal adequacy: providing the right logic for metaphysical modality; and (3) semantic utility: providing a semantics that links ordinary modal language to the metaphysics of modality.
Michael B. Gill
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198714033
- eISBN:
- 9780191782480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714033.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explains what it means for a view of morality to be “pluralist” and “Humean.” It also describes Berys Gaut’s distinction between prioritarianism and pluralism, and shows how Gaut ...
More
This chapter explains what it means for a view of morality to be “pluralist” and “Humean.” It also describes Berys Gaut’s distinction between prioritarianism and pluralism, and shows how Gaut elucidates a crucially important difference between two ways of conceiving of moral justification from the first-personal, deliberative perspective.Less
This chapter explains what it means for a view of morality to be “pluralist” and “Humean.” It also describes Berys Gaut’s distinction between prioritarianism and pluralism, and shows how Gaut elucidates a crucially important difference between two ways of conceiving of moral justification from the first-personal, deliberative perspective.
