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This chapter surveys four torn states in the Middle East. Turkey and its Kurdish separatist movement regularly accuse each other of mobilizing organized crime to brutalize the other. Both are correct. The Turkish government mobilized gangsters (gunrunners, mercenaries, and assassins) as instruments of antiseparatist crackdown. Profiting on the side, these gangsters nevertheless remained patriotic and indisputably state controlled. Mafias also sustained Kurdish separatists in Turkey (through narcotics, arms, extortion, and money laundering), the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria (oil, extortion, theft, and gangs), and Gazan Palestinians in Israel (tunnel smuggling). In contrast, Yemen and the Houthis were both sabotaged in their efforts by a state dependent — but utterly disloyal — mafia operating qat and arms rackets.

The Persian Gulf’s security architecture is inherently unstable and insecure due to four primary reasons. First, America’s heavy-handed presence in and “footprints” across the region are a source of chronic tension and resentment by both state and non-state actors throughout the region. Second, state actors feel vulnerable to external threats and therefore foster highly securitized national and regional environments. Third, this insecurity is reinforced by the rise of identity politics across national boundaries. Identity politics has always had a measure of salience across the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf region in particular. This appeal would most likely not have been as powerful had it not been for the widespread inattention of state actors to elements of human security—the fourth reason for the instability of the prevailing security architecture.

Chapter 2 describes the issues Yemen’s transition is facing. It recounts the 2011 uprising and Saleh’s eventual abdication after 33 years in power as part of a Gulf Cooperation Council-backed transition deal. Yemen’s transition has been beset by major security, political, and economic challenges, but as the chapter covers, the two biggest obstacles to national reconciliation are the Houthi rebellion and the Southern movement’s desire for independence. Southerners endured serious social, economic, and political injustices under the Saleh regime and their suffering must be acknowledged. Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference called for federalism, and the author argues that southerners should give this model a chance rather than assume that secession will solve their problems. The Zaidi Shi’ite Houthi movement also has major grievances as it endured systemic discrimination and six military campaigns against it between 2004 and 2010. The chapter notes that the Houthis had not articulated specific demands, but in 2014 their forces advanced rapidly from Saada and ultimately seized Sanaa and staged a coup, disrupting Yemen’s transition and provoking a regional military intervention. The Houthis’ aggression, apparently supported and facilitated by Saleh, has consolidated an additional barrier to Yemeni reconciliation, and led to civil war.

In Chapter 6 the various strands of the study come together as the actual performance of the Gulf armies is appraised. Given the limited involvement of GCC countries in military operations, the available evidence to base judgments upon their battlefield effectiveness is slender. Therefore, the analysis integrates lessons that may be learned from training and large-scale exercises GCC armies have participated in. To understand Gulf armies’ deficiencies, special attention is paid to the instruction and cultural aspects of the most prestigious military specialization, pilot training. In the second section the scant foreign deployment of Gulf militaries is examined, with special emphasis on the UAE, the only GCC army with extensive experience in this area. The bulk of this chapter centers on the ongoing civil war in Yemen in which the Saudi and Emirati armed forces have played a major role, thus allowing us the opportunity to assess their performance.

The Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war changed the strategic landscape of that conflict. Iran’s pro-Assad position as emboldened by Russia’s support, and the IRGC’s role in the war was further legitimized. Russia’s backing earned Iran a seat at the table in the international diplomatic effort to solve the Syrian conflict. Iran’s ascent further antagonized its tense rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Iran-Saudi relations were already inflamed due to the on-going war in Syria, the Saudi-led war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, and a tragic accident during the annual Muslim pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia which killed over two thousand, including over 450 Iranians. Iran’s former ambassador to Lebanon went missing in the aftermath of the hajj tragedy, and Iranian officials blamed Saudi Arabia for his abduction. Incidents such as this suggest regional conflict is far from abating.

When rebel Houthis, followers of Zaidi Shia code, captured Sanaa in September 2014, and expelled Yemen’s Sunni President Abd Rabbu al Hadi, alarm bells rang in Riyadh. Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman led a coalition of friendly states to intervene in the Yemeni civil war in March 2015. This ignited protest by the Shias in Saudi Arabia. Their indignation intensified when, ignoring international appeals for clemency, the Saudi government executed their revered Ayatollah Nimr al Nimr in January 2016. This led to the severance of diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran. In Iraq, whereas Iran dispatched its trained Shia volunteers to fight Islamic Sate in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), Riyadh lent four jet fighters to the Pentagon in Washington’s anti-ISIS campaign. When Riyadh backed Syrian opposition with cash and weapons, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent air force units to Syria, and shored up Assad’s depleted arms arsenal. With Assad’s recapture of Eastern Aleppo, an opposition stronghold, in December 2016, Iran established superiority over Riyadh in Syria. In July 2015, Iran and six major world powers signed an accord on Tehran’s denuclearization program, titled Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It won universal approval except by Saudi Arabia and Israel.