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This chapter examines the history of the House of Commons in Great Britain, discussing the nineteenth- and twentieth-century legacy of the House of Commons. It reveals that, by the end of the twentieth century, the prestige and pre-eminence which Parliament possessed at its beginning was clearly no more. The first signs of a retreat from the principle of parliamentary sovereignty was the passage of the European Communities Act and the Factortame case.

The puzzle addressed by this chapter is why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely made it to the agenda, let alone to adoption, despite the existence of widely recognized problems with the current electoral system, the experience of several rounds of constitutional reform in which the issue could have been raised, and relatively weak constitutional barriers to reform. The first section, ‘Electoral Rules and the Party System’, provides background on how the Canadian party system has evolved under the current set of single‐seat district (SSD) plurality electoral rules. The second section, ‘Explaining the Limited Electoral Reform Agenda in Canada’, examines why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely been on the political agenda. The final section, ‘Prospects for Electoral Reform in the Future’,discusses conditions under which electoral reform might come onto the agenda in the near future, and whether it is likely to do so.

In the field of electoral systems, Britain has long held out as a bastion of stability, as the country seen as least likely to undergo fundamental electoral reform, but this picture was rudely shattered in the late spring of 1997, with the election of a new Labour government. The central argument of this chapter is that the current debate over British electoral reform should be viewed as part of a wider process of the coming of age of British politics. A review of the historical debate reveals a series of failed initiatives to reform the electoral system, suggesting that the matter has never been entirely put to rest, and that there has always been the prospect of its re‐emergence. The current episode, dating from the election of the new government in 1997, provides reason to expect that electoral reform may really happen this time, and indeed already has happened in a number of British electoral arenas (European Parliament; London mayor; Northern Ireland, Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies). The chapter is arranged as follows: the first section summarizes the historical record from 1860 to 1970, and provides evidence of a political elite willing at least to countenance the idea of experimenting with change, even if not yet prepared to embrace it; the second section explores possible explanations for why the issue re‐emerged in the 1990s and describes the reforms implemented in that period (up to 2000); this is followed by an outline of the deliberations and proposals of the Independent Commission on the Voting System for the British House of Commons (the Jenkins Commission), which was established by the new Labour prime minister, Tony Blair, in December 1997, whose report was published in October 1998 and suggested ‘alternative vote plus (AV+)’ as the new electoral system; the concluding section discusses the current prospects for electoral reform in the UK.

This chapter discusses changes in the procedures and practices of Parliament. With the development and regular use of standing committees, the four major developments in parliamentary procedure needed to enable the House of Commons to cope with the growth of government were all in place — an increase in parliamentary time, precedence given to government business, the extension of government control over its own time and over the parliamentary agenda generally, and the use of committees to spread the legislative burden. In addition, from 1906 Parliament adopted the practice of spreading sittings throughout the year, rather than concentrating them between January/February and July/August. There was one other change that facilitated the acceptance of these changes and that concerned the role of the Speaker. Arthur Onslow, Speaker from 1728 to 1761, is regarded as the prototype of the modem Speaker — politically-neutral, the defender of minorities, and the arbiter in all matters procedural.

This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about the history of the British constitution in the twentieth century. In the beginning of the twentieth century, doubts started to emerge concerning the function of the uncodified constitution and the role of the sovereign in such a system. In the later part of the century it became accepted that the sovereign could perform a valuable role as mediator, and Queen Victoria had not hesitated in exercising this role. The chapter also discusses the role of other government agencies under an uncodified constitution, including the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the civil service.

This chapter discusses the second premiership of Lord Derby from 1858 to 1859. Derby became Great Britain's prime minister for the second time in February 1858. However, like his first term in office, Derby was confronted with several political problems. His Conservative Party remained a minority in the House of Commons, the country's internal and external relations were in a most delicate and complicated position, and there was armed conflict in India and China, and a crisis with France. The Queen noted that the forbearance and support of some of Derby's opponents would be needed for him to carry on any government.

This chapter shows that although the party composition of the House of Commons chan change suddenly, its socio-economic composition tends to change slowly. Changes of party composition are exaggerated by the electoral system: even a small swing can make a significant difference, ousting a government and usually bringing the main opposition party to power; a large swing will produce a landslide in seats, if not in votes. Such changes may make the Commons more conservative or more radical in its attitude towards the way it works and the role of its members and large turnovers of membership sometimes have a profound impact on the socio-economic composition of the House.

This chapter discusses the controversies between George III and the factions, which centred on the appointment and dismissal of ministers. The question of ministerial responsibility had never been completely settled. The various impeachments of unpopular and unsuccessful ministers had clearly established the right of the House of Commons to criticize the king's instruments and to demand their removal, and when the quasi-criminal procedure of impeachment was replaced by a vote of censure, the right of the House of Commons was rendered more effective.

This chapter examines the war prerogative in practice from 1620 - 2012. It focuses on how the House of Commons and the executive have interacted in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. It will show that the House of Commons has played an active and influential role in the exercise of the war prerogative, despite the common assumption of an exclusive executive power. Part II describes an extraordinary period in English constitutional history, during which the Commons assumed responsibility for the war and foreign policy powers and experimented with different constitutional arrangements for their exercise. Part III, the main focus of this chapter, identifies the ways that the Commons and the executive have interacted in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. Those interactions are grouped into five types: freedom of speech and debate; the power of supply; retrospective scrutiny; parliamentary consultation before going to war; legislation.

This chapter discusses the first premiership of Lord Derby in 1852. Derby became prime minister of Great Britain in February 1852, just five weeks short of his 53rd birthday. This was the political summit upon which Derby set his sights nearly twenty years before. However, his assumption of office without the possession of power rendered the event less than the triumphant fulfilment of his ambitions. He headed a party with a minority in the House of Commons and with no official experience or talent to compensate for the lack of numbers. In addition to this, Derby also had to contend with the incubus of Protectionism, which had been the focus of the legislative agenda of the Commons majority.

This chapter deals with conflict between lex parliamenti (the law of parliament) and lex terrae (the law of the land). The Blackstonian conception of privilege necessitates giving lex parliamenti primacy over lex terrae in cases of conflict (which includes denying to the ordinary courts the power to rule on questions of lex parliamenti) in order to prevent other powerful political actors from manipulating the House of Commons. The Millian conception of privilege focuses increasingly on allowing judges to check potentially reckless or self-dealing actions by a House of Parliament, furthering the democratic parts of the Constitution.

This chapter establishes some necessary definitions of terms. A description of ‘non-élite’ in this context, and as used throughout this book is given. The application of the definitions of ‘élite’ and ‘non-élite’ to the individual cases of men who entered the House of Commons poses problems, the chapter states. It then looks more closely at the type of data taken into account in the handling of the enquiry. The pattern of the generations of social ascent adopted, culminating with individuals in Parliament who, on the one hand, had reached the ranks of the élite, but on the other had their immediate social background in ranks of society were below the élite, provides a reasonable yardstick by which the proportion of MPs of non-élite background in any particular 18th-century Parliament can be at least roughly measured. In general, this chapter is concerned with the establishment of categories and illustrative examples.

This chapter examines how the House of Commons has resolved disputed parliamentary elections as well as disputes over the qualifications of elected Members. It also considers how and why the House surrendered that role to the courts in the late nineteenth century. The Blackstonian model holds that the House of Commons must be the sole judge of disputed elections, on the grounds that allowing the intervention of any outside body would present a grave threat to the independence of the House and thus to the democratic element of the Constitution that it represents. The Millian model, on the other hand, sees as a greater threat the potential for corruption and self-dealing that arises when the House is allowed to be the sole judge of who has been duly elected to it.

This chapter examines the changes in the electoral system in Great Britain during the twentieth century, focusing on elections to the House of Commons, and considers franchise, the translation of votes into seats, and the rules about campaigning. It describes the main features and the principal changes that occurred during the course of the twentieth century, and attempts to explain why the electoral system came to have the characteristics it did.

This chapter addresses the question on what contribution to the activities of Parliament was made by the ‘non-élite’ Members of the House of Commons. It is approached through an analysis of two representative samples, firstly the 106 men who returned to Parliament at the general election of 1790, and secondly the 136 who returned at the elections of 1818. In terms of achievement, the record of the businessmen of non-élite background in the House of Commons elected in 1790 tended, overall, to be undistinguished. Analysis of the membership of the cohort of 1818 tends on the whole to confirm the impression already made, though some features of it call for additional comment. In general, the ‘non-élite’ were assuming an increasing role in Parliament as the Hanoverian age drew to its close.