Search Results

The Arya Samaj has long been distinguished among nineteenth century reform organizations as forerunner of Hindu nationalist politics and exemplar of Hindu religious intolerance. Arya Samaj practices that can be classed as proselytizing lie at the heart of this scholarly assessment: practices of religious controversy between contending Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian organizations; and the shuddhi ritual of conversion or purification. This chapter argues that understandings of the so-called proselytizing activities of the Arya Samaj have been circumscribed by the framing narrative of Hindu Tolerance. One consequence is a near exclusive focus on the motives or intentions of Hindu elite ‘proselytizers’ in the Arya Samaj. When shuddhi is viewed from the perspective of those who pursued conversion, its subversive potential becomes visible. The chapter treats the case of the Arya Samaj controversialist and former Muslim, Dharm Pal, who pursued shuddhi as a step towards radical caste reform.

This chapter describes paramilitary camps in India in which middle-class, urban Hindu women's gender identities are deployed to support interethnic violence and militarization. The instruction and trainings that young women receive at the camps socialize them into a particular Hindu nationalist worldview through the cultivation of a siege mentality that is built on the fear of a sexually violent male, Muslim “other.” Through these camps, anti-Muslim hatred is used as an antidote to the fragmentation of ethno-nationalist allegiances in order “to patch the fractured Hindu polity together.” Hindu nationalist women's elevation to the symbolically powerful position of citizen warriors is nonetheless tempered and circumscribed by an emphasis on feminine duty and sacrifice. Thus, despite the potential for empowerment of women, the dichotomy of women as in need of protection and men as natural protectors remains intact within the militarized, nationalist ideologies promoted at the camps.

It is widely believed that at the time of Independence there was in India a broad consensus on non-alignment. This consensus, crafted by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is depicted as having steadily weakened over subsequent decades, eventually collapsing when diplomatic isolation and near bankruptcy toward the end of the Cold War prompted India to revitalize relations with the West. The evidence does not support this narrative, however. Drawing on a variety of sources, including Constituent Assembly debates and prominent essays, this essay shows that there were throughout the Cold War voices—often Hindu nationalists otherwise suspicious of modernity—calling for closer relations with the West. Though these voices were subdued, recollecting them reveals that post-Cold War declarations of a “natural alliance” between India and America in particular are not a new development, but instead the fruition of a longer view of the West’s significance.

To the surprise of many, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) singlehandedly won a majority in the national elections of 2014. Since then the party which, once had two seats in parliament, has come to govern 21 states in India. How did the BJP become so successful? The BJP is now the principal carrier of conservatism in India. This was not the case at independence. The ideological roots of the BJP lie in the idea of Hindu majoritarianism. Over the years the BJP succeeded in accommodating conservative elements not only from the Congress but also from other right-wing parties. Its electoral success has been aided by the social and economic changes in India since the 1990s. These changes, however, have also generated contradictions within the ideological coalitions that brought about the rise of the BJP and pose a potential challenge to the party as it moves to consolidate its position.

Mridu Rai discusses the location of Kashmiri Muslims in India after the BJP’s electoral win in 2014, identifying how Kashmiri Muslims are made to serve as contrapuntal symbols for constructing a mythical Hindu nation – of terrorist violence, illegitimate religious impulses and sedition. Rai argues that the evocatory purpose Kashmiris serve is so essential to Hindutva that it dissipates the possibility of resolving the Kashmir question under the Modi-led BJP. The preference for militaristic modes of dominance has allowed India to eschew its responsibility of administering Kashmir through democratic engagement and of seeking negotiated settlement with all segments of the public. This governance confines Kashmiris to a reality of daily atrocities, including shootings, mass graves and gendered violence. The study of the mistreatment of Kashmiris by the Indian state and Hindu nationalists is important, as similar repressive strategies are being deployed in the heartland of India against other minority groups.

The fourth chapter examines the way that Gandhi began to emphasize the centrality of ‘nonviolence’ to satyagraha after his return to India from South Africa in 1915. He adapted the religious principle of ahimsa (nonviolence), giving it a new political content. In this, he came into conflict with Hindu nationalists, such as Lala Lajpat Rai, who held that a supposed Indian civilizational emphasis on ‘ahimsa’ (nonviolence) had weakened the country, leaving it open to conquest by outsiders. Gandhi argued, by contrast, that the nonviolent way required great courage and that it also conferred a moral advantage when resisting injustice. Also, people of all religions could practice such nonviolence – making it a secular and non-sectarian principle that could be asserted by the oppressed anywhere in the world.