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Rocco J. Gennaro defends the HOT theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia, a delusion where one denies ownership of a limb, and the related anosognosia, a condition in which a person who suffers from a disability seems unaware of the existence of the disability. Liang and Lane have argued that somatoparaphrenia threatens HOT theory because it contradicts the notion that according to HOT theory, when I am in a conscious state, I have the HOT that “I am in mental state M.” The ‘I’ is not only importantly self-referential but essential to tying the conscious state to oneself and thus to one’s ownership of M. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how one can have a conscious state but not, at least implicitly, attribute it to oneself. Gennaro argues, for example, that understanding somatoparaphrenia as a delusion leads to a number of replies to Lane and Liang. He also examines the central notions of “mental state ownership” and “self-concepts” to account especially for the depersonalization aspect of somatoparaphrenia. Among other things, Gennaro also discusses to what extent HOT theory can make sense of Shoemaker’s immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) principle.

This is the first and introductory chapter to the volume entitled Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. Rocco J. Gennaro presents an overview of philosophical psychopathology, specific disorders of consciousness, and philosophical theories of consciousness. Some background on key terminology and a summary of the essays to follow is also included. Some of the theories of consciousness described are the higher-order thought theory, self-representationalism, and the global workspace theory. A fairly lengthy list of disorders, along with their definitions, is also provided.

Jakob Hohwy seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely, the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition which is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception. Furthermore, Hohwy argues that this theory can unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for the selection of representational content into consciousness.