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This chapter rejects the “white backlash” thesis that attributes the South's embrace of the Republican Party to racial issues, and white working-class abandonment of the Democratic Party over civil rights, taxation, welfare, and affirmative action. Backlash implies that the South's move from the Democrats to the GOP was reactionary, but this chapter argues that angst over civil rights alone did not guarantee a Republican realignment. Instead it stresses the building of Republican organization in the South—resources, field workers, communications infrastructure, and leadership—beginning with the 1944 campaign of Thomas Dewey, and culminating in Herbert Brownell's mastery of such organization on behalf of Dwight Eisenhower that shook the southern GOP out of its “post office politician” mentality. Unlike the presidential campaign of 1968, in which Richard Nixon amassed a “silent majority” around the concept of law and order, this chapter argues, the Republicans' first southern strategy was not based on race.

This chapter discusses the Old Guard and how it continued to undermine Thomas Dewey's control of the Republican Party. The congressional statement of policy had checked Dewey's plans to reshape the GOP as a moderate alternative to the New Deal and forced RNC chairman Herbert Brownell to change his tone or risk appearing out of step with the party he led. With the congressional elections of 1946 looming, the national chairmanship became even more critical for the presidential nomination. Midterm elections were essentially trial runs. Mounting a strong off-year campaign would demonstrate to party elites that a candidate's organization could manage a successful national election drive and make a strong case for their continued control. In April 1946 the Taftites capitalized on a bit of good timing and increased discontent with the Dewey faction to seize the chairmanship of the RNC.

Crouch's failures in New Orleans and Philadelphia led to a growing chorus of denunciations. Not only did the media, politicians, and Communists rail against Crouch, but they also began to question the use of Communist informants in general. Such questions grew even louder when news broke that it was Crouch who had helped instigate the Army-McCarthy hearings. Joseph and Stewart Alsop took the lead in attacking Crouch and the informant system, and while Crouch found a few willing supporters, many of his former allies quickly abandoned him. J. Edgar Hoover, for one, refused to respond to Crouch's numerous pleas for support. When Crouch realized the government had dropped him he attempted to save his career by suing Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Despite such difficulties, he refused to concede his lies, remained adamant in his anti-Communism, and insisted that all the attacks on him were part of a massive Communist plot.